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By the summer of 1940 the British Army had suffered two 
simultaneous strategic defeats in Norway and France. Both had led to 
hurried and ignominious evacuations.  A popular misconception 
contends that this led to a wholesale clearing out of the British 
Army’s command structure in order to start again, and that many 
officers suffered the loss of their careers in the necessity to rebuild an 
army both to withstand invasion and enable victory over Nazi 
Germany.   
This thesis contends that this belief is misplaced, and that 
rather than automatically ending the careers of all involved, some 
officers would progress and even thrive after 1940 in varying 
degrees. Its basis is a group of officers, brigadiers, on the cusp of 
either progression to general’s rank, stagnation or demotion. The 
careers of these officers are examined to establish whether or not 
factors including education, regiment, staff qualifications and so on 
influenced their professional survival. The work also considers 
whether the presence or absence of influence was responsible for an 
officer’s progression through the war after 1940.   
This thesis also examines those brigadiers serving in fighting 
commands in the initial stages of the Battle of Normandy in 1944. 
This is to compare a group on the cusp of winning a war with one 
close to its loss. The conclusion will be that the degree of change 
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between the types of officer serving was not as radical as might have 




POINT OF FAILURE 







List of Charts and Tables ...................................................................................................6 
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................................9 
Introduction: .................................................................................................................. 17 
Chapter 2........................................................................................................................ 74 
Chapter 3...................................................................................................................... 158 
Chapter 4...................................................................................................................... 209 
Chapter 5...................................................................................................................... 278 
Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 347 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 373 
 
  
POINT OF FAILURE 






At the start of this process, I was passed a piece of wisdom by my 
supervisor that he had been let into by his, a few years before – that 
a doctorate is “an itch you simply have to scratch”. Although the 
writing has taken eight years, the itch has been present since the 
early 1990s, when life, work and two Gulf Wars got in the way. 
Writing a thesis is a lonely furrow to plough, but like those recruiting 
adverts for the Royal Air Force in the 1970s, showing the pilot in front 
of his aircraft with a large triangle of those needed to keep him in the 
air behind him, it is not a completely solitary one.  
This thesis would not have been possible without the support 
and assistance of a large number of people. My supervisory team 
of Professor John Buckley and Professor Stephen Badsey have been 
hugely helpful, patient, wise and present. Their consistent faith in me 
when I thought I would give in, got me there. Dr Phylomena Badsey 
also deserves more thanks in this regard than simple words.  
These have been difficult times for museums and archives, with 
funding difficulties ever present. The usual sources for the military 
historian, the Imperial War Museum, the National Army Museum, The 
National Archives and the Liddle Hart Centre at King’s College London 
have been of great help. Regimental museums across the country 
have been under greater pressure after the withdrawal of Ministry of 
Defence funding in 2017, forcing many to charge for help. Several 
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curators were understanding and helpful in this regard, but their 
existence is still precarious, and museums deserve support.  
I am particularly grateful to Mr Mike Taylor who not only 
allowed me access to his collection of Second World War British Army 
unit histories, but spent considerable time copying and collating 
sections I needed. I also record my thanks to the late Professor Keith 
Jeffrey, who provided not only good-humoured encouragement, but 
gave me one piece of advice from his own work on the official history 
of the Secret Intelligence Service which unlocked a fruitful avenue of 
enquiry. Dr John Spencer’s advice on drafting, general 
encouragement and friendship was and remains invaluable. The 
deepest gratitude must go to my partner Helen, for her selfless 
support for this effort, from supporting my decision to leave full time 
employment to follow it, altering her own plans as a result, to 
keeping my body and soul together.  
This work is dedicated to three people who did not live to see it 
finished. First, my dear parents, John and Betty, and my maternal 
uncle, Ronald Cotton. My parents taught me to read before I went to 
school and they and Ron, an autodidact, never made me feel that to 
have my head in a book was anything to be disdained.  
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Point of Failure 
British Army Brigadiers 
in the BEF and NWEF, 1940 
 
“Amateurism, class hierarchy, snobbery, cowardice, looting, 
betrayal, and almost endlessly incompetent leadership 
characterized the whole business”.1 
 
Nigel Hamilton, review of Dunkirk (2007) 
 
By the early summer of 1940, the British Army had suffered two 
simultaneous operational failures in Europe. These were the Battle of 
France from May to June (the British Expeditionary Force, or BEF) and 
the landing of forces in Norway and operations there from April to 
May (the North West Expeditionary Force, or NWEF). Some officers 
involved in these operations progressed professionally after 1940; 
some did not. After such strategic defeats the pressure on an army to 
change, be it political, internal or even popular can be acute.   
This research examines a defined set of British Army officers, 
specifically brigadiers, who served in these operations. Both 
campaigns ended in strategic defeat and the intention of the work is 
to determine how much an officer’s subsequent professional fate was 
influenced through membership of, or access to either networks 
within the army, outside it, or a combination of both. This thesis does 
                                                          
1 Hamilton, Nigel, Review of Simon Sebag-Montefiore, “Dunkirk: Fight to The Last 
Man” Journal of Military History. April 2007, Vol. 71 Issue 2, pp. 557-59. 
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not directly address issues of perceived combat effectiveness of the 
formations commanded by each officer in the respective campaigns. 
This is both for reasons of space and to prevent repetition of 
operational narratives well known elsewhere. The overall 
historiography of both campaigns is discussed later in this chapter, in 
the Literature Review. It cannot be denied, however, that certain 
brigadiers’ performance in France brought them to notice, which 
further challenges one of the contentions which inspired this 
research, described below. It does consider issues such as award of 
decorations for operational service, and whether divisional 
commanders who had been successful “carried” their subordinate 
brigadiers with them as they themselves were promoted. Such 
factors could reflect their operational performance in 1940.  
In 1940, whilst formations existed which were designated 
Brigades, such as infantry and armoured brigades, and the officers 
commanding them were labelled “brigadiers”, technically this was, 
and had been since the eighteenth century an appointment rather 
than a substantive rank, held by the officer as long as he was needed 
in the particular role.  There is no order of seniority within the Army 
List for brigadiers. The Gradation List (part of the Army List which 
indicates officers by seniority within their rank) moves from full 
Colonels to Major Generals.   
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The aim of this research is to examine a specific set of British 
Army officers who served in these roughly simultaneous operations in 
Europe in 1940. Both resulted in operational and strategic defeat. The 
core group is of officers who held the rank of Brigadier, either 
substantively or temporarily, in each Expeditionary Force during the 
relevant period of operations.  It will examine factors which may have 
contributed to the advancement of certain officers, as well as those 
which may have been presumed to do so, but which the findings of 
this thesis have shown were ineffectual or less influential. It also 
examines certain prevailing presumptions arising from modern 
literature concerning the British Army in the Second World War, such 
as the influence of patronage by senior officers, most notably Bernard 
Montgomery and Alan Brooke.  
By its nature, this thesis draws on secondary sources, such as 
campaign narratives, biographies and biographical sources. Primary 
sources, such as war diaries, personal papers, and autobiographies 
are used but are subject to limitations which are discussed below.  A 
primary source which would be informative on a personal level, 
officers’ annual confidential reports, remain closed and inaccessible to 
researchers. 
It should also be stressed that this thesis does not seek to offer 
a general paradigm for the mechanics of advancement among all, and 
particularly senior, officers across the British Army in the Second 
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World War; this would require a much broader study encompassing 
other theatres of operations and a larger sample of officers. However, 
the methodology does lend itself to wider application across such 
groups. 
The inspiration for this research was triggered by a series of 
separate assertions made several years apart. The first was a 
discussion in the margins of a military history conference in the mid-
1990s where one participant asserted that any senior officer’s career 
was finished by their participation in the failure at Dunkirk. Another 
participant agreed and asserted confidently that “all” officers above 
the rank of Colonel who returned from France in 1940 found their 
careers abruptly terminated. He continued by saying that the reason 
was association with a major failure, with a “new broom” approach 
required to facilitate the necessary reform and reconstruction of the 
army in the face of strategic defeat. Another, equally confidently, 
dismissed this declaration as far too generalised, and identified a 
number of officers whose progress upwards seemed unimpeded by 
their service in France. These included Alan Brooke, who was en route 
to become Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) for the 
remainder of the war; Harold Alexander, later Supreme Allied 
Commander in the Mediterranean; Ronald Adam, who would become 
the army’s Adjutant General in 1941 and implement major reforms in 
personnel selection. Finally, there was a then relatively obscure (at 
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least to the public) divisional commander named Bernard 
Montgomery. Three of these – Brooke, Alexander and Montgomery - 
would become Field Marshals, the army’s highest rank. 
He could have added officers such as Richard McCreery, the last 
commander of the Eighth Army and John Crocker, a Corps 
commander in North West Europe who would gain Montgomery’s 
confidence sufficiently to be his preferred, if unsuccessful, choice 
after the war to succeed him as CIGS. Both McCreery and Crocker 
had taken over command of armoured brigades in the field in France 
in 1940. Montagu “Monty” Stopford, a highly successful Corps 
commander in the Far East later in the war, performed well in France 
commanding an infantry Brigade. Brian Horrocks had left his post as 
Chief Instructor at the Staff College, Camberley on its temporary 
closure at the outbreak of war in September 1939. He commanded a 
battalion of his parent regiment, the Middlesex Regiment, in France 
but at the end of the campaign briefly took command of his Brigade 
to bring it successfully within the Dunkirk evacuation perimeter. By 
1944, he too was a Lieutenant General and a Corps commander. 
Kenneth Anderson, promoted to take over Montgomery’s 3rd Division 
when the latter took over Brooke’s II Corps in France, would 
command an Army in North Africa. There are other examples which 
could be cited to refute a simplistic zero-sum analysis that service in 
POINT OF FAILURE 





France or Norway was enough on its own to inhibit or end a 
professional soldier’s career.  
The second trigger was a casual suggestion concerning 
Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie, as he then was, when in command of 
the Eighth Army in the Middle East in the early summer of 1942. 
Ritchie, who served as BGS of II Corps in France in 1940, had been 
appointed to command of Eighth Army in November 1941 by the 
General Officer Commanding in Chief (GOC-in-C) Middle East, Sir 
Claude Auchinleck. Ritchie was comparatively junior, at the time 
lacked experience for such an important command and did not 
perform well when seriously tested. Ritchie had not commanded any 
unit in the field since the First World War. In 1938 he was a 
Lieutenant Colonel commanding a battalion of the King’s Own 
Regiment in Palestine; all his service in the Second World War to this 
point was in senior staff positions, but he had favourably impressed 
influential supporters.2 Following Eighth Army’s defeat at the Battle of 
Gazala and its headlong retreat to the El Alamein line in May and 
June 1942, Auchinleck was forced to dismiss Ritchie and send him 
home to the United Kingdom. Most of the later opprobrium for the 
failure of the Eighth Army fell on Auchinleck for his poor selection of 
                                                          
2 In his diary for 15 July 1942, Alan Brooke wrote, in the context of Ritchie’s 
dismissal from Eighth Army, “Neil Ritchie had done me so wonderfully well in the 
fighting leading to Dunkirk and I had grown so fond of him.” Danchev, A. and 
Todman, D. (eds.) (2001), “War Diaries 1939-1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke” 
(London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson), p. 280. 
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subordinates rather than their actual performance. Ritchie’s 
professional survival may have been through his supposed 
connections to the Royal Family via his wife, who, it was said, was a 
lady-in-waiting to the Royal Family. Indeed, when Ritchie landed back 
in the UK after his sacking, his first meeting was an audience with 
King George VI at Buckingham Palace. Subsequent research showed 
this claim of spousal influence via royal connections is unsustainable.  
Catherine Minnes, later Lady Ritchie, had only married him in 1937 
(when he was merely a Lieutenant Colonel) and had no connections 
to the Royal Household at the time.   
Ritchie’s professional survival and advancement after his failure 
in the desert was more ascribable to his having impressed Alan 
Brooke when serving as his Brigadier General Staff (BGS) at II Corps 
in 1940 and also encountering Montgomery when the latter briefly 
assumed command of the Corps from Brooke in France later in the 
year.3 In addition, his being considered the head of a so-called 
“Highlander faction” within the army, the senior officer among those 
in and from Highland infantry regiments, possibly bore more weight 
and influence.   
This example is telling, in that the power of hearsay and 
rumour, often unattributed, cannot be put aside when examining 
                                                          
3 Danchev and Todman (2001), p. 280. 
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biographical detail such as this, even if not fully sourced in 
documents. There is a risk in that the effect of such statements can 
be amplified by repetition, even without confirmation.  This does not 
automatically bar them from consideration, evaluation or 
examination. Although the original inference concerning Ritchie 
proved to be untrue, he remained valid as a launching point for the 
examination of factors possibly contributing to advancement. He was 
from a well-to-do family background; was educated at a public school 
and was commissioned into a “smart” regiment of social standing. He 
was a graduate of the Staff College and attracted the attention and 
potential patronage of an influential officer.  
After most of the BEF had returned from France there was a 
pressing need to identify the lessons to be learned from the 
catastrophe on the European mainland.4 The urgency was enhanced 
in the face of a possible German invasion of the UK from across the 
English Channel. A committee, chaired by General Sir William 
Bartholomew, was convened in mid-June 1940 to report on the 
lessons learned from the defeat in France and to suggest vital 
reforms of the army which could rapidly be carried out. Bartholomew 
had recently retired from active service as the General Officer 
                                                          
4 The Committee formed, and took evidence, whilst around 100,000 troops were 
still in France south of the River Somme and were gradually evacuated during 
Operations Cycle and Ariel from Cherbourg, Le Havre and other smaller Channel 
ports between 15-25 June. The 51st (Highland) Division surrendered at St Valery 
during this period.  
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Commanding-in-Chief,  Northern Command and had served 
previously as the Director Military Operations and Intelligence at the 
War Office and as Chief of the General Staff (India); the committee 
convened whilst troops were still fighting.5 The final report did not 
censure individuals – which would surely have been deleterious to 
their career prospects – but neither did it distribute specific or 
individual praise - although the final document had a list appended 
commending certain officers in a general sense. Whilst the report was 
being circulated concerns were expressed by senior officers that if it 
were released publicly, it could damage the reputation of, and 
confidence in, the army in general. As such, few individuals were 
singled out in the deliberations by name or post held.  
Only one Brigadier was interviewed by the Committee. This was 
Sir Oliver Leese, who had served as the BGS to Lieutenant General 
Sir Ronald Adam, the latter having originally been sent to France to 
establish and command a new III Corps but who was instead forced 
by circumstances to organise and maintain the defence of the Dunkirk 
evacuation perimeter. As the threat of invasion diminished, the report 
became bogged down in the army’s bureaucracy as senior officers 
debated its findings and recommendations. These were watered down 
in the face of considerable opposition from within the Army Council 
                                                          
5 TNA CAB 106/220 (1940) “Final report of the Bartholomew Committee on lessons 
to be learnt from the operations in Flanders”. 
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and beyond. (The sole surviving copy of the draft circulated for 
comment which survives in TNA contains multiple angry marginalia; 
the author is not named but the handwriting matches that of 
Lieutenant General Sir William Lindsell, the BEF’s Quartermaster 
General). A major proposal in the report – that the brigade become 
the primary operational building block of the army in preference to 
the division – was not adopted. 
The defeat in France was not the only strategic failure in the 
spring of 1940. In April, a month before the German attack in the 
west, Hitler invaded Norway, violating its neutrality. An Allied 
expeditionary force failed both to stem the German advance from 
Oslo in the south and, in co-operation with the French to deny the 
northern Norwegian ports, particularly Narvik, to the invaders. The 
aim of the latter was to prevent the export of vital materials, 
predominantly Swedish iron ore, to Germany. The Anglo-French joint 
operation was hastily mounted, poorly planned and badly equipped. It 
was ending in failure and evacuation just as the German attack on 
the Low Countries and France was beginning on 10 May 1940. 
However, of the 13 officers holding Brigadier’s postings in the NWEF, 
seven proceeded to the rank of Major General or beyond during the 
war. Although the secondary literature on the Norwegian campaign 
focuses on its negative aspects, with titles of books carrying 
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variations on “catastrophe”, “fiasco” and “disaster”,6 involvement at 
this level of command was not inherently as career-limiting as has 
been supposed and as such terms imply. Although the failure of the 
Norwegian expedition resulted in a fierce parliamentary debate, a 
division to vote and the ultimate fall of the Chamberlain 
administration, the incoming War Cabinet led by Churchill did not 
press for an equivalent of the Bartholomew Committee.  
The charge that participation in either Battle of France or the 
Norwegian campaign in 1940 was the automatic end of an officer’s 
career is therefore readily refuted. The question arises, however, 
whether those who survived and advanced professionally, or those 
who did not, was either because of their participation in the 
campaigns, or their connections both within and outside the army.  
The key question is whether participation in these campaigns, or an 
officer’s connections (in and outside the army), influenced their 
subsequent career.  
Methodology 
This thesis in its final form is based on a qualitative analysis of the 
set of data as compiled. The original intention was to apply methods 
of Social Network Analysis to investigate and interrogate the defined 
set of officers serving in postings assigned to, or appropriate for, 
                                                          
6  For example, Kiszeley, J. (2017) “Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in 
Norway, 1940” (Cambridge, Cambridge UP). 
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individuals holding the rank of Brigadier formed into various 
databases and processing them through an off-the-shelf SNA 
application, Microsoft Node XL. After several attempts, it became 
apparent that Node XL would not produce the results intended due to 
the disparate variables in the set, and a decision was made to revert 
to a qualitative approach, using some tools from SNA 
One description of SNA is that it is “mathematical sociology”, a 
label daunting to anyone wishing to employ its methods who is 
neither a mathematician nor a sociologist. The discipline can and has 
been typified by highly technical and mathematical language which 
may exclude those from less technical backgrounds seeking to make 
practical use of the tools offered. An attempt to bridge this divide is 
outlined in Professor John Scott’s Social Network Analysis: A 
Handbook.7 Professor Scott, a sociologist, has sought across three 
editions of his work to simplify the mathematical constructs to allow 
non-mathematicians to apply Social Network Analysis methodologies 
to derive information through data handling of large data sets. Scott 
warns that care must be taken against applying Social Network 
Analysis terminology in an overly general manner - a specific 
example being of the term “clique” – stating that the context of the 
issue being examined is vital; the selection of appropriate tools and 
the use of informed judgement being of particular importance.8 Use 
                                                          
7 London, Sage Publications Ltd. 3rd Ed. 2012. 
8 Scott (2012), p. 2. 
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of social network theory in an historical context remains 
comparatively young as a discipline, only developing over the last 
twenty years or so, and typified in the work of historians such as 
Charles Wetherell, and Niall Ferguson.9 Wetherell notes that the basis 
of the social network approach is founded on four principles: 
Firstly, actors in social systems are interdependent rather than 
independent.   
Secondly, linkages between actors in a system channel knowledge 
and other resources.   
Third, the structure of those relations can both constrain or facilitate 
action.  
Finally, patterns between the actors can define economic, political 
and social structures.10  
Wetherell states that Social Network Analysis demands 
evidence of social interaction among all members of a social system 
for a variety of behaviours, and thus necessitates a broad range of 
high-quality records for the place, time and activities being studied; 
where the historical record is incomplete, or the understanding of 
                                                          
9 In particular his article “Historical Social Network Analysis”, International Review 
of Social History (43) 1998, pp. 125-44.  Ferguson, N. (2017) “The Square and the 
Tower: Networks, Hierarchies and the Struggle for Global Power” (London, Allen 
Lane) 
10 Wetherell, C.  (1998), p. 126; in the latter case Wetherell referred to his case 
study of European peasantry. 
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past social relations is imperfect, Social Network Analysis remains an 
inherently problematic enterprise. In this example, a rigid 
interpretation of “social” interaction may be of less application than a 
“professional” viewpoint.  
Charles Kadushin’s Introduction to Social Network Theory11 offers 
accessible definitions for the non-specialist. A network is a set of 
relationships; a simple network contains two “nodes” and one 
relationship that links them; however even this can be symmetrical or 
non-directional (e.g. A likes B; B likes A). Yet a third party, C can be 
connected to B, and although non-reciprocal, is connected to A via B. 
As such relationships expand, regardless of the scale of the issue 
being addressed, is the set of conditions which will make it more or 
less likely that paths will exist between these nodes and whether they 
are reciprocally or mutually related. Kadushin goes on to note that 
social science defines three types of network: 
 Ego-centric: Connected by a single node or individual, such as a 
group of friends or companies which all do business with a single 
company. However, to be a proper network there must be an 
information set available about the connections between the 
nodes, or there is no network.  
 
                                                          
11 Provided as a free download: 
http://communityanalytics.staging.r2integrated.com/portals/0/resource_library/soci
al%20network%20theory_kadushin.pdf 
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 Socio-centric networks are closed, i.e. within defined 
boundaries such as children in a classroom or the board of a 
company. 
 Open system networks are not confined to a box or exist in a 
state where boundaries are not clear or difficult to define.  
 
For the purposes of this research, it will be initially assumed that the 
group is predominantly socio-centric, although elements of the ego-
centric may emerge.  
 In his 2017 work The Square and The Tower,12 Niall Ferguson 
presented examples to illustrate that the influence of networks and 
hierarchies throughout history. He contends that the impact of these 
structures has been significant, although at times, at a lower level 
than has been supposed, namely, below the level of “great men” and 
their like. Ferguson adds that networks, by virtue of being more 
widespread, can have a greater influence than hierarchies.  He adds, 
to underline this, that hierarchies can also be horizontal and broad, 
by comparison with narrow, straight up and down, hierarchies.  The 
latter assertion, of horizontal and broad hierarchies, is the most 
applicable to the analysis in this thesis.  
 
                                                          
19 Ferguson, N. (2017) Chapter 3 “Networks, Networks Everywhere” pp.14-20 and 
Chapter 4 “Why Hierarchies” pp.21-24 
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 The data set was compiled using a series of spreadsheets 
branched out from a master sheet containing criteria including age, 
school and university attended, regiment of first commissioning, 
whether or not each officer was a Staff College graduate, post 
occupied in 1940, whether the individual had deposited papers (or 
other materials) in repositories such as the Liddell Hart Centre, the 
Imperial War Museum and the National Army Museum.  A checklist 
was also added to see if individual officers featured in certain senior 
officers’ diaries and accounts, as a launching point for further 
investigation. As a starting point, these were the published diaries of 
Alan Brooke and Henry Pownall (Chief of Staff of the BEF) and the 
memoirs of Bernard Montgomery. A freeform data cell was used to 
capture other biographical detail as it emerged.    
 This master sheet was subsequently broken down into subsets 
both to allow direct sorting of the data, and to break out information 
derived in the biographical area, such as awards of decorations and 
inter-war active service, which were compiled into the tables 
contained later in this work.    
The Research Questions: Primary and Secondary 
The questions to be examined in this thesis are:  
1) What social networks existed in the British Army in the period 
1919-1939?  
2) What impact did service in the First World War have on officers’ 
careers in the period 1918-39? 
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3) To what extent did attendance at Staff College between the 
wars influence an officer’s career? 
4) Did inter-war active service generate any connected networks 
among officers? 
5) What proportion of officers in the group proceeded to higher 
rank after the conclusion of operations in France and Norway after 
June 1940? 
 
The secondary questions for consideration include: 
 If such networks were present, to what extent were these 
formal, informal, or perceived? 
 Whether influencing networks external to the army were 
present, including, but not limited to, family and connections, 
and whether they had an effect on an officer’s progression 
 The influence, or patronage of senior officers towards former 
subordinates, or in the case of education – particularly at the 
Staff College level 
 If service on the staff as a junior officer in the First World War 
(whether or not an officer later proceeded to graduate from 
the Staff College) provided an advantage for their later 
progression or generate a talent pool for promotion or 
selection.  
 Whether the possession of decorations for gallantry and/or 
distinguished service in the First World War made an officer 
more likely to be selected for advanced education or 
promotion before and after 1940 
 If awards made for service in 1940 played any part in whether 
an officer advanced in rank after the campaigns in France and 
Norway.   
 Officers who attended Staff College from 1919 (the first post-
war course) until the early 1930s are also examined to determine 
whether attendance on the course generated networks between the 
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students and between students and instructors and whether these 
were inherent or durable.  Conversely, if an officer did not succeed in 
gaining a place at Staff College did this inhibit his advancement or 
prove a block to it, whether or not this restricted access to patronage 
or networks.   
Reasoning for the selection of Brigadiers 
The selection of this level of rank was driven by the following factors. 
Until 1922, the rank had been that of Brigadier General, and holders 
of it were considered General Officers. Following the First World War 
the rank was reduced from General officer status to that of “Colonel 
Commandant” or “Colonel on the Staff” depending on what specific 
type of post the individual was serving in and reducing its status from 
that of General Officer to that of Field Officer. The move proved 
unpopular and the rank of Brigadier – minus its previous suffix of 
General - was reinstated in 1928 and new rank insignia introduced of 
a crown above three stars, removing the sword and baton and 
reinforcing the distinction between General and Field Officers.  A 
brigadier’s posting did not suggest the holding of an operational level 
command per se, as the fundamental operational unit of the British 
Army remained the division, a Major General’s command.  (The rank 
of Brigadier did not become a substantive rank until 1947).  
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The post of Brigadier was regarded, until the late 1930s at 
least, as a form of extension of a full Colonel’s posting to fulfil a 
temporary or particular need. This was comparable to the Royal Naval 
rank of Commodore, until the late 20th century a holding position for 
senior Captains, RN ahead of advancement to Flag Rank.13 As late as 
the January 1942 Half Yearly Army List (HYAL) there was no separate 
listing for brigadiers; after the gradation (seniority) list for Major 
Generals, the next category below was for full Colonels, some of 
whom occupied Temporary or Acting Brigadier rank. 
An officer holding a brigadier’s position in 1940 is most likely to 
have been a pre-war, professional Regular Army officer. As such, he 
will have left a detailed paper trail in official and unofficial, primary 
and secondary records. This eases the assembly of the data required 
to create both a comprehensive sample and a picture of an 
individual’s personal and professional activities and social standing. 
Aside from command of a Brigade, or Brigade level, formation, 
brigadiers held senior staff appointments; for example, the senior 
Staff Officer at Corps level was a Brigadier, General Staff (BGS). The 
                                                          
13 Commodore only became a substantive rank in the Royal Navy in 1997. Prior to 
this, it continued to be an appointment conferred on senior captains holding certain 
positions. For example, the senior commander of destroyers within a fleet in the 
Royal Navy could carry the title of "Commodore (D)", while the fleet's senior 
commander of submarines could carry the title of "Commodore (S)", although in 
both cases as an appointment rather than a rank. Source: “Debrett’s’ Forms of 
Address” website, accessed 30 October 2012. 
https://archive.is/20120729172653/http://www.debretts.co.uk/forms-of-
address/professions/armed-forces/royal-navy/commodore-and-captain.aspx. 
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chief artillery officer in a division was also a Brigadier – the Brigadier, 
Royal Artillery. (BRA; also in some accounts Commander, Royal 
Artillery [CRA]) In the BEF of 1939-1940, there were several service 
arms posts held by brigadiers, such as the Director of Labour, the 
Director of Works, the Command Paymaster and so on. Such 
positions have been incorporated in the group.  
In the BEF, some Territorial Army (TA) Brigades were 
commanded, even if only temporarily, by TA officers – but such 
command could not be taken as granted. (In Norway, despite a 
preponderance of TA troops in the NWEF and the forming of local, ad 
hoc “Forces” rather than a system based on a formal brigade 
structure, all the brigadiers there were Regular Army officers). In 
general, Territorial officers can be more challenging to research as 
they did not leave as many traces in sources such as newspapers, 
and Territorial officers were not included in the biographical sections 
of the HYAL in the inter- and early war periods. Also, very few were 
included – unless they rose to eminence in their civilian occupation - 
in biographical directories such as Who’s Who14 or Debrett’s.15 The 
short biographies included in the HYAL list dates of birth, 
commissioning, key appointments and decorations. With officers of 
                                                          
14 Who’s Who (1849 to date) “…the definitive directory of everyone who’s anyone in 
Britain, and beyond, today” Published by Baily Brothers Ltd (London) 1849-97 and 
AC Black Ltd (London) 1897-date. 
15 “The Peerage of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland” (London, John 
Debrett Ltd. 1812- Date). 
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the TA these must be reconstructed from source material such as the 
London Gazette and the monthly Army List. Also, until the late 1930s, 
there were no vacancies put aside for Territorials on the course at the 
Army Staff College at Camberley, also denying them an opportunity 
to form networks there.  
There is also anecdotal evidence which suggests that TA officers 
commanding their TA battalions were removed from their command 
on the outbreak of war, replaced with Regular officers and transferred 
to staff posts. Colonel Donald Dean, who had been awarded a Victoria 
Cross in 1918 serving with The Royal West Kent Regiment and 
remained with the regiment as a Territorial between the wars, 
eventually taking command of his battalion, made such a claim in his 
personal diaries.16  Although such action could be justified by the fact 
that Territorials, lacking Staff College experience, were not qualified 
for these levels of command, it is also possible that come the 
outbreak of war Regular Army officers would not wish to face 
increased competition for such a scarce commodity as divisional 
command.  
However, this did not prevent officers from Territorial 
backgrounds from being promoted to this rank, however temporarily, 
in 1940 (albeit it from necessity rather than merit) nor of holding 
                                                          
16. See Crowdy, T. and Bavin, S. (eds. 2010) “Donald Dean VC” (Barnsley, Pen & 
Sword), p.65 
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operational commands later in the war. Major General Harry Willans, 
who was Director General of Army Welfare and Education at the War 
Office from 1940-42, was a Territorial officer, having been a senior 
executive of J. Lyons Ltd, the catering company. He once expressed 
frustration at the obstacles to the advancement of Territorial officers 
to a group of members of the Army Council thus: 'We know that you 
dislike us [Territorial officers] but we are going on soldiering whether 
you like us, or not’.17 
The Monthly Army List for May 1940 lists 1027 brigadiers in the 
British and Indian Armies. The latter includes officers of the British 
Army in India, and the Indian Army (1903-47). However, except for 
Honorary Officers, no native Indians, or “Viceroy Commissioned 
Officers” (VCOs) reached the level of Brigadier. Of all these officers, 
forty-five were Brigadier Generals, indicating that they had not seen 
active service since 1922 and remained on the Army List by virtue of 
holding honorary positions such as equerries to the Royal Household 
or representative Colonels Commandant of regiments, a ceremonial 
rank. One of this group was listed in the Obituaries column. This 
reduces the total to 982; there are 146 Honorary Brigadiers. These 
                                                          
17 Willans in a letter to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 23 May 1963, cited in French, D. 
“Colonel Blimp and the British Army: British Divisional Commanders in the War 
against Germany, 1939-1945” The English Historical Review, Vol. 111, No. 444 
(November 1996), pp. 1182-1201. Willans was a rarity in that he had commanded 
a Territorial Army division before the war; he was killed in an air crash in the Middle 
East in February 1943 http://www.kzwp.com/lyons.pensioners/obitary2W.htm 
(Accessed 15 October 2017). 
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officers cannot be automatically excluded as several were serving 
Colonels in staff posts in Home Commands, made Honorary 
Brigadiers as a mark of distinction for previous service.  
Why 1940 & 1944? 
As described above, 1940 was chosen – above and beyond the trigger 
of a casual remark – as a point where a major global power suffered 
simultaneous strategic defeats.   Its officer corps, certainly at this 
level, predominantly consisted of veterans of the First World War, 
who received their further professional education (if at all) around the 
mid-1920s. In this period, such training was in flux as changes were 
made to the syllabus and demand greatly outstripped supply. 
Furthermore, a shortage of qualified officers in 1939-1940 
necessitated the recall of older, sometimes retired, officers to fill skill 
gaps, particularly in rear echelon posts.  
   1944 was chosen in preference to any other key point, such as 
the war in the Western Desert, in the Mediterranean from 1943 on 
and the war in the Far East for the following reasons. First, at the 
direct suggestion of the supervisory team. Second, the formations 
landing on D-Day were led a mixture of officers with varying degrees 
of battlefield experience prior to 1944, with some who had fought in 
France in 1940 in more junior ranks and subsequently in other 
theatres of operations. Some had remained in the United Kingdom 
after 1940 in training and administrative posts and would therefore 
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be completely new to active service at such levels, even if they had 
seen active service in 1940. This was considered to be a level starting 
point from which to conduct a comparison of the type of officer who 
had risen to such rank where, arguably, the Brigade had increased in 
operational importance.  
  Another point of investigation was also to determine whether 
there had been a level of rejuvenation – with younger officers 
attaining the rank – in the intervening years by comparison with four 
years before. Also, the necessity to address officers from Empire and 
Commonwealth backgrounds, with differing traditions of selection, 
training and advancement was deemed to over-complicate an already 
well-populated sample. In theatres such as the Middle and Far East, 
an additional factor would have been the necessity to take account of 
officers from the Indian Army (This is also why Canadian officers in 
Canadian formations were omitted from both the 1940 and 1944 
analysis).  Lastly, as noted elsewhere, it was to begin from a basis of 
an army which had been comprehensively defeated to one on the 
threshold of final victory. 
  The aim in this thesis is to examine factors from before 1940 
which could, aside from operational performance in France or 
Norway, have influenced the professional survival of officers from the 
primary group. Therefore, the use of a comparative group in 1944 
was to examine if such factors had a remaining prevalence by then, 
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rather than to attempt a wide-ranging review of reform of officer 
selection and promotion in the course of the war, which merits its 
own study.  Such changes as occurred, driven by first by the Hore-
Belisha reforms in 1938 to clear promotion logjams and improve 
possibilities for advancement, and Sir Ronald Adam’s further 
reshaping of officer selection after 1941, were as noted here likely to 
have little impact on the 1940 group and arguably less on the Brigade 
level of command by 1944 than it did on more junior officers 
thereafter.  
The final influence and trigger for this research was a large 
graphic posted in the Ministry of Defence after 2001 which undertook 
to establish linkages between insurgent commanders in South West 
Asia. This illustration used a combination of social network analysis 
methods and classified intelligence. Combining this with the ideas 
generated in the discussions at the conference in the 1990s sparked a 
curiosity as to whether other officers who were perceived to have 
underperformed in action may have evaded career ruin or termination 
through their connections. The intelligence-led example of insurgent 
commanders indicated that there may be methodologies to determine 
and discover such linkages in the proposed sample, and perhaps 
indicate others less apparent from a visual or cursory sifting of the 
evidence. The current United States Army Field Manual “Insurgencies 
and Countering Insurgencies” states that social network analysis is an 
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essential tool in modern warfare; whilst this is couched predominantly 
in terms of “attack the network” operations, it also states: 
A social network analysis allows analysts to identify and portray 
the details of a network structure. It shows how… [an 
insurgency’s] networked organisation behaves and how that 
connectivity affects its behaviour. A social network analysis 
allows analysts to assess the network’s design, how its 
members may or may not act autonomously, where leadership 
resides, how leadership is distributed across the network and 
how hierarchical dynamics may mix or not mix with network 
dynamics.18  
Literature Review 
Assembling the group 
The first tier was the most straightforward; the officers commanding 
Brigade level formations, predominantly Infantry Brigades, both in 
France and Norway. These officers are clearly identified in the 
respective volumes of the Official History of the Second World War19 
(OH) in the appendices which list forces engaged. Ellis’ official history 
of the war in France and Flanders also occasionally lists brigadiers 
who held temporary command of Divisions in the absence of the 
                                                          
18 US Army Field Manual FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Washington DC, Department of the 
Army, cleared for public release on unlimited distribution 2 June 2014.  
19 Derry, T. K. (1952) “The Campaign in Norway” (History of the Second World War, 
United Kingdom Military Series) London; His Majesty’s Stationery Office and Ellis, L. 
F. (1954) “The Campaign in France and Flanders, 1939-40” (History of the Second 
World War, United Kingdom Military Series) London; His Majesty’s Stationery Office 
Lt. Col. H. F. Joslen, (1960) “Orders of Battle” Vols. 1 & 2 ” (History of the Second 
World War, United Kingdom Military Series) London; His Majesty’s Stationery Office. 
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Major General commanding. However, neither source lists officers in 
Staff posts in their appendices, although there are occasional passing 
references in the body of the narrative. Joslen’s two volume Orders of 
Battle, part of the Official History, was also used to cross check post 
holders and temporary commanders of formations. 
The second tier in assembling the group was via reference to 
higher command level War Diaries at TNA Kew. The Corps War 
Diaries in WO 16720 of the three Corps in France (including the 
proposed III Corps under Sir Ronald Adam, which became instead the 
operational headquarters for the defence of the Dunkirk evacuation 
perimeter) contain staff returns of the operational commanders and 
some senior support arm commanders who were brigadiers, such as 
the “Commander (also “Brigadier”, Royal Artillery” (CRA) at Divisional 
level; and the posts of Chief Engineer (CRE) and the Deputy Adjutant 
& Quartermaster General (DA&QMG) at Corps level. Operational 
orders contained within this series also identified some officers in 
staff postings moved between units during the period of the so-called 
“Phoney War” from October 1939-May 1940.21 A shadow series in WO 
16622 is more concerned with general administrative details but 
                                                          
20 TNA WO167/124 - I Corps; WO167/148 – II Corps; WO167/168 – III Corps. 
21 An illustrative example of such moves is that of Brigadier C. Le B Goldney, 
Director Royal Army Service Corps (DRASC) who was held on strength of I Corps on 
15 February 1940 but was transferred to III Corps at some point before 6 May 
1940. 
22 TNA WO166/169 – I Corps; WO166/186 – II Corps; WO166/204 – III Corps. 
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occasionally illuminates or corroborates the presence of officers 
appropriate to the group.  
The war diaries for the Norwegian Campaign in the WO 198 
series23 are less illuminating and in one specific case (due to lack of 
detail and an administrative error) required many further attempts to 
ascertain the correct information to identify the individual officer 
concerned. Derry’s volume of the OH refers to very few brigadiers 
beyond field commanders at this level. Ellis’ is slightly better in this 
regard for the period before 10 May 1940 and for the Battle of France 
thereafter but still omits many brigadiers in key staff positions who 
would play a significant part in operations.24 The files of the Cabinet 
Office Historical Section used in the preparation of Derry’s volume 
include correspondence with key figures which provided some more 
insight, but not markedly so.25  
The complete group comprises one hundred and fifty-six 
officers. Completion and corroboration of the group, and expansion of 
their biographical records was achieved through the following 
sources: 
                                                          
23 TNA WO198/1-5; 6-7, 9-11; 16-17. 
24 For example Brigadier Sir Oliver Leese Bt. (later General Sir Oliver, GOC Eighth 
Army) whose posting to be BGS of III Corps in May 1940 was reversed as a result 
of the German attack and he spent the rest of the campaign at GHQ BEF. Leese 
was a key witness to the Bartholomew Committee on lessons learned from the 
Battle of France in June 1940. 
25 In the series TNA CAB 106/1154-1178 in particular. 
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 The Half Yearly Army List (HYAL). This official publication 
contained the Gradation List of the British Army, which listed all 
officers of the Regular Army by rank and according to their seniority, 
the date on which they were appointed to that rank. Up to January 
1940 it also contained an outline synopsis of a Regular Army officer’s 
career. It does not give an officer’s posting in precise detail, 
presumably for reasons of operational security.  
 The operational honours lists for France and Norway published 
in the governmental newspaper, The London Gazette. These lists 
have specific headlines indicating the theatre of operations. The first 
list for France was published in the Gazette on 11 July 1940, being an 
extension (or Supplement) of the list for the King’s Birthday Honours 
published on 9 July.26 A second list published on 26 July 194027 was 
of awards for performance of duty in the period up to 31 March 1940. 
Some awards made for France were announced on 10 August 1940 
and the last list was published on 20 January 1941, this latter one 
being predominantly of Mentions in Dispatches. Two main lists for 
operations in Norway were published on 6 August and 27 September 
1940.  
                                                          
26 The London Gazette (Supplement) 9 July 1940. pp. 4243–69. The list had been 
delayed from its usual publication date in June because of the change of 
government on 10 May 1940.  
27 The London Gazette (3rd Supplement to the edition of 23 July 1940). 26 July 
1940, pp. 4579-86. 
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 Biographical directories. The main source was Who’s Who.28 All 
personal detail contained in entries was at the discretion of the 
individual and therefore varies considerably in the amount of detail 
provided. It is perhaps the best single source for personal information 
aside from The Army List. Family connections were traced via sources 
such as Debrett’s Peerage & Baronetage,29 Burke’s Peerage and 
Burke’s Landed Gentry30  
 Online biographical resources. The co-location of archive 
sources via genealogy websites and gateways is a dynamic and 
expanding resource. In this case, the primary source used on a 
personal subscription was Find My Past31 ; its main rival Ancestry has 
been accessed via public libraries and at TNA Kew. A third party 
website, The Peerage32 proved useful in discerning family linkages but 
this was treated with caution due to its third party nature and 
amalgamation from other sources which were sometimes 
unattributed.  
 Obituaries. Many of the officers in the group were sufficiently 
eminent to merit obituary notes in broadsheet newspapers. The most 
readily accessible archive is that of The Times (London). A secondary 
                                                          
28 Who’s Who and Who Was Who (London, AC Black Ltd.) Various annual directories 
1914-1990 
29 Debrett’s, London. Various annual directories 1914-50. 
30 Burke’s Ltd, London. Various annual directories 1914-50. 
31 www.findmypast.co.uk; accessed on multiple dates 
32 http://www.thepeerage.com/; accessed on multiple dates 
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result which was of value is the notification of memorial services; the 
list of attendees can prove useful in the extrapolation of military and 
personal connections through representation.33  
 Newspapers. Broadsheet newspaper indices and their online 
resources proved of value in identifying postings, awards and the 
careers of many officers in the group. Again, the online archive of The 
Times was the most valuable single resource in this regard. This 
latter source was also of value in tracking participation in sport and 
highlighting potential connections in this area. However, the British 
Newspaper Archive, both in physical form at the British Library and in 
its subscription based online presence, also proved of value. This was 
because military news in the pre-war period would often be 
announced in a wider range of newspapers than may be assumed to 
be the case, sometimes reflecting the geographic background of 
regiments or officers serving in them. For example, if a regiment 
which had its depot in Yorkshire deployed to Aldershot, it would 
appear in newspapers for both areas, and sometimes individual 
officers would be mentioned similarly.34 
 Personal papers. Very few sets of complete personal papers 
have been located for the majority of the group. The single most 
                                                          
33 I am indebted to the late Professor Keith Jeffrey of Queen’s University Belfast for 
suggesting this source, which he noted proved extremely useful in the writing of his 
history of the Secret Intelligence Service - MI6: The History of the Secret 
Intelligence Service (London; Bloomsbury 2010). 
34 https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/ accessed on multiple dates.  
POINT OF FAILURE 





significant repository is the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at 
King’s College London (LHCMA) although even here in the main there 
are few detailed accounts of operations in 1940. The LHCMA’s Survey 
of the Papers of Senior UK Defence Personnel, 1900-1975 includes 
very few officers in the group of one hundred and fifty-six who have 
deposited personal papers with national repositories. A cross-check 
with holdings of the imperial War Museum and the National Army 
Museum confirmed this or highlighted fragmentary sets of papers 
which did not specifically further this research. This was cross-
referenced again against the Culture Grid UK website, a search 
engine from the Collections Trust intended to locate assets in national 
collections.35 A difficulty with personal papers, which was reflected in 
those used in the research for this thesis, is a reticence to be critical 
of senior commanders and not to mention issues such as patronage 
as the subject may not have been aware of it.  
One modern account of operations36 by the covering force of 
rear echelon troops draws on an account from one Brigadier, John 
Gawthorpe, held in the regimental archives of his original regiment, 
the West Yorkshire Regiment.37 Also in this category are published 
                                                          
35 http://www.culturegrid.org.uk/  accessed on 20 February 2013: Searches 
conducted on “Private Papers”, “Dunkirk” and “Norway”. 
36 Lynch, T. (2010) “Dunkirk 1940: Whereabouts Unknown” (Stroud; The History 
Press). 
37 Gawthorpe commanded 137 Brigade in 46th Division, a Territorial formation 
originally assigned to labour and training duties in France. The account was 
published in Ca Ira, The Journal of the West Yorkshire Regiment, in 1948. He was 
National President of the Dunkirk Veterans’ Association in 1975-76.  
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and/or edited personal diaries. At present the three most useful 
examples of this have been the edited diaries of Viscount Alanbrooke, 
Lord Ironside and Sir Henry Pownall. The first has also been of value 
in the study of officers post-Dunkirk after his assumption of the post 
of Chief of the Imperial General Staff.38  
 Within the literature on the British Army in the Second World 
War, detailed studies of the brigade level of command in the early 
period of the war are non-existent; individual brigade histories exist, 
but these focus predominantly on the campaign in North West Europe 
and are narrative rather than analytical.39 In one aspect at least, 
academic analysis is in agreement as to the root causes of the defeat 
in 1940, which apply generally to France and Norway. The common 
threads, from Brian Bond’s France and Belgium 1939-40 in 1975 to 
Edward Smalley’s The British Expeditionary Force in 2015, agree that 
the combination of an habitually under-resourced army, with its 
officers inappropriately trained at Staff Colleges, combined with an 
awareness of emergent doctrine of infantry-armour co-operation but 
                                                          
72 Danchev and Todman, (eds.) (2002) “War Diaries 1939-1945: Field Marshal Lord 
Alanbrooke” (London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson); McCleod, Col. R. and D. Kelly 
(1962) “Time Unguarded: The Ironside Diaries 1937-1940” (London, Constable) 
and B. Bond (1974) “Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant General Sir Henry 
Pownall. Volume 1: 1937-40” (London, Leo Cooper). 
39 A rare example is Horton, A (2010) “56th Infantry Brigade and D-Day: An 
Independent Infantry Brigade and the Campaign in North West Europe 1944-1945” 
(Bloomsbury, London) based on the author’s 2009 PhD thesis from the University of 
Plymouth 
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the lack of a coherent method to implement or propagate it were 
equally at fault.   
Both Smalley and David French in Raising Churchill’s Army 
indicate that the speed of British defeat was not due purely to the 
inflicting of heavy casualties by the Germans, but the latter’s focus on 
the rapid disruption of the means of command and control, within a 
hierarchical system which was insufficiently flexible  at this stage – 
and further into the war – to allow effective delegation to subordinate 
officers and units, notwithstanding the direction in the 1935 Field 
Service Regulations that the local commander should be trusted to 
make decisions based on immediate knowledge of the actual 
situation, on his own initiative.   
Interest in the Army as an institution in the inter-war period 
has attracted more study since Brian Bond’s British Military Policy 
Between The Wars in 1980.  Bond focuses on those institutional 
challenges facing a much reduced post-First World War Army and the 
demands of modernisation in the face of financial constraint and 
demands of imperial policing and peacekeeping. Studies of British 
Generalship in the Second World War began to emerge in the 1960s 
and 1970s, such as Corelli Barnett’s The Desert Generals, which 
sought to correct, in the author’s view, the excessive credit given, in 
the author’s view, to Montgomery for success in the desert whilst 
overlooking the part played by Auchinleck and his subordinates, not 
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least due to Montgomery’s portrayal of his predecessor in his own 
writings.  Sir John Smyth’s Leadership in War 1939-45: British 
Generalship in Victory and Defeat from 1974 was a general survey 
from a veteran of France in 1940, but his more sympathetic analysis 
is weakened by an overly broad approach and an over-emphasis on 
officers he himself had encountered in his career.    
Jeremy Crang’s study The British Army and the People’s War 
from 2000 and David French, in Raising Churchill’s Army observe that 
in the 1930s there was a system in place which appear to ensure that 
selection for promotion and advancement to higher ranks in the Army 
was, if not fully transparent, at least fair due to the system of 
confidential reporting and recommendation, in its turn requiring the 
approval of the Military Secretary and the agreement of the Army 
Council.  However, both agree, in a point also noted by Bond, that 
this system was not immune to being influenced by the views of 
senior commanders such as the CIGS, or indirectly by the social 
background of an individual officer.   However, French adds in his 
Military Identities that the hold of the upper classes on the senior 
ranks of the British Army was weakened by the First World War and 
continued to do so past the Second World War.40  Such analysis is in 
step with the findings of the sociologist CB Otley, who traced the 
                                                          
40 French, D (2005)  “Military Identities: The Regimental System. The British Army 
and The British People” (Oxford, Oxford UP) pp. 169-70 
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weakening of the connection of the upper classes to officer ranks to 
the abolition of purchase in the 1870s.41 
Although there is already a body of study on divisional 
command in the British Army in the Second World War, there is little 
which examines Brigade level operations specifically and in 1940 in 
particular, a gap this thesis aims to address. This is not entirely 
surprising as the Brigade was not considered to be an independent, 
self-sustaining formation until the Bartholomew Committee 
recommended this to be the way forward in its findings in June 1940. 
From this point it is therefore arguable that brigadiers became more 
significant as field commanders than they had been in the inter-war 
period and would briefly be allowed greater levels of operational and 
command autonomy. Histories of individual British Army brigades 
exist, but there is a dearth of analytical work on brigade level 
operations in France, with most (based on a survey of the holdings of 
the Imperial War Museum and National Army Museum other than War 
Diaries held at TNA) covering the later period of the war and focussed 
particularly on operations in the Mediterranean and North West 
Europe. A rare example of closer focus on Brigade operations in 1940 
is Charles More’s The Road to Dunkirk,42 a re-evaluation of the BEF’s 
5th Division and its battle on the Ypres-Comines Canal from 26-28 
                                                          
41 This is discussed further on p.64  and p.121 
42 More, C. (2013) “The Road to Dunkirk: The British Expeditionary Force and the 
Battle of the Ypres-Comines Canal, May 1940” (Frontline Books, Barnsley). 
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May. However, this is a detailed study of a divisional battle in a 
limited time period and has the benefit of space to examine brigade 
level operations in more detail.  
Many of the popular accounts of 1940 operations published in 
the 1960s, ‘70s and ‘80s proved of little value in determining any 
possible omissions in the group as they are focussed, understandably, 
on combat operations and those of divisions and above in particular. 
Those from the 1950s and 1960s were also disadvantaged by the lack 
of public access to the official records, which remained closed into the 
1970s. With regard to the Battle of France, accounts often slant into 
the politico-strategic examination of high command tensions between 
Gort and the French Supreme Command. These are typified in Sir 
Edward Spears’ Assignment to Catastrophe, his two-volume account 
of his time with the BEF, particularly in the first of them, Prelude to 
Dunkirk.43 Spears, arguably, inclines too much towards wishing to 
emphasize his championing of General De Gaulle in his writings but 
has the benefit of actual presence at several key meetings as the 
situation deteriorated.  
Alistair Horne’s To Lose A Battle,44 otherwise a standard 
account of the Battle of France, almost never ventures below 
                                                          
43 Spears, Sir Edward (1955) “Assignment to Catastrophe Volume 1: Prelude to 
Dunkirk” (New York; AA Wyn). 
44 Horne, A. (1969) “To Lose A Battle: France 1940” (London, Macmillan). 
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divisional level and even here is very selective rather than 
comprehensive. Gregory Blaxland’s Destination Dunkirk45 goes into 
more detail on British operations as its subtitle The Story of Gort’s 
Army suggests. It is one of the most useful sources in terms of 
identifying brigadiers engaged. Blaxland consulted regimental sources 
extensively in terms of published histories, personal accounts and 
regimental records, and his presence in France as an officer of 2nd 
Battalion, The Buffs also informed his writing at a period when most 
of the official records were still closed to public access. He is also 
perceptive on the state of officer promotion in the inter-war army, 
remarking that:  
Speed of promotion differed from Corps to Corps… the fact 
that Major General Harold Alexander, GOC 1 Division, 
belonged to the Irish Guards may have helped him gain 
promotion at the age of 45… the Divisional commanders of II 
Corps came from the infantry of the line and were older men… 
A Divisional commander under the age of fifty was likely to be 
younger than his brigade commanders...46  
Two modern works which are more helpful, but again both 
mainly focus on operations above Brigade level, are Simon Sebag-
Montefiore’s Dunkirk: The Fight to the last Man47 and Julian 
                                                          
45 Blaxland, G. (1973) “Destination Dunkirk: The Story of Gort’s Army” (London; 
William Kimber). 
46 Blaxland (1973), p. 15. 
47 Sebag-Montefiore, S. (1996) “Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man” (London, Viking). 
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Thompson’s Dunkirk: Retreat to Victory.48 Thompson, a retired Major 
General of the Royal Marines, writes with a soldier’s eye for 
operational details, leavened with personal stories. He mentions, 
however briefly, more brigadiers by name than any other account 
save that of Blaxland.  
Nick Smart’s British Strategy and Politics During The Phony 
War49 takes a more sympathetic view of the ability of the BEF to fight 
a modern war on the continent, including its leadership, even if the 
opportunity of the Phony War between September 1939 and May 
1940 to equip and train further was not fully exploited. Smart’s 
contention that had units been better equipped (such as Major 
General Roger Evans’ 1st Armoured Division) the outcome could have 
been affected differently is somewhat overstated. However, his 
assertion that the shock effect of the breakthrough at Sedan 
unravelled French planning is sound.  
Accounts of the Norwegian campaign are even less illuminating 
in terms of individual brigadiers than those for France. Of fourteen 
brigadiers identified as serving in Norway, only five are referred to by 
name, and of these five only three merit more than passing notice in 
                                                          
48 Thompson, J. (2008) “Dunkirk: Retreat to Victory” (London, Sidgwick and 
Jackson). 
49 Smart, N (2003) “British Strategy and Politics During the Phony War” (Westwood, 
Praeger) 
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either Derry’s OH volume or the majority of secondary accounts.50 
Kiszely’s Anatomy of a Campaign51 is the most insightful and 
considered account of the battle for Norway, covering actual 
operations with a more analytical eye than many other accounts.  
The concept of the army as an organisation within which 
officers could be part of a network, be it formal or informal, by virtue 
of their professional connections as their careers developed and 
enjoying the patronage of senior officers for whom they had worked 
is not new. As one example there were the competing, so-called 
“Rings” which developed around Field Marshals Lord Wolseley and 
Lord Roberts in the second half of the 19th century. These two Field 
Marshals actively sought to appoint officers who had served on 
campaign with them in Africa and India respectively, and such 
patronage is identified and well established in the literature.52 Authors 
such as David French, Brian Bond and Timothy Harrison-Place have 
identified General officers of the Second World War who actively 
encouraged the careers of those they had encountered earlier. This 
was either when they were their commanding officers or instructed 
                                                          
50 These are Brigadier The Honourable William Fraser, of 24th Guards Brigade; 
Brigadier Colin Gubbins of “SCISSORFORCE” and Brigadier Douglas Hogg, 
Commander Base Area Adalsnes. Derry (1952) refers.  
51 Kiszeley, J. (2017) “Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940” 
(Cambridge, Cambridge UP). 
52 Examples include Spiers, E. (1980) “The Army and Society 1815-1914” (London, 
Longman); Brice, C. (2013) “The Thinking Man’s Soldier: The Life and Career of Sir 
Henry Brackenbury 1837-1914” examines the impact of such patronage on one of 
Wolseley’s acolytes both for good and ill when the former was perceived to have 
slighted the latter in his later career.  
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them in officer training establishments such as the Staff Colleges at 
Camberley or Quetta.  
In his edited diaries it is apparent that once appointed CIGS, Sir 
Alan Brooke had his favourites and protégés – not least Bernard 
Montgomery. Montgomery had built a solid reputation as a trainer, 
particularly of officers, when on the Directing Staff at the Army Staff 
College, Camberley whilst still in his 20s and later as Chief Instructor 
at the Staff College at Quetta in India.53 (British Army officers serving 
in India were not excluded from attending Camberley, but if serving 
in India at the time were preferred to attend the latter). His elevation 
to Divisional command at the age of 51 did not necessarily indicate 
his being singularly ahead of his contemporaries, some of whom such 
as Bernard Freyberg and Harold Alexander achieved it whilst still in 
their mid-40s. In this regard, Montgomery was not a particularly 
“networked” officer and he stands almost atypically to the thesis of 
interconnected officers prior to the outbreak of the Second World 
War. Brooke’s promotion after Dunkirk opened the door for 
Montgomery’s advancement after his creditable performance in 
command of the 3rd Division in France. Montgomery was also ready to 
advance the careers of those officers who had gained his approval 
before, during and later in the war. He was, however, equally ready 
to dispose of those who either did not live up to his standards or 
                                                          
53 Danchev and Todman (2001), ibid.  
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represented a different command regime to his, however 
successful.54 For example, when in command in North West Europe, 
Montgomery did not employ officers who had performed successfully 
in Tunisia with Kenneth Anderson’s First Army, such as Dick Mc 
Creery and Anderson himself, even though they had both performed 
well in France in 1940.  Brooke’s patronage could also be curtailed if 
someone who had previously come to his attention in favourable 
terms no longer performed successfully in the field. A rare exception 
was Neil Ritchie, towards whom Brooke remained disposed even after 
his failure in the Western Desert.  
This research broadens the basis of this analysis to go beyond 
key factors identified in other studies, such as regimental connections, 
officer education and shared active service. Works such as 
Regimental Identities by David French and his paper on Divisional 
commanders in the British Army of the Second World War, An 
Extensive Use of Weedkiller and studies on the Victorian and 
Edwardian Army (whose influence would endure) by authors such as 
Edward Spiers in The Army and Society 1815-191455  and Ian Beckett 
in A British Profession of Arms56 are examples of this approach. This 
thesis examines these areas, and others such as social and family 
                                                          
54 Danchev and Todman (2001), p. 78. 
23 Spiers, E. M. The Army and Society, 1815-1914 (London, Prentice Hall 1980) and 
The Late Victorian Army, 1868-1902 (Manchester, Manchester UP, 1992)    
56 Beckett, I. F. W. “A British Profession of Arms: The Politics of Command in the 
Late Victorian Army” (Oklahoma, Oklahoma UP, 2018) 
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connections, military sport and so on. Until now these areas have not 
been the subject of detailed research. 
Mark Frost’s unpublished 2017 PhD on the senior commanders 
of British Second Army,57 also looked at higher level command, such 
as those at Division or Corps. He considered these officers with 
respect to age, Staff College attendance and father’s profession but 
not at the level of detail in this thesis or consolidated across as many 
databases as used in this work. The end result, using information sets 
previously unexamined or used only in passing, is an examination of 
the careers of a representative set of professional officers from the 
inter-war period to the critical point of 1940 and after. Going beyond 
traditional military and institutional factors, it looks at the inter-war 
army as a connected body and social entity to show how such 
networking influenced either advancement or professional survival 
after two major operational failures.  
Although charges of nepotism in senior appointments can be 
rebuffed in the 20th century, with checks and balances such as the 
requirement for appointments to be approved by the Army Council, 
the army’s senior decision-making body, it would be impossible 
completely to eradicate all traces of patronage, although there is a 
distinction between patronage, which could be backed by objective 
                                                          
57 Frost, M. R. Preparation is Key: The effect of the pre-war years on Senior 
Command in the British Army, 1944-45” (Unpublished PhD thesis, King’s College 
London 2017) 
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appreciation of ability, and favouritism. French identified that Brooke 
and Montgomery used patronage “assiduously” to promote merit and 
professionalism among those they taught when instructors at the 
Staff College and after, but equally appreciated that use of it had to 
be judicious, or it could reflect back to the patron to their own 
disadvantage.58 Personal knowledge of an officer selected for 
advancement can smooth the process, as in any other form of official 
service. This research aims to determine the interconnections on 
various levels and indicate their extent, both known and previously 
unknown.  
Social Composition of the Army and the group of Brigadiers in 
particular 
 
The social composition of the army between the wars has been 
covered in the literature to some extent, most notably in Brian Bond’s 
British Military Policy Between The Two World Wars59 which addresses 
the problems of an army re-establishing itself as a professional force 
after a period of massive expansion and transformation into a citizen 
army in less than five years, and its equally rapid contraction from 
the early 1920s – leaving a surfeit of young, comparatively senior 
                                                          
58 French, D. “Colonel Blimp and the British Army: British Divisional Commanders in 
the War against Germany, 1939-1945” The English Historical Review, Vol. 111, No. 
444 (Nov., 1996), pp. 1182-1201 
59 Bond, B. (1980,) “British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars” (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press). 
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officers. Bond describes the immediate period after the war as one of 
“contraction, fragmentation and uncertainty”.60  
Notwithstanding such a state of affairs, some pre-war regulars 
considered that a return to a regular force focussed on imperial 
policing would restore normal, pre-war soldiering. Many officers 
reverted to their substantive rank and spent several years climbing 
back up the seniority system before they regained their wartime 
standing of ten or fifteen years previously. An illustrative case is that 
of Brigadier Archibald Beauman. He had ended the First World War 
aged twenty-nine and in command of an infantry brigade as an Acting 
Brigadier-General. He had also been decorated twice. On his 
appointment to the first post-war Staff College course at Camberley 
in 1919 he had to revert to his substantive pre-war rank of Captain. 
It would take until 1932 for him to regain the rank of Colonel; he 
would retire briefly in 1938 and be granted only the honorary rank of 
Brigadier – he would be recalled in 1939 as a Temporary Brigadier.61  
According to Bond in British Military Policy Between The Two 
World Wars, a major problem for those seeking advancement was 
that retirement ages for senior officers were set too high. This 
created demoralising logjams at the top, leading promising officers to 
retire prematurely at the lack of promotion prospects.62 Many officers 
                                                          
60 Bond, B. (1980), p. 2. 
61 Beauman, A. B. (1960) “Then A Soldier: A Memoir” (London, Macmillan). 
62 Bond (1980), p. 53. 
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also spent periods languishing on half-pay when there were no 
appointments for them to fill, with no incentive to retire as doing so 
from half-pay would lead to a reduced pension.  
In 1937, the new Secretary of State for War, Leslie Hore-
Belisha, attempted to initiate reforms, firstly by dismissing the entire 
Army Council and by both reducing the mandatory retirement ages 
for General Officers and setting tenure limits for their posts. However, 
those below General Officer rank were not affected by these changes 
and reviewing them in retrospect with regard to preparations for the 
outbreak of war, the reform would prove to be too little too late.63 
Although Bond does to some extent examine the social makeup 
of the inter-war army, it is not to the extent of Spiers’64 work on the 
Victorian and pre-war army in the 1980s or of Bowman and 
Connelly’s for the period 1902-1914.65 Regular officers at the 
outbreak of war in 1939 would not be atypical to their forbears of 
1914, being predominantly products of the major and lesser public 
schools. A further minority within the overall 1940 group were those 
officers who had attended public school and university. This latter 
group was dominated by the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. 
                                                          
63 Bond (1980), p. 46. 
64 Spiers, E. M. (1980), “The Army and Society 1815-1914” (Themes in British 
Social History Series) London; Longman] 
27 Bowman, T. and Connelly, M. (2012) “The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training 
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Bowman and Connelly contend that it is “difficult to define a uniquely 
Edwardian officer corps”66 as its senior officers had begun their 
careers in the 1870s; even battalion commanders at the outbreak of 
the First World War were officers of the 1880s and ‘90s, and veterans 
of the Second Boer War, 1899-1902. The brigadiers of 1940 group, 
who were inter-war regular soldiers, were either products of the pre-
First World War era or commissioned, mainly, during the early period 
of the war itself.  
David French argues that even before the First World War a 
commission in the army could not be viewed as the refuge for the 
dissolute sons of the landed gentry, a trend he notes as declining 
whilst at the same time, what he terms the self-replication of sons 
following fathers into the army was increasing. The latter trend, 
French suggests, would accelerate through the 1930s. But the 
primary source for potential officers would remain the public 
schools.67 A point of agreement in Bond and French is that the inter-
war army was a dubious choice for a fulfilling and constant career. 
Promotion logjams, a lack of active service and opportunities to show 
worth which would invite accelerated promotion caused difficulties 
which were not easily overcome in the 1920s and 1930s,   
                                                          
66 Bowman and Connelly (2012), p. 7. 
67 French, D. (2000) “Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War 
Against Germany 1919-45” (Oxford; Oxford University Press), p. 51. 
POINT OF FAILURE 





French’s conclusions are also in harmony with the work of the 
sociologist C.B. Otley, who examined the social backgrounds of 
British Army officers in a series of works in the 1970s.68 Otley’s 
findings indicated that the influence of the upper classes was eroded 
by the abolition of the system of purchase of commissions in the 
1870s but endured, albeit reduced, due to the dominance of the 
products of the public schools in the body of officers.  
 Choice of regiment could also influence one’s rate of progress 
up the promotions ladder, with Royal Artillery officers suffering the 
worst and Guards officers coming off best (as shown in Blaxland’s 
remark concerning Harold Alexander’s advancement to Major General 
at the relatively youthful age of 45 in 1940 being attributed to his 
being a Guards officer confirms this).69 Gunner officers could remain 
subalterns for as long as seventeen years, whereas Guards officers 
could, in the same period, rise to command their battalions, or be 
serving elsewhere in a Lieutenant Colonel’s post. 
Professional Education of Officers 
The main avenues for higher professional education of officers beyond 
that conducted within their battalions and equivalents were the 
Senior Officers’ School at Sheerness; the Staff Colleges at Camberley 
and Quetta in India (in 1940 a wartime outstation of the Staff College 
                                                          
68 Discussed in more detail below, on p.139 
69 See p.54 
POINT OF FAILURE 





was also established at Haifa in Palestine but ran short wartime 
courses which did not award a p.s.c. qualification); and from 1927 
the Imperial Defence College at Seaford House in London. It is well 
established that Camberley in particular was a source of “talent 
spotting” for future commanders and David French70 specifically notes 
Alan Brooke’s tenure as an instructor at Camberley in 1924-25 and 
how he would later advance the careers of his most promising 
students.  
Wider studies of patronage networks at the Staff College in the 
inter-war period are made more difficult by the fact that many 
records – by the Staff College’s own admission – were destroyed due 
to an “administrative decision” in 1940.71 The Staff College Archives 
are maintained by the Joint Command and Staff College (JCSC) 
Library at Shrivenham. The Staff List of the Staff College was known 
as “The Camberley Pink” and the JCSC provided a listing for the inter-
war period from their database. In the inter-war period, the 
instructors and students at Camberley and Quetta were laid out in 
The Army List, but for the Senior Officers’ School only the Directing 
Staff is listed. No list of the graduates of the Senior Officers’ School 
exists as a single, consolidated entity. 
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It has been possible to reconstruct and fill some gaps from the 
annual publication of lists of graduates from the College which were 
published in The Times. These usually appeared in February or March 
of the year following the end of the course the previous December, 
but there are gaps which break continuity for example in 1924 
reflecting the graduates of 1923 (this was reconstructed using the 
Staff College’s internal annual journal, Owl Pie, held at the British 
Library); for Quetta, complete lists for 1926, 1927 and 1928 did not 
appear, although shorter notes headed “among those graduating” 
were published for 1926 and 1927.   
Of two studies published on the history of the Staff College in 
the 20th Century, Godwin-Austen’s 1927 work The Staff and the Staff 
College, whilst illuminating as to the evolution of the college when it 
reopened after the First World War, is rather colloquial and lacks 
identification of many attendees.72 It does, however, underline the 
importance of the Staff College Drag (the College hunt) as a social 
body, referring to the rivalry between officers to occupy committee 
positions in it. Gregory Kennedy contends that there was also a 
practical function to the Drag; it allowed the Directing Staff to assess 
which students were able to remain mentally alert whilst physically 
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tired, vital in an efficient staff officer.73 Hunting and polo were also 
considered advantageous in this regard. One wonders whether such 
skills may have been more successfully achieved in field exercises, of 
which there were few on the syllabus.  
A recent biography of General Sir Richard McCreery highlights 
the struggle between the then Captains McCreery and Claude 
Nicholson when fellow students at Camberley for the post of 
Secretary of the Drag. 74 A generation earlier, in 1896, Douglas Haig 
and Edmund Allenby, both of whom rose to be Field Marshals and 
ennobled, had also been rivals for the same position. Allenby 
prevailed because “nobody wanted D.H.”75  In the 1920s, Nicholson 
prevailed, but both officers remained on friendly terms.  
During the Second World War, McCreery would command, first, 
an Armoured Brigade in France in 1940 and later Eighth Army in the 
Mediterranean. Nicholson was captured in command of 30 Brigade 
defending Calais in May 1940 and died in captivity in 1943. The 
second account of the Staff College, published by the College’s 
Librarian to mark the centenary of its founding in 1958, is a collection 
                                                          
73 French, D. (2002) “Officer Training in the British Army 1919-1939” in Kennedy, 
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of short accounts in a small volume by various authors.76 Of most 
immediate use to this research is the third part of the chapter Four 
Generations of Staff College Students - 1930 by Brigadier C.N. 
Barclay, himself an author of Second World War regimental and 
divisional histories.77 Barclay admits that he found attendance at 
Camberley “…to be a great advantage in later life. In whatever part of 
the world one later served, and in whatever capacity, there was 
certain to be a few “old boys” of Camberley days.”78 
French further points out in his 2002 essay on senior officers’ 
promotion patterns, 1919-1939 published in the collection The British 
General Staff: Reform and Innovation79 that a Staff College 
qualification (be it from Camberley or Quetta) became a pre-requisite 
for advancement from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s as former 
Staff College graduates, instructors and Commandants sought out 
those similarly qualified or to “talent spot” those they had taught. 
Indeed, all senior appointments made by Field Marshal Sir Cyril 
Deverell during his tenure as CIGS in 1936-37 were Staff College 
graduates.80 The expansion programme of the army from 1938 
                                                          
76 Young, Lt Col. F. W. (1958) Published for the Staff College by Gale and Polden 
Ltd, Aldershot. 
77 Young (1958), pp. 25-28. 
78 Barclay, Brigadier C. N. in Young (1958), p. 26. 
79 French, D. “An Extensive Use of Weedkiller: Patterns of Promotion in senior ranks 
of the British Army, 1919-1939” in D. French and B. Holden-Reid (2002) “The 
British General Staff: Reform and Innovation” (London; Frank Cass). 
80 French (2002) in French & Holden-Reid, p. 168. 
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meant that demand soon exceeded supply. As a result, several 
brigadiers in the group, including several in fighting commands, were 
not graduates of either Camberley or Quetta. 81   
As noted above, the Senior Officers’ School is less well 
documented. It was established originally in Aldershot in 1915 as a 
temporary wartime expedient but was put on a permanent footing in 
1920 and eventually relocated to Sheerness. Its function was to 
prepare senior Majors for battalion command, but throughout the 
1920s its curriculum expanded to include non-military subjects to 
further a wider geopolitical and technical view amongst its students. 
It was also, in modern terms,  a joint service establishment, with the 
Royal Navy sending Lieutenant Commanders and the Royal Air Force, 
Squadron Leaders to take part in the course. The School was 
unpopular with some senior officers, who felt that the professional 
development of junior officers was the role of their local commanders 
– an increasingly outdated view as officer training developed along 
more professional lines and also attempted to instil a coherent and 
uniform doctrine. The lack of comprehensive records on the school in 
TNA or elsewhere has rendered it impossible to achieve a complete 
listing of staff and students at Sheerness, although as noted above 
the Directing Staff were named in The Army List. Some of the officers 
                                                          
81 “Fighting” commands in this context suggests officers commanding infantry or 
armoured brigades, and officers holding the position of “Commander, Royal 
Artillery” at Divisional level. 
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in the group served as instructors at the School and are listed later in 
this work.   
  There are some articles in the Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institution (RUSI) of the inter-war period which suggest that 
the School’s existence was controversial and its training was thought 
inadequate by some.82 Nonetheless, it had powerful supporters such 
as the-then CIGS, Field Marshal  Sir George Milne (CIGS 1928-1933), 
who felt that whilst local commanders lacked the time to perform 
such training (his belief was that they should devote one day a week 
to the training of their officers) the School was essential.83 The next 
educational step, for the select few, was attendance at the Imperial 
Defence College, founded in 192784 and intended to prepare officers 
of the British and Imperial armed forces, with some senior civil 
servants, for higher posts in the military and government. The 
syllabus was intended to go beyond purely military subjects and 
encourage greater strategic thought and vision. The college closed on 
the outbreak of war; of the group of one hundred and fifty-six officers 
in this thesis, nine attended, mostly in the early 1930s. All advanced 
beyond Brigadier during the Second World War, as discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
                                                          
82 For example, Sandilands, Col H. R. “The Case for the Senior Officers’ School” 
(Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, Vol. 73 Issue 490 May 1928, pp. 
235-238) Sandilands was a senior instructor at the School. 
83 French (2002) in Kennedy and Neilson (2002). 
84 Now, and since 1970 the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) 
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Structure of the thesis 
This thesis has six chapters. After this introduction, the second 
chapter considers the educational and family backgrounds of the 
officers in the group and the regiments into which they were 
originally commissioned. It examines the trends or groupings which 
may have developed among the attendees of schools and through 
service with regiments. The third chapter covers the period 1919-
1939, and considers, firstly, the further professional education and 
training of the officers in the group. Examined next is the possible 
influence and impact on their careers of overseas postings, 
particularly those in garrison, staff or operational roles, in a period 
when opportunities for active service were scarce. Chapter 4 is a 
closer examination of those officers in the group who advanced in 
rank between 1940-1945, looking to determine further trends and 
traits which may have contributed to their professional success after 
1940.  
Chapter 5 employs the methodology used to examine the 1940 
group, but in a slightly reduced format (to employ the full 
methodology would lead to a thesis worthy of a standalone work) to 
look at brigadiers serving in fighting formations which landed in 
France on, and for a period immediately following, D-Day, 6 June 
1944. The intention of this chapter is to determine how, or if, the 
criteria for advancement to Brigadier had altered after four further 
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years of active service, if the notional profile of a typical Brigadier had 
changed and if so, to compare them. The final chapter draws together 
the findings and conclusions.  
Although the officer cadres of the British Army of the World 
Wars, and to a lesser extent of the period 1919-1939 has been 
extensively studied in the literature, no previous work has looked into 
the social and professional backgrounds of its officers in such detail, 
and doubly so for officers at this level. Studies of future senior 
commanders exist in the literature (including some officers included 
in this group) but they have not compared those who progressed 
against those who did not in pursuit of potential characteristics and 
connections to explain success, or its absence. The addition of the 
Normandy chapter also seeks to identify whether the requirements 
for officers in a fighting command by the later part of the Second 
World War had evolved in the intervening years; from an army which 
had suffered two simultaneous strategic defeats, to one moving 
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Chapter 2  
Education, Regiment and Family 
 
“The Army knows the debt it owes to the Public Schools.” 1 
General Sir William Robertson 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff,  
Address at Bradfield College, November 1916 
 
The intention of this chapter is, firstly, to examine the educational 
backgrounds of all the officers in the 1940 group to determine the 
impact of their schooling on their subsequent advancement, or lack 
thereof, after 1940. It will also investigate whether certain schools were 
prevalent in the production and supply of officers serving in 1940. From 
this, it will consider whether groupings of former pupils from those 
schools were significant over other institutions for advancement, for 
example if Old Etonians were singularly significant over those from 
other schools. Secondly, there is an examination of the regiments into 
which officers were originally commissioned, both to determine whether 
certain schools directed their pupils to certain regiments, or that 
belonging to particular regiments was advantageous for promotion. 
Finally, this chapter examines the family backgrounds of the officers in 
the group, looking at how many were the sons of military officers or 
other eminent persons, in order to examine the social composition of 
the group. The combination of education and family background is 
                                                          
1 Quoted in Blackie, J. (1976) “Bradfield 1850-1975“(Bradfield, Bradfield College), p. 
44. 
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assessed to determine certain presumptions as to the prevailing social 
status of those officers who formed the 1940 group.  
 
Initial Education 
Initial bonds between individuals can be formed during the period when 
they are in education undergoing long periods of teaching and sports. In 
the case of boarders at public schools, communal living in school 
dormitories can promote enduring connections between those who 
shared the experience simultaneously. It has been possible to confirm 
the educational background of all but two of the officers in the group 
studied. Six did not fit the traditional pattern of education,2 by far the 
majority, 84%, were taught at British public schools.3  
Authors such as Spiers,4 Simpson5 and Sheffield6 have shown 
that, certainly in the early period of the First World War up to late 1915, 
the selection and recruitment of officers sought to replicate the social 
foundations of the pre-war army. An officer would preferably be public 
school educated and from the upper tiers of society, for choice from 
                                                          
2 For example, Crocker was home schooled; two officers were from Grammar Schools 
and one was educated in Australia. 
3 For the purposes of this chapter, schools which were members of the Clarendon 
Group and/or the Headmasters’ Conference are considered to be public schools.  
4 Spiers, E. M. “The Regular Army” in Beckett and Simpson (eds. 1985, Manchester) 
“A Nation in Arms”, pp. 36-61. 
5 Simpson, K. “The Officers” (Beckett and Simpson 1985), pp. 85-86. 
6 Sheffield, G. (2000) “Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations on the 
Western Front” (London, Macmillan). 
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wealthy families who could provide a private income to their sons to 
supplement their army salary. The latter, especially in regiments 
deemed “fashionable” or of high social standing such as the Guards, 
cavalry regiments or infantry regiments which did not recruit from 
county areas,7 was often inadequate to meet the considerable costs of 
life as an army officer. In the period 1914-1916 professional 
competence took second place to social acceptability and an ability to fit 
into an officers’ mess, regardless of whether a candidate had been a 
member of the Officer Training Corps (OTC) at public school or received 
any form of military education. However, nearly half of the overall 
group, some seventy-four officers, had left their schools before the OTC 
system was fully embodied under the Haldane Reforms of 1908.8 It had 
two Divisions, the Junior Division established in the school system, and 
the Senior Division established in universities. Prior to 1908, some, but 
not all, public schools possessed school contingents of the Rifle 
Volunteer Corps. 
As the war progressed, casualty rates increased, and the army 
expanded, the demand for officers would outstrip the ability of the 
traditional routes of supply such as the public schools, the scions of the 
gentry, the clergy, the land-owning classes, and the sons and younger 
                                                          
7 In particular, the King’s Royal Rifle Corps and the Rifle Brigade in England and the 
Royal Irish Rifles in Ireland. 
8 The OTC system was incorporated as a contingent of the new Territorial Force in 
October 1908, in accordance with Army Order 160 of July 1908, which itself was a 
result of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907 (7 Edw. 7, c.9). 
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relatives of officers. The class-based bar would lower as more officers 
were promoted from the ranks on the basis of practical and battle 
experience. An officer could no longer be considered automatically to be 
”a gentleman” on the basis of their birth and upbringing - and almost 
all9 army officers were expected to have the social standing of 
‘gentlemen’, a tradition which could trace its origins back beyond the 
Napoleonic Wars. Laurence James argues that its basis lies in the 
warrior elite which controlled British society after the Romans, whose10 
political and territorial authority was founded on their success on the 
battlefield.11 The Duke of Wellington noted that the necessary 
“character” of an officer was “Due to the officer exclusively, the man of 
education, manners, honesty, and other qualities required by education 
which English gentlemen receive…”12 Character was the trait that most 
clearly defined a gentleman, even more than wealth or birth, and it was 
character that was the most desirable trait in a potential officer. 
Anthony Clayton notes that social norms were upheld in the inter-war 
period, citing as an example that “at least ninety percent” of officers 
                                                          
9 Officers promoted from the ranks to fill specialist posts such as Quartermasters, 
riding and musketry instructors were not expected to be of similar social standing.  
10 Clayton, A. (2006) “The British Officer” (London, Longman Pearson) p.156; Clayton 
cites “The History of the Royal Artillery 1918-1938” (Woolwich, Royal Artillery 
Institution 1978) p.15, 
11 James, L. (2001) “Warrior Race: The British Experience of War from Roman Times 
to the Present” (London: Little, Brown), pp. 288-90. 
12 Cited in Blanco, Richard “Reform and Wellington’s Post Waterloo Army, 1815-1854,” 
Military Affairs 29, no. 3 (1965), p. 130. 
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serving in the (amalgamated, post-1924) Royal Artillery had received a 
public school education at the “better known” schools. 13 
Yet this gentlemanly ideal, which army officers were deemed to 
embody, was predominantly transmitted from generation to generation 
via Britain’s public schools, from which many officers and specifically 
among the group studied in this thesis, the majority, were drawn. 
Rupert Wilkinson’s characterization of the public school gentlemen 
underlines the importance of officers as being gentlemen: “It is…true 
that a prime characteristic of the public school gentleman ideal was to 
attach great importance to a dignified bearing and aura of command. 
Such leadership qualities were readily identified with character – a 
confusion of manners with the morals they were means to symbolize”.14  
  By the middle of 1916, as officer recruitment shifted more 
towards selection on grounds of experience and ability, all prospective 
officers were expected to have spent some time in the ranks and to 
have been trained in an Officer Cadet Battalion. These later entrants 
were unofficially labelled “Temporary Gentlemen”, indicating that the 
bearer was an officer only for the duration of hostilities. It was worn 
half mockingly as a badge of honour by those deemed so to be, even 
                                                          
13 Clayton, A. (2006) “The British Officer” (London, Longman Pearson) p.156; Clayton 
cites “The History of the Royal Artillery 1918-1938” (Woolwich, Royal Artillery 
Institution 1978) p.15, 
14 R. Wilkinson (1964) “Gentlemanly Power: British Leadership and the Public School 
Tradition (London: Oxford University Press), pp 13-14. 
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though some, especially soldier-poets such as Siegfried Sassoon and 
Robert Graves detested the term.15 The origins of the term are unclear, 
but it was in popular use in Britain by 1916, when a book of letters was 
published, with War Office permission, under the title “A ‘Temporary 
Gentleman’ in France: Home Letters from an Officer at the Front”.16 Its 
“editor” – in fact its author - Captain A.J. Dawson, a pre-war traveller 
and author, had been commissioned into a Service Battalion of The 
Border Regiment in 1914, but was invalided to home service in 1915. 
The traditional view was that if one was a gentleman, one was born and 
died a gentleman. The status was conferred by birth and education. But 
being an officer in the British Army also indicated gentlemanly status, 
the “officer and gentleman,” and the connection continued despite 
lower-class men being offered temporary and artificial elevation to it. 
Dawson himself – much older than the usual New Army officer as he 
was 43 when commissioned – uses the term in gentle self-mockery as 
he was from humble origins and had not had the typical education of an 
“officer and a gentleman”.17  
                                                          
15 Despite this, both men held “Permanent” commissions by virtue of their having 
been commissioned via the Special Reserve, a route taken by some which bypassed 
the military academies. See Root, Laura, "Temporary Gentlemen” on the Western 
Front: Class Consciousness and the British Army Officer, 1914-1918" (2006). All 
Volumes (2001-2008). Paper 72. Available from 
http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/ojii_volumes/72. 
16 Dawson, Capt. A. J. (1916) “Temporary Gentleman in France: Home Letters form an 
Officer at the Front”; (London; George Putnam’s). 
17 Root (2006), p. 2. 
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The officers in the group studied in this thesis were predominantly 
products of the pre-war system. There was one exception; Brigadier 
Sidney Rice, who was a civilian put into uniform as a member of the 
Regular Army Reserve of Officers. This was to allow him to serve with 
GHQ BEF as its Chief Financial Adviser by virtue of his expertise and 
was in no sense a professional soldier (and does not feature further in 
this analysis contained in this thesis),18 the majority of the group were 
products of the pre-First World War period. Five were commissioned 
during the reign of Queen Victoria; sixty-two under King Edward VII and 
forty-three under King George V from 1911-1913 prior to the outbreak 
of the First World War. 1914 itself produced a spike – indeed, it 
produced the single highest annual number of commissions among the 
group – but the advent and outbreak of war is behind this.19 Only 
thirty-nine officers of the one hundred and fifty-six in the group gained 
their commissions after 1913, with two brigadiers, exceptionally young 
in 1940 terms, being commissioned in the 1920s. The majority, 
therefore, were products of the Victorian/Edwardian officer selection 
and training process – and the social norms which applied to it. Thus, 
an officer who reached Brigadier’s rank in 1940 would have had over 
                                                          
18 Rice ended the war as the Chief Accountant of the War Office (HYAL Jan 1945). 
19 Sidney Noel Rice, who served as the Chief Financial Adviser to GHQ BEF as a 
Brigadier, but was appointed CBE (Civil Division) in the New Year’s Honours List as 
“Chief Accountant, War Office” London Gazette, 1 January 1941, p. 14. 
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twenty years’ experience in uniform, even if they had retired but were 
recalled in 1939-1940.  
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Chart 1: 1940 brigadiers
By Year Of First Commissioning
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The six officers in the group who were not educated via the public 
school system, and therefore represent the sole significant deviation 
from the norm, were as follows. One, John Crocker, was home schooled 
both due to a respiratory ailment which precluded him attending 
conventional school and to the premature death of his father, leaving 
his mother to cope with his four other siblings.20 Only Gordon Gill, 
commander of the Nantes Sub-Area was a Grammar School pupil 
among the 1940 group, although he was later educated at the 
University of Cambridge.21 Tommy Clifton, who commanded 2nd Light 
Reconnaissance Brigade in the BEF spent seven years in the ranks of 
the Royal Field Artillery before being commissioned as an infantry 
officer and did not attend public or grammar school.  
The remaining officers attended thirty-five different public schools 
at varying times. No single school absolutely dominates the group, 
although Eton with twelve former pupils and Cheltenham, Wellington 
and Winchester with nine each, figure prominently. As Sheffield points 
out,22 by the outbreak of war in 1914, most officers had followed the 
path of public school followed by initial officer training either at the 
                                                          
20 Commander, 3rd Armoured Brigade in the BEF; later a Corps Commander in North 
West Europe and Adjutant General. See Delaney, D. (2011) “Corps Commanders: Five 
British and Canadian Generals at War, 1939–45” (Vancouver, University of British 
Columbia Press) pp. 122-123: and Delaney, D. (2007) "A Quiet Man of Influence: 
General Sir John Crocker". Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research Vol 85 
(Autumn 2007): pp. 185–207. 
21. See Venn, J. (2011) “Alumni Cantabrigienses: A Biographical List of All Known 
Students, Graduates and Holders of Office at the University of Cambridge, from the 
Earliest Times to 1900 Volume 2. From 1752 to 1900”, p. 51. 
22 Sheffield (2000), pp. 2, 8. 
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Royal Military College, Sandhurst (RMC, for infantry or cavalry officers) 
or the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich (RMA, for Artillery, Engineer 
and technical officers). Some would circumvent this via commissions in 
the Militia, the Special Reserve or via service in the Officers’ Training 
Corps at school (the Junior Division) or university (the Senior Division). 
The only two officers, educated at public school but not schools which 
were members of the Clarendon Group or HMC were William Ramsden 
(Bath College) and George Sutton (Kersal School).   
A university education was much less common, as it was a 
minority experience across the country overall, as it remains. The 
percentage of the UK population in higher education did not rise above 
3% until the 1950s. Although twenty-one officers in the group of one 
hundred and fifty-six were graduates, 13% of the total, they would 
remain a minority group within a minority of the population, being both 
army officers and graduates.23 Oxford and Cambridge Universities 
predominate in this list, though no individual colleges of those 
universities are pre-eminent. It is noteworthy that the representation of 
graduates was four times the norm across society in general, coming 
from the social classes which produced army officers, and the ability to 
                                                          
 Sheffield (2000), pp. 2, 8 
23 Bolton, P. (2012) “Education: Historical Statistics” (Standard Note SN/SG/4252, 27 
November 2012 (London; House of Commons Library); Statistics from House of 
Commons Library Report SN/SG/4252: “Education: Historical Statistics” published 27 
November 2012. Table G “Higher Education” p. 13 and Table 8, “Students Obtaining 
University Degrees”, p. 20. 
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fund a public school education, a university education and enable their 
sons to afford an army career.  
 In the period after the First World War, the old preferences 
began to reassert themselves, where officers who did not “fit in” would 
face varying degrees of ostracism and even pressure to leave the army. 
The future brigadiers considered here had already proved themselves 
suitable to be considered permanent officers by virtue of their active 
service, many having decorations for gallantry and distinguished service 
during the past war or between the wars, which would lend them an 
advantage in resisting and overcoming such pressures in comparison to 
contemporaries without them.24  
The first, enlarged, post-war course at the Staff College, 
Camberley in 1919 opened to officers who had particularly distinguished 
themselves in the past war and who might not otherwise have gained 
entrance via the traditional routes of competition by examination or 
nomination by a senior officer. Beauman notes in his memoir that his 
possession of a DSO and two MCs was probably more influential than 
his command of a battalion, and temporarily a brigade, while still in his 
twenties on the Western Front. The impact on career prospects through 
the possession of decorations for gallantry or distinguished service is 
discussed separately in a forthcoming chapter. Equally, they also 
                                                          
24 Beauman (1960), p. 2. 
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survived a period of retrenchment in defence spending in the 1920s and 
early 1930s where many other officers retired either voluntarily or 
forcibly. As Bond indicates,25 the system of placing under-employed 
officers on half-pay in the 1920s and 1930s did not encourage officers, 
especially those without private means or supplementary incomes, to 
leave the army and free up the seniority list. The effect on an officer’s 
pension was also a factor, as described earlier (p.45).  
Even those few in the group who entered as “Temporary 
Gentlemen” in and after 1916 were deemed sufficiently suitable by their 
peers and superiors to remain in the army and convert to permanent 
commissions. Sheffield contends that overall, officer candidates who 
emerged from outside the traditional paths were quickly inculcated with 
the officer class ethos founded on the basis of a public school 
education.26 Bond suggests that the massive expansion of the officer 
corps between 1914 and 1918, followed by an equally “breakneck” 
demobilisation in 1919-1920, left the post-war officer corps at a similar 
level to that of 1913 – but in command of a much smaller army. This 
would exacerbate the problems of advancement; too many officers for 
too few placements where they might distinguish themselves for 
promotion.27  
                                                          
25 Bond (1980), p. 46. 
26 Sheffield (2000), p. 2. 
27 Bond (1980), p. 44. 
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Although a public school education is sufficiently prominent 
among the officers to lead one to conclude that it was a pre-requisite 
(albeit an implied rather than a mandated one) to remain in the army 
and build a career after the First World War, the group is not dominated 
by the seven “great” public schools and the two day schools of the 
Clarendon Group (CG).28  Schools from the Headmasters’ Conference 
(HMC) are more frequently represented, but there were more schools in 
the HMC than the CG.29 Although individuals may be separated during 
their time at a public school by virtue of being in different school houses 
and different starting times, mixing only on communal activity such as 
sport, chapel or the OTC, such distinctions diminish after leaving, 
becoming substituted by a broader allegiance to the school as a whole – 
encapsulated in terms such as “the old boys’ network” or “the old school 
tie”.  
                                                          
28 So-called after the 1861-64 Clarendon Commission established to investigate the 
management of nine schools after complaints over the running of Eton College; the 
Public Schools Act of 1868 resulted. The schools of this group were Eton, 
Charterhouse, Harrow, Rugby, Shrewsbury, Westminster and Winchester; the day 
schools were St. Paul’s and Merchant Taylors. ’Shrosbree, Colin (1988). “Public 
Schools and Private Education: The Clarendon Commission, 1861-64, and the Public 
Schools Acts” (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p. 12. 
29 The Headmasters’ Conference (since 1996, The Headmasters and Headmistress’ 
Conference) was formed in 1869, when Edward Thring, Headmaster of Uppingham, 
invited some sixty other headmasters to convene and form a grouping of schools and 
have an annual conference. Fourteen accepted, but membership expanded 
considerably up to the First World War and beyond. Clarendon schools are also 
members of the HC, for example, Eton. Membership of the HC is widely accepted to 
define what constitutes a “public school” in the United Kingdom. See Leinster-Mackay, 
D. P. (1987) “The educational world of Edward Thring: a centenary study” (London, 
Falmer Press), p. 100. 
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Therefore, it can be determined that among this group of officers 
who continued as professional soldiers after the First World War, 
regardless of their means of initial entry to the profession of army 
officer, products of the public school system reasserted their dominance 
of it in the inter-war period. In the difficult economic times of the 1920s 
and early 1930s, officers deemed suitable to remain in the army may 
also have done so in the absence of opportunity or qualification to work 
elsewhere. As the army contracted following demobilisation and the 
retrenchment in public spending following the recommendations of the 
Committee on National Expenditure chaired by Sir Eric Geddes in 1921, 
the army would revert to recreating its social basis among those who 
elected or were selected to remain as regular officers with permanent 
commissions in the post-war army. Bond observes that many officers 
commissioned from the ranks, or “ranker officers” as they were known 
to further highlight their separation from the mainstream, wondered 
whether they could survive as the pre-war regimental system and 
traditions reasserted itself.30 Furthermore, E.S. Turner wrote in his 
study Gallant Gentlemen “men who had kept their nerve in the trenches 
lost it on the social front and resigned.”31  
                                                          
30 Bond (1980), p. 44-45. 
31 Turner, E. (1956) “Gallant Gentlemen: A Portrait of the British Officer, 1660-1956” 
(London, Joseph), p. 294. 
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Seldon and Walsh32 seek to reclaim the public school ethos from 
its detractors and critics, a position they contend has been prevalent in 
the popular conception of the British officer since the 1960s. They 
suggest that public schoolboys were not all the “bluff, anti-intellectual, 
sporting hearties of popular image”,33 and their focus on instilling values 
of “duty, service to others and personal responsibility, as well as 
courage and loyalty” grounded in classical philosophies stands.34 
However, this may be expected of a former headmaster and senior 
master of eminent public schools, as the authors are, Seldon having 
been Master of Wellington and Walsh, among other appointments, a 
master at Tonbridge.  
Sheffield challenges the generally negative position adopted by 
Parker, suggesting that a reliance on sport, or “the cult of athleticism” 
both channelled aggression into co-operation and developed self- and 
team discipline. On entering an institution (the army) where sporting 
prowess was equally prized, such ability would impress the men who 
had spectated at games such as football. Parallels were also drawn to 
cricket as “a form of stalking” and how polo developed stamina, with 
hunting also doing this, as well as promoting an eye for the ground and 
decision-making when physically tired.35 The latter was re-emphasized 
                                                          
32 Seldon, A. and Walsh, D. (2013) “Public Schools and The Great War: A Generation 
Lost” (Bradford, Pen and Sword). 
33 Seldon and Walsh (2013), p. 5. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Sheffield (2000), pp. 47-48. 
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to officers attending the Staff College, especially at Camberley, in the 
inter-war years.  
Schoolboys were inculcated with honour codes based on ancient 
history and philosophy and encouraged to believe that they were born 
into a class intended to lead, although in the latter nineteenth century, 
Kipling’s writings had also emphasized the paternalistic, courageous and 
self-denying virtues of those appointed over the ‘working classes’ of the 
soldiery to lead them. Equally, these men came to expect the 
demonstration of such virtues.36        
Horace Vachell’s novel The Hill,37 published in 1905, also gave an 
idealised view of the public school experience, based on his own time at 
Harrow in the 1870s. However, his portrayal is of a school where the 
titled hold sway over the sons of the rising middle-classes. The latter 
were eager to acquire social status and therefore acquiesced in an 
inherent culture of random punishment, acting as servants, or 
“fagging”, for senior boys and the dominance of the sports field. Yet 
Vachell inclines to the romanticised view. Kipling’s own Stalky and Co38 
(published as a novel in 1899, following serialisation in a magazine) 
predates Vachell. In contrast, it presents “the College” as a school 
                                                          
36 Sheffield (2000), p. 53. 
37 Vachell, H. A. (1905) “The Hill: A Romance of Friendship” (London, John Murray). 
38 Kipling, R. (1899) “Stalky & Co” (London, Macmillan). 
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where there is no system of fagging. Chapel features less prominently 
and the classroom prevails over the sports field.  
Kipling’s hero, Stalky himself, was inspired by and based on Lionel 
Dunsterville, who retired as a Major General, latterly in command of his 
eponymous Dunsterforce, in Persia and the Black Sea during the First 
World War and after. Dunsterville’s command was a mixed multinational 
formation akin to modern special forces which both deterred a 
Germano-Turkish force from attacking India through the Transcaucasus 
and prevented the establishment there of a separate republic. In the 
book, Stalky, who feels he is assured a career in the army after school, 
pays less heed to academic subjects than of being active and dynamic, 
yet well read, something the college indulges.  
 Kipling’s boys are resourceful and patriotic without jingoism (and 
deriding of those who seek to invoke the latter).  Nevertheless, all the 
protagonists are shown, in adult life, as serving as imperial 
administrators and soldiers.  Whilst the book, and “the Coll” are not 
utterly devoid of cruelty and violence among the boys, overall, the book 
mocks other popular works from the Victorian schooldays canon.  
These include Frederick Farrar’s Eric, or Little by Little originally 
published in 1858 and in print for over fifty years. However, Kipling’s 
“College” in Stalky is an idealised version of his own, the United 
Services College (USC) at Westward Ho! Devon, described as 
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“something between a traditional public school and an army crammer”39 
established to educate the sons of army officers, ideally to become 
officers themselves or colonial and imperial administrators. The USC, 
absorbed by the Imperial Service College in 1906, was not a member of 
the Clarendon Group or the Headmasters’ Conference and despite its 
background would only produce one officer in this group, Cecil Haydon 
(1910-1914).  
Even Haileybury, which records on its website that a 1956 memoir 
of the school notes that “the College’s contribution to the British Army 
alone stands at one Field Marshal [Viscount Allenby], seven Generals, 
four Lieutenant Generals, thirty-two Major Generals and one hundred 
and six brigadiers”40 only produced two of the officers considered here. 
(Haileybury would amalgamate with the USC under the single 
Haileybury banner in 1942). 
Furthermore, Seldon and Walsh highlight that in the Great War 
public school educated officers were at risk of becoming fatalities at an 
inverse proportion to their number as a group within the army itself: 
Some 35,000 public schoolboys… died in the war out of a 
total of 900,000 dead; just over 3% of the total and less than 
2% of those who fought… [Public schoolboys] were to die at 
about twice the average of those who served. While 11% of 
those who served overall were to die as a direct result of the 
                                                          
39 Parker (1987), p. 59. 
40https://www.haileybury.com/explore/haileybury/heritage-archives/haileyburys-
military-heritage accessed 26 September 2016. 
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fighting, the figure for public schoolboys was 18%. Those who 
left between 1908 and 1915 were to die at even higher rates 
as they were most likely to be serving in the front line as 
junior officers.41 
For over one hundred and thirty officers42 of the group to have survived 
to the end of the First World War indicates that they were ahead, if only 
through good fortune, of the statistical trend. At least fifty-five of them 
left their schools during that critical time period recognised by Sheldon 
and Walsh. Whether the very fact that they had survived underlined and 
enhanced networks between these officers is difficult to prove with 
certainty, but subsequent commemoration of the dead within schools, 
universities and regiments can act as a unifying force between those 
with common experience, or communal connection.  
Messenger43 suggests that in the period 1914-1916, there was an 
institutional bias against candidates from the grammar schools 
presenting themselves for commissions, whether or not they had 
experience within the Junior Division of the OTC at school. He describes 
a system, certainly present in the autumn and winter of 1914 and into 
1915, where those from the public schools or universities with 
experience in the Senior Division of the OTC, and particularly if they 
were in possession of a Certificate B training qualification, could be 
                                                          
41 Seldon and Walsh (2013), p. 1. 
42 Excluding the six not educated at public school those for whom schools could not be 
traced.  
43  Messenger, C. (2005) “A Call to Arms: The British Army 1914-1918” (London. 
Cassell), p. 293. 
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commissioned instantly by the regiments to which they had presented 
themselves. Holding Certificate B was held by the recruiting authorities 
to be equivalent to six months attendance at the Royal Military College, 
Sandhurst.44 (Certificate B focussed on the tactical employment of an 
infantry company in the field). Those from the Junior Division would 
require the recommendation of the respective Commanding Officer. 
Furthermore, Messenger suggests a “north-south divide” in this latter 
case; grammar schoolboys from the south of the United Kingdom 
generally found it harder to be commissioned quickly, whereas in the 
Midlands and the North, the sons of the “managerial classes” educated 
at grammar schools were quickly admitted as officers, especially in the 
hastily and locally raised “Pals Battalions” of the so-called Kitchener 
Armies in the industrial cities.45  
R.C. Sheriff, an infantry officer in the war and the playwright who 
wrote the early and defining play of the Western Front experience 
Journey’s End in 1928, encountered this directly. Presenting himself to 
the depot of the local county regiment as a potential officer, the 
adjutant declined his application on the grounds “I am sorry, but it isn’t 
a public school.”46 Sheriff’s school was Kingston Grammar School, 
                                                          
44 Spiers, E. (2012) “University Officers’ Training Corps and the First World War” 
COMEC (Council of Military Education Committees of the United Kingdom) Occasional 
Paper No.4, p. 11. 
45 C. Messenger (2005) p. 293. 
46 Sheriff cited in Panichas, G. (1968) “Promise of Greatness” (London, The John Day 
Company) and quoted in Stempel, Lewis-J. (2010) “Six Weeks: The Short and Gallant 
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founded in 1567, five years before Harrow School, founded in 1572. It 
did not have an OTC. Sherriff would enlist in the ranks, eventually 
becoming an officer in a Service Battalion of the Kitchener Armies, 9th 
Battalion, East Surrey Regiment.47  
However, as so few of the group under examination here were 
products of the grammar schools and there are no common schooling 
connections between those who were, their influence on the group as a 
whole is less marked than those who attended public schools. 
Examination of the schools listed can be further reduced to a smaller 
group as those schools producing a single officer who progressed, by 
definition did not produce networks based on periods of mutual 
attendance. The focus for the purposes of this research will be, 
therefore, to examine officers who were exact contemporaries or 
overlapped significantly in their time spent at certain schools.  
Bowman and Connelly state that the Edwardian officer corps, as 
difficult as it is to determine a uniquely “Edwardian” group due to the 
short reign of King Edward VII, was dominated by a small group of 
schools:  
Reinforcing the class consciousness of the Edwardian officer corps 
was the small number of schools which cadets came from [to the 
                                                          
Life of the British Officer in the First World War” (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson), 
p. 38. 
47 Lucas, M. (2012) “The Journey’s End Battalion: The 9th East Surreys in the Great 
War” (Bradford, Pen & Sword). 
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Royal Military College, Sandhurst]. Bedford Grammar, Cheltenham, 
Clifton, Eton, Harrow and Marlborough provided the majority of 
cadets between 1902-1914. The position at the RMA (Royal Military 
Academy, Woolwich) was similar.48  
The group examined in this thesis49 does not completely reflect 
this assertion and suggests that the dominance of those schools was 
neither as complete or enduring as Bowman and Connelly suggest.  
Those six schools produced just under one third of it, forty-six officers, 
or 30.06% of the total. Eton produced twelve; Cheltenham and 
Wellington nine each; six went to Marlborough, five to Harrow and four 
to Clifton. There was a sole representative from what was then Bedford 
Grammar School.50 Although officers originating from these schools 
commissioned in the Edwardian period were more likely to have been 
trained at Sandhurst or Woolwich, a smaller group of officers bypassed 
this route via direct commissioning based on service in Special Reserve 
or Militia units.  
 The adapted Gantt charts presented below are intended as an aid 
to visualisation of the narrative which follows them. 
                                                          
48 Bowman, T. and Connelly, M. (2012) “The Edwardian Army” (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press), p. 10. 
49 All references to first commissioning of officers in this section are derived from 
either The HYAL for January 1939 [for the Period Ending 31st December 1938]” (1939; 
His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London), and HYAL January 1940 [for the Period 
Ending 31st December 1939] (1940, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London). 
50 Brigadier Henry George Pyne, the Chief Engineer in IV Corps of the North Western 
Expeditionary Force. 
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THE CLARENDON GROUP 
 
The boarding schools in the Group were Charterhouse, Eton, Harrow, 
Rugby, Shrewsbury, Westminster and Winchester. Shrewsbury and 
Westminster provided no officers who proceeded past the rank of 
Brigadier. The day schools were St. Paul’s and Merchant Taylors’, 
neither of which produced officers who advanced. 
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The schools outside the grouping identified by Bowman and Connelly 
which produced three or more officers were: 
Clarendon Group:  
Charterhouse, Rugby, Winchester and St Paul’s  
A total of twenty-six officers 
Headmasters’ Conference:  
Dover College, Edinburgh College, Renton, Uppingham  
A total of thirty-nine officers 
The schools producing two officers to the sample were: 
Clarendon Group: Shrewsbury  
Headmasters’ Conference:  
Bradfield, Elizabeth College Guernsey, Fettes, George Watson’s, 
Haileybury, Lancing; Radley, Sherborne, Tonbridge and Wimbledon  
A total of twenty officers. 
 Therefore, whilst the group of brigadiers overall is dominated by 
public schoolboys, within this set a smaller number of fifteen (of thirty-
five) schools combining members of the CG and HC produced the 
majority - eighty-seven of them, or 55% of the total. As noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, initial connections between individuals often 
begin in schooldays. Therefore, the first point of comparison used is the 
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officers who attended these fifteen schools. In performing this 
comparison, the core period is those who attended school between 
1897 and 1914.  
Three officers, although educated at schools within this group, 
were excluded as they stood sufficiently far apart from the core of the 
sample as not to be connected to other members of it. Alfred Young 
from Cheltenham College (who commanded 35 Brigade temporarily in 
France), attended from 1917-1921 and from Eton, Gervase Thorpe 
(Base Commandant, Cherbourg) who was at the school from 1891-1895 
and Richard Dawnay, 4th Viscount Downe (commanding 69 Brigade in 
France), who attended Eton from 1917-1921.  
Examining the Clarendon schools specifically, the biggest single 
collection of future officers was the twelve Old Etonians. With Thorpe 
and Dawnay excluded from this analysis, a group of ten remains, with a 
spread of attendance from 1900-1909, meaning that not all the Old 
Etonians were contemporaneous. Huddleston “Noel” Williamson and 
John “Jack” Churchill were direct contemporaries at Eton in the period 
1900-1902, although their army careers diverged with Williamson 
joining the Royal Artillery from RMA Woolwich in 1907 and Churchill the 
Durham Light Infantry from RMC Sandhurst in 1906. (Churchill 
remained at Eton until 1903).51 
                                                          
51 Entries in The Eton Register Vol. VII, 1899-1909 (1922) (Eton; Spottiswoode, 
Ballantyne and Co.), p. 36. 
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Merton Beckwith-Smith (1903-1908) just overlapped with 
Churchill, but in turn was a year ahead of the direct contemporaries the 
Honourable Edward Lawson and Charles Norman (1904-1909). 
Beckwith-Smith, after attending Oxford, was commissioned into the 
Coldstream Guards in 1911. Lawson joined the Royal Horse Artillery 
after Oxford, Norman the 9th Lancers after Cambridge. 
John Laurie arrived at Eton in 1906, overlapping with Beckwith 
Smith, Lawson and Norman, leaving in 1910. This made Laurie senior to 
but contemporary with John Fitzgerald (1907-1911) and Oliver Leese 
(1908-1912). Laurie, who would succeed to a baronetcy, was 
commissioned into the Seaforth Highlanders from the RMC; Fitzgerald 
the Irish Guards and Leese the Coldstream Guards. Arriving in 1910, 
John Whitaker would follow Leese to the Coldstream after leaving Eton 
in 1914. In turn, Whitaker was a year ahead of Richard McCreery 
(1911-1915) who would join the 12th Lancers in 1915.  
The nine officers from Cheltenham College attended across a 
fourteen-year spread, from 1900-1914. Guy Ormsby-Johnson (1900-
1904) and Charles Massy (1900-1905) did not attend university and 
were commissioned into the Bedfordshire Regiment5252 and the Royal 
Artillery respectively. Douglas Hogg (1901-1906) overlapped with both, 
joining the Royal Engineers in 1908. Charles Phipps (1904-1908), 
                                                          
52Ormsby-Johnson transferred to the Army Pay Department in 1911 and remained in it 
and its successor, the Royal Army Pay Corps, for the remainder of his career. (HYAL 
January 1940). 
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commissioned into the Royal Engineers in 1910, entered the school in 
the latter days of all three of his predecessors; but he was more directly 
contemporary to Ian Grant (1904-1909) and William Duncan (1905-
1909), the former becoming an officer in the Cameron Highlanders, the 
latter in the Royal Artillery. A later arrival, Fendall Pratt (1906-1911) 
entered a year after Duncan, but was at the College behind Hogg, 
Phipps and Grant; he joined the Royal Engineers in 1912. Colin Gubbins 
(1909-1914) entered three years behind Pratt and was present when 
Phipps and Grant were ending their time at the school; Gubbins entered 
the Royal Artillery from the RMA in September 1914. 
The officers from Wellington College, again nine in number, were 
present across a spread of attendance from 1900-1913. Ralph Chevenix 
-Trench (1900-1904) and Wilson Crewdson (1901-1905) were close 
contemporaries, being commissioned into the Royal Engineers and 
Royal Artillery out of the RMA in 1905 and 1908 respectively. Charles 
Marshall, who would be commissioned into the Royal Artillery via the 
Special Reserve in 1908 (thus bypassing the RMA) attended Wellington 
from 1902-1906, overlapping Chevenix-Trench and Crewdson. Edmond 
Schreiber and John Stafford (both 1903-1907) were direct school 
contemporaries and like the predecessors they overlapped, would also 
join the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers respectively. Richard Bond 
(1904-1908), another Gunner, was more contemporary to Schreiber 
and Stafford.  
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Charles Greenwood and Montagu Stopford (1906-1910) were at 
the school in the same period, Greenwood becoming a Sapper and 
Stopford the first infantryman to emerge from this group, being 
commissioned into the Rifle Brigade in 1911. A year behind him was 
another Greenjacket, Evelyn Barker (1907-1912) who joined the King’s 
Royal Rifle Corps in 1913. Greenwood, Stopford and Barker attended at 
the same time, albeit two and three years behind, Marshall (except 
Barker), Schreiber, Stafford and Bond. The last arrival was Claude 
Vallentin (1909-1913), commissioned into the Royal Artillery from the 
RMA five weeks after the outbreak of war, in September 1914. He was 
therefore present in the same time bracket as Greenwood, Stopford and 
Barker, but was closer in time of attendance to Barker. 
The Marlborough group’s attendance period was more extended 
over time, between 1896 and 1911. Clement Tomes (1896-1900) had 
left the school in 1900 and had been a serving officer in the Royal 
Warwickshire Regiment for over two years before the next Marlburian, 
Graham Leventhorpe, arrived there in 1903; he left in 1908 for, firstly, 
the RMA and then the Royal Artillery. Three years behind Leventhorpe 
were the direct contemporaries Francis Davidson and Noel Irwin (1906-
1910) both receiving their commissions in 1911, Davidson joining the 
Royal Engineers from the RMA and Irwin the Essex Regiment from the 
RMC. A year behind them were two other pupils whose time there was 
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also contiguous, Philip Kirkup and Christopher Woolner (1907-1911), 
both of whom were commissioned into the Royal Engineers in 1912.53 
The Old Harrovians (OH) were sufficiently widely spread across a 
time frame of arrival there (1897-1910) as to suggest that opportunities 
for immediate connections to form were fewer than in other schools. 
Charles Findlay (1897-1901) entered the Royal Artillery via the Militia in 
1903, bypassing the RMA. Hugh Dawes (1898-1902) a near 
contemporary, also entered the army via the Militia, joining the Royal 
Fusiliers in 1906. Harold Morgan arrived in 1902, leaving in 1906 for 
Oxford University and a commission in The Buffs, an infantry regiment, 
in 1910; he would only briefly coincide with Dawes and Eric Miles 
(1905-1909) before joining the King’s Own Scottish Borderers in 1911. 
The last OH of the group was Henry Crewdson (1910-1915) whose time 
did not coincide with any of the others; he was also exceptional in that 
he was a Territorial infantry officer in the Sherwood Foresters, serving 
only part-time in most of the inter-war period whilst working as a 
barrister.54 
Clifton College, of which Douglas Haig was an old boy,55 produced 
four 1940 brigadiers, but they were mostly disconnected in terms of 
                                                          
53 Both would, however, command infantry brigades in the BEF; Woolner 8 Brigade 
and Kirkup 70 Brigade. 
54 Source: “Henry Alistair Fergusson Crewdson” entry in http://geneagraphie.com, 
citing “Genealogy of the Pease Family” (1997) Site accessed 12 February 2013. 
55 Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, ‘Haig, Douglas, first Earl Haig (1861–1928)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography (DNB), Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, 
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attendance there. This largely eliminated any network based on direct 
personal connection. Noel Whitty, born in Australia in 1885, was at the 
school from 1899-1903; he was originally commissioned into the Royal 
West Kent Regiment in 1906. Roland Towell (1905-1909) joined the 
Royal Artillery in 1911; Frederick Morgan arrived at Clifton in 1908, 
leaving in 1912 for the RMA and the Royal Artillery also and thus 
coincided briefly with Towell; Alec Lee (1910-1914) arrived halfway 
through Morgan’s time at the school. He was commissioned into the 
South Staffordshire Regiment in 1915, having spent a year in the ranks 
of the Special Reserve.  
The six Old Carthusians of Charterhouse in the group spanned an 
attendance bracket reaching from 1902 to 1915. Frederick Bissett 
(1902-1906), an officer recalled from retirement to serve in the BEF, 
was originally commissioned in the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry. He 
was still at the school when The Honourable William Fraser arrived in 
1904; originally an officer in the Gordon Highlanders after leaving 
Charterhouse in 1908, he would later transfer to the Grenadier Guards. 
John Swayne was a direct contemporary of his and after attending 
Oxford University became an officer in the Somerset Light Infantry. 
Kenneth Anderson (1905-1909) arrived slightly behind Fraser and 
Swayne and just as Bissett was leaving; he would join the Seaforth 
                                                          
January 2011. http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33633, accessed 17 September 
2015. 
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Highlanders from the RMC in 1911. Colin Jardine (1907-1910) was a 
Baronet who did not use his title in the army (despite its being noted in 
the Army List) and joined the Royal Artillery from the RMA in 1912. He 
was therefore in the school contemporaneously with Fraser, Swayne 
and Bissett. The last OC of the group was William Fox-Pitt, (1910-1914) 
who briefly overlapped with Jardine in his final year; he would join the 
Welsh Guards after six months’ service in the Special Reserve in April 
1915. 
Of the eight former pupils of Rugby School, who attended in a 
period between 1901 and 1913, the first four were closest 
contemporaries: Arthur Percival (1901-1906), Henry Eden (1902-1907), 
Geoffrey Franklyn (1902-1907) and Richard Wootten (1903-1907). 
Percival was not thought to be a good student except for sport and left 
with minimal qualifications;56 he did not go to university or the RMC but 
was commissioned in the Bedfordshire Regiment in 1914 direct from 
civilian employment.  
Eden and Franklyn (1902-1907) would also be contemporaries at 
the RMA, Woolwich and join the Royal Artillery in 1909. Wootten (1903-
1907) went to the RMC and passed out into the 6th (Inniskilling) 
Dragoons in 1909. Hugh Hamilton (1905-1910) and Horatio Berney-
Ficklin (1906-1911) overlapped; the former went to the Royal Artillery 
                                                          
56 Smith, C.  (2006) “Singapore Burning: Heroism and Surrender in World War Two” 
(London, Penguin), p. 24. 
POINT OF FAILURE 





from the RMA in 1912, the latter the Norfolk Regiment from the Special 
Reserve in 1914. Both therefore overlapped to some degree with 
Percival, Eden, Franklyn and Wootten. The last two Rugbieans, Robert 
Reford and Edmund Raitt-Kerr, were direct contemporaries from 1909, 
but Reford left in 1912 with Raitt-Kerr remaining until 1913. Reford, 
after attending Oxford, gained his commission in the Sherwood 
Foresters via the Special Reserve in 1915. Raitt-Kerr went to the RMA 
and the Royal Engineers in 1914.  
The Wykehamists of Winchester College were the most spread out 
of the groups of old boys; from 1898-1917, with fewer opportunities to 
create informal networks. Edward Chadwick (1898-1902) entered the 
Royal Artillery from Woolwich in 1903. James Hamilton and Arthur “Kit” 
Stanley-Clarke were directly contemporary (1900-1904) and partly 
overlapped with Chadwick; Hamilton joined the Seaforth Highlanders at 
the age of 21 in 1907. Stanley-Clarke, after attending Oxford, joined 
the Cameronians in 1908. George Burney (1905-1908) went into the 
Gordon Highlanders in 1909 from the RMC.  
John Clark, James Gammell and Richard Wyatt (1906-10; Wyatt 
1911) arrived at Winchester together. Clark went via the RMC to the 
12th Lancers; Gammell served briefly in a Yeomanry regiment (The 
Scottish Horse) after leaving Cambridge University before joining the 
Royal Artillery. In 1927 he transferred to the infantry, serving with the 
Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders. Wyatt, after Oxford, joined the 
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Royal Sussex Regiment. Clark, Gammell and Wyatt briefly coincided 
with Thomas Wilson (1910-1914) who, after the RMC, joined the King’s 
Royal Rifle Corps in November 1914. The last of the group, Claude 
Nicholson, joined the school in 1912, coinciding only with Wilson; he 
would join the 16th Lancers from Sandhurst in 1916.  
With the two officers from St Paul’s School, one, the son of a Privy 
Councillor and colonial administrator, Arthur Clementi-Smith,57 was at 
the school from 1892-1896 and joined the Royal Engineers in 1897. 
James Whitehead, at St Paul’s from 1894-1898, was originally 
commissioned into the Royal West Kent Regiment later transferring to 
the Indian Army.  
Moving from the CG to the HMC. Dover College’s three alumni 
were not completely connected; Claude Goldney (1901-1905) attended 
in isolation before passing into the Gloucestershire Regiment via the 
RMC. Douglas Pratt (1906-1910) arrived the year before Reginald 
Parminter (1907-1911); Pratt went to the Royal Irish Regiment from 
the RMC in 1911 (he would later transfer to the Royal Tank Corps). 
Parminter also went to the infantry, joining the Manchester Regiment 
from the RMC in 1913.  
                                                          
57 Mosley, C.  (ed.) (2003) “Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, 107th edition”, 
(Wilmington, Delaware, USA: Burke's Peerage (Genealogical Books) Ltd. Entry for Sir 
Cecil Clementi-Smith. 
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At Edinburgh Academy, two of the three officers originating from 
the school spent their entire education there as opposed to the English 
pattern of an affiliated Preparatory School and then the main school. 
However, the time served by the three of them did not coincide and the 
third attended for secondary education only, from the age of fourteen. 
Eric Milligan (1897-1909) was commissioned into the Royal Garrison 
Artillery from the RMA in 1911. Thomas Grainger-Stewart (1904-1914) 
was commissioned into the Royal Scots after attending Edinburgh 
University, but served as a Territorial officer between the wars. James 
Shepherd (1904-1909) who was the officer who attended for his 
secondary education only, departed to a commission in the Royal 
Artillery, but like Grainger-Stewart also served in the Territorial Army in 
the inter-war period.  
The four officers from Repton were not connected, save for two 
who were brothers. Arthur Archdale (1896-1900) went to the Royal 
Artillery from the RMA in 1901. Charles Phillips (1903-1908) went from 
the RMC to the West Yorkshire Regiment in 1909. John “Jacky” Smyth 
(1908-1912) and Herbert Smyth (1910-1914) coincided but were 
already strongly “connected” as they were brothers. Jacky, after a short 
period on the Unattached List, would transfer to the Indian Army in 
1913; Herbert would join the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light 
Infantry directly in 1915.  
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Uppingham produced three officers: two graduates of the RMA 
heading to the Royal Artillery and one infantry officer. Edward Pease-
Watkin (1897-1901) joined the Royal Artillery in 1903; George “Noel” 
Martin (1907-1911) the Royal Field Artillery in 1912. Brian Horrocks 
arrived at the school in 1909, leaving in 1913; he was commissioned 
into the Middlesex Regiment the day before the outbreak of war in 
1914. One of his biographers claimed that his performance at RMC was 
sufficiently poor that his very commissioning could have been far from 
certain, were it not for the outbreak of war.58 
Briefly to review the ten schools which produced two officers 
apiece; Shrewsbury’s alumni, William Cave-Browne and Miles Dempsey 
were separated by eight years between the former’s departure and the 
latter’s arrival completely distancing them as contemporaries. At 
Bradfield, Henry Currey left in 1904; Donald McMullen arrived in 1905.  
The two Channel Islanders who attended Elizabeth College 
Guernsey, Valentine Beuttler and Donald Banks, similarly overlapped in 
departure and arrival, Beuttler leaving in 1904 and Banks arriving later 
in the same year. Beuttler, after a brief period serving as a Second 
Lieutenant in the Royal Guernsey Light Infantry – a Militia unit – 
transferred to the Regular Army and the Northamptonshire Regiment on 
the mainland in 1907. Banks served during the First World War with 
                                                          
58 Warner, P. (1984) “Horrocks: The General Who Led from The Front” (London, 
Hamish Hamilton), p. 7. 
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Service Battalions of the New Armies. He served as a Territorial infantry 
officer between the wars due to his position as a senior civil servant in 
the General Post Office. 
Fettes in Edinburgh again produced two officers who only 
coincided by departure and leaving dates and are therefore unlikely to 
have been connected at school; Herbert Stewart (1900-1905) went to 
the Royal Scots Fusiliers from the RMC in 1906; James Muirhead (1905-
1910) joined the Seaforth Highlanders from the RMC in 1911.  
Haileybury’s pair overlapped only in their last and first years 
there, Edward Grinling (1903-1906), whose younger brother also 
attended the school and was killed at Gallipoli as an officer in the Royal 
Marines, joined the Lincolnshire Regiment. John Utterson-Kelso (1906-
1910) went to the Royal Scots Fusiliers in 1912. There was no 
connection, in direct school terms, between Vyvyan Pope (1905-1909) 
and Neil Ritchie (1911-1915) at Lancing. Pope was commissioned into 
the Northamptonshire Regiment via the Special Reserve in 1912; 
Ritchie the Black Watch in 1914.  
The pair from Radley is more likely to have known one another, if 
indirectly. Frank Witts (1901-1905), after attending Oxford, entered the 
Irish Guards via the Special Reserve in 1914. Justice (given name) 
Tilley (1903-1906), although bypassing Sandhurst to a commission in 
the Special Reserve battalion of the West Yorkshire Regiment in 1909, 
would eventually transfer to the newly formed Tank Corps in 1917. Both 
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officers would become fatalities during the first half of the Second World 
War.  
John Griffin (1905-1909) attended Sherborne just ahead of 
Charles Hudson (1906-1910); Griffin was commissioned into the 
Lincolnshire Regiment in 1911. Hudson was forced to drop out of the 
RMC due to his father’s illness; working as a tea planter in Ceylon from 
1912, he returned on the outbreak of war in 1914 and was directly 
appointed a Second Lieutenant in the Sherwood Foresters. Hudson 
noted in a privately published memoir that he did not excel as a student 
and his complete aversion to physical pain led him to avoid participating 
actively on the football pitch. This made him feel “terribly conscious of 
being a coward.”59 He would be awarded a Victoria Cross in 191860 as a 
26-year old Lieutenant Colonel, for rushing an enemy position in Italy 
whilst wounded by a grenade explosion.  
The final pairs came from Tonbridge, Wimbledon and George 
Watson’s College. Arthur Kent-Lemon arrived at Tonbridge in 1903, 
leaving in 1907. Clifford Beckett (1905-1909) was therefore in the 
school as a near contemporary. Kent-Lemon would join the York and 
Lancaster Regiment in 1913 after a year and a half’s service in the 
Special Reserve battalion of the Royal West Kent Regiment, before his 
                                                          
59 Hudson, C. and Hudson, M. (1992) “Two Lives 1892–1992. The Memoirs of Charles 
Edward Hudson, VC, CB, DSO, MC, and Miles Matthew Lee Hudson, also some poems 
by Charles Edward Hudson” (Privately published by Wilton 65, York), pp. 2-3 
60 The London Gazette: 9 July 1918, No. 30790., p. 8155. 
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twenty-fourth birthday, comparatively late.61 Beckett followed his 
father, Brigadier General Edward Beckett, to the RMA and into the Royal 
Artillery, in 1911. His maternal grandfather, Major General Edward 
Thomason, had been an Indian Army engineer in Bengal in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. The Wimbledon pair overlapped; 
Christopher Perceval (1904-1908) went to the Royal Artillery via the 
RMA aged 20 in 1910; Michael Green (1905-1909) took the Special 
Reserve route to the Gloucestershire Regiment in May 1915, aged 24. 
The pupils from George Watson’s College in Edinburgh were William 
Morgan and William Robb; they were not closely contemporary due to a 
three year difference in age (Morgan being born in 1891 and Robb in 
1888) but would have been in the school simultaneously.  
For completeness, the twenty-eight schools which generated one 
1940 Brigadier each were:  
Aldenham 







Imperial Service College 
Kersal 
King William College, IoM 
King’s Canterbury 
Magdalen College School 
                                                          
61 His Army service record held at The National Archives reportedly covers the period 
“1912-1920” but is incomplete save for one page listing his promotions from 1916-
1918.  His intervening career has not emerged from research and he does not appear 
in the online transcripts of the 1911 census). 
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Royal Belfast School 
Royal Naval School, Eltham 
Sedbergh 
St Bees 
St Lawrence Ramsgate 






As noted, university graduates are a minority among the group, 
albeit represented at a significantly higher rate than in the wider 
population, totalling twenty-three or 15% of the total. One officer, 
unsurprisingly a senior medical officer, Brigadier Gilbert Blake, the 
Assistant Director Medical Services (ADMS) of the North West 
Expeditionary Force to Norway trained at Guy’s Hospital in London.  Of 
the remaining twenty-two, the most represented university was Oxford, 
with thirteen graduates who started there between 1905 and 1914.62 
Five officers attended Cambridge, starting there between 1900 and 
1911.63 There were two graduates of the University of London, and one 
each from Queen’s Belfast and Edinburgh.  
                                                          
62 Craig, E. S. and Gibson, W. M. (eds. (1920) “Oxford University Roll of Service” 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press), pp. various. 
63 Carey, G. V. (ed) (1921) “The War Roll of the University of Cambridge” (Cambridge, 
The University Press). 
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 The future brigadiers from Oxford who overlapped in their time 
spent there were Arthur Friend (Hertford College, 1905) Arthur Stanley-
Clarke (University College, 1906) and Frank Witts (Trinity College, 
1906). Harold Morgan went up to Worcester College in 1907, and three 
officers arrived at Oxford in 1908: James Muirhead (Oriel), John 
Swayne (Trinity) and Raleigh Chichester-Constable (Exeter). Merton 
Beckwith-Smith went up to Christ Church in 1909. His Eton 
contemporary The Honourable Edward Lawson went up to Balliol the 
same year. Richard Wyatt followed to Christ Church in 1911. John 
Hawkesworth matriculated at Queen’s in 1912 and Robert Reford went 
up to New College in 1914. The last of the Oxford group to attend, 
Henry Crewdson, went up to Magdalen after his First World War service 
in 1919. 
Of the five graduates from Cambridge, the overlap was less 
notable. Gordon Gill, as one of the older officers in the group, went up 
to St John’s in 1900. Hugh Scott-Barrett also went to St John’s, but in 
1906. Three officers were roughly contemporaries at Cambridge: 
Charles Norman (Trinity, 1910) James Gammell (Pembroke, 1911) and 
Horatio Berney-Ficklin (Jesus, 1911). The two London graduates. Percy 
Clark and Archibald Hughes, although close in age. (born 1886 and 
1888 respectively) studied at affiliated schools of the University and 
were not contemporaries; neither is entered in the University of London 
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War List for 1914-1918, but its preface admits a difficulty in locating all 
external students.64 
Seldon and Walsh65 in their conclusions also consider the 
proportional casualty rates sustained by graduates of universities, if 
only to contend that those of the public schools were higher. They state 
that from the provincial, or redbrick, universities, such as Liverpool, 
Birmingham and Manchester, the ratio of those killed to those serving 
was 1:8, roughly equivalent to the national average, but that a smaller 
proportion of graduates from those universities was commissioned, 
citing Leeds, where 60% of graduates became officers. They assert that 
97% of Oxford and Cambridge graduates were commissioned.  
However, their main source for this data is a book published in 
early 1917, British Universities and The War. It was intended for 
consumption in the American market for propaganda purposes to 
indicate the scale and sacrifice already made by the “brightest and the 
best” in Britain prior to America’s entry into the war and its compilation 
of statistics is neither uniform nor, given its date of publication, 
complete for the whole period of the war.66 The book also asserts 
                                                          
64 “University of London War List, containing names of Appointed and Recognised 
Teachers, Graduates and Matriculated Students who have served or who are serving in 
His Majesty’s Armed Forces, 1914-1918” (London, University of London Press, May 
1918). 
65 Seldon and Walsh (2013), p. 237 
66 “A.W.M” (editor, not further identified, 1917) “British Universities and the War: A 
Record and Its Meaning” (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co). 
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(based purely on statistics gleaned from the award of school prizes at 
Eton) that the more academically gifted one was, the higher the 
probability of being killed, citing a quarter of King’s Scholars at Eton (25 
out of 100) becoming fatal casualties.67 
To return to university graduates. A study of the First World War 
Memorial for Pembroke College, Cambridge analyses the proportion of 
casualties to year of admission; 16% of 1905 admissions would be lost, 
dropping to 10% for the 1906 intake, spiking at 26% for 1907, falling 
back to 10% for 1908. However, the trend from 1909 to 1912 is 
upwards, rising from 10% to 35% of the 1912 intake. Twenty-six 
officers admitted to Pembroke, contemporaries of James Gammell, 
would die in the war.68 
Of course, one cannot draw counterfactual arguments about those 
who became casualties as potential connections to the officers who 
survived and progressed within the army, not least as it would require a 
large and unsafe presumption that they would have continued to serve 
in the army between the wars. However, it highlights that as part of an 
elite within a set, firstly of public schoolboys and secondly, in an even 
smaller group, university graduates, those officers who survived and 
progressed did so against not insignificant statistical odds.  
                                                          
67 Seldon and Walsh (2013), p. 239. 
68 http://www.pem.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Pembroke-College-
Cambridge-the-dead-of-the-war-of-1914-1918-2.pdf Accessed 26 September 2016. 
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Schools and Regiments 
At this point, the intention is to examine whether another possible layer 
of connection exists; that of certain schools providing officer candidates 
to certain regiments at first commissioning (transfers to other 
regiments or Corps will be discussed later). This section will also 
examine whether certain schools were predominant in the supply of 
officers to the army, or whether there was a direct and particular 
association of certain schools to certain regiments Although it was 
perfectly possible for an officer to serve in a distinct battalion of a 
regiment and not directly overlap with another officer in early service 
(for example if one battalion of a regiment was on Home Service and 
another deployed overseas) this research looks back from 1940 towards 
the sense of regimental “brotherhood” and ties that a common core 
provides, even if very specific contemporary service in early 
commissioned service, such as in the same battalion, is less common. 
By way of an illustrative example, in 1940, the-then Captain JD Frost of 
The Cameronians was detached for loan service to the Iraq Levies. 
Despite requests for a transfer home, as Frost was keen to be on 
“active” service, these were turned down firstly because his contract 
with the Levies was still running and secondly, because of his fluency in 
Arabic, he was told he would be of more use in the Middle East. In his 
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subsequent memoir, he expresses regret that he did not write to 
another officer of his regiment elevated to senior rank for help:  
…our armies had achieved spectacular success against the 
Italians in Libya under General “Dick” O’Connor, himself a 
Cameronian, and I wondered if I had not made a great 
mistake in neglecting to have asked him to fit me in 
somewhere.69 
 
Although this example is specific, it highlights that officers of other 
regiments could expect or hope for paternalistic oversight by 
officers of their regiment who had risen to senior rank, and to 
encourage and support the careers of promising junior officers in 
their former regiments. Brian Bond adds this could have its 
drawbacks; he cites that General Sir John Burnett-Stewart, 
formerly of the Rifle Brigade, and notwithstanding his part in 
mechanising the army in the 1920s and 1930s, was “an awful 
snob…in that... he refused to “know” (recognise socially) anyone 
but members of the Rifle Brigade and Guardsmen.”70 
A popular stereotype is that of “Eton and the Guards” as typified in a 
later article in a British newspaper discussing the decline of a high 
street retailer:  
                                                          
69 Frost, J. D. (1980) “A Drop Too Many” (London, Cassell), p. 15 Frost, famous for the 
defence of the road bridge at Arnhem in 1944, would retire as Major General John 
Frost, CB DSO MC. 
70 Bond (1980), p. 70. 
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[WH] Smith's, they thought, was a law unto itself, an 
impregnable fortress that could withstand the worst its piffling 
competitors could throw at it. Management were schooled in 
the Smith's tradition. That usually meant a stint at Eton and 
the Guards before going into what was still a family business.71 
And in a discussion of education in North London:  
Michael Palin, another local resident and parent, 
apparently used to joke that Gospel Oak and William Ellis 
school, where my sons later went and where I now also 
chair the governing body, were the ‘Eton and the Guards’ 
of North London.72 
In fact, this popular stereotype – at least from the perspective 
of the illustrative example of the brigadiers in 1940, appears to 
have some slight basis in truth. Examining the group of 
schools which provided two or more officers to this primary 
group of brigadiers, the figures are as follows: (regiments 
listed reflecting the alphabetical order of pupils, not the Army 
Order of Precedence)  
                                                          
71 The Independent, 12 June 1996. 
72 http://www.gospeloak.camden.sch.uk/Fiona%20Millar%20steps%20down.html 
“Fiona Millar steps down as chair of governors”, Gospel Oak School website, 13 
September 2013. Accessed 25 September 2016. 
POINT OF FAILURE 





Bradfield (2):  Indian Army  
Royal Engineers 
 
Charterhouse (6): Infantry (5)  
Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, 
Gordon Highlanders,  
Somerset Light Infantry,  
Seaforth Highlanders,  
Cheshire Regiment 
 Royal Artillery (1) 
 
Cheltenham (9)  Infantry (3)  
Bedfordshire Regiment,  
Cameron Highlanders,  
Queen’s Regiment 
 
Royal Artillery (4) 
Royal Engineers (2) 
 
Clifton (4)   Infantry (2)  
South Staffordshire Regiment,  
Royal West Kent Regiment  
 
    Royal Artillery (2) 
 
Dover College (3) Infantry (2)  
Manchester Regiment,  
Royal Irish Regiment 
 
Army Service Corps 
 
Edinburgh Academy (3) Infantry – Royal Scots 
    Royal Artillery (2) 
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Elizabeth College (2) Infantry – Essex Regiment 
    Army Service Corps 
 
Eton (12)   Guards (5)  
Grenadier, Coldstream (3), Irish (1) 
Infantry (3)  
Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders,  
Seaforth Highlanders,  
Durham Light Infantry 
 
Royal Artillery (2) 




Fettes (2)   Infantry (2) 
Royal Scots Fusiliers 
Seaforth Highlanders 
 
George Watson’s (2)  Infantry  
King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry 
    Royal Artillery 
 
Haileybury (2)  Infantry (2)  
Lincolnshire Regiment  
Royal Scots Fusiliers 
 
Harrow (5)   Infantry (4)  
Sherwood Foresters,  
Royal Fusiliers,  
King’s Own Scottish Borderers,  
The Buffs 
 
 Royal Artillery  
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Lancing (2)   Infantry (2)  
North Staffordshire Regiment,  
The Black Watch 
 
Malvern (2)   Cavalry – 7th Dragoon Guards 
 Army Ordnance Corps 
 
Marlborough (6)  Infantry (3)  
Royal Warwickshire Regiment,  
Essex Regiment,  
Durham Light Infantry 
 
 Royal Artillery (2) 
 Royal Engineers 
 
Radley (2)   Guards: Irish       
    Infantry: West Yorkshire Regiment 
 
Repton (4)   Infantry (2)  
West Yorkshire Regiment,  
Oxford & Buckinghamshire Light Infantry 
 
    Royal Artillery 
    Indian Army 
 
Rugby (8)   Cavalry - 6th Dragoons 
Infantry (3)  
Bedfordshire Regiment,  
Norfolk Regiment,  
Sherwood Foresters 
 
    Royal Artillery (2) 
    Royal Engineers (2) 
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Sherborne (2)  Infantry (2)  
Lincolnshire Regiment,  
Sherwood Foresters 
 
St Paul’s (2)  Infantry – Royal Berkshire Regiment 
    Royal Engineers 
 
Tonbridge (2)  Infantry – York and Lancaster Regiment 
    Royal Artillery 
 
Uppingham (3)  Infantry – Middlesex Regiment 
    Royal Artillery (2) 
 
Wellington (10)  Infantry (2)  
King’s Royal Rifle Corps  
 Rifle Brigade 
 
    Royal Artillery (4) 
    Royal Engineers (4) 
 
Wimbledon (2)  Infantry – Gloucestershire Regiment 
    Royal Artillery 
 
Winchester (9)  Cavalry (2) 16th Lancers (2) 
Infantry (6)  
Cameron Highlanders,  
Gordon Highlanders (2),  
Royal Sussex Regiment,  
Cameronians,  
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The immediate conclusion from this listing, aside from supporting 
the assertion that “Eton and the Guards” may have a factual basis with 
five out of twelve OEs joining Guards regiments, and the Coldstream 
Guards in particular, no line infantry regiment particularly 
predominates. There is also little correlation between the geographical 
location of the school and the county or area infantry regiments joined 
by those from particular schools. This in itself is not particularly 
significant due to the influence of factors such as family ties, history 
and traditions; the fashionability or smartness of certain regiments and 
the varying levels of supplementary income required to be able to bear 
the expenses of being part of them. Seeing that four of the six 
Wykehamist infantry officers would join Scottish regiments, nearly as 
far as it is possible to go away from Scotland within the British Isles, 
the tenuousness of a connection between the location of the school and 
joining regiments associated with the area is clear. The inverse is true; 
apart from “Eton and the Guards” only one officer from the seventy-
eight infantry officers within the larger group of one hundred and fifty-
six joined a regiment local to the school he attended.  
The regiment or Corps most represented among the group outside 
the infantry is the Royal Artillery, with twenty-four individuals. Between 
1899 and 1924, the Royal Regiment of Artillery was divided into two 
branches and one sub-branch, the Royal Field Artillery and its sub-
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branch the Royal Horse Artillery, and the Royal Garrison Artillery.73 
Although this distinction prevailed during the initial period of service of 
several officers in the group, particularly during the First World War, the 
re-amalgamation of the Royal Artillery into a single body in 1924 is 
deemed more significant going into the inter-war period for comparative 
purposes. The twenty-four officers are therefore counted as Royal 
Artillery, regardless of original, pre-1924 commissioning branch, 
throughout. The Royal Engineers, also trained at RMA Woolwich, 
received eleven officers from this group of schools at varying points.  
Of the six cavalry officers, Eton and Winchester produced two 
officers apiece, the other two being from Rugby and Malvern. The one 
common regiment was the 16th Lancers, where Claude Nicholson and 
John Clark, both Wykehamists, would later both serve together despite 
the six years’ difference in age (Clark the elder of the two).  
Almost all of the public school entrants to the Brigade of Guards, 
five of six in the group, were Old Etonians. The Coldstream Guards 
predominates with three. There is a seven-year spread of dates of birth 
(1890-1897) among the three Coldstream; given that the eldest 
(Merton Beckwith-Smith) spent three years after Eton at Oxford, they 
will have overlapped in the regiment, albeit in different battalions. 
Similarly, the two Irish Guards officers, John Fitzgerald and Frank Witts, 
                                                          
73 Although technically correct in strict terms. in day to day operations there was little 
practical distinction between the RFA and the RHA 
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have a four year difference in age, Fitzgerald being the elder but as 
Beckwith-Smith, his three years at Oxford makes them contemporaries 
in terms of first service in the regiment.  
With regard to county infantry regiments, there is no single 
dominant regiment in terms of original commissioning. Scottish 
regiments, however, stand out as a regiment of first choice. The single 
most numerous is the Gordon Highlanders, with three officers born in a 
narrow window (1889-1892). These three contemporaries came from 
Charterhouse, Winchester, and Glenalmond; none of them was a 
graduate. The two officers of the Seaforth Highlanders were directly 
contemporary, being born in 1891 and 1892; they attended 
Charterhouse and Eton respectively.  
The seven year age difference between the two officers of the 
Royal Scots Fusiliers (born 1886 and 1893 respectively) reduces the 
possibility of them being direct regimental contemporaries; one was 
educated at Fettes, the other at Haileybury. The two officers of the 
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders are highly unlikely to have been 
regimentally contemporary, as they are separated by nineteen years of 
age (1877 and 1896). The elder was an Old Etonian, and in 1940 was 
one of the officers “dug out” of retirement for their skills and who 
served in the rear areas of the BEF. The other Scottish regiments, with 
a single officer apiece, were the Highland Light Infantry and the King’s 
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Own Scottish Borderers, the subjects being educated at Mercer’s, and 
Harrow.  
It is noteworthy that none of the officers in the group began their 
careers in any of the Welsh country regiments, the Royal Welsh 
Fusiliers,74 The Welsh Regiment or the South Wales Borderers. Irish 
regiments are not highly represented either, with three – two of whom 
were commissioned into the Royal Irish Rifles and one the Royal Irish 
Regiment. The latter was educated at Dover College; the two Rifles 
officers at Downside and the Royal Belfast School. The five-year age 
difference between these two Rifles officers (born 1889 and 1894) 
makes it less likely that they were directly contemporary within the 
regiment.  
There is a wide spread of English county regiments among the 
brigadiers. Starting first with the nationally based smart regiments, the 
four officers were divided equally between the King’s Royal Rifle Corps 
(KRRC) and the Rifle Brigade (RB). The KRRC officers, born in 1894 and 
1896 and educated at Wellington and Winchester respectively, were 
regimental contemporaries. The RB officers were two years apart (born 
1890 and 1892); although the younger of the pair came from 
Wellington, the elder was one of the officers whose initial schooling 
remains unlocated; neither attended university. The two officers of the 
                                                          
74 Although the archaic nomenclature “Welch” had been used informally by the 
regiment, the official change from “Welsh” did not occur until Army Order 56 of 1920. 
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Bedfordshire Regiment, both among the eldest officers in the sample 
being 53 and 54 years of age in 1940, were also regimental 
contemporaries on first commissioning in 1904 and 1905. They were 
schooled at Rugby and Cheltenham. The two officers from the Durham 
Light Infantry, which was held in particular esteem in the English north-
east, had too much of an age difference (six years, being born in 1887 
and 1893) to be direct contemporaries; they too were products of Eton 
and Marlborough respectively. The West Yorkshire Regiment’s two 
officers were closer in age and therefore contemporaneous (born 1889 
and 1891 respectively); the latter, John Gawthorpe, is also a singular 
exception to the assertion that schoolboys did not join regiments 
associated with the areas in which they were schooled; he attended 
Wakefield from 1905-1909.  
In their early careers, the two officers commissioned into the 
Essex Regiment were contemporaries as they were born in 1891 and 
1892 respectively; the first was educated in the Channel Islands and 
the latter at Marlborough, so whilst not connected by a school they 
joined their regiment close together. The Lincolnshire Regiment’s three 
officers were widely spread in schools and age: the eldest born in 1882, 
the youngest in 1891 with the man in the middle born in 1889. Their 
education came from Glenalmond, Haileybury and Sherborne 
respectively. There was also an eleven-year spread in age between the 
officers first commissioned into the Royal Berkshire Regiment in this 
POINT OF FAILURE 





group; the eldest born in 1886, was educated at Weymouth College. 
The younger officers, born in 1896 and 1897, the first of whom went to 
Shrewsbury (the second is in the group of those undetermined for 
education) were regimentally contemporary.  
With respect to officers commissioned into what were then termed 
“services”, logistics and ordnance for example, the difficulty in 
determining contemporary early service is compounded by the wide 
area in which their formations served. Also, few of the officers in this 
group who served in the Army Ordnance Corps (as it then was) and the 
Army Service Corps (also) received a public school education and none 
went to university – indicating that university graduates were 
furthermore a social elite on three levels, possessing a public school and 
university education within an elite – army officers – and an elite within 
that group, as they rose to senior rank. The eight officers who originally 
joined the Army Service Corps were born between 1882 and 1891; only 
four are known to have been educated at public school but none was 
common to any single school; only two (born in 1882 and 1883) will 
have been commissioned closely together. For the Army Ordnance 
Corps, both were born in 1884, but only one received a public school 
education at Malvern and neither attended university – one was 
commissioned into the Regular Army in 1903; the other was mobilised 
as a Territorial in 1914, further reducing the potential for their having 
been connected as junior officers. 
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For comparison, looking one or two echelons upwards – to 
divisional and corps command (in the BEF) or to Force level (in Norway) 
it is immediately apparent that among the brigadiers’ senior 
commanders in 1940, public schools again predominate. Of the three 
Corps Commanders in France,75 Michael Barker, Alan Brooke and Ronald 
Adam, Barker and Adam were educated at Malvern and Eton 
respectively. Brooke was privately educated in France. Of the thirteen 
divisional commanders deployed to France in 1939-1940, eleven were 
public-school educated, with one privately tutored (Major General EA 
Osborne, 44th Division) and one whose education is unrecorded (Major 
General WN Herbert, 23rd Division). In the BEF, no schools predominate 
among the group, although the commanders of 2nd, 46th and 48th 
Divisions (Major Generals HC Loyd, HO Curtis and AFAN Thorne, 
respectively) were all Old Etonians, but none of their subordinate 
brigadiers was.76  
There is little commonality of school, either, between the other 
divisional commanders and their subordinate brigadiers, except when 
Brigadier FHN Davidson took over temporary command of 2nd Division 
between 16-20 May as this meant that the divisional commander and 
the officer commanding the division’s junior brigade, Noel Irwin, were 
both Marlburians. (Irwin would be promoted Major General and took 
                                                          
75 Ellis, L. F. (1954) Appendix A: British Forces Engaged, pp. 375-99. 
76 Ellis (1954), pp. 375-80. 
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over command of the division from Davidson on 20 May).77 One 
conjunction of the school of the divisional commander and his 
subordinates comes in the 51st (Highland) Division, where its 
commander, Major General VM Fortune and two of his three Brigade 
commanders were Wykehamists. (Fortune attended from 1897-1901; 
George Burney of 153 Brigade, 1905-1908 and Arthur Stanley-Clarke of 
154 Brigade 1901-1905). There is no firm evidence to suggest that 
Fortune had any influence over their appointment based purely on their 
place of education. The chances of their overlapping are slight, being 
only in the year of departure and arrival, and all three served in 
different regiments; the Black Watch, the Gordon Highlanders and the 
Cameronians respectively.  
With regard to the NWEF in Norway, all senior field commanders 
(at Brigade, ad hoc “Force” and NWEF HQ)78 were public school alumni, 
but with a wide variety of schools represented. The sole school with two 
representatives in Norway was Repton, Charles Phillips (146 Brigade; 
Repton 1903-1908) and Herbert Smyth (15 Brigade, Repton 1910-
1914). They did not coincide in their time at school.  
The number of direct personal linkages between officers via 
school, university and first commissioned service is not widespread 
                                                          
77 Ellis (1954), p. 375. 
78 T. K. Derry (1952) “The Campaign in Norway” Appendix B: List of Forces Engaged, 
pp. 263-67 (History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series. 
London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office). 
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among the group as a whole. It is not possible to measure all of the 
indirect linkages, for example through siblings being contemporaries 
with other men among the group overall.  The influence of such 
combinations would be more significant in later service when specifics 
such as time at school, in the public schools which house one resided, 
time and place as an undergraduate would “level” into a general 
connectivity through mutual awareness and loyalties based on the 
school and university overall and also that concept of being a 
gentleman.  
Moving into wider society – both civil and military – connections 
of school and regiment, regardless of the precise period spent within 
them act as a common point of reference. The strength of such ties 
varied, depending on interpersonal relationships, but as the example of 
Frost shows, a sense of connection to more senior officers of the same 
regiment could raise expectations of support for the advancement of 
careers among juniors, exploiting paternalistic expectations. The 
pattern of advancement had a common template and seniors 
maintained or resurrected the notion that an officer should be a 
gentleman. The importance of school connections was along the broader 
principle of having attended the right kind of school rather than from 
being a direct contemporary.  
Overall, the patterns of groups of old boys from the various 
schools attended by the brigadiers show that there is no clear indication 
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of school groups, or factions developing among the officers in the 1940 
group, as time of attendance were spread out or overlapping across  
extended periods, even with those schools, such as Eton, Wellington 
and Winchester which provided multiple candidates for commissions.  
There is no evidence of a clear-cut, significant self-helping clique 
emerging based purely on the basis of school attended.  Equally, there 
is no direct grouping of specific schools to regiments, removing this as a 
source of self-supporting groups. It can therefore be stated that with 
regard to this specific group of officers no individual school is 
particularly dominant over any other in the supply of officers, nor is 
there any direct linkage between particular schools and particular 
regiments. Even the connection of Eton to the supply of officers to the 
Guards regiments is dissipated by the lack of a dominant single 
regiment within this group. Whilst the “old school tie” connection cannot 
be entirely dismissed due to the commonality of experience even if 
separated by gaps in time, in respect of this specific group its influence 
is of lesser impact.  
 
Family Connections 
The social and educational origins of British Army officers from 1800-
1970 were examined in a series of articles in the 1970s by the 
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sociologist C.B. Otley.79 Otley argued that the link between the provision 
of officers from the nobility and landed gentry was at first eroded by the 
abolition of purchase, but had “nothing to fear” as the Public Schools 
continued to supply a constant stream of “suitably processed” young 
men.80 The First World War had permitted access to the officer class to 
a wider range of society if only out of necessity.81 However, a rapid 
reapplication of pre-war social norms combined with the very expense 
of living as an officer - which varied between distinct regiments and 
corps, based on expectations of the level of uniforms, supply of horses 
(for example, with cavalry officers being required to supply and 
maintain ponies for polo and hunting) reduced the impact of this 
process. Fashionable regiments of higher social standing, such as the 
Guards, Rifles and cavalry were more expensive to bear the cost of 
living in by comparison with county regiments, services and the Royal 
Artillery and Royal Engineers.  Stephen Badsey further suggests that 
even in regiments not deemed smart, where an officer’s pay might have 
sufficed to cover routine living, a supplementary income was needed to 
                                                          
79 Otley, C. B. (1970) “The Social Origins of British Army Officers” The Sociological 
Review Vol. 18(2), July 1970 pp. 213-239; Otley, C. B. (1973) “The Educational 
Background of British Army Officers” Sociology, Vol. 7(2) May 1973, pp. 191-209; C. 
B. Otley (1978) “Militarism and Militarization in the Public Schools, 1900-1972” The 
British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 29(3) September 1978, pp. 321-39 
80 Otley (1970), p. 216. 
81 Sheffield (2002), p. 100. 
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sustain an image of “conspicuous display and consumption” beyond the 
actual costs of soldiering.82 
Otley, combining earlier work by Razzell and Janowitz, proved 
that the percentage of scions of the “upper class” continued to decline 
as a proportion of all British Army officers up through the 1920s and 
1930s. Their influence remained, however, as the senior (or General) 
officers of the time, the “rarified” levels, as Otley describes them, 
reflected the social make up of their group a generation or two before, 
when they joined the army. Consolidating the findings of Janowitz, 
Razzell and his own investigations, Otley found that the sons of the 
upper classes had declined, by 1939, to 22% of the army’s elite, with 
78% from the middle classes, whereas on the verge of the First World 
War this was a 35/65 split.83 
In terms of educational background, Otley describes the period 
1870-1939 as the “institution of examination-dominated selection” 
producing a 'two-tier' system with school education to 18 as the bottom 
tier, competitive selection intervening and a college training – at the 
RMC or RMA - as the top tier. This entry system endured, substantially 
unchanged, until the Second World War.84 
                                                          
82 Badsey, S. (2008) “Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880-1918” 
(Aldershot, Ashgate) p.67. 
83 Otley (1970), p. 218. 
84 Otley (1973), p. 193. 
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Otley’s findings were that in 1910, from 347 entrants to 
Sandhurst, 68.6% of entrants to Sandhurst came from the “major” 
public schools, 23.3% from “other” public schools (91.9% of the total) 
with the remainder from private education. (There were no products of 
grammar schools). By 1917, with 1087 entrants to the shortened war 
course, 79.7% came from the public schools, 7% from private 
education and 4.8% from grammar schools. (The balance came from 
“other/unknown” educational origins). By 1920, public schoolboys had 
gone back up to 83% of the intake, which remained constant give or 
take a few tenths of a percentage point, until 1939; the percentage of 
grammar schoolboys rose from 4.2% in 1917 to 5.1% in 1939.85 In 
contradiction to Otley, however, the growth in the number of officers 
from grammar schools is not borne out among the 1940 group (and as 
will be shown later nor is it with officers serving in Normandy in 1944). 
This indicates that whilst the social basis of officer candidates was 
changing, it would not be reflected at the brigadier level for the 
majority of the Second World War.  
Frost’s examination of the family and educational backgrounds of 
the senior commanders (divisional and above) in British Second and 
Eighth Armies in 1944-45 agrees with Otley’s findings that officers with 
aristocratic or landed backgrounds declined markedly in comparison 
with the rise of those from middle class backgrounds, which, he states, 
                                                          
85 Otley (1973), p. 197. 
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mirrors the post-war decline in the economic fortunes of the landed (or 
as Otley also labels them, “monied”) classes.86 He notes that only two 
officers in Second Army and one in Eighth Army were from aristocratic 
backgrounds.87 Whilst Otley observes a decline in the number of officers 
who were the sons of officers themselves from the First World War until 
the 1950s (when it began to reverse), ten of twenty-six in Second Army 
and five of twenty-five in Eighth Army in 1944-45 were the sons of 
army officers. 
With regard to 1940, allowing for fourteen officers from the whole 
group of 156 whose initial education was untraced, and five more who 
were public school educated but from schools that were neither CG nor 
HMC, 84% of the whole group were products of the public school 
system. With the officers who progressed, only one had an untraced 
early education and only two attended non CG/HMC schools, meaning 
that 95% were public schoolboys. As to their family backgrounds, 
thirty-one of the overall group in 1940 were the sons of military officers 
ranging in rank from Major88 to Lieutenant General,89 20.1% of the 
                                                          
86 Frost, M. R. “Preparation is Key: The effect of the pre-war years on Senior 
Command in the British Army, 1944-45” (Unpublished PhD thesis, King’s College 
London 2017). 
87 Frost (2017), p. 57. 
88 Charles Phillips, whose father, Maj. GE Phillips DSO RE, was killed in action in 
Somaliland in 1902 when his son was 13. Phillips senior had been a pioneer in British 
Army aviation, having commanded Balloon Sections, RE in Africa and during the 2nd 
Boer War. H. Driver (1997) “The Birth of British Military Aviation (Studies in History 
Series)” (London, Royal Historical Society), p. 311. 
89 Geoffrey Franklin, whose father was Lt-Gen. Sir William Franklyn KCB, latterly 
Military Secretary. He was also the brother of Lt-Gen. Sir Harold Franklyn, GOC 5th 
Division and “Frankforce” in the BEF in 1940. 
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whole group. Thirteen of these thirty-one progressed beyond Brigadier, 
22% of the group of officers advancing, or 8% of the whole group. If 
this group is extended to grandfathers, nine of the group had 
grandfathers (paternal or maternal) who had served in the army or 
Royal Navy; seven of these had both a father and a grandfather who 
had served.  
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TABLE 2.3 1940 BRIGADIERS WITH OFFICER FATHER OR GRANDFATHER 
(NAMES IN BOLD ARE OFFICERS PROGRESSING AFTER 1940) 
 1940 FATHER GRANDFATHER (IF OFFICER) 
BARKER 10 BDE MAJ GEN SIR GEORGE 
BARKER 
 
BECKETT CRA 15 DIV BRIG-GEN WTC BECKETT MAJ GEN CS THOMASON IA 
BOND CRE I CORPS MAJ GEN SIR FG BOND  
BURNEY 153 BDE BRIG-GEN HH BURNEY MAJ GEN JT COKE 
CHEVENIX-
TRENCH 
SIG OFF IN CHF COL C CHEVENIX-TRENCH   
CHICHESTER-
CONSTABLE 
139 BDE LT COL WGR CHICHESTER-
CONSTABLE 
 
CHIPPINDALL CRE III CORPS COL WH CHIPPINDALL  
CHURCHILL 151 BDE COL AG CHURCHILL LT GEN SIR WILLIAM PAYN 
CURREY HQ NWEF LT COL HC CURREY  
DUNCAN CRA III CORPS  ADM SIR WILLIAM 
EDMONSTONE 
FOX-PITT 20 GDS BDE LT COL WA FOX-PITT  
FRANKLYN CRA 4 DIV LT GEN SIR WILLIAM 
FRANKLYN 
 
GOLDNEY DRASC III CORPS COL WH GOLDNEY  
HAMILTON, H AAQMG II CORPS BRIG GEN WG HAMILTON GEN SIR HUGH GOUGH 
HOGG BASE AREA NWEF MAJ GEN GC HOGG  
HORROCKS 11 BDE COL WH HORROCKS  
HUDSON 2 BDE LT COL HE HUDSON  
KENT-LEMON HQ NWEF LT COL W KENT-LEMON  
LAWSON CRA 48 DIV LT COL WA LEVY-LAWSON 
(Yeo.) 
LT GEN SIR FREDERICK 
MARSHALL 
PHILLIPS 146 BDE MAJ GE PHILLIPS  
PHIPPS CRE II CORPS LT COL EVA PHIPPS  
ROUPELL 36 BDE LT COL FF ROUPELL  
SCHREIBER CCRA II CORPS BRIG GEN AL SCHREIBER  
STOPFORD 17 BDE COL SIR LIONEL 
STOPFORD 
V/ADM SIR MONTAGU 
STOPFORD 
THORPE BASE CMDT 
CHERBOURG 
COL J THORPE  
TILLY 1 TK BDE LT COL JC TILLY  
TOMES OC 2ND ECHELON LT COL A TOMES  
UTTERSON-
KELSO 
131 BDE CAPT WE UTTERSON-
KELSO 
 
WHITAKER 7 GDS BDE COL SIR ALBERT 
WHITAKER Bt 
COL J CROKER 
WHITEHEAD AAG BEF LT COL E WHITEHEAD  
WILLIAMSON CRA MED ARTY III 
CORPS 
CAPT CH WILLIAMSON  
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TABLE 2.4 OFFICERS FROM ARISTOCRATIC AND TITLED FAMILIES 
OFFICER FATHER MOTHER GRANDFATHER GRANDMOTHER 










NAPIER, dtr OF 
9TH LORD 
NAPIER 
BARRETT SIR HUGH 
SCOTT-
BARRETT 
   
BLUNT   SIR HENRY 
GORDON KCB 
 
DAVIDSON SIR LEYBOURN 
DAVIDSON 





 8TH VISCOUNT 






FFOLKES dtr, of 
GEN SIR 
CHARLES WALE 
FRASER 19TH LORD 
SALTOUN 
   
GAMMELL SIR SYDNEY 
GAMMELL  
   
JARDINE SIR JOHN 
JARDINE, 1ST 
BARONET 
   
LAURIE SIR WILFRED 
LAURIE, 5TH 
BARONET 








 1ST BARON 
BURNHAM (P). 




LEESE SIR WILLIAM 
LEESE 2ND 
BARONET 




PERCEVAL SIR WESTBY 
PERCEVAL  
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The number of officers who came from the aristocracy90 (Table 
2.4) were similarly in a minority; only fifteen of the whole group, 9.7%, 
came from such backgrounds (of whom four were hereditary Baronets), 
with only eight of those fifteen progressing. All four hereditary Baronets 
were promoted after 1940. Even fewer officers were sons of clergymen, 
(Table 2.5) with only seven (4.5%), having family connections who 
were so employed, including Brian Horrocks whose grandfather-in-law 
was the Reverend JC Moore. Four of these seven (2.5% of the whole 
group, 6.7% of the officers advancing) officers advanced in rank during 
the war.  
 
 
Although most of the remainder, whose fathers’ profession can be 
traced were the sons of professional men or gentlemen of independent 
                                                          
90 In this case “aristocracy” is extended to cover those who were sons of those who 
received knighthoods in the course of their professions, not just those of the Peerage 
and Baronetage. 
TABLE 2.5 OFFICERS WITH RELATIVES WHO WERE CLERGY 
 FATHER GRANDFATHER FATHER IN-
LAW 
HAWKESWORTH REV. JOHN 
HAWKESWORTH 
  
HOPWOOD REV CANON 
HOPWOOD 
  
HORROCKS   REV JC MOORE 
SCHREIBER  REV JOHN 
SCHREIBER 
 
SMITH  REV JOHN SMITH  
SWAYNE RT REV BISHOP WS 
SWAYNE 
  
WITTS REV CANON FRANCIS 
WITTS 
REV EDWARD WITTS 
REV CANON GD 
BOURNE 
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wealth or private means, no specific professions predominate. The use 
of the UK National Census to identify many of these officers’ fathers’ 
occupation is often inconclusive, as in many cases these officers were at 
school in 1901, or under training or serving in 1911, especially among 
those officers who were past their mid-forties when in France or 
Norway. (Some officers, furthermore, could not be positively identified 
in the 1891 Census due to multiple instances of names, which were not 
further qualified or expanded to include further Christian names) 
Equally, not all officers who had entries in Who’s Who listed their 
fathers’ professions.  
Away from the sons, or grandsons of officers of either the army or 
the Royal Navy, a wide range of professions were represented among 
the other officers’ fathers, with no particular professional group 
dominant. By means of example, Kenneth Anderson and Clifford Beckett 
were sons of railway engineers, both of whom worked in India; Donald 
Banks’ father had a stationery business, but his great-grandfather had 
founded Banks’ Brewery in Wolverhampton. Arthur Archdale’s father 
was also a brewer, in Baldock, Hertfordshire but he did not own the 
business. Claude Gill’s father was a shipbuilder at Rochester on the 
River Medway, in Kent.91 Archibald Beauman’s father had been a 
                                                          
91 The Cambridge Alumni Database, University of Cambridge 
http://venn.lib.cam.ac.uk/ Accessed 1 May 2019. 
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stockbroker and Percy Clark’s an Associate of the Royal College of Art 
and external examiner for the University of Cambridge.  
John Crocker’s late father had been the company secretary of a 
gold mining firm; Francis Davidson’s father had been a plantation owner 
in Ceylon. Lawyers were not especially represented, with only Oliver 
Leese’s father, a barrister, William Duncan’s father, a Scottish advocate 
and Geoffrey Franklyn’s father in law, a barrister and a Fellow of the 
Royal Statistical Society. Four fathers had been diplomats or colonial 
officials. Colin Gubbins’ father John was a specialist in Anglo-Japanese 
affairs at the Foreign Office, having been appointed Companion of the 
Order of St Michael and St George (CMG) for his part in negotiating the 
Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 1894.92 Sir John 
Jardine KCIE, 1st Baronet, father of Brigadier Colin, the 2nd Baronet, had 
been a senior official in the Bombay Civil Service;93 Christopher 
Perceval’s father, Sir Westby Perceval KCMG, as well as serving as an 
MP in New Zealand, became the Agent-General (now High 
Commissioner) to the United Kingdom, for which he was knighted. 
Hubert Clementi Smith’s father, Sir Cecil, was a Privy Counsellor and 
former Treasurer of Hong Kong; his career culminated as Governor of 
the Straits Settlements, for which he was advanced to GCMG in 1892 
                                                          
92 Nish, I. (1997) “John Harrington Gubbins, 1852-1929” in “Britain and Japan: 
Biographical Portraits” (London, Japan Library). 
93 India Office List 1891, (London, HMSO). 
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(having been knighted, KCMG in 1886).94 William Cave-Browne’s father, 
Edward, had ended his career as the Accountant-General of the India 
Office and appointed Commander of the Order of the Star of India 
(CSI).95 
Although very few of the officers could be described as having 
emerged from working, or lower class, backgrounds,96 neither do they 
fit a social stereotype of the officer corps as being dominated by the 
aristocratic or land-owning classes. In this sense, they defy the 
archetype claimed by Barnett and Williamson,97 that the aristocratic and 
upper classes still dominated, and were still the main source of supply 
to the British officer cadre up to, into and beyond the First World War. 
Otley’s assertion that this dominance had weakened, with Frost’s 
analysis of certain senior commanders in 1944 being in harmony with 
the former’s findings is also borne out by examination of the 1940 
brigadiers in this thesis. This shows that the trend was maintained into 
the Second World War, although as will be discussed in a later chapter, 
                                                          
94 The Cambridge Alumni Database, University of Cambridge 
http://venn.lib.cam.ac.uk/ Accessed 1 May 2019. 
95 Details of other fathers’ professions from Who Was Who online; 
https://www.ukwhoswho.com/ Accessed 2 May 2019. 
96 One exception is Brigadier A. J.” Tommy” Clifton, who spent 7 years, 224 days in 
the Royal Field Artillery, rising to the rank of Sergeant. Born in 1887, he was 
commissioned in 1909 which means he must have joined the Army as a Boy Soldier 
aged 14. HYAL January 1942, p. 125 
97 Barnett, C. (1960) “The Desert Generals” (London, William Kimber) p. 130 and 
Murray, W. (1988) British Military Effectiveness 1919-1939 in Murray, W. and Millett, 
R. (1988) “Military Effectiveness Vol.2: The Interwar Period” (Cambridge, Cambridge 
UP), p. 105. 
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at least with D-Day brigadiers there was some reassertion of the social 
background of the “officer type”.  
Barnett also asserts that the abolition of purchase in 1870 
theoretically opened up the officer ranks to a wider section of society 
and not just those with the means to buy their way in. In reality the 
very cost of living as an army officer – which could be, depending on 
the social fashionability of the regiment, beyond an officer’s pay or in 
some cases far beyond - could act as a disincentive to join for those 
without some form of private income. Therefore, in the judgement of 
the Akers-Douglas Committee of 1902 which sought to examine how to 
attract a wider social band of officer candidates to serving in the army 
“many suitable candidates are precluded from entering the Service for 
no other consideration than the insufficiency of their private income”.98 
Although this was mitigated by the need for more, and experienced 
officers during the First World War broadening the social base, the 
return to peacetime soldiering reasserted pre-war patterns and the re-
emergence of a more socially typical candidate for advancement.99 
                                                          
98 Barnett, C. (1970) “Britain and Her Army 1509-1970: A Military, Political and Social 
Survey” (London, Allen Lane), p. 346. 
99 An indirect relative of the author was Captain BF Whiteley DCM of the King’s Royal 
Rifle Corps. He joined the Army as a Rifleman in 1899, fought in the Boer War and 
remained in the Army after 1902. On the outbreak of war in 1914 he was a Sergeant 
and was rapidly advanced to first Colour Sergeant and then Company Sergeant Major. 
He received a Distinguished Conduct Medal at the First Battle of Ypres in October 1914 
and was commissioned in the field in December 1914. Severely wounded in January 
1915, he would not return to the Western.  Front until August 1918. Promoted 
Captain, he served in North Russia in 1919. Married with two children, he resigned his 
commission in early 1920. Family lore suggested that his resignation was precipitated 
by his wife’s refusal to uproot the family to go to India, but in his private memoir he 
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By far the majority of the 1940 group were taught at British public 
schools. An officer would typically be public school educated and from 
the upper tiers of society. Officers from well-established families who 
could afford to provide a private income to their sons to supplement 
their army salary possessed an advantage, unsurprisingly, over those 
who needed to live on their pay. Anecdotally, Brigadier Shelford Bidwell, 
a junior officer in the 1930s, said that his father gave him £50 per year 
to supplement his pay in the Royal Artillery.  Neil Ritchie’s family had 
accrued a fortune in business in Canada, leaving him well established; 
he returned to these interests after retirement from the army. 
Only thirty-nine officers in the group of one hundred and fifty-six 
gained their commissions after 1913, with two brigadiers, exceptionally 
young in 1940 terms, being commissioned in the 1920s. The majority, 
therefore, were products of the Victorian/Edwardian officer selection 
and training process – and the social norms which applied to it. As the 
First World War progressed, the demand for officers would outstrip the 
ability of the traditional routes of supply such as the public schools, the 
scions of the gentry, the clergy and the land-owning classes, both as 
casualty rates increased and as the army expanded in size. A class-
                                                          
also mentioned concern at being unable to live as expected by the regiment solely on 
his Captain’s salary. (Captain B. F. Whiteley, DCM “My War, 1914-1918”; unpublished 
typescript ms. 1951). 
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based bar would lower as more officers were promoted from the ranks 
on the basis of practical and battle experience. However, this would 
raise again from the 1920s. 
Post-war, the old preferences would begin to reassert themselves, 
where officers who did not “fit in” would face varying degrees of 
ostracism and even pressure to leave the army. However, the future 
brigadiers considered here had already proved themselves “suitable” on 
active service, the majority, one hundred and twenty-one of the one 
hundred and fifty-six having one or more decorations for gallantry and 
distinguished service during the past war or between the wars, which 
would lend them an advantage in resisting and overcoming such 
pressures in comparison to contemporaries without them.  (The issue of 
possession of decorations is discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter). 
Although a public school education is sufficiently prominent 
among the officers to lead one to conclude that it was a pre-requisite 
(albeit an implied rather than a mandated one) to remain in the army 
and build a career after the First World War, the group is not dominated 
by the seven “great” public schools and two day schools of the 
Clarendon Group (CG). No single school absolutely dominates the 
group, and although Eton, Cheltenham, Wellington and Winchester 
figure prominently, Bowman and Connelly’s assertion that the 
Edwardian officer corps, was dominated by a small group of six schools 
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is not completely reflected in this group as just one third of it came 
from these schools, even though the CG and HC produced the majority 
over half of them.  
A university education was much less common, as it was a 
minority experience across the country overall. The officers in the group 
who were graduates remained a minority group within a minority of the 
population, although being a graduate was of itself no impediment to 
progression to high rank. 
Officers who continued as professional soldiers after the First 
World War, regardless of their means of initial entry to the profession of 
army officer, were still products of the public school system. Public 
school alumni reasserted their dominance of the profession in the inter-
war period.  
One hundred and thirty officers of the group of one hundred and 
fifty-six who served in and survived through to the end of the First 
World War were ahead, if only through good fortune, of the statistical 
trend. Whether their very enhanced networks between them is difficult 
to prove with certainty, but subsequent commemoration of the dead 
within schools, universities and regiments acted as a unifying force 
between those with common experience, or communal connection.  
Although the popular assertion linking “Eton and the Guards” may 
have a loose factual basis from the number of OE officers within this 
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group – five, three of whom served with the Coldstream Guards - no 
other line or county infantry regiment or regiments particularly 
predominates among them. There is also little correlation between the 
geographical location of the school and the county or area infantry 
regiments joined by those from particular schools. This in itself is not 
particularly significant due to the influence of factors such as family 
ties, history and traditions; the “fashionability” of certain regiments and 
the varying levels of supplementary income required to be able to bear 
the expenses of being part of them.  
The number of immediate and direct personal linkages between 
officers via school, university and first commissioned service is not 
widespread among the group as a whole. The influence of such 
conjunctions would be more significant in later service when specifics 
such as time at school, in the public schools which house one resided, 
time and place as an undergraduate would “level” into a general 
connectivity through mutual awareness and loyalties based on the 
school and university overall and also that concept of being a 
gentleman. 
Otley’s assertion that the percentage of scions of the “upper 
class” continued to decline as a proportion of all British Army officers up 
through the 1920s and 1930s has some applicability to this group, but 
its influence remained, however, as the senior officers of the time, 
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reflected the social make up of their group a generation or two before, 
when they actually joined the army.  
As to family backgrounds, although the largest minority of the 
whole group of 1940 brigadiers, a fifth, were the sons of military 
officers ranging in rank from Major to Major General, 20.1% of the 
whole group, they were still a minority. This statistic remains largely 
constant among the officers who advanced in rank after 1940, with 
22% of the group of officers advancing having fathers who had served 
previously.  
No specific professions are predominant among the relatives of 
other officers in the group, either among those who advanced and those 
who did not. Although very few of the officers could be described as 
having emerged from working, or lower class, backgrounds, neither do 
they fit a social stereotype of the officer corps as being dominated by 
the aristocratic or land-owning classes. In this sense, they defy the 
stereotype claimed by Barnett and Williamson,100100that the aristocratic 
and upper classes still dominated, and were still the main source of 
supply to, the British officer cadre up to, into and beyond the First 
World War.  
                                                          
100 Barnett, C. (1960) “The Desert Generals” (London, William Kimber), p. 130 and 
W. Murray (1988) British Military Effectiveness 1919-1939 in W. Murray and R. Millett 
(2010) “Military Effectiveness Vol. 2: The Interwar Period” (Cambridge, Cambridge 
UP), p. 105. 
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With schools and regiments of initial commissioning proving 
inconclusive as definitive providers of advantage to higher rank 
promotion, factors such as professional education are now examined to 
identify whether, and to what extent, it favourably influenced an 
officer’s suitability for higher promotion.  
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The inter-war period, 1919-1939: 
Education, Training and Postings 
 
I am glad Sir, that you have no Staff College officers on 
your staff, I do not like Staff College officers. My 
experience of Staff College officers is that they are 
conceited, and they are dirty! Brains? I do not believe in 
brains...my Military Secretary, and a damned good one he 
is too, is the stupidest man I ever came across. 
Attributed to Prince George, Duke of Cambridge, 
Commander in Chief of the Forces (1856-95)1 
 
The Staff College has been devised to restrain and curb 
officers who are unable to remain at the official level of 
proficiency. 
The Young Officer's Guide to Knowledge 
by The Senior Major (1915)2 
 
 
This chapter examines two issues which could influence the potential for 
advancement of the officers in the group who remained in the army 
during the interwar years, from 1919 to 1939. Although the return to 
peacetime soldiering meant large scale reductions in manpower, at the 
same time promotion structures based on seniority and a lack of 
incentives for older officers with little prospect of advancement to retire, 
meant that a younger officer would need to show that he was distinct 
from his peers to gain advancement.  
                                                          
1 http://regimentalrogue.com/quotes/quotes_officers1.htm Accessed 1 July 19; the 
quotation has proven impossible to attribute definitively to the speaker. 
2 Attributed to Captain C. G. Massie Blomfield; 2nd Edition, Bourne Press, Aldershot 
1915. 
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The first issue considered is those avenues open to junior officers 
for professional education in the period between the First World War 
and the mid-1930s, including the successful completion of courses such 
as the Army Staff College and whether successful admission to, and 
completion of, such education was influential in post-1940 
advancement. It will also explore whether shared experience of such 
courses created enduring networks between students which may have 
been influential later in their careers. This will be followed by an 
examination of whether service overseas, be it in staff postings or 
attached service in armies of the empire and so on had any influence 
over advancement, or generated subgroups and networks within the 
main grouping. 
It should be noted that it is not intended to examine the precise 
nature of the education, such as the syllabus, provided on such 
courses; this work is discussed elsewhere.3 The primary aim is to view 
whether the time spent in such establishments was a potential 
generator of networks. Consideration will also be given to whether such 
networks were immediate (for example, through being direct 
contemporaries) or indirect, through being connected as graduates of 
such courses.  
                                                          
3 For example, in works such as Bond, B. (1972) “The Victorian Army and the Staff 
College” (London, Methuen) and Duncan, A. G. “The Military Education of Junior 
Officers in the Edwardian Army” (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham 
2016) 
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  Despite having recently engaged successfully in the largest scale 
war the British Army had ever experienced, with the return of peace 
and demobilisation attitudes towards the profession of soldiering quickly 
reverted to pre-war norms. It was as if the war just won was an 
aberration, and the changes the army had gone through were not to be 
replicated or extended. Education of officers was one area where this 
attitude was particularly visible, where prejudices and custom would 
reassert themselves as the army returned to “normal”. Even after the 
Second World War, Montgomery noted that “…we did not properly check 
up on the lessons of the [First World] war”,4 notwithstanding his own 
role in redrafting the second post war edition of the official manual 
Infantry Training in 1931.5 
In the inter-war period, there were three formal avenues for the 
continued professional education and training of army officers: the 
Senior Officers’ School with branches at Sheerness in the UK and at 
Belgaum in India, the Staff Colleges at Camberley in the UK and Quetta 
in India, and from 1927 the Imperial Defence College in London. The 
first was an innovation from the First World War, established in 1916 by 
Brigadier-General R.J. Kentish. It was originally intended for officers of 
                                                          
4 “Opening address delivered by Field-Marshal the Rt. Hon. Viscount Montgomery, 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), on the occasion of Exercise Evolution, Staff 
College, Camberley, 14 August, 1946” London, Imperial War Museum Maj. Gen. R. 
Briggs Papers MSS 66/76/1. 
5 French, D. (2001) “Doctrine and Organization in the British Army, 1919-1932” The 
Historical Journal, 44(2), pp. 497-515.  
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the British Army who aspired to battalion command and to ensure that 
all such candidates received suitable training. This was a role which had 
traditionally rested with battalion commanders. At the time and 
increasingly after the cessation of hostilities some took its very 
existence to imply that they were incapable of preparing their officers 
adequately. The School attempted to widen officers' outlook by 
including in its syllabus subjects that were not immediately military but 
led to an appreciation of the wider political, geographical and 
technological environment in which the British Army would operate.6  
With the massive expansion of the British Army in the First World 
War, the demand for qualified staff officers at all levels of command 
outstripped the ability of pre-war structures to produce them. The 
closure of the Staff College on the outbreak of war in August 1914 – as 
the pupils and the directing staff were needed immediately for front line 
service – did not help the situation. When the Hooge Chateau was 
shelled by the Germans at 13.25 on 31 October 1914, among the 
extensive casualties were the staffs of Major General Monro 
(commanding 2nd Division) and Major General Lomax (commanding 1st 
Division) which had co-located there to plan the defence of Ypres. 
Seven staff officers were killed7 and a further four were wounded, one 
                                                          
6 See Kennedy, G. and Neilson, K. (2002) in “Military Education, Past Present and 
Future” (Praeger, Connecticut), p. 111. 
7 Robbins, S. (2016) “British Generalship during the Great War: The Military Career of 
Sir Henry Horne” (London, Rutledge), p. 73. 
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mortally, removing them from duty at a critical point. (Lomax was so 
badly hurt he had to be evacuated home and subsequently died of his 
wounds; Monro, though injured, continued in command).8  
Apart from the obvious tactical error of combining such essential 
personnel in one location, it underlined the shortage of supply of such 
specialists. Additional demand would stem from the need to place 
qualified Regular Army staff officers with the newly forming and 
expanding Territorial and New Army divisions at home and latterly in 
France, which had not generated their own staffs organically. From forty 
qualified staff officers serving with the BEF on its initial deployment to 
France, by the spring of 1915 the total number of staff officers at Army, 
Corps and Divisional level had risen to 300.9 Out of necessity, at junior 
levels, front line officers with some experience would be invited, first, to 
become what were titled “Staff Learners” to determine whether they 
had the ability to fill staff posts and, indeed, whether they wished to do 
so.  
Staff schools were initially established in France in early 1916, but 
after the experience of the Battle of the Somme, both a Senior and 
Junior Staff School were established at Hesdin. The courses lasted six 
weeks and took twenty students each at a time. The former prepared 
                                                          
8 Brice, B. (2014 reprint of 1927 original) “The Battle Book of Ypres”, p. 141. 
9 Harris, P. (2017) “The Men Who Planned the War: A Study of the Staff of the British 
Army on the Western Front 1914-1918” (London, Routledge), p. 50. 
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officers for postings as GSO1s and AA&QMG; the latter prepared 
GSO2s. An analogue to Hesdin was formed in Cambridge in 1917, and 
the Staff College at Camberley restarted short staff courses later that 
year, but this did not endure long as it became a tactical school for 
senior officers in 1918.10 GSO1s and 2s were appointed by GHQ; GSO3s 
and Brigade Majors at Army level.  
Qualifications for staff postings also relaxed as the war went on; 
until the summer of 1916, potential staff officers either had to be a 
p.s.c., or to have held a staff position, or to have successfully 
completed a staff course (including a month’s service as a Staff 
Learner). The rules were further relaxed in 1917, with candidates for 
staff postings in the UK no longer being required to have passed a staff 
course, but they had to have been a Staff Learner for a month. In 
September 1917, this relaxation was also applied to the most junior 
GSOs, GSO3s, in operational theatres overseas.11  
From the whole 1940 group of one hundred and fifty-six, fifty- 
five of them served as GSOs on active service (for the purposes of this 
analysis, officers serving in the UK, such as on the staff of home 
commands, schools and the War Office are included). This represents 
35.7% of the whole. Of these fifty-five, forty-two, or 76% of the 
                                                          
10 UK TNA WO 256/15 Summary of Schools for Training in the British Expeditionary 
Force, Winter 1916-Spring 1917. 
11 Details on staff qualifications from Messenger, C. (2005) “Call to Arms: The British 
Army 1914-1918” (London, Cassell), pp. 361-65. 
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subgroup, were either already or would become Staff College graduates 
between the world wars, 27.7% of the whole 1940 group. The 
combination of staff service and subsequent attainment of a staff 
college qualification were therefore a significant minority within the 
group.  
Of the fifty-five serving as GSOs, twenty-two officers were 
promoted beyond Brigadier during the course of the Second World War 
(40% of the subgroup). Of these twenty-two, only three did not attend 
Staff College. This suggests that the combination of front line service as 
a GSO and a p.s.c. - with nineteen out of fifty-five officers being so 
qualified, (35.4% of the subgroup and 12.3% of the whole) whilst far 
from decisive, was a positive influence towards selection for further 
promotion. By comparison, among the remaining ninety-nine officers 
who did not serve as GSOs during the First World War (even though 
several did between the wars after attending Staff College) the 
proportion of Staff College graduates is slightly lower, with thirty-seven 
out of the ninety-nine, or 37.3%. Of the ninety-nine. the number of 
officers advancing beyond Brigadier is the same – thirty-seven, and the 
same percentage.  
Army promotion prospects stagnated in the 1920s and 30s due to 
blockages caused by a lack of funding to allow career progression or to 
encourage ageing officers with little prospect of further promotion to 
retire. The system of promotion for officers up to Major was still based 
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on the concept of regimental seniority, whereby an officer could only be 
promoted when a vacancy emerged in the higher rank within his 
regiment, usually through retirement. This could result in long waits for 
advancement. The latter was exacerbated by the historic system of Half 
Pay. As described earlier on p.79, the concept of Half-pay allowed 
officers of the British Army (and Royal Navy) to be put into semi-
retirement during periods of peace, when fewer command slots were 
available. While his services were not immediately needed, the officer 
would receive half of his original pay. This ensured that officers would 
be financially supported to some extent while they waited to be recalled 
to active duty.12 However, as mentioned previously if an officer chose to 
retire or resign whilst on the half-pay list, his pension would also be 
reduced by half.13 
Any officer with ambition would have to find avenues to render 
him distinctive amongst his contemporaries to impress selection boards 
for further promotion. Attached service overseas was one option, either 
in staff posts or with Imperial or Colonial units, such as Kenneth 
                                                          
12 Alphabetical Register of Army Officers on Half Pay, 1737-1921; TNA PMG 4; General 
office files of the Paymaster General in relation to military pensions, 1730-1969 TNA 
PMG 74. Public Records Office Records Information Leaflet No.123 British Army 
Pensions (1997). 
13 The Half Pay system was a legacy of the system of purchase of commissions, 
although Purchase was abolished in 1871. Army officers did not receive a formal 
pension until 1921 and the system of half pay endured into the 1930s. Bruce, A. P. C. 
(1980) “The Purchase System in The British Army 1660-1871 (Royal Historical Society 
Studies in History Series)” (London. RHIstS) and D. W. Allen, “Compatible Incentives 
and the Purchase of Military Commissions” The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 
(January 1998), pp. 45-66 (University of Chicago Law School). 
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Anderson serving as the GSO1 at Deccan Command in India from March 
1936 to December 193714 or Wilson Crewdson, Staff Colonel at HQ 
Hong Kong in 1938,15 and George Martin, who after serving as a GSO2 
at the Royal Military College in Canada from 1931-33 and a year at the 
War Office, again went abroad in 1935 as a GSO2 at HQ Gibraltar.  
For many others, this would be an application to the Staff College, 
either for a competitive place by examination or through the much 
scarcer route of nomination by the candidate’s commanding officer. For 
example, in 1926, in response to a Parliamentary Question from the 
Member of Parliament for Barnstable, Sir Basil Peto, the Secretary of 
State for War, Sir Lamington Worthington-Evans16 responded that there 
were 440 entrants for the entrance examination for admission to 
Camberley. There were 34 vacancies open for competition, of which 22 
were for British Army officers, and about 16 vacancies to be filled by 
nomination, of which 10 were for British Army officers.17 These figures 
were generally typical in the 1920s, but by the end of the decade, the 
pressure on places was increasing.  
In 1926 Worthington-Evans had added that the limitations of 
accommodation at Camberley was “a very difficult matter” preventing 
                                                          
14 HYAL January 1938. 
15 HYAL January 1940. 
16 Secretary of State for War, 1924-29. 
17 STAFF COLLEGE, CAMBERLEY (ADMISSION). Hansard, HC Deb 16 February 1926 vol 
191 c1697 the size of the course was a particular issue for Peto, who had pressed the 
War Office on the same issue in 1925 and would again in 1927.  
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expansion of the course. On average, the annual intake at both 
Camberley and Quetta was around fifty each, leaving just over one 
hundred places for each year across the two colleges. (In 1925, the 
prevailing number for each intake was officially declared to be 57 at 
Camberley and 53 at Quetta).18 Despite the apparent pressure for 
places via either route, there was also what has been described as a 
“suspicion” of the Staff College among regimental commanders and 
some senior officers.19  
Competition for places at Camberley grew as the 1920s 
progressed, notwithstanding the rigorous process required even to get 
to sit the competitive examination. The number of candidates applying 
for the College doubled in under four years, from 193 in 1923 to 400 in 
1926. By 1927, the ratio of applicants to places was running at 9:1. In 
1929, there were 409 applicants for 56 places.20 To get to this stage, an 
officer had to have been deemed suitable, and of a sufficient standard, 
just to be considered. An officer’s CO had to declare the candidate 
“suitable” to apply, and he had to sustain this for two years on what 
was called the “Selected List” before being allowed to sit the 
examination.21 Furthermore, if an officer were successful in passing the 
                                                          
18 STAFF COLLEGES (CAMBERLEY AND QUETTA). HC Deb 10 March 1925 vol 181 
cc1104-05. 
19 French, D. (2005) “Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, 
and the British People c. 1870–2000” (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 153. 
20 WO 279/57 “Report from a Conference Held at the Staff College” 1927 and WO 
279/70 “Report from a Conference Held at The Staff College”, 1930. 
21 Staff College (Camberley) Regulations War Office; HMSO 1930. 
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test but did not achieve a place on the next course, he would be 
required to sit the examination again on re-applying.  
Success on the course was no guarantee of advancement to the 
upper ranks of the army. However, exposure to some of the Directing 
Staff, either the College’s Commandants or instructors, could mark 
promising officers for later advancement through passive talent spotting 
as the former advanced to higher ranks. This was particularly marked in 
the mid-1920s when Brooke and Montgomery were serving there as 
instructors. Brooke was a General Staff Officer Grade 1 (GSO 1), or 
Senior Instructor, as a Lieutenant Colonel from 1923-26. Montgomery 
taught there as a Major (GSO 2, Staff Instructor) from 1926-1929; and 
would also serve as the Chief Instructor at Quetta from 1934-37.22 Both 
would later promote and advance the careers of officers they had 
taught at Camberley to senior positions in the army during the Second 
World War. (See below, pp. 242-245) 
Such patronage was not solely restricted to Montgomery and 
Brooke. Arthur Percival gained a place on the 1923 course via 
nomination by his Commanding Officer, as was permitted at the time. It 
was said in the army that although Percival was technically too old (at 
36) for Staff College, Winston Churchill had exerted pressure for him to 
                                                          
22 Frost, M. The British and Indian Army Staff Colleges in the Interwar Years  in 
Delaney, D, Engen, R. and Fitzpatrick, M. (2018) “Military Education in the British 
Empire, 1815-1949” (Vancouver, University of British Columbia [UBC] Press), pp. 156-
57. 
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be accepted as he had been impressed with his conduct both in North 
Russia in 1919-1920 and against the Irish Republican Army during the 
Irish Civil War.23 Having gained entry to Camberley, he first came to the 
attention of John Dill, who was instructing there. The link would be 
renewed when Percival was himself posted to Camberley as an 
instructor when Dill was Commandant. Dill would describe Percival as 
“the best officer I have seen in a long time” to the Director of Army 
Staff Duties and Dill would seek to appoint him to posts in his 
subsequent commands, the link only being broken when Percival was 
posted away from France in early 1940 on promotion to Major General 
to command 43rd (Wessex) Division. This was a post he held for only 
three months before returning to London in June to become Assistant 
CIGS, under Dill.  
Dill had recommended Percival for appointment to a post as Major 
General (General Staff) at Army level, but another candidate was 
selected without Dill’s knowledge. Both men were said to hold the other 
“in high mutual regard”.24 Dill had also been the BGGS at Camberley 
from 1919-22 when the cadres admitted on wartime merit, rather than 
competition or nomination, attended; he taught Alan Brooke when the 
latter attended the first course at the newly opened Imperial Defence 
                                                          
23 Kinvig, C. (1996) “Percival of Singapore” (London, Brassey’s), p. 89. 
24 Kinvig (1996), pp. 95, 110, 112. 
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College in 1927.25 Although by the time of his return to Camberley in 
1931 as Commandant (where he remained until 1934), most of the 
1940 brigadiers, both progressing and not, had already passed through. 
From the 1940 group, Miles Dempsey, James Steel and Brian Horrocks 
were pupils under Dill, and all three progressed to General’s rank in the 
course of the war.  
  Recent scholarship has argued that the training provided at 
Camberley and Quetta in the first half of the twentieth century was 
inadequate and left graduates unprepared for the roles and challenges 
these officers would face during war.26 However, the notion that the 
Staff College was the gold standard of officer training in the British 
Army was persistent and enduring to the extent that whatever the 
practical reality, the perception of it being so was unshakeable.  
The 1924 intake at Camberley, which graduated at the end of 
1925,27 was notable in producing thirty-three officers who advanced to 
General officer rank during the Second World War.  The 1925 Camberley 
class also produced the most 1940 brigadiers who progressed in rank, 
with seven. Richard Bond, Gerald Gartlan, Noel Irwin, William Morgan, 
                                                          
25 Danchev, A. (1986) “Very Special Relationship: Field Marshal Sir John Dill and the 
Anglo-American Alliance, 1941-44” (London, Brassey’s), p. 47. 
26 For example, Duncan, A. G. “The Military Education of Junior Officers in the 
Edwardian Army” (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham 2016) and 
Smalley, E. “The British Expeditionary Force 1939-40” (London, Palgrave Macmillan 
2013) and French (1996) “Colonel Blimp”, p. 1200. 
27 “Staff College: List of Graduates” The Times (London), Wednesday, February 17, 
1926; p. 11; Issue 44198. 
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Vyvyan Pope, John Swayne and Daryl Watson were therefore directly 
contemporary with those officers above. Of the thirty-two 1940 
brigadiers who did not progress to Major General but were Staff College 
graduates came from the 1925 class.  
TABLE 3.1:  STAFF COLLEGE, CAMBERLEY: 1925 GRADUATES ADVANCING TO GENERAL RANK 




IVO THOMAS RA LT GEN GOC 43 DIV 
DOUGLAS GRAHAM CAMERONIANS MAJ GEN GOC 50 DIV 
MICHAEL CREAGH 7H MAJ GEN GOC 7 ARMD DIV 
READE GODWIN-AUSTIN SWB LT GEN QMG INDIA 
GUY ROBINSON NORTHAMPTON MAJ GEN GOC NORTHERN DIST 
ARCHIBALD NYE LEINSTER LT GEN VCIGS 
NOEL BERESFORD-PIERCE RA LT GEN GOC S CMD (INDIA) 
RUFUS LAURIE SEAFORTH MAJ GEN GOC 52 DIV 
JOHN REEVE RB MAJ GEN DEP ADJ GEN ME 
NOEL NAPIER-CLAVERING RE MAJ GEN DEP ADJ GEN EGYPT 
HUMFREY GALE ASC LT GEN DEP CHF STAFF SHAEF 
CLIFFORD MALDEN R SUSSEX MAJ GEN GOC 2 DIV (DIED 1941) 
WILLOUGHBY NORRIE 11H LT GEN GOC XXX CORPS 
GEOFFREY RAIKES SWB MAJ GEN GOC SUDAN 
FREDERICK HYLAND RE MAJ GEN DEP CDR GIBRALTAR 
THOMAS RIDDELL-WEBSTER CAMERONIANS LT GEN QMG TO THE FORCES 
SYDNEY WASON RA LT GEN  GOC 1 AA CORPS  
(RTD 1942) 
JAMES HARTER RF MAJ GEN GOC N MIDS DIST 
GERALD BRUNSKILL R SUSSEX MAJ GEN DIR SPECIAL WPNS 
OTTO LUND RA MAJ GEN DIRECTOR RA 
GERALD FITZGERALD INDIAN ARMY MAJ GEN GOC LUCKNOW DIST 
GEORGE LAMMIE R SCOTS MAJ GEN DIR QUARTERING, WO 
LANGLEY BROWNING RA MAJ GEN GOC RA TRG 
ROBERT STUDDERT RA MAJ GEN D/MGO (INDIA) 
LIONEL FINCH LANCS FUS MAJ GEN DIST CDR HOME  
BEF/NWEF BRIGADIERS 
RICHARD BOND RE MAJ GEN CDR, RE 
GERALD GARTLAN R IR RIF MAJ GEN MGGS N CMD 
NOEL IRWIN ESSEX LT GEN E ARMY, BURMA 
WILLIAM MORGAN RA LT GEN CGS, MED 
VYVYAN POPE N STAFFS MAJ GEN GOC XIII CORPS (KIA 1941) 
JOHN SWAYNE SOM LI LT GEN CGS, INDIA 
DARYL WATSON  RF LT GEN GOC W CMD 
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The extended, progressing group was typical in one aspect; with 
the exception of one grammar school pupil and one who appears to 
have gone no further than prep school, public schools were again the 
predominant source of education. Wellington and Cheltenham were 
dominant, with four old boys each, followed by Eton with three and 
Clifton, George Watson’s and Marlborough with two each.  
Among those officers who served both as GSOs on active service 
during the First World War and also graduated later from Staff College 
there were a number of groups of contemporaries. Arthur Archdale, 
Archibald Beauman and Frederick Bissett were at Camberley in 1920 
(none of whom progressed after 1940). Merton Beckwith-Smith, Raleigh 
Chichester-Constable, Henry Currey, James Gammell, Graham 
Leventhorpe, Eric Miles and Richard Wooten were GSOs who graduated 
from Camberley in 1922 (seven, of whom four, Beckwith-Smith, 
Gammell, Miles and Wooten advanced). In 1923, Geoffrey Franklyn, 
Gerald Gartlan, John Halstead, Douglas Pratt, George Roupell, “Jacky” 
Smyth and “Monty” Stopford (again seven, of whom five were 
promoted; Gartlan, Halstead, Pratt, Smyth and Stopford) were 
contemporaries, In 1926, John Clark, William Duncan, Humfrey Gale, 
Cyrus Greenslade and Geoffrey Mansergh (five, of whom only Clark and 
Gale progressed) were students together. The only other subgroup 
among these doubly qualified officers was the 1927 set, comprised of 
Evelyn Barker, John Hawkesworth and “Kit” Woolner, all of whom 
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progressed.  Therefore, of five groups of officers, totalling twenty-two, 
fourteen were promoted after 1940. 
 
The Senior Officers’ School 
The Senior Officers’ School opened at Aldershot in 1915 and endured 
until its closure in 1961. Originally conceived as a wartime expedient, in 
1920, it was put on the permanent peacetime establishment. In 1925 it 
was “temporarily” transferred to Sheerness, into barracks vacated by 
the Royal Garrison Artillery in 1924.28 Its final location from 1939 was 
Erlestoke Park in Wiltshire. The parallel establishment at Belgaum in 
India closed in 1939. Its continued existence after the end of the First 
World War was questioned in some quarters, not least on grounds of 
cost. In 1920, Sir Archibald Williamson MP, the Financial Secretary to 
the War Office, declared in Parliament that:  
It is necessary for all officers of the Regular Army, with the 
exception of the Royal Army Medical Corps and the Royal Army 
Veterinary Corps, to undergo a course at this school before they 
can be considered fit for promotion to the rank of substantive 
Lieut.-Colonel. This procedure is required in the interests of the 
higher tactical training of officers and of the training and 
administration of units, and to ascertain the fitness of officers to 
command troops.29 
                                                          
28 “Army Senior Officers School”, The Scotsman 11 January 1924, p. 11.; Hansard, HC 
Deb 26 February 1924 vol 170 cc231-32. 
29 Hansard, HC Deb 30 March 1920 vol 127 cc1057-58. 
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These remarks underline the perception that the aim of the Staff 
Colleges both at Camberley and Quetta was to prepare their candidates 
for “higher”, e.g., General Officers’ commands, even if when attending 
they were several steps in rank, and/or years from any such 
appointment, if at all.  
In the inter-war period, the Senior Officers’ School had a high 
throughput, with three courses of three months’ duration a year with a 
total of up to one hundred and twenty-six students30 (i.e. forty-two per 
course) from all three services. Priority was given to those serving in 
Home Forces, with places equalling a third of the total open to officers 
serving in the Rhine Army and the Middle East.31 Its very existence was 
frequently debated in the 1920s as battalion commanders felt it their 
place to train and prepare their junior officers for later command of 
battalions. When CIGS, Sir George Milne32 expressed understanding for 
this view, but in turn believed that a lack of common doctrinal teaching 
at this devolved level could be overcome by retaining the school. He 
also resisted a proposal from Sir Edmond Ironside, when the latter was 
Commandant at Camberley,33 that the School be disbanded in favour of 
                                                          
30 For example, the 36th Course, which completed in September 1931, had forty one 
students, including a Rear Admiral, rather more senior than the typical intake and 
senior in rank to the school’s Commandant, an Army Brigadier. Hampshire Telegraph, 
18 September 1931, p. 20. 
31 The Times (London) 17 March, 1921, Issue Number 42671, p. 21. 
32 Field Marshal Sir George Milne was CIGS from February 1926 until his retirement 
from the Army in January 1933.  
33 Ironside was Commandant of the Staff College from 1922-26. 
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forming a War College, where a select few graduates of the Staff 
Colleges would spend a year later in their careers learning the 
requirements of higher level command. Milne rejected this suggestion 
on two practical grounds; first, the continuing lack of consistent 
standards in training and second, a fear that the spilt would produce 
antagonistic groups of officers prepared to be staff officers but not 
commanders, and commanders not necessarily proficient in staff 
work.34 (Personal antagonism between Ironside and Milne, exacerbated 
by the former’s desire to accelerate army reform along the lines 
proposed by JFC Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart, also cannot be ruled out 
as a factor).35 
The School’s courses were reformed in 1932, reducing the 
number to two per year and replacing the third three-month course with 
four courses of two weeks’ duration intended specifically for Lieutenant 
Colonels of the Territorial Army, “for higher tactical training and actual 
command of troops, so that a higher number of TA commanders may 
receive this instruction to assist in the training of their troops.” 36 The 
number of vacancies on the two remaining courses for Regular officers 
                                                          
34 French, D. (2002) Officer Education and Training in the British Regular Army 1919-
1939 in Kennedy, G. & Neilson, K. eds.) “Military Education, Past, Present & Future” 
(New Haven, Praeger), p. 118. 
35 Cairns, John C. (September 2004), "Ironside, (William) Edmund, first Baron Ironside 
(1880–1959)". Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (online ed. Accessed 13 Apr 
2018). 
36 The Times (London) 8 March 1932), p. 20; Issue 46076. 
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was not increased to compensate for the loss of capacity.37 Although 
there had been places at the School for a “select number” (unspecified) 
of TA Lieutenant Colonels in the 1920s and 1930s, this was the first 
time that a specific course tailored to the TA had been provided.38 In 
this regard, the School was more advanced than the Staff College, 
which did not admit Territorials until 1938.  
Defining a set of possible connections between the School’s 
students is complicated as a complete list of course attendees does not 
exist. Although the Directing Staff are listed in the HYAL as part of the 
list of Educational Establishments, no comprehensive lists of its 
graduates survive. Lists of those graduating appear intermittently but 
erratically in newspapers in the inter-war period, but their usefulness is 
reduced by several being only partial, being captioned “among those to 
pass through…were”.39  
A posting as an Instructor to the school could be variable in 
duration, from as long as three years in some cases (such as Henry 
Currey) to a few months, or, in the extreme case of Edmond Schreiber, 
eighteen days. (Schreiber was posted away almost before taking up 
post in order to become the Brigadier, Royal Artillery in Southern 
                                                          
37 For example, the 39th Course at the Senior Officers’ School, the Second Course of 
1932, comprised 35 Army officers of the rank of Maj. or Lt. Col. (including one Maj. 
from the Indian Army); 2 Captains, RN; 2 Lt. Cols. Royal Marines and 2 Sqn. Ldrs. RAF 
– a total of 41 candidates. The Times (London), 23 April 1932; Issue 46115; p. 8. 
38 The Times, 8 March 1932. 
39 Hampshire Telegraph, 18 September 1931, p. 20.  
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Command to fill an urgent vacancy).40 Some of the other 1940 
brigadiers did serve as instructors at the School, including Alfred 
Hopwood, Henry Currey, Jack Churchill, John Crocker and Edmond 
Schreiber. 
TABLE 3.2 1940 BRIGADIERS: INSTRUCTORS AT THE SENIOR OFFICERS’ SCHOOL 
NAME           1940          SCHOOL                 REGT       STAFF 
COLLEGE 
       SEN 
O    OFFS SCH 
CHURCHILL 151 
BDE 
ETON DURHAM LI 1919 OCT 35-OCT 37 
CROCKER  3 ARMD  
     BDE 
AT HOME TANK CORPS 1929 
QUETTA 
APR 37-FEB 38 
CURREY HQ 
NWEF 
BRADFIELD R IR RIF 1922 NOV 33-OCT 36 
HOPWOOD NWEF 
BASE 
GLENALMOND LINCOLN R 1919 SEP 33-SEP 35 
SCHREIBER CCRA II 
CORPS 
WELLINGTON RA 1925 8-26 SEP 1938 
 
Churchill and Hopwood, whilst Staff College graduates together, 
just missed serving simultaneously at Sheerness, but Churchill and 
Crocker were contemporaries between April and October 1937. 
Hopwood and Currey served there together for nearly two years, from 
November 1933 to September 1935. However, another 1940 connection 
was that the-then Brigadier Wilfrid “Tommy” Lindsell served as 
Commandant of the school from September 1933 to May 1935, making 
him a contemporary of Hopwood and Currey. Lindsell served as the 
BEF’s Quartermaster General in France. (Gort had served as the Chief 
Instructor at Sheerness for eleven months in 1926-27, too early to have 
                                                          
40 Smart (2005), p. 281. 
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encountered any of the brigadiers serving under him in France in 
1940).41  
Having graduated from the school – or having been Directing 
Staff thereof did not proffer any particular advantage to officers in 
terms of advancement or the generation of networks. Its Commandants 
up to the mid-1930s were, in the main, officers late in their careers for 
whom command of the school represented their professional swansong 
and were limited in their ability to influence the careers of former 
subordinates. Of the five, only Crocker and Schreiber advanced to Major 
General or above during the course of the war. No officers from the 
Indian Senior Officers’ School in Belgaum served in France or Norway.  
The Imperial Defence College 
 
The Imperial Defence College was established at 9 Buckingham Gate in 
London in 1927 to instruct senior officers in the defence of the British 
Empire and as such was designed for officers destined for the highest 
ranks of the army. However, as established it differed from Ironside’s 
rejected proposal in that it was tri-service, and senior civilians were 
admitted. Students were of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or equivalent 
and above (on its early courses, some substantive Majors with a Brevet 
of Lieutenant Colonel were admitted). Of all the officers who served as 
                                                          
41 HYAL December 1938, pp. 13-20. 
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brigadiers in France and Norway, only nine were graduates of the 




The eight IDC contemporaries were therefore Bond and Swayne, 
in 1933; Miles and Pope in 1934 with Gartlan and Percival following in 
1937, leaving Davidson (in 1935), Irwin (in 1936) and West (in 1938) 
as the officers who did not graduate together from Buckingham Gate. 
However, if the conjunction between time at Staff College and the IDC is 
considered, Gartlan and Percival are doubly connected by being direct 
contemporaries at both, in 1923-24 and 1937 respectively. All the nine 
IDC graduates fulfilled the intent of the course at least in part; six 
progressed to Major General42 and three to Lieutenant General43 Alan 
                                                          
42 Bond, Davidson, Gartlan, Miles, Pope and West. As Pope was killed in action in 
1942, whether he may have progressed further is a matter of conjecture.  
43 Irwin, Percival, and Swayne. 
TABLE 3.3: IMPERIAL DEFENCE COLLEGE GRADUATES 
NAME 1940 INITIAL ED REGT STAFF COLLEGE IDC 
CLASS 
BOND CRE I CORPS WELLINGTON RE 1926-27 1933 
DAVIDSON CRA I CORPS MARLBOROUGH RA 1923-24 
QUETTA 
1935 
GARTLAN 5 BDE DOWNSIDE R IRISH; RUR 1923-24 1937 
IRWIN 6 BDE MARLBOROUGH ESSEX 1924-25 1936 
MILES 126 BDE HARROW KOSB 1922-23 1934 
PERCIVAL BGS I CORPS RUGBY BEDFORDS 1923-24 1937 
POPE BGS II CORPS LANCING N STAFFS; RTR 1924-25 1934 
SWAYNE BGS BEF CHARTERHOUSE 
OXFORD (TRINITY) 
SOMERSET LI 1925-26 1933 
WEST ASST MIL SEC KING’S 
CANTERBURY 
RE 1927-28 1938 
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Brooke, having been a student at the IDC in 1927, returned to the 
College as an instructor in 1932, remaining until 1934 – and would 
therefore have taught Bond, Swayne, Miles and Pope.  
In terms of “talent spotting” by the Commandant of the college 
itself, the sole Commandant of the IDC from the army in the period was 
the-then Major General Robert Haining in 1935-1936, when Davidson 
and Irwin were students. Haining went on to significant postings, 
thereafter, including the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence 
in 1936, GOC British Forces in Palestine and Trans-Jordan in 1938, GOC 
Western Command in 1939 and VCIGS in 1940.44 After a period in the 
Middle East in the summer of 1941 in a post, Intendant General, 
specially and specifically created by Churchill45 to ensure continuity of 
supplies to theatre, and especially those coming from the United States, 
Haining retired in 1942. In an immediate sense, therefore, his influence 
over the careers of his students would only have been indirect, as their 
postings (save for Davidson’s subsequently following him as DMI) did 
not directly coincide; neither served under him in Palestine nor in the 
War Office or subsequently. Although attendance on the IDC course was 
a factor in the advancement of the 1940 brigadiers to higher rank, the 
direct influence of the army commandants on their students’ careers is 
not an influential factor.  
                                                          
44 LHCMA, Dill Papers DILL 3/1/14 1940 15 April 1941 – 5 November: Correspondence 
whilst CIGS; letters from Haining. 
45 Hansard HC Deb 09 July 1941 vol 373 cc165-67. 
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Attached Service Overseas 
 
A second route for an officer seeking to make himself appear distinctive 
among his peers was to apply for attached service overseas, in 
command or staff postings in the armies of the British Empire and 
Commonwealth. Service overseas in the interwar period, attached, on 
loan or in staff postings was a common occurrence among the 1940 
group, with eighty-six of them (including some officers who served more 
than once, in different parts of the world), having done so. By far the 
most common region was India, with thirty-three officers serving there 
between 1919 and 1938. Nine served in East, West or South Africa, 
seven in Palestine, six apiece in Egypt and Gibraltar, five in China, four 
in Malaya, three apiece in Iraq and Turkey and two in the British Military 
Mission to Finland. Among the single instances were an observer at the 
Schleswig Plebiscite in 1920, and Instructors at the Royal Military 
Colleges of Canada and Australia.  
Table 3.4 below indicates the number of officers from the overall 
group who served in overseas postings from 1918-1939 and the areas in 
which they served, along with the percentage of the sub-group who 
advanced in rank. (These figures include officers who served in more 
than one overseas theatre, as will be shown later).  
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TABLE 3.4: OVERSEAS SERVICE RECONCILIATION 
OVERSEAS THEATRE NUMBER OF OFFICERS OFFICERS ADVANCING PERCENTAGE 
INDIA 33 17 45.5 
AFRICA 9 6 66.6 
PALESTINE 7 5 71.4 
EGYPT 6 1 16.6 
GIBRALTAR 6 1 16.6 
CHINA 5 1 20 
MALAYA 4 3 75 
IRAQ 3 0 0 
TURKEY 3 1 33.3 
FINLAND 2 0 0 
SINGLE POSTING 8 3 37.5 
TOTALS 86 38 44.1 
  
Therefore, over half of the whole group, 54 per cent, served overseas on 
varying forms of attached duty in the inter-war period, making it a 
sufficiently influential factor in the careers of those who reached 
Brigadier by 1940. However, with less than half of this total figure, 
44%, advancing beyond that rank, having served overseas in the inter-
war period is not decisively influential as a factor in advancement of 
itself.  
 
Postings to India 
Although the largest single area of operational service between the two 
world wars, comparison of contemporary service among the officers in 
India is of reduced immediate usefulness due to the wide geographical 
area covered and a lack of precise location detail in the records. It is 
worthy of mention here in a similar manner to that of having attended 
the same schools, as a certain commonality of experience would apply 
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in later years, however tangential. Table 3.4A arranges the officers 
serving in India alphabetically; Table 3.4B arranges them into groups by 
period served. Table 3.4C lists them as groups of contemporaries, 
arranged by two-year time frames as this was the predominant posting 
duration among the group, although officers could, and did, serve for 
both longer and shorter tours of duty, or served in overlapping postings 
within the same period of service. For example, Arthur Clifton spent 
seven years in India in three separate specialist postings connected to 
armoured cars and armour. “Jackie” Smyth. unsurprisingly for an officer 
commissioned into the Indian Army and who was awarded a Victoria 
Cross with the Indian contingent on the Western Front in 1915, spent 
most of the period 1919-1939 in staff posts in India, save for a period in 
the mid-1920s at the Staff College, Camberley. At the other extreme, 
Frederick Roupell spent only three months in India, in two postings, in 
1920. (Names in all following tables listed in bold indicate officers 
progressing beyond Brigadier after 1940).  
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TABLE 3.4A: OVERSEAS POSTINGS 1919-1939: INDIA 
NAME 1940 1940 POSTING POST INDIA DATES 
ANDERSON BEF 11 BDE GSO 1 DECCAN DIST  MAR 36-DEC 37 
ARCHDALE BEF CRA 42 DIV  BDE MAJ MAY 23-JUL 24 
BLAKE NWEF CHF MED OFF 
(RUPERTFORCE) 
OC HOSPITALS 1933-38 
CHENEVIX-TRENCH BEF SIG OFF IN CHF BEF CHF SIG OFF INDIA MAR 27-FEB 31 
CHURCHILL BEF 151 BDE GSO 2 JAN 29-DEC 32 
CLIFTON BEF 2 LT ARMD RECCE BDE ADVISER ARM CARS 
CMDT ARM CARS (I) 
CHF INST RTC SCH (I) 
MAR 18-OCT 20 
DEC 21-JUL 23 
JUL 23-MAR 25 
DAVIDSON BEF CRA I CORPS GSO 2 
BDE MAJ 
NOV 25-MAY 27 
MAY 27-NOV 29 
DAWES BEF DA/QMG II CORPS DA&QMG MAR 21-SEP 23 
DE CORDOVA BEF 35 BDE STAFF CAPT SEP 24-NOV 28 
EDEN BEF CRA 51 DIV DAAG MAY 26-OCT 28 
FRANKLYN BEF CRA 4 DIV STAFF GHQ (I) APR 32-APR 36 
GREENSLADE BEF DQMG DIR QTRG BEF GSO 2 NOV 35-OCT 36 
GRIFFIN BEF BASE CMDT INST, SMALL ARMS  
SCH (I) 
MAR 21-MAR 23 
GUBBINS NWEF SCISSORFORCE GSO 3 APR 26-FEB 28 
HOGG NWEF BASE AREA ANDALSNES  DAAG 
BDE MAJ 
MAR 24-JUL 26 
JUL 26-MAR 28 
JARDINE BEF MIL SEC BEF DAAG 
BDE MAJ  
MAR 24-DEC 25 
DEC 25- FEB 27 
KING BEF D/ENG IN C BEF GSO 1 (RE) 
CRE (DIV) 
DEP CHF ENG (I) 
FEB 33-OCT 35 
OCT 35-JAN 37 
JAN 37-SEP 39 
LEESE BEF DCGS HQ BEF INST SC QUETTA SEP 38-SEP 39 
LEVENTHORPE BEF CRA 1 DIV DAAG OCT 28-OCT 32 
MORGAN BEF CDR SPT GP 51 HD GSO 2 JAN 32-JAN 35 
PHIPPS BEF CRE II CORPS SO, TO CHF ENG  OCT 18-NOV 20 
PRATT, F BEF CC MED ARTY I CORPS INST, SCH OF ARTY  DEC 29-DEC 33 
PYNE NWEF CRE IV CORPS CHF RE CL 2 SEP 26-MAR 30 
ROBB BEF 9 BDE GSO 3 AUG 26-AUG 30 




SMYTH BEF 127 BDE BDE MAJ 
GSO 3 
GSO 2 
OCT 19-JUN 20 
JAN-NOV 22 
NOV 25-NOV 29 
STAVELEY BEF CCMA II CORPS DA&QMG 
DAAG 
DEC 28-MAR 31 
MAR 31-DEC 32 
STEELE BEF 132 BDE STAFF CAPT NOV 19-JUL 20 
SWAYNE BEF BGS BEF ADC TO GOC W CMD FEB 21-APR 23 
SWINTON BEF CRA MED ARTY INST, SCH OF ARTY DEC 31-DEC 35 
THORPE BEF BASE CMDT CHERBOURG DAG DEC 31-APR 35 
WATSON BEF BGS III CORPS  SPEC. EMPD. 
CMDT SEN OFFS SCH 
MAY 36-JAN 37 
JAN 37-DEC 38 
WOOLNER BEF 8 BDE GSO 2 
BDE MAJ 
MAY 30-MAR 32 
APR 32-MAY 34 
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TABLE 3.4B: DEGREES OF CONTEMPORANEOUSNESS BY DATE: INDIA 
NAME 1940 1940 POSTING POST INDIA DATES 
PHIPPS BEF CRE II CORPS SO TO CHF ENG  OCT 18-NOV 20 
CLIFTON BEF 2 LT ARMD RECCE BDE ADVISER ARM CARS MAR 18-OCT 20 
SMYTH BEF 127 BDE BDE MAJ OCT 19-JUN 20 
STEELE BEF 132 BDE STAFF CAPT NOV 19-JUL 20 
ROSSITER BEF 6 AA BDE DAAG FEB-MAR 20 
ROSSITER BEF 6 AA BDE DA&QMG APR-MAY 20 
SWAYNE BEF BGS BEF ADC TO GOC W CMD FEB 21-APR 23 
GRIFFIN BEF BASE CMDT INST, SMALL ARMS  MAR 21-MAR 23 
DAWES BEF DA/QMG II CORPS DA&QMG MAR 21-SEP 23 
CLIFTON BEF 2 LT ARMD RECCE BDE CMDT ARM CARS (I) DEC 21-JUL 23 
SMYTH BEF 127 BDE GSO 3 JAN-NOV 22 
ARCHDALE BEF CRA 42 DIV  BDE MAJ MAY 23-JUL 24 
CLIFTON BEF 2 LT ARMD RECCE BDE CHF INST RTC SCH (I) JUL 23-MAR 25 
JARDINE BEF MIL SEC BEF DAAG MAR 24-DEC 25 
HOGG NWEF BASE AREA ANDALSNES  DAAG MAR 24-JUL 26 
DE CORDOVA BEF 35 BDE STAFF CAPT SEP 24-NOV 28 
DAVIDSON BEF CRA I CORPS GSO 2 NOV 25-MAY 27 
SMYTH BEF 127 BDE GSO 2 NOV 25-NOV 29 
JARDINE BEF MIL SEC BEF BDE MAJ  DEC 25- FEB 27 
GUBBINS NWEF SCISSORFORCE GSO 3 APR 26-FEB 28 
EDEN BEF CRA 51 DIV DAAG MAY 26-OCT 28 
HOGG NWEF BASE AREA ANDALSNES  BDE MAJ JUL 26-MAR 28 
ROBB BEF 9 BDE GSO 3 AUG 26-AUG 30 
PYNE NWEF CRE IV CORPS CHF RE CL 2 SEP 26-MAR 30 
CHENEVIX-
TRENCH 
BEF SIG OFF IN CHF BEF CHF SIG OFF INDIA MAR 27-FEB 31 
DAVIDSON BEF CRA I CORPS BDE MAJ MAY 27-NOV 29 
LEVENTHORPE BEF CRA 1 DIV DAAG OCT 28-OCT 32 
STAVELEY BEF CCMA II CORPS DA&QMG DEC 28-MAR 31 
CHURCHILL BEF 151 BDE GSO 2 JAN 29-DEC 32 
PRATT, F BEF CC MED ARTY I CORPS INST, SCH OF ARTY  DEC 29-DEC 33 
WOOLNER BEF 8 BDE GSO 2 MAY 30-MAR 32 
STAVELEY BEF CCMA II CORPS DAAG MAR 31-DEC 32 
THORPE BEF BASE CMDT 
CHERBOURG 
DAG DEC 31-APR 35 
SWINTON BEF CRA MED ARTY INST, SCH OF ARTY DEC 31-DEC 35 
MORGAN BEF CDR SPT GP 51 HD GSO 2 JAN 32-JAN 35 
FRANKLYN BEF CRA 4 DIV STAFF GHQ (I) APR 32-APR 36 
WOOLNER BEF 8 BDE BDE MAJ APR 32-MAY 34 
KING BEF D/ENG IN C BEF GSO 1 (RE) FEB 33-OCT 35 
BLAKE NWEF CHF MED OFF 
(RUPERTFORCE) 
OC HOSPITALS 1933-38 
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Table 3.4C indicates groupings of overlap between officers; as 
noted above, the size of India and the lack of exact data as to officers’ 
precise postings means that they were not necessarily serving in the 
same space (for example, in GHQ India) they were contemporaries in-
theatre. Thus, Archdale, Clifton and De Cordova were in India together 
in the 1920s, and Churchill, Staveley, Thorpe and Woolner in the late 
1920s and early 1930s. Blake’s service from 1933-38 in command of a 
number of medical units, including two British Military Hospitals, placed 
him in India in common with King, Thorpe, Swinton and Woolner at 
various points, but their paths did not cross in 1940, as Blake served in 
Norway when the others were in France. (Although Davidson served in 
two posts in India, they were continuous and are therefore considered 
as a single posting).  
  
KING BEF D/ENG IN C BEF CRE (DIV) OCT 35-JAN 37 
GREENSLADE BEF DQMG DIR QTRG BEF GSO 2 NOV 35-OCT 36 
ANDERSON BEF 11 BDE GSO 1 DECCAN DIST  MAR 36-DEC 37 
WATSON BEF BGS III CORPS  SPEC. EMPD. MAY 36-DEC 38 
KING BEF D/ENG IN C BEF DEP CHF ENG (I) JAN 37-SEP 39 
LEESE BEF DCGS HQ BEF INST SC QUETTA SEP 38-SEP 39 
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Postings to Africa (including South Africa) 
TABLE 3.4D: OVERSEAS POSTINGS 1919-1939: AFRICA 
NAME 1940 1940 POSTING POSTING AFRICA DATES 
BURNEY BEF 153 BDE ATT. RWAFF LT COL JUN 24-JUN 30 
DEMPSEY BEF 13 BDE GSO 2 SA DEF FORCE MAY 37-JAN 38 
GRANT BEF 154 BDE ATT. RWAFF LT COL OCT 24-OCT 30 






“B” BDE BEAUMAN 
FORCE 
MAJ. ATT KAR 
LT COL CO 3/KAR 
MAR 23-DEC 26 
JAN 27-DEC 29 
PERCIVAL BEF BGS I CORPS ATT. RWAFF GSO 2 APR 25-JAN 29 
PRATT, F BEF C MED ARTY I CORPS EMPLD SA DEF FORCE OCT 35-OCT 36 
STOPFORD BEF 17 BDE GSO 2 TO INSP GEN 
RWAFF & KAR 
MAY 32-JUN 36 
WOOLNER BEF 8 BDE SURVEY DUTY GOLD 
COAST 
MAY 20-SEP 23 
 
The next group is of those officers who served in Africa (including 
South Africa). Nine officers served there between 1919-1939; postings 
tended to be of longer duration, two to three years or more, save for 
Frederick Pratt, who served in South Africa for one year only in 1935-
36. Two 1940 officers in this group served simultaneously in Africa first, 
between 1920 and 1923 but were unlikely to have served directly 
together, as “Kitt” Woolner was engaged in mapping and survey duty in 
the Gold Coast whereas Arthur Kent-Lemon arrived in Africa in 1923 to 
serve with a battalion of the King’s African Rifles (KAR). They 
overlapped between March and September 1923, when Woolner 
departed.  
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Four officers subsequently coincided with Kent-Lemon; Woolner 
again, for six months in 1923; George Burney,46 from 1924 and across 
Kent-Lemon’s two postings from 1923-1929; Donald Grant, who arrived 
in Africa eighteen months after Kent-Lemon, in November 1924 and 
Arthur Percival, between April 1925 and January 1929. However, Kent-
Lemon was the only officer who served with the King’s African Rifles, 
ultimately commanding its 3rd Battalion.47 Grant, Burney and Percival 
served with the Royal West African Frontier Force; the latter gained 
experience in bush fighting which he wrote up in 1927 for publication.48 
(Burney and Grant would go on to serve together in 51st (Highland) 
Division in France in 1940). The next small group was that of Michael 
Green and “Monty” Stopford, serving in Africa simultaneously between 
May 1932 (when Stopford arrived) and July 1934, when Green 
departed, after four years’ service in Africa.49 Frederick Pratt was also 
on the continent when Stopford was serving, but was in South Africa on 
attachment. Although Miles Dempsey would also serve with the South 
African Defence Force in a staff posting in 1937-1938, he did not 
coincide there with any other officers. Therefore, whilst service in Africa 
                                                          
46 Burney had served with the Nigeria Regiment (West African Frontier Force) in 1917 
(HYAL December 1938 p. 227). 
47 Moyse-Bartlett, Lt. Col. J. (1956) “The King’s African Rifles” (Aldershot, Gale & 
Polden), p. 438. 
48 Percival, Maj. A. E. (1927) “The West African Frontier Force” The Army Quarterly, 
XV:1 pp. 91-99 The WAFF was granted a Royal Charter in 1928.  
49 Green returned to Africa after Dunkirk to command a Brigade Group in Sierra 
Leone, and as “Commander, Sierra Leone”. Stewart, A. (2017) “The Quiet Colony of 
Sierra Leone” in A. Jackson, Khan, Y.  and Singh, G. (eds.) “An Imperial World At War” 
(Abingdon, Routledge) p. 15 and Joslen (1960), Vol.2 p. 440. 
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offered, proportionately, a good chance of later advancement (with six 
of nine officers who served there doing so) the disparity and spread of 
their service mitigates against a specific bloc of officers.  
Postings to Palestine 
 
TABLE 3.4E: OVERSEAS POSTINGS 1919-1939: PALESTINE 
NAME 1940 1940 POSTING POSTING PALESTINE DATES 
BARRETT BEF D/JAG EMPD. SEP-DEC 36 
BERNEY-FICKLIN BEF 15 BDE T/BDE CDR OCT 38-JUL 39 
MC MULLEN BEF DG TRANSPORT ASST DIR TPT JAN 36-JAN 37 
RAMSDEN BEF 25 BDE GSO 1 JAN-SEP 39 
RITCHIE BEF BGS II CORPS GSO 2/GSO 1 JAN 38-AUG 39 
SMYTH, H NWEF 15 BDE BDE MAJ/GSO 2 JAN 35-MAR 37 
UTTERSON-KELSO BEF 131 BDE CDR LofC TPS JUN-NOV 36 
 
With the exceptions of Herbert Smyth and Donald McMullen, who 
were already serving there, the remaining five officers who served in 
Palestine in the inter-war period did so during the time of the Arab 
Revolt against the British Mandate from April 1936 to August 1939. (Mc 
Mullen was “double-hatted” in that he was Assistant Director, Transport 
Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan).50 Except for Neil Ritchie, who arrived 
in Palestine initially as the Commanding Officer of 1st Battalion, the 
King’s Own Regiment but remained first as a GSO 2 and then a GSO 1, 
all served in staff postings. With the establishment of a GOC’s command 
in Palestine in September 1936, all holders of the post until the end of 
the revolt in August 1939 were officers of considerable repute who 
                                                          
50 HYAL December 1938, p. 233. 
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would advance to higher command in 1939-1945. Lt-Gen. Sir John Dill, 
later CIGS was first, from September 1936-October 1937; he was 
succeeded by the-then Lt-Gens. Sir Archibald Wavell, later Commander 
in Chief Middle East and Viceroy of India (August 1937-April 1938), Sir 
Robert Haining, later VCIGS (April 1938-July 1939) and Michael Barker 
(July 1939-February 1940).51 (From 1932-1938, all served under the 
High Commissioner, Gen (Retd.) Sir Arthur Wauchope, who was initially 
admired by both sides, but after 1936 came to be seen as too 
favourable towards Jewish immigration whilst not strict enough on Arab 
rebels in return to stem the revolt. Due to his advanced age and 
declining health, he resigned in February 1938).52 
Wauchope’s patronage of these officers is likely to have been at 
best indirect, as although he and Herbert Smyth were products of 
Repton (albeit it over thirty years apart, Wauchope in the late 1880s 
and Smyth not until 1910), Wauchope served initially in the Argyll & 
Sutherland Highlanders; none of the others did, even though Ritchie and 
Utterson-Kelso served in Scottish regiments, the Black Watch and the 
Royal Scots Fusiliers respectively.  
Whilst John Dill served as Commandant of the Staff College from 
1931-1934, the only p.s.c.’s in this group were Ritchie and Smyth, both 
                                                          
51 Barker commanded I Corps in France in 1939-40 but suffered a complete nervous 
breakdown, requiring his replacement by Harold Alexander. Alan Brooke described him 
as “overwrought and impossible to deal with”. Danchev & Todman (2001), pp. 64-65. 
52 “Wauchope, Sir Arthur Grenfell”, by M. Bunton (2008) DNB (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press) https://www.oxforddnb.com Accessed 6 March 2020. 
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of whom preceded Dill’s tenure there, nor were they taught by him 
when he was an instructor at Camberley. 
 
Postings to Egypt  
 
 
The next largest group was of those officers serving in Egypt. 
There is little overlap in the early period, save between James Hamilton 
and Arthur Kent-Lemon between February 1920 and April 1921. 
Whether they interacted directly is unlikely as Hamilton was serving with 
British forces and Kent-Lemon with the Egyptian Army. Donald McMullen 
(serving simultaneously as AD Tpt for Palestine and Transjordan) and 
Clement Tomes are more likely to have crossed paths as they were 
serving in senior staff postings at GHQ and with the Egyptian Army 
when they coincided in 1936. Tomes actually returned to the UK in 
March 1939 and retired from the army but was recalled on the outbreak 
of war.  
  
TABLE 3.4F: OVERSEAS POSTINGS 1919-1939: EGYPT 
NAME 1940 1940 POSTING POSTING EGYPT DATES 
BLAKE NWEF CHF MED OFF (RUPERTFORCE) CO FD AMB 1926-31 
HAMILTON BEF 144 BDE BDE MAJ 
GSO 3 
FEB-DEC 20 




“B” BDE BEAUMAN FORCE 
EMPLD. W.  
EGYPTIAN ARMY 
JAN 17-APR 21 
MC MULLEN BEF DG TRANSPORT ASST DIR TPT JAN 36-JAN 37 
SHILSTONE BEF 3 AA BDE CHF INST, MIL MISS. 
TO EGYPTIAN ARMY 
JUN 37-DEC 38 
TOMES BEF OC 2ND ECHELON BRIG I/C ADMIN MAR 35-DEC 38 
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Postings to Gibraltar 
 
TABLE 3.4G: OVERSEAS POSTINGS 1919-1939: GIBRALTAR 
NAME 1940 1940 POSTING POSTING GIBRALTAR DATES 
ARCHDALE BEF CRA 42 DIV GSO 2 AUG 24-MAY 27 





BRIG. DA&QMG OCT 36-DEC 39 
HAMILTON, H BEF AAQMG 2 DIV GSO 2 MAR 31-JAN 33 
LAURIE BEF 157 BDE ASST MIL SEC NOV 24-FEB 27 
VALLENTIN BEF CRA 1 DIV GSO 2 MAR-DEC 38 
 
Arthur Archdale and Sir John Laurie overlapped during the latter’s 
service in Gibraltar from 1924-27 and served in the same headquarters 
when General Sir Charles Monro was Governor and commander there. 
Whilst Monro was held in high esteem during his tenure, due to the 
exertions of his service in the First World War his health was broken and 
he would die of cancer soon after returning, term expired in 1928, in 
1929.53 His opportunity to influence the careers of two still-relatively 
junior officers was limited. Hugh Hamilton arrived in Gibraltar in March 
1931; his period of service alongside John Barrie was rather brief, the 
latter arriving in November 1932 and the former departing in January 
1933. Both served there under General Sir Alexander Godley (Governor 
August 1928-October 1933) during the latter’s last tour of duty before 
retirement from the army.  
                                                          
53 “Monro, Sir Charles Carmichael, Baronet “, by D. Cassar (2008) DNB (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press) https://www.oxforddnb.com Accessed 6 March 2020. 
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As Godley was an infantryman, with Hamilton a sapper and Barrie a 
gunner, there was no regimental connection between them; as he had 
also left the Staff College prematurely in 1900 to fight in South Africa, 
the ties between them as graduates were weaker. Godley had 
commanded New Zealanders on the Western Front during the First 
World War. Despite a firm reputation as a trainer of raw troops and 
adept in organisation, he was considered “…a picture of austerity and 
dedication. Aristocratic in outlook, he remained aloof from all but his 
intimates…”54 Again, his influence over the careers of junior subordinates 
at this late stage was as limited as it was unlikely.  
Although Barry left just as the Gibraltar garrison was being 
reinforced in response to the declining situation in Spain which resulted 
in the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War 1936-1939, “Harry” Currey 
arrived in October 1936 with Claude Vallentin following him in March 
1938, having been a student at the Royal Naval Staff College at 
Greenwich in 1936-37. Both served latterly and directly under Edmund 
Ironside when he was Governor in 1938-39, prior to his appointment as 
CIGS.  
  
                                                          
54 ‘GODLEY, General Sir Alexander John' (1966) from An Encyclopaedia of New 
Zealand (ed. A. H. McLintock). 
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Postings to China 
TABLE 3.4H: OVERSEAS POSTINGS 1919-1939: CHINA 
NAME 1940 1940 POSTING POSTING CHINA DATES 
BARRETT BEF D/JAG EMPD. W. SHANGHAI DEF FORCE APR 27-MAY 28 
CHURCHILL BEF 151 BDE DAA & QMG SHANGHAI DEF 
FORCE 
JAN 27-NOV 28 
HOPWOOD NWEF BASE AREA CDR TIENTSIN AREA SEP 35-DEC 38 
MILES BEF  126 BDE BDE MAJ SHANGHAI DEF FORCE JAN 27-JUN 28 
ROUPELL BEF 36 BDE GSO 2 CHINA OCT 34-NOV 35 
 
Of the officers who served in a posting to China, four overlapped 
with each other, however briefly. (China Command was a pre-war 
independent command, responsible for the British possessions of Hong 
Kong and Kowloon, and the British concessions in the Chinese cities of 
Shanghai and Tientsin. Command of the British Troops in China was a 
Major General’s appointment. Due to the activity of the National 
Revolutionary Army (led by Chiang Kai Shek) within China from 1925, 
the international garrisons were reinforced. The British dispatched the 
Shanghai Defence Force, equivalent to a three-brigade Division, under 
the command of Major General Sir John Duncan (hence its also being 
known as Duncan Force). His second in command was the-then Colonel 
The Viscount Gort, later CinC of the BEF.55 Eric Milligan and Jack 
Churchill arrived with the first wave of reinforcements, dispatched via 
                                                          
55 Stevens, K. (2008) “Duncan Force' - the Shanghai Defence Force in 1927, & the 
Career of Captain Ronald Spear” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong 
Branch, Vol. 48 (2008), pp. 151-74. 
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Hong Kong, in January 1927;56 The Honourable Hugh Barrett followed in 
April, overlapping with Milligan until his departure in May 1928.  
The Tientsin Area was responsible for the British concession in the 
Chinese city of Tientsin (now called Tianjin). The city of Tientsin was 
captured by Japanese troops on 30 July 1937. Japan, however, 
respected the international concessions in the city and the British troops 
remained in situ. Alfred Hopwood remained in command of the area, as 
a Local Brigadier from 27 September 1935 until he was relieved at the 
end of 1938. Although George Roupell coincided in China with Hopwood, 
he was based on the staff of the GOC British Troops in China, Major 
General Arthur Bartholomew, who had assumed command in 1935, 
having served very briefly under Bartholomew’s predecessor, Lieutenant 
General Oswald Borrett.57 Either General’s influence on their former 
subordinates would again have been limited. 
 
Postings to Malaya 
 
TABLE 3.4I: OVERSEAS POSTINGS 1919-1939: MALAYA 
NAME 1940 1940 POSTING POSTING MALAYA DATES 
CAVE-BROWN BEF DIR OF WORKS CHF ENG MALAY STATES MAY 35-FEB 38 
HUDSON BEF 2 BDE GSO 2 STRAITS 
SETTLEMENTS 
NOV 28-MAR 32 
MILES BEF 126 BDE GSO 1 MALAYA FEB-DEC 38 
PERCIVAL BEF BGS I CORPS GSO 1 MALAYA MAR 36-MAR 38 
 
                                                          
56 TNA FO 371/63436 “The Despatch of Shanghai Defence Force to Shanghai in 1927” 
(March 1928). 
57 Bartholomew returned from China in 1938 and immediately retired from active 
service on grounds of age. Borrett left China a matter of six weeks after Roupell’s 
arrival in the autumn of 1935.  
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Again, all the officers who served in Malaya and the Straits 
Settlements were in staff postings at headquarters level, but across the 
times spend would have served under several different GOCs; Major 
General Sir Casimir Van Straubenzee (1927-1929). Major General Harry 
Pritchard (1929-31) Major General Ernest Lewin (1934-1935) and Major 
General William Dobbie (1935-1938). Van Straubenzee was already way 
past retirement age when appointed (being 61) and retired from the 
army when Pritchard – himself being an advanced 58 years old on 
appointment – relieved him. However, Pritchard’s final job before 
retirement in 1933 was as the Commandant of the Royal School of 
Military Engineering (RSME) at Chatham and would therefore have been 
familiar with and aware of the careers of those Sapper officers passing 
up their career chain. William Cave-Brown and Arthur Percival would 
have crossed paths due to coinciding; both would also have served 
under William Dobbie, who had been Pritchard’s predecessor at RSME 
and therefore also have been familiar with those Sappers progressing.  
Although Dobbie himself was retired on grounds of age in 1939, a 
chance encounter with Edmund Ironside (when the latter was CIGS) led 
to Dobbie being offered command on Malta, which he took up on 
promotion to Lieutenant General. However, the strain of command 
under siege broke his health and he retired again – being temporarily 
replaced by his CRA, Clifford Beckett, who had served in France in 1940 
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as the CRA of 15 Division. (Beckett, in turn, was replaced by William 
Robb, who had commanded 9 Brigade in France in 1940). 
 
Postings to Iraq 
TABLE 3.4J: OVERSEAS POSTINGS 1919-1939: IRAQ 
NAME 1940 1940 POSTING POSTING IRAQ DATES 
CHIPPINDALL BEF CRE III CORPS CHF ENG IRAQ FEB 33-SEP 37 
CLARK BEF CHF ENG, ADV AIR STR FORCE ATT IRAQI ARMY 
CHF ENG (AIR) 
MAR 28-AUG 32 
MAR 37-DEC 38 
WARREN BEF 4 BDE ATT IRAQI ARMY SEP 28-SEP 32 
 
British involvement in Iraq was confirmed after the Iraqi Revolt of 
1920 against the proposed British Mandate of Mesopotamia,58 thereafter 
Kingdom of Iraq under British Administration, or Mandatory Iraq. 
Atypically, in 1922, command of all British forces in the area was passed 
to the Royal Air Force, whilst the High Commissioner of the territory 
until Iraqi independence was agreed in 1932 was a serving or former 
army officer, except for the period from 1923-1928 when it was Sir 
Henry Dobbs, an experienced colonial administrator. Both Edward 
Warren and Percy Clark served there pre-independence as advisers to 
the Iraq Army; Warren training infantry and Clark training engineers. 
Clark returned as the Chief Engineer to the Iraqi Air Force in 1937. John 
Chippindall, as an engineer by background and training, was responsible 
for several key infrastructure projects including the construction of the 
                                                          
58 Wright, Quincy (1926), “The Government of Iraq” The American Political Science 
Review, vol. 20, no. 4, 1926, pp. 743–769, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1945423 
Accessed 21 April 2020. 
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military airfield and airport at Habbaniya, for which he received a CBE in 
1937.59 Although these officers performed with some distinction, the 
opportunities for patronage based purely on these postings were slight. 
 
Postings to Turkey and Constantinople  
TABLE 3.4K: OVERSEAS POSTINGS 1919-1939: TURKEY/CONSTANTINOPLE 
NAME 1940 1940 POSTING POSTINGS DATES 
FOX-PITT BEF 20 GDS BDE STAFF CAPT TURKEY MAR-OCT 23 
GREENSLADE BEF D QUARTERING STAFF CAPT TURKEY JUL 21-OCT 23 
PRATT, F BEF C MED ARTY I CORPS STAFF CAPT CONSTANTINOPLE AUG 20-JAN 21 
 
Frederick Pratt was attached to the staff of the British Mission to 
Constantinople for four months in 1920-1921. Cyrus Greenslade, who 
arrived in Turkey some six months after Pratt’s departure, served in two 
postings in Turkey from 1921-1923, firstly on special employment to the 
Turkish Gendarmerie in 1921-1922 and from 1922-1923 on the staff of 
the British Mission to Constantinople. This was during the second stage 
of British occupation from 1918-1923, which followed the Treaty of 
Sevres in 1920. William Fox-Pitt was also present in this final phase, 
which ended in 1923 following the conclusion of the Turkish Civil War 
(1919-1922). The end of the war led to the establishment of a Turkish 
Republic and the revision of the earlier peace treaty with the Allied 
powers.  
 
                                                          
59 Obituary, Journal of the Royal Engineers. Vol. LXXXVIII; 3 (September 1974), p. 
190. 
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Postings to Finland  
John Fitzgerald and Cyrus Greenslade both served on the headquarters 
staff of the first British Military Mission to Finland and the Baltic States 
in 1920, established under Gen. Sir Hubert Gough in 1919, to observe 
and report on the general military situation, and to assist those states in 
preparing for defence against any Bolshevik action against them 
resulting from the civil war under way in Russia.60  
TABLE 3.4L: OVERSEAS POSTINGS 1919-1939: FINLAND 
NAME 1940 1940 POSTING POSTINGS DATES 
FITZGERALD BEF 156 BDE GSO 3 BRIT MIL MISS FINLAND  MAY 19-JUN 20 
GREENSLADE BEF D QUARTERING BRIT MIL MISS FINLAND JUN 19-JAN 20 
 
Single Postings 
TABLE 3.4M: OVERSEAS POSTINGS 1919-1939: SINGLE POSTINGS 
NAME 1940 1940 POSTING POSTINGS DATES 
MILLIGAN BEF  1 AA BDE INST IN GUNNERY, MALTA JAN 32-FEB 35 
CLOUGH BEF DIR SURVEY ALBANIAN FRONTIER COMMN. 
N. RHODESIA BORDER COMMN.  
JUL-AUG 25 
 
APR 28-JUL 30 
MILES BEF 126 BDE GSO 3 SCHLESWIG PLEBISCITE 1920 
MORGAN, W BEF BGS I CORPS MIL ATTACHE BUDAPEST JAN 29-MAY 
31 
PRATT, D BEF 1 ARMY TK BDE INST, MILITARY ART 
R MIL COL AUSTRALIA 
DEC 29-JAN 
33 
ROUPELL BEF 36 BDE INST, R MIL COL CANADA MAR 29-APR 
31 
STAFFORD BEF CHF ENG E. SOMALILAND SVY JUN 29-JUL 31 
TOMES BEF OC 2ND ECHELON BDE MAJ BRIT TPS SUDAN NOV 24-MAY 
25 
 
                                                          
60 Copy of Orders from Gen. Sir Henry Wilson, CIGS, to Gen Sir Hubert Gough, dated 
4 June 1919; United States Congressional Serial Set, Senate Documents Vol.7610 
May-November 1919 (pp. 37-40). 
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By its nature, a single posting is unlikely to generate networks 
unless the officers concerned served alongside others who rose to 
prominence. On Malta, Eric Milligan was serving as a Gunnery instructor 
whilst “Ivo” Thomas, later to command 43rd (Wessex) Division in North 
West Europe, was serving as a GSO2 on the island from 1932-1936.61 
However, Milligan’s career stalled after Dunkirk, with his reverting to 
Lieutenant Colonel and being placed on retired pay in 1941. (His 
involvement in a well-publicised divorce in 1941 which led to the setting 
of a legal precedent would not have stood in his favour socially). Pratt, a 
Lieutenant Colonel on his arrival in Australia, served briefly and 
atypically (as historically the post was intended for a Brigadier or Major 
General) as the Commandant of the Royal Military College when it was 
relocated from Duntroon to Sydney in a reduced form in 1931. The 
move was politically contentious in a period of drastic defence cuts. He 
was quickly replaced by Brigadier F.B. Heritage, an Australian officer 
who had been the college’s commandant in the 1920s.62 Roupell’s 
posting to the Royal Military College of Canada in 1929 was to act as an 
assistant to its deputy commandant, the-then Lieutenant Colonel George 
Pearkes VC with the specific aim of preparing Canadian candidates for 
entry to the Staff College at Camberley.63 Both had been awarded the 
                                                          
61 HYAL January 1942, p. 1400. 
62 Coulthard-Clark, C. (1986) “Duntroon: The Royal Military College of Australia, 
1911–1986” (Sydney: Allen & Unwin), p. 82. 
63 Oldfield, P. (2017) “Victoria Crosses on the Western Front: Third Battle of Ypres, 
1917” (Bradford, Pen & Sword), p. 293 and Roy. R (2011) “For Most Conspicuous 
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Victoria Cross on the Western Front, Roupell in 1915 at the Second 
Battle of Ypres64 and Pearkes in 1917 at the Third Battle of Ypres.65  
 
Multiple Overseas Service 
Those officers who undertook multiple overseas tours in the inter-war 
period were as follows: 
TABLE 3.4N OFFICERS WITH MULTIPLE OVERSEAS TOURS 
ARCHDALE BEF CRA 42 DIV  BDE MAJ INDIA MAY 23-JUL 24 
   GSO 2 GIBRALTAR AUG 24-MAY 27 
BARRETT BEF D/JAG EMPD. W. SHANGHAI DF APR 27-MAY 28 
   EMPD. PALESTINE SEP-DEC 36 
BLAKE NWEF CHF MED OFF (RUPERTFORCE) CO FD AMB EGYPT 1926-31 
   OC HOSPITALS INDIA 1933-38 
CHURCHILL BEF 151 BDE DAA/QMG SHANGHAI DF JAN 27-NOV 28 
   GSO 2 INDIA JAN 29-DEC 32 
KENT-
LEMON 
NWEF/BEF 15 BDE/ B BDE BEAUMAN EMPLD. W. EGYPT JAN 17-APR 21 
   MAJ. ATT KAR MAR 23-DEC 26 
   LT COL CO 3/KAR JAN 27-DEC 29 
MILES BEF  126 BDE GSO3 SCHLESWIG 1920 
   BDE MAJ SHANGHAI DEF  JAN 27-JUN 28 
   GSO 1 MALAYA FEB-DEC 38 
PRATT, F BEF CC MED ARTY I CORPS INST, SCH OF ARTY I DEC 29-DEC 33 
   EMPLD SA DEF FORCE OCT 35-OCT 36 
PERCIVAL BEF BGS I CORPS ATT. RWAFF GSO 2 APR 25-JAN 29 
   GSO 1 MALAYA MAR 36-MAR 38 
WOOLNER BEF 8 BDE SURVEY GOLD COAST MAY 20-SEP 23 
   GSO2 INDIA MAY 30-MAR 32 
   BDE MAJ INDIA APR 32-MAY 34 
 
 
                                                          
Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, VC” (Vancouver, University 
of British Columbia Press), p. 107. 
64 Brazier, K. (2015) “The Complete Victoria Cross” (Barnsley, Casemate), p. 7. 
65 Roy (2011), p. 110. 
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Officers progressing with overseas postings 
Breaking out those officers with overseas postings in the inter-war 
period who progressed, in order to examine possible linkages of school, 
regiment or attendance at Staff College presents the following results:  
AFRICA     
DEMPSEY BEF SHREWSBURY R BERKS 1930 
GRANT BEF ? A&SH NO 
STOPFORD BEF WELLINGTON R BDE 1923 
 PALESTINE     
BERNEY-
FICKLIN 
BEF RUGBY NORFOLK NO 
RAMSDEN BEF BATH COLLEGE WI REGT NO 
RITCHIE BEF LANCING BW 1929 
UTTERSON-
KELSO 
BEF HAILEYBURY RSF NO 
GIBRALTAR     
LAURIE BEF ETON SEAFORTH NO 
MALAYA     
HUDSON BEF SHERBORNE N&D 1926 
SINGLE 
POSTINGS 
    
MORGAN, W BEF GEORGE WATSON’S RA 1925 
PRATT, D BEF DOVER COLLEGE R IRISH 1923 
                                                          
66 Excluding Pratt, F and Woolner, included in the “Multiple Postings” table below 
TABLE 3.4/0: OFFICERS WITH OVERSEAS SERVICE 1919-1939 PROGRESSING:  
SCHOOL, REGIMENT & STAFF COLLEGE 
INDIA66  SCHOOL REGT STAFF COLLEGE 
SMYTH BEF REPTON INDIAN ARMY 1924 
STEELE BEF ROYAL BELFAST R IRISH 1931 
SWAYNE BEF CHARTERHOUSE SOM LI 1925 IDC 1935 
DAVIDSON BEF MARLBOROUGH RA 1924 QUETTA IDC 1935 
JARDINE BEF CHARTERHOUSE RA 1922 
GUBBINS NWEF CHELTENHAM RA 1928 QUETTA 
HOGG NWEF CHELTENHAM RE 1922 QUETTA 
ROBB BEF GEORGE WATSON’S KOYLI NO 
MORGAN BEF CLIFTON RA 1928 QUETTA 
KING BEF FELSTEAD RE NO 
ANDERSON BEF CHARTERHOUSE SEAFORTH 1927 
WATSON BEF MERCER’S HLI 1924 
LEESE BEF ETON C GDS 1927 
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MULTIPLE POSTINGS    
MC MULLEN BEF BRADFIELD RE NO 
MILES BEF HARROW KOSB 1922 & IDC 1934 
PERCIVAL BEF RUGBY BEDFORDS 1923 & IDC 1935 
PRATT, F BEF CHELTENHAM RA NO 
WOOLNER BEF MARLBOROUGH RE 1927 
 
Firstly, with one exception, Donald Grant, whose educational 
background could not be traced, all the advancing officers were 
educated at public schools. Of these, nearly a third (nine officers) 
attended Clarendon Group schools. Among those who served in India, 
Cheltenham (Gubbins, Hogg, Pratt) and Charterhouse (Anderson, 
Jardine and Swayne) predominate. In India, it was not an absolute that 
an officer be a graduate of Staff College to take up a posting in a junior 
job, in Robb’s case as a GSO 3, or even as a senior post, such as King, 
who served as a GSO 1 but did so by virtue of serving in specialist 
Engineer postings where professional technical knowledge outweighed 
formal staff qualifications. The officers serving in India included four 
graduates of the Staff College at Quetta (Davidson, Gubbins, Hogg and 
Morgan) – unique among the group of officers who progressed and had 
overseas service, as no other Quetta graduates served overseas. 
However, none of them were contemporaries at Quetta. No single 
regiment predominates in the India group as a whole. Gunners and 
sappers represent a significant minority, being nearly a quarter – three 
of thirteen - of those who served and advanced in rank. Furthermore, 
with one exception all these officers served in general staff posts, not 
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specialist engineer or artillery jobs; with the exception of Arthur King, 
who was not a Staff College graduate.  
There are few overall conjunctions or patterns among the 
remaining officers who had interwar overseas service and advanced 
after 1940. It is significant that of the four officers who served in 
Palestine, three of them were not Staff College graduates. Since all four 
served there just before or during the Arab Revolt, this most likely 
reflects urgent need following an upsurge in operations, requiring the 
filling of vacancies outstripping the available supply of Staff College 
trained candidates. This would also be the situation in France in 1939-
1940, where retired officers were “dug out” for rear area and some 




With the return of peace and demobilisation, attitudes towards the 
profession of soldiering quickly reverted to pre-war norms. It was as if 
the war just won was an aberration, and the changes the army had 
gone through were not to be replicated or extended. Education of 
officers was one area where this attitude was particularly visible, where 
prejudices and custom would reassert themselves as the army returned 
to “normal”. This chapter has shown that officers who wished not only to 
sustain a career in the interwar army but wished to progress would find 
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it necessary to make themselves distinctive with respect to other 
officers and potential rivals. The two paths were to seek overseas 
postings either in staff positions or on attached service, or to acquire 
higher professional educational qualifications, such as graduation from 
Staff College or the Imperial Defence College.  However, neither path 
was any guarantee of progression to the higher ranks of the army, and 
service in some areas overseas – such as Egypt, Iraq and Gibraltar, 
offered little or no advantage at all.  Overseas service, therefore, did not 
generate any particular blocs of officers favoured for advancement. 
 
Some pre-war attitudes towards professional education of officers 
did reassert themselves, notwithstanding the increased interest in and 
demand for its limited places as a means of professional distinctiveness. 
One manifestation of this was the deep-seated suspicion among some 
senior officers of the continued existence of the Senior Officers’ School, 
latterly at Sheerness. This school was intended to prepare officers for 
battalion command (a role traditionally, and inconsistently resting in 
commanding officers) and inculcate a wider world view in its students. 
Graduating, or having been Directing Staff thereof did not proffer any 
particular advantage to officers in terms of advancement or the 
generation of networks. As most of its Commandants were late in their 
careers and who retired thereafter, their ability to act as patrons or to 
influence the careers of former subordinates was therefore limited.  
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Officers who served as GSOs during the First World War, and 
especially those who subsequently graduated from Staff College had an 
edge over those who had not. This was significant, but not singularly 
decisive as several officers who had not served in staff posts during the 
First World War but did graduate from Camberley and Quetta did 
progress after 1940. Whilst the value and applicability of the type of 
training offered at Staff College has been debated in recent literature, 
perception of its status endured and enhanced an officer’s prospects. 
Attendance at the Imperial Defence College after 1927 when it was 
founded, was an influential factor in advancement. All the officers who 
attended it from the group were promoted to higher command during 
the war, and it also generated small, but close groupings of officers as 
minor networks, in once case reinforced by the officers being 
contemporaries both at Camberley and Buckingham Gate.  
 
The single most influential path for advancement, whatever the 
actual value of the education offered, remained the successful 
completion of Staff College at Camberley or Quetta. The assessment by 
French that Brooke and Montgomery used their times there as Directing 
Staff in later years to “talent spot” is well-founded, but other officers 
such as John Dill also identified pupils they would later act as patrons 
for. Camberley also produced clusters of officers who would reach 
General’s rank during the war.  The supply of qualified staff officers 
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remained inadequate to meet the demand of the BEF in 1940, as 
indicated by the number of officers recalled from retirement to fill gaps 
in certain administrative and support posts, whether or not such officers 
were p.s.c.   An officer who was public school educated, had served in 
junior staff officer’s post during the First World War, was a Staff College 
graduate and who had served overseas between 1919-1939, was 
therefore possessed of advantages ahead of his contemporaries.  
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Officers Progressing Beyond Brigadier, 1940-45 
On the morning of 1 June [1940] the situation 
around Dunkirk was this: 195,000 troops had 
been embarked, of which about 160,000 were 
British. This left around 40,000 British and an 
unknown number of French… In addition, most of 
the senior commanders were now also in Britain: 
Brooke, Adam, Montgomery, Franklyn. Petre, 
Osborne, Thorne, Martel and many of the 
brigadiers. Here was the nucleus around which a 
future British Army might be built.1 
 
When Britain Saved The West 
 by Robin Prior (2015) (Emphasis added) 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the officers from the 1940 group 
more closely and to determine the linkages between them to identify 
connections and groupings. The intention is to establish whether these 
were sufficiently distinctive to explain, in part, their professional 
survival and advancement after 1940. This research reveals that the 
general contention which initiated this research, that merely serving in 
France or Norway was the career graveyard of officers at the level of 
brigadier, is open to challenge.  
Of the one hundred and fifty-six officers who served in those 
operational theatres during the spring of 1940, fifty-eight of them, 
37.9% of the total, advanced to the rank of Major General or above 
                                                          
1 Prior, R. (2015) “When Britain Saved The West: The Story of 1940” (London, Yale 
University Press), p. 131. 
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during the course of the war. Whilst still a minority, being more than 
one third of the group is a considerable proportion when not all officers 
could expect to advance to such a rank.  The January 1940 HYAL 
contains 503 Major Generals.2 When officers such as those on the 
Retired List, Maj. Gens holding Honorary Rank such as Royal Colonels 
of regiments and retired officers granted the rank on their retirement, 
are excluded, the total falls to just under two hundred serving officers. 
(This includes officers holding Temporary rank).  
This chapter will examine questions including, which elements in 
their professional and personal backgrounds were influential in their 
advancement beyond Brigadier. For those who rose higher than Major 
General, consideration will be given to whether there were any further 
distinctions, or evidence of groupings, such as their schools, 
regiments, attendance at Staff College, war service and possession of 
decorations. Whilst these methods have already been employed in 
previous chapters, it is intended to show that as the cohorts reduced in 
number, which factors predominated among the smaller groups. (For 
example, as will be shown in Chapter 6, the proportion of public school 
educated officers serving as brigadiers in Normandy in 1944 actually 
increased in comparison with 1940, when it might have been expected 
                                                          
2 This figure does not include Colonels on the Retired List granted Honorary Rank on 
retirement. 
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that a larger army would be recruiting from a wider pool of potential 
officers from more diverse social and educational backgrounds).  
The army had not been static in attempting to reform the officer 
corps after Dunkirk. In 1941, the Army Council reduced the maximum 
ages for the appointment to command positions in the field army, with 
a further reduction expected to have been implemented by 1943. The 
maximum age for field force command, unless the officer possessed 
unspecified “special qualifications” was to be fifty years old.3 Had this 
later rule been applied strictly to the complete 1940 group, fifteen 
officers, 9.6% of the total, would have reached this limit by or in 1943. 
A further thirteen officers, 8.4% of the group, would reach that age 
before the end of the war in August 1945, suggesting that 18% of the 
1940 group, some 28 officers, would have been notionally ineligible for 
advancement on grounds of age. Twenty-two would not have reached 
the age of fifty and faced possible compulsory retirement under the 
1941 rules before the cessation of hostilities. (These figures include 
officers who retired or were subsequently killed in action after 1940).  
On 10 May 1940, sixty-four of the whole group, 41.3%, were 
aged fifty or above. In the advancing group, nine officers (5.2% of it) 
would not have reached fifty by the end of the war; three would have 
by 1945; three by 1944; ten by 1943; five by 1942 and fifteen by 
                                                          
3 French (2001), p. 79. 
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1941. The remainder were aged fifty or above, the eldest being 53. 
Therefore only 12 of the 58, or 20.8% of the group, would have 
survived to command in the field by the end of the war, at least in 
Europe in May 1945, had this criterion been strictly applied. Among 
the officers who advanced to high command or eminence who would 
have been affected by this included “Monty” Stopford (47 in 1940), 
Kenneth Anderson (48 in 1940), Frederick Morgan (46 in 1940) and 
John Hawkesworth (47 in 1940). 
From the group of fifty-eight officers who progressed, twenty- 
one reached the rank of Lieutenant General by the end of the war, 
representing 36.2% of the group of officers advancing in rank and 
13.7% of the overall group of 1940 officers, fewer than one in seven. 
The next section will examine the fifty-eight in more detail. 
 
Age Profile 
As noted earlier, the average age of the officers in the overall group is 
49.23 years, the youngest being 364 and the eldest 63.5 (Sixty-seven 
were below 49 years old in 1940, sixty-nine were older). Both the 
youngest and eldest from the group were serving in France, including 
several older officers recalled from retirement to fill administrative 
posts. Some of the latter were in their late fifties and even sixties. For 
                                                          
4 A/Brig. Viscount Downe, cdg. 69 Inf Bde. 
5 Brig. Gervase Thorpe, cdg. Base Depot, Cherbourg. 
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the group only serving in France, one hundred and forty of the group, 
the average was only slightly lower, at 49.22. The smaller group which 
served in Norway also had an average age equalling the overall group, 
49.23, but the spread among ages was closer; the youngest 436 and 
the eldest 54.7 However, when the officers who did not progress 
beyond Brigadier after 1940 are filtered out, the average age in the 
overall group drops to 47.76, with the age range being comparable to 
the Norway group – 428 to 53.9 Of the six officers in Norway who 
progressed,10 the average age climbs back to 48.83 as four of them 
were aged fifty and above. (The average age of officers who did not 
progress was higher than the overall average, at 50.16). 
 
Education 
The educational background for two of the officers in the whole 
advancing group was untraced;11 of the remaining 56, one was home 
schooled12 and all the others were products of the public school 
system. Table 5.1 indicates the schools these officers attended and 
demonstrates the percentage of attendees from those schools who 
                                                          
6 There were two 43-year olds; A/Brig. Colin Gubbins, cdg. Scissorforce and Brig. 
Herbert Smyth, cdg. 15 Bde. 
7 Brig. Henry Currey, BGS HQ NWEF. 
8 A/Brig. Richard McCreery, cdg 2 Armd Bde and A/Brig Neil Ritchie, BGS II Corps.  
9 Brig. Arthur Percival, BGS I Corps and Brig. Herbert Stewart, cdg 152 Bde.  
10 Gubbins of Scissor Force; Gammell, BGS NWEF; Phillips, 146 Bde; Wootten, Chf 
Admin Off; Hogg, Base Area Cdr Andalsnes and Morgan, 148 Bde. 
11 Halstead, Robb and Slater; Halstead was born and initially educated in Australia. 
12 John Crocker. 
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rose to General officer rank after 1940. Eliminating those schools with 
a sole attendee – whose success rate in producing a General Officer 
from within the main 1940 group would of course be 100% - and 
schools from which no-one progressed, whose success rate would be 
zero, leaves a spread from 100% to 30% - the latter figure influenced 
by those who attended Wellington.   
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MAJ GEN OR 
HIGHER 
INDIVIDUALS PROGRESSING 
BATH COLLEGE 1 1 RAMSDEN 
BRADFIELD 2 1 MCMULLEN 
CHARTERHOUSE 6 3 ANDERSON, JARDINE, SWAYNE 
CHELTENHAM 9 4 GRANT, GUBBINS, HOGG, PRATT, F 
CLIFTON 4 2 LEE, MORGAN F 
DOVER COLLEGE 3 2 GOLDNEY, PRATT, D 
DOWNSIDE 1 1 GARTLAN 
ETON 12 7 
BECKWITH-SMITH, LAURIE, LAWSON, 
LEESE, MC CREERY, NORMAN, 
WHITAKER 
FELSTED 1 1 KING 
FETTES 1 1 STEWART 
GEORGE WATSON 1 1 MORGAN, W 
HAILEYBURY 1 1 UTTERSON-KELSO 





LANCING 2 2 POPE, RITCHIE 
MARLBOROUGH 6 3 DAVIDSON, IRWIN, WOOLNER 
MERCER’S  1 1 WATSON 
RADLEY 2 1 TILLY 
REPTON 4 2 PHILLIPS, SMYTH 
ROYAL BELFAST 1 1 STEELE 
RUGBY 8 3 BERNEY-FICKLIN, PERCIVAL, WOOTTEN 
SHERBORNE 2 2 GRIFFIN, HUDSON 
SHREWSBURY 1 1 DEMPSEY 
ST BEES 1 1 HAWKESWORTH 
ST PAUL’S 2 1 GALE 
TONBRIDGE 2 1 BECKETT 
UPPINGHAM 3 1 HORROCKS 
WELLINGTON  10 3 BOND, SCHREIBER, STOPFORD 
WINCHESTER 9 3 CLARK, GAMMELL, WILSON 
 102 54  
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TABLE 4.2 SCHOOLS PRODUCING MORE THAN ONE BRIGADIER IN 1940:  





SUCCESS SUCCESS %  
BRADFIELD 2 1 50 MCMULLEN 
CHARTERHOUSE 6 3 50 ANDERSON, JARDINE, SWAYNE 
CHELTENHAM 9 4 44.4 GRANT, GUBBINS, HOGG, PRATT F 
CLIFTON 4 2 50 LEE, MORGAN F 
DOVER COLLEGE 3 2 66.6 GOLDNEY, PRATT D 
ETON 12 7 58.3 BECKWITH-SMITH, LAURIE, 
LAWSON, LEESE, MC CREERY, 
NORMAN, WHITAKER 
HARROW 5 2 40 MILES, MORGAN H 
LANCING 2 2 100 POPE, RITCHIE 
MARLBOROUGH 6 3 50 DAVIDSON, IRWIN, WOOLNER 
RADLEY 2 1 50 TILLY 
REPTON 4 2 50 PHILLIPS, SMYTH 
RUGBY 8 3 37.5 BERNEY-FICKLIN, PERCIVAL, 
WOOTTEN 
SHERBORNE 2 2 100 GRIFFIN, HUDSON 
ST PAUL’S 2 1 50 GALE 
TONBRIDGE 2 1 50 BECKETT 
UPPINGHAM 3 1 33.3 HORROCKS 
WELLINGTON - 10 3 30 BOND, SCHREIBER, STOPFORD 
WINCHESTER 9 3 33.3 CLARK, GAMMELL, WILSON 
 89 42 47.1  
 
Table 4.2 indicates that a small group of the public schools 
therefore retained its dominant position not only in the production of 
officers overall but was an influencing factor among those successful in 
advancing beyond Brigadier. Eighteen schools with more than one 
successful officer produced 47% of the overall total. If the schools 
which produced only one or two successful candidates are omitted the 
remainder highlights that traditional, core sources of army officers 
predominate. The group comprises Cheltenham, Clifton, Eton, Harrow, 
Marlborough, Rugby, Wellington and Winchester; Dover College is the 
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exception. Members of the seven “great” schools of the Clarendon 
Group13 are still prominent; Eton with seven officers, Charterhouse, 
Rugby and Winchester with three apiece and Harrow with two – 
eighteen of the forty-two successful, 42.8% of the total.  
  
                                                          
13 Eton, Charterhouse, Harrow, Rugby, Shrewsbury, Westminster and Winchester; 
see Chapter 2. 
POINT OF FAILURE 





TABLE 4.3 DEGREES OF CONTEMPORANEOUSNESS,  
SCHOOLS PRODUCING MORE THAN ONE PROGRESSING OFFICER 











PRATT, F. 1906-10 
GUBBINS 1909-14 
   
CLIFTON MORGAN F. 1908-12 
LEE 1910-14 
   
DOVER COLLEGE GOLDNEY 1901-05 
PRATT D. 1906-10 












   
HARROW MORGAN 1901-06 
MILES 1906-09 
   
LANCING POPE 1905-11 
RITCHIE 1911-15 






   
REPTON PHILLIP 1903-08 
SMYTH 1908-12 






   
SHERBORNE GRIFFIN 1905-09 
HUDSON 1906-10 
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As can be seen from the table above, relatively few of the 
officers in the group progressing were exact school contemporaries (as 
in they attended together during exactly the same years). However, as 
described in Chapter 2, the impact of this would mitigate over time as 
the very fact of having attended the school would become more 
significant as individuals moved on in life and encountered other 
alumni from eras different to their own – the “old school tie”. The 
effect of having attended together (however loosely) should not, 
however, be completely discounted as in many cases they would have 
been aware of their fellow pupils and the same masters. This degree of 
overlapping attendance is examined below.  
 
Degrees of Contemporaneousness 
Exact Contemporaries  
The number of exact contemporaries – individuals whose period of 
attendance directly overlapped - is small; six of the fifty-eight, or 
10.3%. These six came from three of the eighteen schools producing 
Maj. Gens from the 1940 group. At Eton, it was Lawson and Norman 
(1904-1908), with Davidson and Irwin (1906-1910) at Marlborough 
and at Winchester, Clark and Gammell (1906-1910). However, by 
extending this definition to close contemporaries - individuals 
attending the school plus or minus one year around each other, the 
alumni networks broaden significantly.  
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At Charterhouse, Swayne and Anderson were close contemporaries, 
having entered in 1904 and 1905 respectively. At Eton, Beckwith-
Smith (entered 1903) was a near contemporary of Lawson and 
Norman (entered 1904), extending the network to three. Under these 
terms, Laurie and Leese (arriving 1906 and 1907 respectively) are also 
close contemporaries. At Marlborough, Woolner (arrived 1907) counts 
as a close contemporary of Clark and Gemmell. Griffin (arrived 1905) 
and Hudson (1906) form a close contemporaries group at Sherborne, 
the only members of the advancing group there and at Wellington, 
Schreiber (arrived 1903) and Bond (1904) are close contemporaries. 
Six of the eighteen schools therefore produce close contemporary 
groups, with three common to the exact group.  
Near Contemporaries 
Near contemporaries, as defined here, are individuals who attended 
the same school in an overlapping period but were separated by two or 
more years. Applying this criterion to the schools list means that the 
three Old Carthusians, Swayne, Anderson and Jardine become 
members of this group with Jardine’s arrival in 1907 overlapping both. 
From Cheltenham, two overlapped groups emerge: Hogg, Grant and 
Pratt with the second being Grant, Pratt and Gubbins, the group 
pivoting on Pratt 1906-1910). Morgan and Lee, at Clifton, also qualify. 
Eton, already the single largest contributing school, is also the only 
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school to have all three types of these networks: exact, close and 
near. In the latter, Lawson, Norman, Laurie and Leese again pivot on 
1907; Leese (1907-1911), and Whitaker (1909-1914) are a second 
near-contemporary group, this time pivoting on 1909. Whitaker and 
McCreery (1911-1915) provide a third grouping. Rugby has two groups 
(from three officers); Percival and Wootten; Wootten and Berney-
Ficklin (Percival’s departure in 1906 omits him from bridging the group 
when Berney-Ficklin arrived). Equally, Stopford’s arrival at Wellington 
in 1906 was just in time to create a close contemporary group with 
Schreiber (1903-1907) and Bond (1904-1908).  
No contemporaries 
Dover College, Harrow, Lancing and Repton, whilst each producing two 
officers each who proceeded to Major General, generated no 
overlapping groups. Miles at Harrow and Smyth at Repton both arrived 
in the year when the other progressing officer left the school (1906 
and 1908 respectively). Pratt arrived at Dover College a year after 
Goldney had departed; two years passed between Pope’s departure 
from Lancing and Ritchie’s arrival.  
 
Regiment 
Among the group of officers who proceeded to general officer rank, no 
infantry regiments of first commissioning can be determined to be 
dominant among the group. Although the three Guards officers who 
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advanced were all Coldstreamers14. No single County or line infantry 
regiment predominates as a single bloc or route to General’s rank. The 
one County or line regiment with more representatives than any other 
was the Royal Irish Rifles15 (the Royal Ulster Rifles after Irish 
independence in 1922) with three, although one of them would later 
transfer to the Royal Tank Corps (RTC).16 Three other officers would 
leave their original regiments for the RTC (these officers were still 
serving when the RTC was renamed the Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) in 
April 1939). There is therefore arguably an RTC/RTR bloc of four 
among the group of General officers.17 The largest single grouping of 
officers reaching Major General’s rank or above remained that of the 
Royal Artillery with ten;18the Royal Engineers produced five.19 The 
Army Service Corps (Royal Army Service Corps after 1920) group 
produced three.20 
  
                                                          
14 Beckwith-Smith, Leese and Whitaker. 
15 Gartlan, D. and Pratt and Steele; Pratt was the transferee. 
16 From 1939 the Royal Tank Regiment. 
17 Crocker and Pope and Pratt, D. and Tilly. 
18 Beckett, Davidson, Jardine, Lawson, F. Morgan, W. Morgan, Pratt, Schreiber, 
Slater and Gubbins. 
19 Bond, Hogg, King, West and Woolner. 
20 Gale, Goldney and McMullen. 
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War Service Before WW2 
“War service” among the progressing officers falls into the following 
groups:  
 Service on the frontline during the First World War, on 
several fronts 
 Service in Russia in 1918-1919 during the Intervention 
against the Bolsheviks 
 Service in India in confrontations on the North West 
Frontier and elsewhere in tribal wars in South Asia from 1919-
1939 
 Service in the Middle East in Iraq and Persia 
 Service in Egypt and Palestine, especially during the Arab 
Revolt of 1936-1939 
                                                          
21 Includes the Tank Corps/Royal Tank Corps. 
22 Includes officers who transferred to the Royal Corps of Signals on its formation in 
1921. 
23 Includes one officer originally commissioned into the Indian Army (Smyth), one 
into the Yeomanry of the Territorial Force (Gammell), one into the West Indies 
Regiment (Ramsden). 







CAVALRY21 7 3 42.8 
GUARDS 7 3 42.8 
INFANTRY 76 31 40.7 
RA 32 10 31.2 
RE22 16 5 31.2 
ASC 6 3 50 
OTHER/SUPPORT ARMS23 12 3 25 
 156 58 41.4 
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All the officers progressing beyond Brigadier had seen active 
service in the First World War, eliminating its effect as a distinction 
between officers who did advance and those who did not. Only four of 
the group of fifty-eight did not serve on the Western Front, indicating 
the influence of service there on advancement, and its primacy as an 
operational front. Hogg,24 who served in Mesopotamia and Egypt and 
King,25 who spent the First World War in India on operations against 
the Mohmands and Swatis,26 countering raids and enforcing a blockade 
of the Swat Valley were two of them. The third was Lawson, a pre-war 
Territorial, who served on Gallipoli with his Yeomanry regiment, the 
Royal Bucks (Buckinghamshire) Hussars, but did not follow when it 
moved to France in April 1918. He remained in the Middle East, 
commanding the Middlesex Yeomanry, until the war’s end. The fourth 
and last was McMullen, who served in Macedonia, Egypt and the 
Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF).  
 Five officers served on Gallipoli for varying periods. Lawson, as 
noted, with his Yeomanry regiment from August to November, when it 
moved to Egypt. Beckett landed at Cape Helles on the first day of the 
landings there on 25 April 1915, leaving for Egypt in mid-June; 
Davidson also landed at Cape Helles the same day, but remained on 
                                                          
24 Commanded the Corps Rear Area at Andalsnes in Norway, 1940. 
25 Deputy Engineer in Chief, BEF. 
26 See, for example War diary, Army Headquarters India, Frontier Operations. GSI, 
1914-1920. 56 vols: Vols. 8-10 (of 56) Aug-Oct 1915 India Office Records and 
Private Papers Reference: IOR/L/MIL/17/5/4073-5 (British Library). 
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the peninsula until evacuated to Egypt in December. Gammell was 
among the last of those to be evacuated from Gallipoli in January 
1916. Although Grant only arrived in August 1915, serving as a staff 
officer (his original battalion of the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders 
did not serve on Gallipoli) he was also one of the last to leave, on 9 
January 1916.  
Barker, Beckett and McMullen also served, again, for varying 
durations and at differing times, on the Macedonian front.27 Barker 
spent the rest of the war after November 1915 serving there, firstly 
with his battalion,28 then in staff postings at divisional headquarters 
and as a Brigade Major. McMullen, as a Royal Engineer, was a 
specialist in railway transportation serving both there and latterly 
Egypt; he served on the Macedonian front from September 1915 to 
January 1916.29 Beckett was present only for just over two months, 
from April to June 1917.30 The likelihood of any of these officers’ 
specific paths crossing in this theatre are therefore slim, but as with 
education the knowledge borne out of shared experience was more 
significant.  
                                                          
27 Also known as the Salonika Front; in official records it is noted as “Greek 
Macedonia, Serbia, 
Bulgaria, European Turkey and the Islands of the Aegean Sea” e.g., Beckett’s entry, 
HYAL January 1940, p. 251. 
28 4th Battalion, King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
29 HYAL January 1940, pp. 201-02 
30 HYAL January 1940 p. 168 
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Davidson, Gammell, Grant, McMullen and Smyth all served in 
Egypt after the Gallipoli campaign and before the formation of the EEF 
in mid-March 1916, when the latter was established as a regional 
strategic force. Hogg had missed Gallipoli, remaining in Egypt from 
December 1914, before transferring to Mesopotamia, where he served 
until the end of October 1918. Grant, whose First World War active 
service was predominantly in staff postings, rapidly returned to France 
but with no active or staff service listed for him in 1917 and a 
notification of his having been wounded, was most likely in hospital 
and/or recuperating. Smyth, an Indian Army officer who earned a 
Victoria Cross in France in 1915, spent four months (August to 
November) in Egypt in 1915 but the rest of the war in India and on the 
North West Frontier.  
The officers serving in the EEF after its formation were Beckett 
(Jun 16 to May 17), Davidson (Mar-Jun 16), Gammell (Mar-Aug 16), 
Hogg (Mar-May 16), McMullen (Mar 16-Oct 18), and Ritchie (Jan-Oct 
18). As noted above, Hogg served in Mesopotamia; the only other 
officer in the group to serve there was Ritchie, who was present at the 
fall of Baghdad on 11 March 1917 with his battalion, 2/Black Watch. 
Except for a period absent wounded between June and December 
1917, Ritchie spent twenty-three months in Mesopotamia from January 
1916 before returning to Egypt. At some point, therefore, Beckett, 
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Gammell, Hogg and McMullen were all serving in the EEF 
simultaneously; McMullen and Ritchie would do so in 1918. 
Eight officers served in Russia during the British intervention there in 
1918-19. Barker, Berney-Ficklin, Gubbins, Hogg, Horrocks (who was 
captured in January 1919 and spent ten months as a Bolshevik 
prisoner),31 Hudson, Percival and Pope. There was a direct connection 
between two of them; Gubbins and Berney-Ficklin (both of whom 
would serve in Norway in 1940) were both on the headquarters staff of 
the then Major General Ironside at Archangel in the summer of 1919.32  
Through the 1920s until the mid-1930s, active service 
opportunities for officers, especially those of the British Army, were 
very limited, unless they served in India on the various pacification 
campaigns against tribal forces from 1919-1935, or on the North West 
Frontier between 1936-37 and again from 1937-39. Officers desiring 
advancement, or improvement of their professional prospects, would 
volunteer for loan service overseas such as training indigenous troops 
in Africa or India, or in staff postings or attached for active service.33 
The latter – India – is the largest single group of those serving 
overseas. At various times between the world wars, Anderson, Berney-
                                                          
31Warner, P. (1984) “Horrocks: The General Who Led From The Front” (London, 
Hamish Hamilton), p. 36. 
32 Ironside, Sir E. (1953) “Archangel 1919” (London, Constable) and Smart (2005), 
p. 31. 
33 As an example, Maj. Gen John Frost (of Arnhem) volunteered to serve with the 
Iraq Levies after regimental service in Palestine. Obituary: Maj.-Gen. John Frost. The 
Independent (London) 24 May 1993. 
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Ficklin, Bond, Irwin, King, Morgan, Ramsden, Robb, Smyth, Steele, 
Tilly and West - twelve in total, were on active service in India. (Four 
officers who did not progress, Chichester-Constable, Clifton, 
Greenwood and Whitehead, served in India at various times in the 
1930s). Therefore, service in India was a potential advantage towards 
later advancement. 
King, Slater and Smyth all served during the Third Afghan War 
between May and August 1919, when the Emir of Afghanistan invaded 
British India, the short, if intense, campaign ending in an armistice. 
Anderson, Irwin, Robb, Smyth and West also served during the so-
called Redshirt Rebellion on the North West Frontier between October 
1930 and February 1931. In this campaign, Afridi tribesmen rebelled 
over imperial encroachment and the loss of grazing land around 
Peshawar, resulting in the dispatch of a two-brigade strong force to 
prevent further tribal advances towards Peshawar. West was 
Mentioned in Dispatches and received a DSO for his part in the 
campaign, a rare inter-war award of this decoration, which joined the 
MC he was awarded in 1917 on the Western Front.34   
Two separate campaigns in Waziristan were deemed sufficiently 
active to attract the award of a clasp to the Indian General Service 
                                                          
34 The London Gazette (London, HMSO) 6 May 1932, p. 2958 “for distinguished 
services rendered in the field in connection with military operations on the North-
West Frontier of India during the period October 1930—March 1931”. 
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Medal of 1908 (IGS 08); from 1919-21 and 1921-24.35 The first was 
given to those participating in operations in Waziristan on the Bannu 
Line in October and November 1919, on the Tank Line between 
October 1919 and December 1921, or occupying posts in the Zhob 
District between November 1920 and May 1921. Smyth and Steele 
received the first, William Morgan and Tilly the second. Steele was 
Mentioned in Dispatches in June 192136 for his part in the campaign. 
Smyth and Steele also served in the same area of operations within 
Waziristan in 1919-20, which attracted the award of the clasp “Mahsud 
1919-20”, for service on the Taki Zam Line between December 1919 
and April 1920. Berney-Ficklin and Smyth were also present during the 
campaign between February and April 1935 in the Loe Agra area, 
which was represented by the last clasp to the IGS 08, “North West 
Frontier 1935”.  
Smyth, unsurprisingly given his Indian Army background, was 
the most experienced officer in frontier fighting. By virtue of this he 
was connected, however indirectly, by operational service in often 
short duration, if intense, campaigns to Anderson, Berney-Ficklin, 
Irwin, King, Robb, Slater and West, creating a loose “India group” 
within the brigadiers. This was more of a convergence of service than 
                                                          
35 A third clasp “Waziristan 1925” was awarded, but only to the Royal Air Force. 
36 The London Gazette (London, HMSO) 10 June 1921. 
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a formal grouping, in comparison with Henry Wilson and Henry 
Rawlinson serving closely together in Burma in the 1880s.  
A new medal was instituted in 1938, to reflect active service on 
the North West Frontier from November 1936 to 15 December 1937,37 
and thence from 16 December 1937 to 1 January 1939.38 For the first, 
the only officers connected from the group were Bond and Ramsden; 
both were Mentioned in Dispatches for their service there between 
November 1936 and January 1937; Bond as the Chief Engineer of the 
Waziristan Force, Ramsden as the Commanding Officer of 1st Battalion, 
the Hampshire Regiment.39 No officers in either group – advancing or 
not - qualified for the clasp/medal awarded for service in the 1937-39 
period.40 
 The other campaign medal covering operational service in the 
inter-war period appropriate to the group of officers under discussion 
was the Army and RAF General Service Medal, instituted in 1918 (1918 
GSM).41 Prior to the Arab Revolt in Palestine in 1936, the only 
campaign for which a clasp to this medal was awarded and was 
common to members of the group was for the Iraqi Revolt of 1920, for 
                                                          
37 Army Order 168, 1938; TNA WO 123/80; the clasp was “North West Frontier 
1936-37”. 
38 Army Order 217 1940; TNA WO the clasp was “North West Frontier 1937-39”. 
39 The London Gazette (London, HMSO) 18 February 1938, p. 1073. 
40 As checked against the Gradation List for Officers of the Army, HYAL January 1940 
& HYAL January 1942. 
41 This medal remained in use until 1962; the clasps awarded and relevant here were 
“Iraq” and “Palestine”. 
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those serving between December 1919 and November 1920.42 Beckett 
and Smyth both qualified for this medal, although it is unlikely that 
their paths crossed as Beckett was a Captain serving as the Adjutant 
of a unit43 and Smyth was a Brigade Major in an Indian Army 
brigade.44  
The 1936-39 Arab Revolt in Palestine45 generated another group 
with common experience; five officers from the group served there, 
Berney-Ficklin, Halstead, Ritchie, Utterson-Kelso and Wootten. This 
campaign was significant in that several officers who rose to high 
command during the Second World War served there in senior posts; 
for example, Richard O’Connor was Military Governor of Jerusalem and 
GOC 7th Division, where Berney-Ficklin served under him as CO of 
2/HLI.46 Montgomery was GOC 8th Division there and certainly “talent 
spotted” junior officers who served under him during the Second World 
War, such as Ritchie, who had transferred from his “home” Scottish 
regiment of the Black Watch to command an English county regiment, 
1/King’s Own (Royal Lancaster) Regiment in Palestine on promotion to 
Lieutenant Colonel. in 1938. (Another example was Major General 
Robert “Bobby" Ross, who commanded the 53rd (Welsh) Division from 
1942-1945, particularly in the North West Europe campaign; although 
                                                          
42 Clasp “Iraq”. 
43 HYAL January 1940 p. 251. 
44 HYAL January 1940 pp. 191-92. 
45 Clasp “Palestine” to the 1918 GSM. 
46 http://regiments.org:80/deploy/uk/reg-inf/074-1.htm (2nd Battalion Highland 
Light Infantry) Accessed 20 January 2016. 
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a Lieutenant Colonel in 1939 and outside the scope of this thesis, he 
was known to Montgomery for commanding a battalion in one of the 
brigades of 8th Division in Palestine, and Monty was a frequent visitor 
to his headquarters in 1944-1945, which was much remarked upon by 
Ross’ staff).47 
In summary, several groupings of common inter-war operational 
service emerge from the officers who advanced to Major General and 
beyond.   
                                                          
47 Delaforce, P. (1996) “Red Crown and Dragon: 53rd (Welsh) Division 1944-1945” 
(Tom Donovan Publishing, London 1996) p.37 
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TABLE 4.5 WAR SERVICE OF OFFICERS PROGRESSING 
THEATRE NUMBER NAMES 
FIRST WORLD WAR: NON-WESTERN FRONT 
GALLIPOLI 5 BECKETT, DAVIDSON, GAMMELL, GRANT, LAWSON 
EGYPT 6 DAVIDSON, GAMMELL, GRANT, HOGG, MC MULLEN, SMYTH 
EEF 6 BECKETT, DAVIDSON, GAMMELL, HOGG, MC MULLEN, 
RITCHIE 
MESOPOTAMIA 2 HOGG, RITCHIE 




8 BARKER, BERNEY-FICKLIN, GUBBINS, HOGG, HORROCKS, 
HUDSON, PERCIVAL, POPE 
INDIA48 
(1919-1939) 
12 ANDERSON, BERNEY-FICKLIN, BOND, IRWIN, KING, 
MORGAN, RAMSDEN, ROBB, SMYTH, STEELE, TILLY, WEST 
IRAQ 
(1920-22) 
2 BECKETT, SMYTH 
PALESTINE 
(1936-39)  
5 BERNEY-FICKLIN, HALSTEAD, RITCHIE, UTTERSON-KELSO, 
WOOTTEN 
 
TABLE 4.5A: OFFICERS ADVANCING WHO SERVED IN MULTIPLE THEATRES,  
FIRST WORLD WAR (EXCLUDING WESTERN FRONT) & 1919-1939 
BERNEY-FICKLIN RUSSIA, INDIA, PALESTINE 
BECKETT GALLIPOLI, EGYPT, EEF, IRAQ 
DAVIDSON GALLIPOLI, EGYPT, EEF 
GAMMELL GALLIPOLI, EGYPT, EEF 
HOGG EGYPT, EEF, MESOPOTAMIA, RUSSIA 
MC MULLEN MACEDONIA, PALESTINE 
RITCHIE MESOPOTAMIA, PALESTINE 
SMYTH EGYPT, INDIA 
 
(Officers highlighted in bold did not serve on the Western Front during the First World War) 
 
Aside from the individual campaign groupings, it can be seen 
that other groups of linked service emerge; Beckett, Davidson and 
Gammell as a Gallipoli/Egypt/EEF group, expanding to a group of five 
if Hogg and McMullen’s service in Egypt and the EEF is factored in. 
Whilst a small group set against the overall number of officers, it again 
shows groupings of shared, varied knowledge and experience. It is 
                                                          
48 Including North West Frontier, Afghanistan and Waziristan. 
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significant that other operational fronts from the First World War do 
not figure in the list of officers advancing after 1940. There are no 
veterans of the war in East or South West Africa, or the Italian 
campaign of 1917-1918, underlining the perception of these fronts as 
“sideshows” to the main effort on the Western Front.  
 
Staff College 
Of the fifty-eight officers promoted to Major General or above during 
the Second World War, forty of them were Staff College graduates, or 
68.9% of the total. (Thirty-five officers, 22.9% of the overall group or 
36.7% of the non-advancing group, were also Staff College 
graduates). This suggests, due to the similarity of numbers advancing 
and not advancing, that possessing a p.s.c. in and of itself was not 
decisive for advancement, even if preferable. Thirty-six of the forty 
graduated from Camberley, the remaining four from Quetta. These 
officers are grouped by their year of graduation as follows:  
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1922 3 BECKWITH-SMITH (C GDS); GAMMELL (CAM HDRS); MILES (KOSB) 
1923 1 WOOTTEN (BAYS) 
1924 6 HALSTEAD (LOYALS); PERCIVAL (BEDFORDS); PRATT (RTR); 
SCHREIBER (RA); SMYTH (IA); STOPFORD (RB) 
1925 5 BOND (RE); GARTLAN (R IRISH); IRWIN (ESSEX); POPE (N STAFFS); 
WATSON (HLI); 
1926 6 CLARK (16L); GALE (ASC); HUDSON (N&D); MORGAN W (RA) 
NORMAN (9L); SWAYNE (SOM LI) 
1927 3 BARKER (KRRC); DAVIDSON (RA); WEST (RE) 
1928 5 ANDERSON (SEAFORTH); HAWKESWORTH (E YORKS); JARDINE 
(RA); LEESE (C GDS); WOOLNER (RE) 
1929 3 CROCKER (MIDDX); GUBBINS (RA); MCCREERY (12L); 
1930 1 RITCHIE (BW) 
1931 2 STEELE (R IRISH); DEMPSEY (R BERKS) 
1932 1 HORROCKS (MIDDX) 
 36  
QUETTA   
1923 1 HOGG (RE) 
1927 2 LEE (S STAFFS); DAVIDSON (RA) 
1928 1 MORGAN F (RA) 
 4  
 
Only one officer who served as a Brigadier in 1940 graduated 
from Camberley before 192249 and none after 1932. There are several 
conjunctions and overlaps, where officers beginning the two year 
course50 would have been present as junior students when their senior 
students were heading towards graduation from the course and would 
have overlapped in their attendance. They can be classified, therefore, 
as close contemporaries as with schools above.  
                                                          
49 Archibald Beauman, who graduated from Camberley after the first post-First World 
War course in December 1919; he was appointed an Honorary Brigadier on 
retirement in 1938, but recalled to service from the reserve in 1939, (HYAL January 
1940 p. 1313). 
50 The first two Staff College courses post-war, in 1919 and 1920, lasted eight 
months and a year respectively; the two-year course was reinstituted in 1922, as 
was entry through competitive examination.  
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For example, Wootten, who graduated in 1923, would have been 
present in his first year while Beckwith-Smith, Gammell and Miles were 
finishing their course in 1922 and been in a similar position to them in 
1923, when Halstead, Pratt, Schreiber, Smyth and Stopford were 
beginning their attendance at Camberley, making Wootten connected 
to nine other officers by their overlapping attendance. By the same 
measure, the 1924-26 “envelope” would be thirteen strong in the first 
period, 1924-25 and eleven in the second, 1925-26 – making this the 
largest conglomeration of officers under examination. The overlap 
reduces after 1925 as the number of individuals who were successful 
in progressing also declines; in 1926-28 it is seven and eight officers 
respectively around the 1927 “pivot”, and in 1927-29, both years have 
an overlap of eight. The highest figure in 1929-31 is five officers 
followed by three in 1930-31. By 1931-32, it falls to two officers – 
Horrocks and Dempsey. Despite the direct connection between 1940 
brigadiers who advanced to Major General and beyond being limited, 
the 1930-2 period did still produce many wartime General officers and 
is a valuable snapshot of officers at a point in their careers for whom 
the outbreak of war would provide additional impetus to higher rank.  
The officers graduating in 1926 could count among their 
contemporaries several officers who, if not brigadiers in 1940, were 
destined for high rank later in the war. These included Ronald 
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Scobie,51 Frank Messervy,52 Raymond Briggs,53 Eric “Dreadnought” 
Harrison,54 Henry Willcox,55 Francis “Gertie” Tuker56, John Swayne57 
and Ralph Deedes.58 
Among Dempsey’s contemporaries in the Junior Division at 
Camberley when he arrived there in January 193059 were William 
“Strafer” Gott,60 George Hopkinson,61 James Steele,62 Maurice 
Chilton,63 Arthur Snelling64 and John “Crasher” Nichols.65 In the year 
above Dempsey, in the Senior Division (who had arrived in January 
                                                          
51 Later GOC Tobruk, GOC 70th Division and CGS Middle East Mead (2007), p. 410. 
52 Commanded 4th (Indian) Division, 1st Armoured Division, 7th Armoured Division, 7th 
(Indian) Division and IV Corps during the Second World War. 
53 Commanded 2nd Armoured Brigade, 1st Armoured Division and was Director, Royal 
Armoured Corps (DRAC) during the war. 
54 A Gunner who spent most of the war in Commander or Brigadier, Royal Artillery 
(CRA/BRA) posts in 12th Division, IX Corps and Northern Ireland: Major General 
Royal Artillery (MGRA) Allied Forces HQ in North Africa and finally GOC Sussex and 
Surrey District. 
55 Commanded 13th (Infantry) Brigade in France in early 1940; transferred command 
to Miles Dempsey, who he had taught at Camberley; GOC 42nd (East Lancashire) 
Division and I Corps from May-October 1941, before being sent to India where he 
saw out the war. 
56 Director of Military Training, India 1940-41; 4th (Indian) Infantry Division 1941-44 
and briefly IV Corps. 
57 Head of the British Military Mission to French General Headquarters, 1939-1940; 
GOC 4th Division 1941; CGS Home Forces 1941; GOC South Eastern Command 1941; 
CGS (India) 1944-45. 
58 GOC Waziristan District (India) 1941-43; Military Secretary (India) 1943-1944; 
Adjutant-General (India) 1944-46. 
59 List of contemporaries from Smart (2005), pp. 81-82. 
60 Later commander, Eighth Army in the Middle East; killed in an air crash 7 August 
1942. Smart (2005), p. 125. 
61 A liaison officer to the Belgians in 1940, later commander of the 1st Airlanding 
Brigade and second commander of 1st Airborne Division, killed in action in Italy on 9 
September 1943. Smart (2005), p. 158. 
62 Latterly GOC 59th Division 1941-42; II Corps 1942; Director of Staff Duties, War 
Office 1943. Smart (2005) pp. 296-97. 
63 Later Dempsey’s Chief of Staff at Second Army and Deputy Adjutant General of 
21st Army Group. 
64 Later Maj Gen in charge of Administration, 14th Army in Burma. Smart (2005), p. 
293. 
65 GOC 50th (Northumbrian) Division at the Battle of El Alamein in October 1942, but 
later dismissed by Montgomery and demoted. Smart (2005), p. 233. 
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1929) were Neil Ritchie,66 Herbert Lumsden,67 George Erskine,68 Ivor 
Hughes,69 Harold Redman70 and Ian Playfair.71 The Junior Division 
below Dempsey, who started in January 1931, included Brian 
Horrocks,72 Sidney Kirkman,73 Frank Simpson,74 Joseph Baillon,75 
Arthur Dowler,76 Thomas “Pete” Rees,77 Keith Arbuthnot78 and 
Cameron Nicholson.79  
 That the Staff College in the inter-war period was a breeding 
ground for talented officers who would rise to senior command during 
the Second World War is a difficult claim to dismiss. Although not 
singularly decisive, it was an advantage. The value and applicability of 
the training it provided for those who did reach the higher echelons 
                                                          
66 A Dunkirk contemporary, commander of Eighth Army in 1942 and XII Corps in 
Normandy in 1944. Smart (2005) p.272 
67 Later commander of 6th Armoured Division, 1st Armoured Division and X Corps in 
the Middle East; II Corps and VIII Corps before Normandy. Smart (2005), p. 196 
68 Commander of 7th Armoured Division in North Africa and Normandy. Smart 
(2005), p.96 
69 Commanding 44th Division in North Africa and XXV (Indian) Corps in the Far East. 
Smart (2005), p.163 
70 Secretary to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington 1943-45. Smart (2005) 
p.263 
71 Director of Plans, War Office 1940-42, but better known as the author of the 
volumes of the Official History of the Second World War “The Mediterranean and 
Middle East” (HMSO, London, 4 Vols, 1954-66). 
72 Chief Instructor at Camberley on the outbreak of war. Commanded 11th Brigade in 
France; XIII Corps in North Africa and XXX Corps in North West Europe.  
73 Commanded 50th Division in the Middle East and XIII Corps in Italy. 
74 Deputy Director, and then Director, Military Operations at the War Office, 1942-45.  
75 Chief of Staff, Persia and Iraq Force (Paiforce) and Chief of Staff. Mediterranean 
Expeditionary Force (MEF). 
76 GOC 38th (Welsh) Division; Chief of Administration, Southern Command 1942-44 
and Chief of Administration MEF 1944-45. 
77 Commanded 10th (Indian) Division in the Middle East and 19th (Indian) Division in 
Burma. 
78 Commanded 78th Infantry Division in Italy, 1944-46. 
79 Brigadier General Staff, 1st Army in Tunisia; Commanded 44th (Indian) Division, 
21st (Indian) Division and 2nd Division in Burma.  
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has been debated,80 from the perspective of this work, it certainly did 
generate networks of officers known and connected to each other. The 
key periods for this were from 1922-26, coinciding with the tenure as 
Commandant of the-then Major General Sir Edmund Ironside and 
1924-28, overlapping between Ironside and Major General Sir Charles 
Gwynn.  
 
The Imperial Defence College 
All nine officers from the 1940 group who attended the Imperial 
Defence College before 1939 would progress to Major General or 
above during the Second World War, achieving the College’s purpose 
of preparing officers selected to attend it as preparation for higher 
command. This should not come as a surprise given the College’s 
reason for existing. (The HYAL for January 1940 contains forty officers 
still serving who were graduates of the College, including a Major 
General of the Royal Marines and several Indian Army officers). Two 
were on the 1933 course, Bond81 and Swayne.82 In 1934, Miles83 and 
                                                          
80 For example, in Duncan, A. G. “The Military Education of Army Officers in the 
Edwardian Era” (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 2016), pp. 187-
214 and French, D. (2002) “Officer Education and Training in The British Army 1919-
1939” in Kennedy, G. and Neilson, K. “Military Education and Training: Past, Present 
and Future” (Praeger, Westport), pp. 105-128, particularly pp. 117-120. Duncan 
contends that the post-Boer War professionalisation of the Army was enhanced both 
by the education provided at Staff College and its growing perception as a necessary 
step for potential advancement to high rank. French states that whilst a positive 
experience for most who attended, the training provided was inadequate to meet the 
demands graduates would face during the Second World War.  
81 Chief Engineer, I Corps in France. 
82 A BGS and Head of the Liaison Mission to French GHQ. 
83 Cdg 126 Bde of 42nd Division in 1940. 
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Pope84 and in 1935, Percival85 and Davidson86. Irwin,87 Gartlan88 and 
Gammell89 followed in 1936, 1937 and 1938 respectively. 
Furthermore, Bond and Swayne had been direct contemporaries at the 
Staff College, graduating in 1925. 
 
Decorated for France 1940 
In Chapter Two, it is shown that of the one hundred and fifty-six  
officers making up the 1940 sample, 79.2%, or one hundred and 
twenty-one of them, had received at least one decoration for gallantry 
or distinguished service during the period of the First World War. Of 
those 121 officers, 54 would advance to Major General or beyond after 
1940, or 44.6% of the whole. However, in order to further examine 
the case against the assertion which originally triggered this research 
(that participation in either of 1940’s strategic failures was 
automatically career limiting or terminating) the number of officers 
who received decorations for gallantry or distinguished service directly 
as a result of these two campaigns, and who progressed beyond 
Brigadier, will now be examined.  
 No awards of the Victoria Cross, the highest British award for 
gallantry, were made to officers at this level in either France or 
                                                          
84 BGS II Corps 1940. 
85 BGS I Corps 1940. 
86 CRA I Corps 1940. 
87 Cdg 6 Bde of 2nd Division to 20 May 1940. 
88 Cdg 5 Bde of 2nd Division. 
89 BGS NWEF in Norway. 
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Norway. Three of the one hundred and fifty-six were holders of the VC, 
all awarded for the First World War.  They were George Roupell, 
originally from the East Surrey Regiment, who commanded 36 Brigade 
in France. He earned his VC on the Western Front in April 1915 and 
graduated from the Staff College in 1927.  Charles Hudson, originally 
from the Sherwood Foresters, commanded 2 Brigade in France. He 
earned his VC in Italy in 1918 and graduated from the Staff College in 
1926.  John “Jacky” Smyth commanded 127 Brigade in France; he was 
originally commissioned into the Indian Army, graduated from the 
Staff College at Camberley in 1923, and taught there from 1931-34.  
All three were from public schools, Roupell from Rossall, Hudson from 
Sherborne and Smyth from Repton; Roupell and Smyth served as 
GSOs during the First World War.  Of the three, only Hudson was 
decorated for 1940, appointed Companion of the Order of the Bath.   
Smyth and Hudson progressed to Major General. Roupell, by 
virtue of having escaped and evaded capture before being smuggled 
out of Occupied Europe via Spain in 1942, did not. None of the three 
had much success thereafter. Hudson briefly held a divisional 
command in the UK, but serious personality clashes with his Corps 
commander led to dismissal and demotion back to Colonel, from which 
he did not recover.90 Smyth’s career was finished after the incident at 
the Sittang Bridge in February 1942 (see p.249).  Therefore, despite 
                                                          
90 Hudson, C. & M. (2007) p.187 
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the possession of other apparent advantages for advancement, a 
Victoria Cross was not a guarantee.  
Seventy-three officers received decorations for their services on 
operations in 1940, ranging from the Mention in Dispatches at the 
lowest end of the Order of Seniority of British Honours and Awards91 to 
a Companion of the Order of Bath (Military Division) at the top. (The 
number of awards reflects occasional multiple awards to individuals). 
In between were the Distinguished Service Order and appointment to 
be a Commander of the Order of the British Empire (Military 
Division).92 The breakdown of awards for service in 1940 is as follows: 
  
TABLE 4.7 HONOURS AND AWARDS TO THE GROUP FOR OPERATIONS IN  
FRANCE OR NORWAY 1940 
AWARD NOT PROGRESSING PROGRESSING TOTAL93 
CB (MIL) 1 7 8 
CBE (MIL) 17 17 34 
BAR TO THE DSO 1 1 2 
DSO 4 6 10 
MID 21 7 28 
 44 38 82 
 
                                                          
91 https://www.gov.uk/honours/types-of-honours-and-awards Official UK 
Government website, accessed 11 August 2018. This list includes awards instituted 
since the end of the Second World War. 
92 Both the Order of the Bath and the Order of the British Empire were (and still are) 
divided into Civil and Military Divisions, the former distinguished by different forms of 
insignia, the latter by a slight difference in the ribbon worn, the Military Division 
having a thin pearl grey stripe added to its centre of the ribbon for the Civil Division 
– Salmon Pink with Pearl Grey edges. Officers of the rank of Lt. Col. and above were 
ineligible for award of the Military Cross, awarded to officers of the rank of Major and 
below only.  
93 Total numbers exceed the size of the group as some individuals received more 
than one award; for example, two officers were Mentioned in Dispatches twice during 
the period.  
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Based on pure numbers of awards, it cannot be stated that 
receipt of a distinction for operations in 1940 was a definitively 
influencing factor in advancement of itself. Examining the nature of 
awards granted, however, suggests that the seniority of the award was 
influential for future advancement. The higher the award, the higher 
the chance of its contributing to subsequent promotion. Comparing the 
size of the group of those who progressed with the much larger group 
of those who did not, indicates a much higher percentage of those in 
the progression group who held an award. This is even clearer if MIDs 
are removed.  
The Statutes of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath94 indicate 
that CBs should be awarded to officers around the rank of Rear 
Admiral in the Royal Navy, Major General in the army or Royal 
Marines, or Air Vice Marshal in the Royal Air Force, and in addition 
must have been Mentioned in Despatches for distinction in a command 
position on active service. Officers of supporting arms (e.g. engineers, 
medical officers, logisticians) may be appointed only for meritorious 
service in wartime. Numerical limitations on the number of 
Companions at any one time are suspended at time of war.95 The 
Order of the Bath, as the main Order of Chivalry awarded to military 
officers then and now, is a mark of distinction for outstanding 
                                                          
94 (No author) “The Statutes of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath (Revised 
1925)” (edition Published 1939, Harrison and Sons. London) Article 17. 
95 Ibid. Article 25. 
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performance on duty or in command. Only one officer who received a 
CB for France did not advance beyond Brigadier.96 He was Ralph 
Chenevix-Trench, the Signal Officer in Chief BEF who was “retired” as 
the Chief Signals Officer, Home Forces by Montgomery in 1941.97 His 
very brief tenure as a Major General may explain his appointment as 
CB in the post-Dunkirk honours list.98 All the other officers appointed 
CB for their service in 1940 progressed beyond Brigadier.99 
Award of a Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British 
Empire (Military Division) or CBE (Mil) to military officers reflects 
recognition for work often not in the face of the enemy, such as on 
headquarters staffs or in command in areas not under fire. That the 
number of awards was equal between officers advancing and those 
who did not, aside from coincidence, suggests that the award of a CBE, 
whilst a signal recognition of good work, was neither a positive 
influence over future promotion nor a negative one. Of the seventeen 
recipients who did progress, all but two held posts as senior staff 
officers in headquarters (such a BGS, for example Ritchie at GHQ BEF 
                                                          
96 Chenevix-Trench held the rank of Acting Major General for three weeks whilst 
“specially employed” in May 1940 see Nalder, Maj. Gen. R. W. H. (1958) 'The Royal 
Corps of Signals: a history of its antecedents and development (circa 1800-1955)’ 
(London, the Royal Signals Institution); The Wire (The Corps Magazine of the Royal 
Corps of Signals) Vol. XXI No.245 (July 1940), p. 1 and Hall, B. N. (2017) 
“Communications and British Operations on the Western Front, 1914-1918” 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 61 
97 Godfrey, S. (2013) “British Army Communications in the Second World War: 
Lifting the Fog of Battle” (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press), p. 73. 
98 The London Gazette, 11 July 1940. 
99 Gammell and Wootten, for Norway; Halstead, Hudson, Irwin, Jardine and Lawson 
for France. 
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and Leese as BGS III Corps) or were the senior officers in charge of 
support arms at higher formation headquarters, for example Director, 
Supply or Director, Transport at Corps level or above.100 
 The Distinguished Service Order was instituted in 1886 as an 
award for distinguished or gallant service for officers, at a time when 
the only other alternatives, apart from meritorious awards of rank, 
were the Victoria Cross or the Order of the Bath. Despite its status as 
an award of distinction, it was also known laconically as “Did 
Something or Other”. Although its use was expanded during the First 
World War and it was awarded to junior officers such as subalterns, its 
primary recipients were intended to be officers of the rank of Major 
and above. (An award to an officer of more junior rank, especially to 
subalterns or equivalent, was often popularly, if not officially, 
considered to be a “near miss” for the award of a Victoria Cross in both 
world wars). This Order was established to reward officers who 
exhibited individual instances of meritorious or distinguished service in 
war. It was usually awarded for service under fire or under conditions 
equivalent to service in actual combat with the enemy.  
Prior to 1943, the DSO could be given only to someone who had 
already been Mentioned in Despatches. Ten were awarded to officers 
of this 1940 group; four to officers who did not progress and six to 
those who did. There were two Bars, signifying a second award to a 
                                                          
100 The two exceptions, being awarded CBEs in command of fighting formations 
were: Gartlan (cdg 5 Bde of 2 Div) and Ramsden (cdg 25 Bde of 50 Div).  
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recipient already holding it, given to two officers who had received 
their original decoration during the First World War. One progressed 
beyond Brigadier,101 the other did not.102 Whether a DSO was 
therefore a contributing element in advancement is not decisively 
proven but may be considered influential.  
The award of “Mentioned in Dispatches “(or MID) is one where a 
name appears in an official report written by a superior officer and 
sent to high command, in which gallant or meritorious action in the 
face of the enemy is described. This lowest-level distinction became 
formalised during the First World War with the issue of certificates and, 
after 1920, the issue of an oakleaf device worn upon an appropriate 
campaign medal or ribbon when the latter only are worn. There are no 
limits to the number of times an individual may be “mentioned” 
although in British practice until 2014 only one device is granted 
regardless of the number of “mentions” received. Authority to award 
MIDs is devolved to lower command without the need to refer to 
higher echelons. As such, it was a ready means to quickly reward 
service not of a standard for higher recognition. Of the twenty-one 
MIDs awarded to officers who did not progress in rank after France and 
Norway, all but two were to those in staff posts at senior 
headquarters, including a Deputy Director of Medical Services, a 
                                                          
101 Phillips (cdg 146 Bde of 49 Div) for Norway; his original DSO had been awarded in 
1919 for East Africa. 
102 Chichester-Constable (cdg 139 Bde of 46 Div) for France; his original DSO had 
been awarded in 1916 for the Western Front. 
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Commander of a Base Area and a Commander of a Rear Echelon base 
– implying that MiD was used, in this case, to recognise organisational 
skill rather than leadership in the field.  
 
“Patronage” beyond June 1940 
The brigadiers serving in 1940 did not do so in isolation; each was 
subordinate to a higher commander of one form or another, a Major 
General or higher. This section will examine, firstly, officers in fighting 
formations to establish if the divisional commander’s career post-1940 
influenced that of his subordinate. Staff officers at GHQ BEF would be 
subordinate to the Commander in Chief - Gort, the Chief of Staff - 
Pownall, the Adjutant General – Brownrigg or the Quarter Master 
General, Lindsell.  
Brigadiers in fighting formations in France were subordinate to 
the Divisional commander, some of whom (for example Anderson of 11 
Brigade, 4th Division) replaced divisional commanders when they were 
reassigned or evacuated back to the UK.103  The smaller force in 
Norway, based on Brigades and ad hoc forces, was more fluid but 
overall the brigadiers were subordinate to Major General de Wiart 
(Mauriceforce), Major General Paget, (Sickleforce) and Major General 
Macksey (Avonforce), with Gubbins, then a Brigadier, in command of 
                                                          
103 Anderson was reassigned to command 3rd Division when its GOC, Montgomery, 
replaced Brooke as II Corps’ commander on 30 May 1940. Mead (2007) p. 48 and 
Mackie (2018 edition), p. 178.  
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Scissorforce. After the reorganisation of British forces in Norway on 13 
May, Lieutenant General Sir Claude Auchinleck assumed command of 
the North West Expeditionary Force. 
 
Careers after 1940 
Whilst the charge that the fact of merely serving in France or Norway 
in 1940 in a Brigadier’s appointment was career-ending is simple to 
refute, it cannot be said that it was necessarily a step to success or 
advancement either. Two elements are now examined more closely. 
Firstly, whether having been a pupil of Brooke (at the Staff College 
from 1924-26 and the Imperial Defence College from 1933-34) or 
Montgomery (at Camberley from 1926-29 and Quetta from 1934-37) 
was influential or advantageous, and secondly whether there was a 
“coat-tails effect” of having served under a Divisional commander in 
1940. The latter will review whether those commanders took 
subordinates with them as, when or if they themselves advanced after 
1940. The following table outlines the career paths after the summer 
of 1940 of those officers in the group who progressed to Major General 
or above.  
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104 Derived from Smart (2005); Joslen (1960, Both vols) and Who Was Who (various 
editions). https://www.ukwhoswho.com/  Accessed on multiple occasions during 
research 
TABLE 4.8 POST 1940 CAREERS OF OFFICERS PROGRESSING BEYOND BRIGADIER104 
NAME BEF/NWEF COMMAND 
1940 
HIGHEST RANK  
WW2  
POST 1940 SERVICE (THEATRE) 
ANDERSON BEF 11 BDE LT GEN GOC 1 DIV 1940 (HOME) 
GOC VI CORPS 1941 (HOME) 
GOC II CORPS 1942 (HOME) 
GOC EASTERN CMD (HOME) 
GOC 1ST ARMY 1942-43 (NORTH 
AFRICA) 
GOC SOUTHERN CMD (HOME) 
1944 
GOC EAST AFRICA 1945 (AFRICA) 
BARKER, E BEF 10 BDE LT GEN GOC 54 DIV 1940-42 (HOME) 
GOC 49 DIV 1944 (NWE) 
GOC VIII CORPS 1944-45 (NWE) 
BECKETT BEF CRA 15 DIV MAJ GEN CRA 15 DIV 1940-41 (HOME) 
CRA MALTA 1941-42 (MED) 
A/GOC MALTA 1942 (MED) 




BEF 1 GDS BDE MAJ GEN GOC 18 DIV 1941-42 (FE) 
DIED AS POW 1942 
BERNEY-FICKLIN BEF 15 BDE MAJ GEN GOC 5 DIV 1940-43 (HOME; MED) 
GOC 48 DIV 1943 (HOME) 
GOC 54 DIV 1944 (HOME) 
 
BOND BEF C/ENG CRE I 
CORPS 
MAJ GEN MAJ GEN I/C ADMIN WO 1940-41 
(HOME) 
DEP QMG INDIA 1941-42; (INDIA) 
ENG IN CHF INDIA 1942-43 (INDIA) 
CLARK BEF 12 BDE MAJ GEN GOC 1 CAV DIV 1940 (ME) 
GOC 10 ARMD DIV 1941 (ME) 
GOC LofC AFHQ 1942 (MED) 
DEP MIL GOV SICILY 1943 (MED) 
CHF ADMIN OFF, AFHQ 1943-45 
(MED)  
HD. SHAEF MISSION NETHERLANDS 
1945 (NWE) 
CROCKER BEF 3RD ARMD 
BDE 
LT GEN GOC 6 ARMD DIV 1940-41 (HOME) 
GOC 2 ARMD GP 1941 (HOME) 
GOC IX CORPS 1942-43 
(HOME/MED) 
GOC I CORPS 1943-45 
(HOME/NWE) 
DAVIDSON BEF CRA I CORPS MAJ GEN DMI, WO 1940-44 (HOME) 
MAJ GEN BRITISH ARMY STAFF 
WASHINGTON DC 1944-46 (USA) 
DEMPSEY BEF 13 BDE LT GEN BGS 1 CAN DIV 1940-41 (HOME) 
GOC 46 DIV 1941-42 (HOME) 
GOC 42 ARMD DIV 1942 (HOME) 
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IRWIN BEF 6 BDE (TO 20 
MAY) 
LT GEN GOC 38 DIV 1940-42 (HOME) 
GOC XI CORPS 1942 (HOME) 
GOC EASTERN ARMY 1942-43 
(INDIA) 
UNEMPLOYED LIST 1943-44 
GOC XIII CORPS 1942-43 (MED) 
GOC 2 ARMY 1943-45 
(HOME/NWE) 
GALE, H BEF DA&QMG III 
CORPS 
LT GEN MAJ GEN I/C ADMIN S CMD 1941 
(HOME) 
CHF ADMIN OFF HOME FORCES 
1942 (HOME) 
DEP CofS & HD ADMIN SHAEF 
1943-45 (HOME/NWE) 
GAMMELL NWEF BGS NWEF LT GEN GOC 3 DIV 1940 (HOME) 
A/GOC XII CORPS 1941 (HOME) 
GOC E CMD 1942-44 (HOME) 
CofS SACMED 1944-45 (MED) 
GARTLAN BEF 5 BDE MAJ GEN GOC DORSET COUNTRY DIV 1941 
(HOME) 
MAJ GEN STAFF N CMD 1941-44 
(HOME) 
RETD 1944 
GOLDNEY BEF DRASC III 
CORPS 
MAJ GEN DIR, S&T GHQ ME 1941-44 (ME) 
RETD 1944 
GRANT BEF AQMG BEF MAJ GEN ADC TO KING, 1944 RETD 1944 
GRIFFIN BEF BASE CMDT MAJ GEN CDG 11 BDE 1943-44 (MED) 
GUBBINS NWEF SCISSORFORCE MAJ GEN CDG AUXILIARY UNITS 1940-41 
(HOME) 
HD, SOE 1941-45 
HALSTEAD BEF DA&QMG I 
CORPS 
MAJ GEN MAJ EN I/C ADMIN S CMD 1941 
(HOME) 
VICE QMG 1945 (HOME) 
HAWKESWORTH BEF 12 BDE LT GEN DMT, WO 1940-42 (HOME) 
GOC 4 DIV 1942 (NA) 
GOC 46 DIV 1943-44 (MED) 
GOC X CORPS 1944 (MED) 
GOC BRIT TPS GREECE 1945 (MED) 
DIED 1945 
HOGG NWEF BASE AREA 
ANDALSNES (V 
CORPS PARTY) 
MAJ GEN MAJ GEN I/C ADMIN N CMD 1940-
41 (HOME) 
RETD 1942 
HORROCKS BEF 11 BDE 
(TEMP) 
LT GEN BGS E CMD 1941 (HOME) 
GOC 44 DIV 1941 (HOME) 
GOC 9 ARMD DIV 1942 (HOME) 
GOC XIII CORPS 1942 (ME) 
GOC X CORPS 1942-43 (ME) 
GOC IX CORPS 1943 (ME) 
GOC XXX CORPS 1944-45 (NWE) 
HUDSON VC BEF 2 BDE MAJ GEN GOC 46 DIV 1940-41 (HOME) 
CDG 182 BDE (AS BRIG) 1941-43 
(HOME) 
ADC TO KING 1944-46 
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GOC E SCOTLAND (MAJ GEN) 1944-
45 
JARDINE BEF MIL SEC BEF MAJ GEN DEP FORTRESS CDR, GIBRALTAR 
1942-43 
DIR, ARMY WELFARE 1943-1945 
KING BEF D/ENG IN C 
BEF 
LT GEN CHF ENG HOME FORCES 1940-41 
(HOME) 
ENG IN CHF, WO 1941-44 (HOME) 
SPECIAL ENVOY, WELFARE SEAC 
1944-46 
LAURIE Bt BEF 157 BDE MAJ GEN GOC 52 DIV 1940-41 (HOME) 
DIR, COMB OPS TRG 1942-45 
(HOME) 
LAWSON BEF CRA 48 DIV & 
CDR Y FORCE 
MAJ GEN GOC YORKSHIRE COUNTY DIV. 
1941-42 (HOME) 
DPR (ARMY) 1942-45 (HOME) 
LEE BEF BGS II CORPS MAJ GEN GHQ ME 1942-43 (AS BRIG) (ME) 
DEP CDR BRIT MIL STAFF 
WASHINGTON 1944-47 (USA) 
LEESE BEF DCGS HQ BEF LT GEN CDG 29 BDE 1940-42 (HOME) 
GOC W SUSSEX COUNTY DIV 1942 
(HOME) 
GOC 15 DIV 1942 (HOME)  
GOC GDS ARMD DIV 1942 (HOME) 
GOC XXX CORPS 1943 (MED) 
GOC LAND FORCES SEAC 1944-45 
(FE) 
MCCREERY BEF 2 ARMD BDE  LT GEN GOC 8 ARMD DIV 1940-41 (HOME) 
ARMD ADVISER GHQ ME 1941 (ME) 
CofS TO SACME 1942-43 (ME) 
GOC X CORPS 1943-44 (MED) 
GOC 8 ARMY 1944-45 (MED) 
MCMULLEN BEF DG 
TRANSPORT 
MAJ GEN DIR OF ARMY TRANSPORT, 1940-45 
(HOME) 
MILES BEF 126 BDE MAJ GEN BGS HOME FORCES 1940-41 
(HOME) 
GOC 42 DIV 1941 (HOME) 
GOC 56 DIV 1941-43 (HOME/ME) 
GOC KENT DISTRICT 1943-44 
(HOME) 
GOC SE CMD 1944-46 (HOME) 
MORGAN, H NWEF 148 BDE MAJ GEN GOC 45 DIV 1941-43 (HOME) 
WO 1943-46 (HOME) 
MORGAN, W BEF CDR SPT GP 51 
HD  
LT GEN BGS 1 DIV 1940-41 (HOME) 
GOC 55 DIV 1941 (HOME) 
CGS 21 AG 1943 (HOME) 
GOC S CMD 1944-45 (HOME) 
CofS SACMED 1945 (MED) 
MORGAN, F BEF BGS II CORPS LT GEN GOC DEVON & CORNWALL DIV 
1941 (HOME) 
GOC 55 DIV 1941-42 (HOME) 
GOC I CORPS 1942 (HOME) 
COSSAC 1943 (HOME) 
CofS SACEUR 1944-45 (NWE) 
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NORMAN BEF 1 LT ARMD 
RECCE BDE 
MAJ GEN GOC 8 ARMD DIV 1941-42 
(HOME/ME) 
GOC ALDERSHOT DIST 1944-45 
(HOME) 
PERCIVAL BEF BGS I CORPS LT GEN ASST CIGS 1940 (HOME) 
GOC 44 DIV 1941 (HOME) 
GOC MALAYA 1941-42 (FE) 
POW 1942-45 (FE) 
PHILLIPS NWEF 146 BDE MAJ GEN CDG BDE N IRELAND 1940-41 
(HOME) 
GOC GAMBIA & SIERRA LEONE 
1942-44 (W AFRICA) RETD 1944 
POPE BEF BGS II CORPS MAJ GEN CDG 3 ARMD BDE 1940 (HOME) 
DIR, AFVs WO 1941 (HOME) 
GOC XXX CORPS 1941 (ME) 
KIA NORTH AFRICA 1941 
PRATT, D BEF 1 ARMY TK 
BDE 
MAJ GEN MAJ GEN AFVs BRIT MIL STAFF 
WASHINGTON 1942-43 (USA) 
DEP DIR GEN BRIT MIL SUPPLY 
STAFF WASHINGTON 1943-45 
(USA) 
PRATT, F BEF CC MED ARTY 
I CORPS 
MAJ GEN CCRA, X CORPS 1940-41 (HOME) 
BRIG, RA SE CMD 1941-42 (HOME) 
CCRA V CORPS 1942-43 (MED) 
BRIG RA 15 AG 1943-44 (MED) 
MAJ GEN I/C TRG, RA 1944-45 
(HOME) 
ADC KING 1944-46 
RAMSDEN BEF 25 BDE MAJ GEN GOC 50 DIV 1940-42 (HOME/ME) 
GOC XXX CORPS 1942 (ME) 
A/GOC 8 ARMY 1942 (ME) 
GOC 3 DIV 1942-43 (HOME) 
GOC SUDAN DEF FORCE 1944-45 (E 
AFRICA) 
RITCHIE BEF BGS II CORPS LT GEN GOC 51 DIV 1940-41 (HOME) 
DCGS HQ ME 1941 (ME) 
GOC 8 ARMY 1941-42 (ME) 
GOC 52 DIV 1942-43 (HOME) 
GOC XII CORPS 1943-45 
(HOME/NWE) 
ROBB BEF 9 BDE MAJ GEN CMDT, SEN OFFS SCH 1940-
41 
CDG 73 BDE 1941-43 
GOC MALTA 1943-45 
SCHREIBER BEF CCRA II 
CORPS 
LT GEN GOC 61 DIV 1940 (HOME) 
GOC 45 DIV 1940-41 
(HOME) 
GOC W CMD 1941-44 
(HOME) 
GOC SE CMD 1944 (HOME) 
GOV & CinC MALTA 1944-
45 (MED) 
SLATER BEF 4TH AA BDE MAJ GEN BRIG RA 9 ARMY 1941-42 
(IRAQ) 
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GOC 7 AA DIV 1942 
(HOME) 
GOC 4 AA GP 1942 (HOME) 
SMYTH VC BEF 127 BDE MAJ GEN CDG 3 BDE 1940 (HOME) 
GOC 17 DIV 1941-42 (FE) 
RETD 1942 
STEELE BEF 132 BDE LT GEN GOC 59 DIV 1942 (HOME) 
GOC II CORPS 1942 (HOME) 
DCOS HQ ME 1942-43 (ME) 
DCOS 18 AG 1943 (ME) 
DIR, ARMY STAFF DUTIES 1943-45 
(HOME) 
STEWART BEF 152 BDE MAJ GEN ADC KING 1941-44 (HOME) 
RETD 1944 
STOPFORD BEF 17 BDE LT GEN GOC 56 DIV 1941 (HOME) 
CMDT, STAFF COLL 1942 (HOME) 
GOC XII CORPS 1942-43 (HOME) 
GOC XXIII CORPS 1943-45 (FE) 
GOC 12 ARMY 1945 (FE) 
SWAYNE BEF BGS BEF LT GEN DCGS HOME FORCES 1940-42 
(HOME) 
GOC 4 DIV 1942 (HOME) 
CGS HOME FORCES 1942 (HOME) 
GOC SE CMD 1942 (HOME) 
CGS, INDIA 1944 (INDIA) 
TILLY BEF 1 TANK BDE  MAJ GEN GOC 2 ARMD DIV 1940-41 (HOME) 
KIA JAN 41, NORTH AFRICA 
UTTERSON-
KELSO 
BEF 131 BDE MAJ GEN GOC 47 DIV 1941-43 (HOME) 
MAJ GEN, INF 1943 (HOME) 
GOC 76 DIV 1944 (HOME) 
GOC 47 DIV 1944 (HOME) 
WATSON BEF BGS III CORPS LT GEN GOC 2 DIV 1940-41 (HOME) 
DIR ARMY STAFF DUTIES 1941-42 
(HOME) 
ASST CIGS 1942 (HOME) 
DEP ADJT-GEN 1942-44 (HOME) 
GOC W CMD 1944-46 (HOME) 
WEST BEF ASST MIL SEC MAJ GEN BGS HOME FORCES 1940-41 
(HOME) 
BGS UK DEL TO NZ FORCES 1941-42 
MAJ GEN GEN STAFF HOME 
FORCES, ATT COSSAC 1943-44 
MAJ GEN GEN STAFF ATT SHAEF 
1944-45 
WHITAKER BEF 7 GDS BDE MAJ GEN BGS HOME FORCES 1940-42 
(HOME) 
COS, W CMD 1942 (HOME) 
DMT 1942-45 (HOME) 
WILSON BEF 3 BDE MAJ GEN BGS HOME FORCES 1940-42 
(HOME) 
CMDT SCH OF INF 1942-43 (HOME) 
DIR, INF 1943-46 (HOME) 
WOOLNER BEF 8 BDE  MAJ GEN GOC SIERRA LEONE & GAMBIA 
1941 
GOC 82 DIV 1943-44 (FE) 
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CDG W MIDLANDS DIST 1944-45 
(HOME) 
WOOTTEN NWEF CHF ADMIN 
STAFF OFF 
MAJ GEN DEP QMG TO US FORCES IN UK 
1942 (HOME) 
CDG N MIDLANDS DIST 1944-46 
 
Taught by Brooke and Montgomery 
TABLE 4.9: OFFICERS TAUGHT BY BROOKE AND MONTGOMERY AT CAMBERLEY, QUETTA  
AND THE IMPERIAL DEFENCE COLLEGE 
NAME AGE FORCE ROLE 1940 STAFF COLL IDC 
BARRY 50 BEF CRA 5 DIV Y 1924 
 
IRWIN 47 BEF 6 BDE (TO 20 MAY) Y 1924 Y 1936 
POPE 49 BEF BGS II CORPS Y 1924 Y 1934 
WATSON 51 BEF BGS III CORPS Y 1924 
 
BOND 49 BEF C/ENG CRE I CORPS Y 1925 Y 1933 
MORGAN 49 BEF BGS 1 CORPS Y 1925 
 
SWAYNE 49 BEF BGS BEF Y 1925  Y 1933 
MANSERGH 47 BEF DA&QMG II CORPS Y 1926 
 
CLARK 47 BEF 12 BDE Y 1926 
 
DUNCAN 50 BEF CRA III CORPS Y 1926 
 
GALE, H 49 BEF DA&QMG III CORPS Y 1926 
 
GREENSLADE 48 BEF DQMG DIR QTRG BEF Y 1926 
 
HUDSON VC 48 BEF 2 BDE Y 1926 
 
NORMAN 49 BEF 1 LT ARMD RECCE BDE Y 1926 
 
WHITAKER 43 BEF 7 GDS BDE Y 1926 
 
ANDERSON 48 BEF 11 BDE Y 1927 
 
BARKER 45 BEF 10 BDE Y 1927 
 
HAWKESWORTH 47 BEF 12 BDE Y 1927 
 
LEESE 45 BEF DCGS HQ BEF Y 1927 
 
WEST 47 BEF ASST MIL SEC Y 1927 Y 1936 
WOOLNER 46 BEF 8 BDE  Y 1927 
 
MCCREERY 42 BEF 2 ARMD BDE  Y 1928 
 
NICHOLSON 41 BEF 30 BDE Y 1929 
 
RITCHIE 42 BEF BGS II CORPS Y 1929 
 
VALLENTIN 44 BEF CRA 1 ARMD DIV Y 1929 
 
DEMPSEY 43 BEF 13 BDE Y 1930 
 
FURLONG 42 BEF 6 BDE (FROM 20 MAY) Y 1930 
 
STEELE 45 BEF 132 BDE Y 1930 
 
(Officers highlighted in bold are those who advanced in rank after 1940) 
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Twenty-nine officers from the 1940 group who were Staff 
College graduates attended during the periods when Brooke and 
Montgomery were members of the Directing Staff there. All were 
graduates from Camberley; none of the 1940 group attended Quetta 
during Montgomery’s time as an instructor. Twenty-two of the 
combined group would advance to Major General or above during the 
course of the war. Although being taught by either Montgomery or 
Brooke should not be over-emphasised as a single factor, with twenty- 
two out of twenty-nine reaching the rank of Major General, this 75% 
“success rate” would indicate that assertions elsewhere105 that both 
senior officers “talent spotted” during their respective tenures has 
some merit. Of the twenty-two, Irwin, Watson, Morgan, Swayne, Gale, 
Anderson, Barker, Hawkesworth, Leese, McCreery, Ritchie and 
Dempsey would also progress further to Lieutenant General during the 
war, twelve of twenty-two or 54 per cent of the advancing group or 41 
per cent of the whole group. These twelve held senior administrative, 
Corps, and Army level commands before its end.  
This factor alone did not in and of itself indicate a constant state 
of approval or continuously positive career management by their 
patrons, and Brooke in particular. For example, although Noel Irwin, a 
Staff College pupil in 1924, performed well in France after temporarily 
taking over a division and would end the war as a substantive 
                                                          
105 For example, French, D. “An Extensive Use of Weedkiller” in French and Holden-
Reid (eds.) (2002), pp. 132-45. 
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Lieutenant General, an unfortunate tendency to a short temper and be 
“difficult”106 with colleagues would cause Brooke much anguish. In 
1941, as Corps Commander of XI Corps, he immediately clashed 
severely with his immediate superior, Lieutenant General Laurence 
Carr, GOC Eastern Command, proclaiming no faith in his abilities, 
leaving Brooke minded to dismiss both officers. Yet Brooke wanted to 
find alternative employment for Irwin,107 noting that Carr “did not have 
the right qualities for this command”.108 Carr would see out the war in 
a dead-end job as Senior Military Assistant to the Ministry of Supply 
whereas Irwin would be sent to command VI (Indian) Corps, and the 
Eastern Army in the Far East.109 Brooke’s faith and reprieve were not 
repaid; his handling of the Arakan Offensive of 1942-43 was a failure. 
HQ staff remarked on his “egocentric and dictatorial temperament,”110 
a tendency to drive his personnel excessively hard and to apportion 
blame to others. Although it may have been motivated as much by a 
long-standing personal animus affected by a perceived personal and 
professional slight to one of Irwin’s friends,111 Irwin’s attempt to sack 
“Bill” Slim from command of his Corps was a step too far. He was 
recalled home and temporarily demoted. His fall from grace was 
                                                          
106 Mead (2007), p. 221. 
107 Danchev & Todman (2001), p. 148. 
108 French (1996), p. 1195. 
109 VI Indian Corps. 
110 Allen, L. (2000) “Burma: The Longest War 1941-45” (London, Phoenix Publishing 
p.94 
111 Mead (2007), p. 221. 
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compounded by bemoaning his fate on return, which left Brooke 
unwilling to use him further, and he remained unemployed for the 
remainder of the war.112 
Nick Smart considers Brooke as “using his powers of patronage 
to the full”, and that he was “more than selectively generous”.113 He 
adds further “It is a reasonable generalisation to say that those British 
Generals who, by 1945 could be said to have had a “good war” tended 
to be those senior (and not so “senior”) officers who had served under 
Brooke in II Corps with the BEF”114. Whilst this was not true of most of 
his subordinate Major Generals save of course Montgomery, that all of 
his brigadiers, plus his Chief of Staff, Neil Ritchie, achieved promotion 
lends this assertion weight.  
 
Another Patron? 
On the surface, the starred career of Sir John Dill before, during and 
after the First World War would suggest that encouragement and 
patronage from such an officer would be as potentially enhancing to a 
junior officer’s prospects as that of Brooke or Montgomery proved to 
be. A veteran of the Boer War, he graduated from the Staff College in 
1911 and by 1918 was a 38-year old Brigadier General. His second 
connection to Camberley came as its Chief Instructor in 1919. He was 
                                                          
112 Danchev and Todman (2001) p. 510 
113 Smart (2005), p. 44. 
114 Ibid.  
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on the original Directing Staff of the Imperial Defence College on its 
opening in 1927 – where Brooke was a student on the first course. He 
was Commandant at Camberley from 1931-34. Furthermore, whilst 
renowned for his commitment and self-discipline towards his 
profession Dill also impressed contemporaries and subordinates, in the 
words of Major General Sir John Kennedy with his “…great courtesy, 
warmth of heart…. [and] obvious sincerity.”115  
When Chief Instructor, Dill trained “Becky” Beckwith-Smith, 
James Gammell, Colin Jardine and Eric Miles from those officers who 
progressed, as all graduated from Camberley in 1922.116 As noted 
earlier in this work, no officers who progressed beyond Brigadier 
graduated from Camberley after 1932, therefore limiting Dill’s direct 
influence when Commandant. Brian Horrocks and James Steele, who 
were both to end the war as Lieutenant Generals, were students under 
Dill, even though Horrocks was only in his first year of attendance 
when Dill departed Camberley. None of the non-progressing officers 
were students at Camberley during his tenure as Commandant. 
Although Dill replaced Ironside as CIGS in May 1940, despite 
being “universally respected” and considered that he “held the 
                                                          
115 Quoted in Mead (2007), p. 121 Kennedy served under Dill as his GSO2 when he 
was Director of Military Operations & Intelligence in 1934.  
116 He would also have trained twelve officers who did not progress after 1940, 
among them Jack Churchill, Archibald Beauman, Henry Currey and Gerald Roupell 
VC.  
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confidence of the army”117 his cautionary advice to Churchill, and the 
latter’s confrontational personal approach led to his counsel being 
discounted and labelled, pejoratively, as “Dilly-Dally”.118 By 1941, he 
had lost Churchill’s confidence, but would serve invaluably as head of 
the British Military Mission to Washington DC until his untimely death 
in November 1944. Although three brigadiers from the 1940 group 
ultimately followed Dill to the United States, two arrived when he was 
already seriously ill, and the other, Douglas Pratt, had no obvious 
connections to Dill.119 For all the esteem, indeed deep affection, with 
which he was held within the army, Dill cannot be considered as 
having generated a patronage network of any measure of influence.  
 
The “Coat tails Effect” 
Although this thesis has focussed on Brigade command, in this section 
the intention is to see whether the divisional commanders under whom 
brigadiers in fighting formations served had any effect on the careers 
of those who advanced after 1940. In certain divisions, all the 
brigadiers advanced; in others, none. In the following Divisions, no 
officer who served as a Brigadier advanced in rank during the course 
                                                          
117 Smart (2005), p. 86 Also Danchev, A. John Dill in Keegan, J ed. (1991) 
“Churchill’s Generals” (London, Abacus) p.65 
118 Ibid. And Danchev, A. “Sir John Greer Dill” Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography (DNB) www.oxforddnb.com Accessed 27 February 1920. 
119 Frank Davidson, the former Director of Military Intelligence and Alec Lee, who had 
been BGS II Corps briefly in 1940 
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of the war; 12th,120 23rd,121 46th, and 48th. In the following, all the 
brigadiers were promoted: 3rd, 4th, 5th and 1st Armoured. That the 
Divisions lacking any progressing officers were Territorial Army based 
ones, and those with a perfect record were from the pre-war Regular 
Army indicates that service with the latter was also an advantage.  
  It might be expected, as the Division went into captivity after its 
capture at St Valery-en-Caux on 12 June 1940, that no brigadiers from 
the original 51st (Highland) Division would progress. However, 
Brigadier Herbert Stewart, commanding 152 Brigade, had been 
evacuated to the UK wounded before the surrender. After spending 
two years as an Aide de Camp to King (reverting to Colonel) in 1941-
43,122 he would serve briefly (January 1943-July 1944) as the 
Commander, South-Western Area of Southern Command. As Major 
General Fortune spent the war in captivity, and Stewart did not 
graduate from Staff College, access to patronage networks as 
discussed here is limited. 
 In the 2nd Division, as Irwin was temporarily promoted to take 
over his division in France, he cannot therefore coat tail himself. He 
                                                          
120 12th Division was disbanded on 11 July 1940 following its return from France and 
its units dispersed. Joslen (1960) p. 56 
121 23rd Division was broken up on its return to the UK on 30 June 1940 and its units 
dispersed. Joslen (1960) p. 62 
122 HYAL, January 1942 p. 69; Army List February1944, Col.205c. Other officers who 
served as ADCs to the King were Gerald Blunt (1937-38), Jack Churchill (1938-43) , 
Charles Findlay (1938-39), Thomas Grainger-Stewart (1943-52), Ian Grant (1944), 
Fendall Pratt (1944-46), Douglas Pratt (1944-46) , James Steele (1951), Frank Witts 
(1938-41, his death) and Richard Wootten (1938). Of these eleven, none would 
advance to Maj. Gen., eliminating it as a factor in patronage or promotion. 
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and Gerald Gartlan were both graduates of the Staff and Imperial 
Defence Colleges, being overlapping contemporaries at the former 
(graduating in 1924 and 1925) but not the latter (graduates of the 
1937 and 1936 courses respectively) but they did not serve together 
during the rest of the war.  
It is noteworthy that all eight123 of the brigadiers serving in 
Brooke’s II Corps (3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions) progressed to Major 
General or above after 1940. However, serving under Montgomery 
whilst he commanded the senior Division in the Corps in the BEF did 
not lend any particular advantage to his subordinate brigadiers. “Jack” 
Whitaker (7 Guards Bde), despite being a Baronet, an Eton-educated 
Guardsman, younger than the average (43 in 1940) and taught by 
Brooke (he graduated from Camberley in 1926) spent the rest of the 
war in the United Kingdom124 in staff positions. This included as the 
Director of Military Training from 1942-45. However, his recurring 
connection to Brooke came from their mutual enthusiasm for 
ornithology.125 
  “Kit” Woolner of 8 Brigade graduated from Staff College in 1927 
and would have been present when Brooke was on the Directing Staff. 
He made little impression on either his divisional or Corps commanders 
                                                          
123 The 5th Division, originally commanded by Maj. Gen. HE Franklyn, had only two 
infantry Brigades during the Battle of France, whereas 3rd and 4th Divisions had the 
standard three. Joslen (1960), pp. 43, 45 & 47. 
124 Except for a fact finding mission to the Far East in the summer of 1945; Danchev 
& Todman (2001), p. 719. 
125 Danchev & Todman (2001), p. 683. 
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in France and thereafter, despite having been a highly decorated 
Sapper in the First World War and both an instructor at Woolwich in 
the 1920s and Deputy Commandant of the School of Military 
Engineering in 1939.126 Most of the rest of his war was spent in West 
Africa, as a District and Divisional commander.  
William Robb, of 9 Brigade, who on his return from France spent 
nine months as Commandant of the Senior Officers’ School at 
Sheerness, then commanded the defences of South Wales for two 
years as a Temporary Major General before being reconnected with his 
senior commander in France, Lord Gort, as commander of the Malta 
Garrison from 1943-45 when the latter served as Governor. He was 
not a Staff College graduate and did not attract much attention from 
Brooke or Montgomery. 
Although Major General Dudley Johnson, GOC 4th Division, was a 
highly decorated veteran of the First World War127 and had held a 
brigade command in India between the wars, he was quickly replaced 
and side-lined after the fall of France.128 He was briefly commander at 
Aldershot and the last Inspector of Infantry before the post was 
abolished and redesignated as Director of Infantry in 1944. His 
influence on the progress of his brigadiers was therefore limited. 
                                                          
126 HYAL January 1940, p. 114. 
127 He held the Victoria Cross, two DSOs and a Military Cross. 
128 Brooke had wished to replace him, fearful that his health would not withstand 
combat operations, but the German assault came before he could do so. French 
(2002), p. 145. 
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However, his three subordinates, Evelyn Barker (10 Brigade), Kenneth 
Anderson (11 Brigade) John Hawkesworth (12 Brigade) would all 
progress to the rank of Lieutenant General during the course of the 
war. All were direct Staff College contemporaries taught by 
Montgomery. Anderson and Hawkesworth would serve in North Africa 
and the Middle East, but Anderson, commanding 1st Army in Tunisia, 
was not favoured by Montgomery, who considered him over promoted, 
unsuitable for Army command and “a divisional commander at 
best”.129 Although such criticism was typical of Montgomery, being 
pointed, direct and more than unfair, it influenced Brooke. He removed 
Anderson from command of Second Army, to which he had been 
appointed on return from Tunisia, in favour of Dempsey. This was a 
choice more palatable to Montgomery, even though his own preference 
had been to bring Oliver Leese back from the Mediterranean, where he 
had been commanding XXX Corps.  
Barker spent most of the period from 1940-1944 in the UK 
training troops, but was picked by Montgomery for Operation Overlord, 
to command 49th Division. Hawkesworth was described as “a master of 
infantry tactics” in Tunisia and Italy,130 but remained in the 
Mediterranean for the remainder of the war.131 Barker performed 
solidly enough to replace O’ Connor as commander of VIII Corps in 
                                                          
129 Montgomery to Alexander, quoted in Mead (2007), p. 51. 
130 Blaxland, G. “Alexander’s Generals” (London, William Kimber, 1979) p. 228. 
131 Recalled home on grounds of ill-health, he died of a heart attack on the troopship 
home at Gibraltar in May 1945. Smart (2005), p. 145. 
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North West Europe from among a more experienced field and 
established a reputation as a popular commander with a keen eye for 
physical fitness in his men.  
The brigadiers of 5th Division, initially commanded by Harold 
Franklyn, were Miles Dempsey and “Monty” Stopford. Neither were 
taught by Montgomery or Brooke (graduating from Camberley in 1930 
and 1924, before Brooke’s arrival - respectively). As Franklyn, despite 
a creditable performance in France, especially during the Arras 
Counter-attack on 21 May, was restricted to home commands on 
grounds of his age, his influence over previous subordinates was, 
again, of limited value to them. Dempsey, however, was marked out 
by Montgomery for command who “demanded” him for XIII Corps in 
Eighth Army.132 As noted above, while Dempsey was not 
Montgomery’s first pick to command British Second Army, he was a 
candidate acceptable to both Brooke and Montgomery, even if, by the 
end of the war the former felt Dempsey to have “a swollen head”.133 
His fellow brigade commander, Stopford, handled his brigade 
well in France, particularly on the Ypres-Comines Canal Line. On his 
return to England, he served as GOC 56th Division. This was a 
formation which proved a launchpad to high command as Douglas 
Graham, Gerald Templer and Lewis Lyne also commanded it between 
                                                          
132 Danchev and Todman (2001), p. 323. 
133 Danchev and Todman (2001), p. 702. 
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1941-1943.134 Stopford also survived Montgomery’s ruthless weeding 
of XII Corps in 1940-1941 and may have impressed him; in early 1941 
he was appointed Commandant of the Staff College, charged with 
consolidating the lessons learned from operations into the truncated 
wartime course. After a brief return to the desert, from 1943 Stopford 
saw out the war in the Far East, effectively and successfully fighting 
the Japanese. 
The only Brigadier from Giffard Martel’s 50th Division to progress 
was William Ramsden. Despite divisional (50th) and corps command 
(XXXth) in the Western Desert, he was an infantryman and had little 
further connection to his former commander, a pioneer in armoured 
warfare. Martel spent much of the war thereafter as Director, Royal 
Armoured Corps and later as the Head of the Military Mission to the 
Soviet Union. Martel and Ramsden did not cross paths directly again. 
Ramsden, who did not attend Staff College, fell foul of Montgomery in 
the autumn of 1942 on the latter’s assumption of command of Eighth 
Army, and was described as “a dull… pedestrian infantryman…who 
inspired none of us.”135 Rapidly posted to command of the Sudan area, 
he saw out the war there.  
Although there were plans to for a III Corps to be formed in 
France, under the command of Sir Ronald Adam (later the Adjutant 
                                                          
134 Joslen (1960), Vol.1, p. 37. 
135 Carver, RMP “Out of Step: Memoirs of a Field Marshal” (London, Hutchison 1989) 
p.70. 
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General and a close comrade and confidant of Brooke), the offensive in 
the West shifted its role towards the maintenance of the defensive 
perimeter around Dunkirk and the safe gathering in of retreating units 
and troops. Purely on paper, the senior Divisional commander within 
the Corps, William Holmes (42nd Division), looks to be a future 
prospect for supporting the advancement of his subordinates from 
France.  He was the youngest Divisional commander in France at 48; 
he was first to be promoted Lieutenant General on his return and was 
given a Corps command. However, poor performance in the Western 
Desert under Ritchie and Auchinleck during the retreat to Egypt in the 
spring of 1942 led to his removal and side-lining.  
Two of Adam’s brigadiers advanced after 1940; Eric Miles (126 
Brigade) and “Jackie” Smyth (127 Brigade). Miles, a graduate of 
Camberley in 1922 and the IDC in 1934, being taught there by Brooke, 
later succeeded to command of 42nd Division and thence to 56th 
Division, commanding both in the Middle East and Tunisia. Being 
wounded in the later stages of the Tunisian campaign led to his 
evacuation home. Smyth, despite having been an instructor at 
Camberley from 1931-34 and a VC, was from an Indian Army 
background and was returned to India in 1941 to a divisional 
command. However, ill-health – which he sought to conceal – during 
the retreat in Burma in February 1942 led to a poor command decision 
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at the Sittang Bridge 136 which destroyed his command and hastened 
the Japanese advance on Rangoon. He was hospitalised and medically 
retired in late 1942. 
Edward “Sigs” Osborne of 44th Division had made a bad 
impression on Brooke in France as he had “grown very fat”.137 
Although he was promoted to Corps command back in the UK, 
spending 1940-41 on anti-invasion planning and training. While there, 
Osborne had a severe personality clash with Charles Hudson VC, 
commanding one of his divisions, leading to the latter’s dismissal and 
demotion. (See p.229) Brooke’s occasional visits to Osborne’s area 
(including a visit to 46th Division, by then commanded by Miles 
Dempsey, but showing in Brooke’s words “positive hallmarks” of 
Kenneth Anderson, his predecessor)138 left him determined to remove 
Osborne, among others, in, as he wrote in his diary after the event “a 
pretty drastic clearing which ought to make way for younger material” 
in November 1941.139 Osborne, who was 56, retired at the same time.  
Two of Osborne’s 1940 brigadiers advanced. “Jack” Utterson-
Kelso (131 Brigade), despite his being a highly decorated (two DSOs, 
two MCs, five MiDs and five wounds) First World War veteran, was not 
                                                          
136 Smyth ordered the bridge demolished prematurely which trapped the majority of 
his Division on the wrong side of the river. Although Slim took a sympathetic view of 
the decision in Defeat Into Victory (London, Cassell, 1956), p. 17, stating that it was 
easy to criticise the decision but hard to make it, he stopped short of endorsing 
Smyth’s actions. 
137 Danchev and Todman (2001), p. 58. 
138 Danchev and Todman (2001), p. 167. 
139 Danchev and Todman (2001), p. 197. 
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a Staff College graduate. Notwithstanding a key role in advancing 
modern training by being the first Divisional commander to incorporate 
a Battle School in 1941, he did not advance past Major General. This 
was despite impressing Bernard Paget, when he was GOC Home 
Forces, sufficiently to have him appointed “Major General, Infantry” 
and to establish the GHQ Battle School. Thereafter he only 
commanded training divisions at home. James “Daddy” Steele (132 
Brigade) was an Ulsterman who had added a DSO for Dunkirk to his 
First World War MC. Having spent much of the inter-war period in staff 
appointments, after France he served in senior staff appointments in 
the Middle East, before becoming Director of Staff Duties at the War 
Office from 1943-45. For such a capable staff officer (he would become 
Adjutant General in 1947 and retired as a full General), he barely 
features in either Montgomery’s or Brooke’s diaries and memoirs and 
does not appear to have benefitted from patronage.  
Major General Roger Evans’ ill-starred command of the 1st 
Armoured Division in France led to his rapid removal before the end of 
1940. He took the move with bad grace; this further reduced his 
currency in Brooke’s estimation, who had formed a poor opinion of him 
as “depressing” and “not cutting much ice…no—one listens to him…” as 
early as January 1940.140 He was quickly side-lined to command of 
Aldershot, which was a regular resort for those Brooke wished to 
                                                          
140 Danchev and Todman (2001) p. 101. 
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remove, and retirement. Hence, his standing as a patron would not be 
of much value.  
Nonetheless, all Evans’ brigadiers advanced to senior, significant 
command, Lieutenant General’s rank and eminence. “Dick” McCreery 
(2 Armoured Bde) was a pupil of Montgomery at Camberley in 1928-
29, but his career after France would be guided more by impressing 
both Brooke, through his being a cavalryman who embraced 
mechanisation and, above all, Alexander. Brooke’s diaries make 
frequent favourable comment on him during the Middle East campaign, 
especially in the difficult period in late 1942 after Auchinleck’s 
dismissal. Montgomery, however, was less supportive, considering 
McCreery “out of touch…with the practical side of battle”.141 John 
Crocker (3 Armd Brigade) graduated from Quetta before Montgomery’s 
arrival there, but despite a torrid experience in France, he had come to 
the attention of both Brooke and Alexander and continued to impress 
them in the Middle East. Despite a reputation for taciturnity and 
occasional temper, his ability impressed the critical triumvirate of 
Brooke, Montgomery and Alexander.  
Frederick Morgan (1 Armoured Support Group) had not 
encountered Montgomery or Brooke prior to the war, having served in 
staff appointments in India. In France, the cheeseparing of his 
innovative formation, a mix of artillery, infantry, engineers and other 
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support arms to make up deficiencies elsewhere made it impossible for 
him to function in a coherent command. This was a trend – 
commanding under-resourced formations - which followed him until his 
appointment in 1943 as head of the Chief of Staff Supreme Allied 
Commander (COSSAC) organisation, in charge of planning the Allied 
invasion of France. However, the antipathy towards the organisation 
coming from both Brooke and Montgomery placed Morgan in an 
unenviable position, in a post Brooke considered no real job and that 
others, Montgomery pre-eminent among them, felt too inclined 
towards the Americans. Montgomery spared no effort to discredit 
Morgan to colleagues. Brooke’s diary entries – which are few on the 
matter – are universally dismissive of Morgan and his difficulties. 
Under these conditions, patronage from these seniors can be 
considered non-existent.  
James Drew, GOC 52nd Lowland Division, was one of the oldest 
Divisional commanders in France at 57 (even though his command’s 
stay in France was short and piecemeal, covering the withdrawal of the 
“2nd BEF” from Cherbourg in June 1940). It was unsurprising that he 
was removed quickly from divisional command and thereafter was 
director of training for Combined Operations from 1941-44. As a 
member of the first post-war Staff College course in 1919, he did not 
interact directly with Brooke or Montgomery and did not particularly 
impress the former with his training methods at Combined Operations 
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at first, who thought them “too stereotypical”.142 The only Brigadier 
from Drew’s division to advance was Sir John Laurie (157 Brigade) a 
Baronet, whose only remarkable contribution to the war effort was to 
leapfrog his former commander and become Commandant of the 
Combined Operations Training Centre in 1941. Neither could be 
described as benefitting from patronage from a senior officer.  
TABLE 4.10 “THE COAT TAILS EFFECT” 
DIVISIONAL COMMANDERS IN FRANCE AND ADVANCING BRIGADIERS 
I CORPS Lieutenant-General M. G. H. Barker 
2nd Division  Major-General H. C. Loyd (to 16th May) 
  Brigadier F. H. N. Davidson (16-20 May)   
Major-General N. M. S. Irwin (from 20th May) 
4th Brigade Brigadier E. G. Warren 
5th Brigade Brigadier G. I. Gartlan 
6th Brigade Brigadier N. M. S. Irwin (to 20th May) 
  Brigadier D. W. Furlong (from 20th May) 
48th Division Major-General A. F. A. N. Thorne 
143rd Brigade Brigadier J. Muirhead 
144th Brigade Brigadier J. M. Hamilton 
145th Brigade Brigadier A. C. Hughes (to 15th May) 
  Brigadier The Hon. N. F. Somerset (from 15 May)   
II CORPS Lieutenant-General A. F. Brooke 
3rd Division  Major-General B. L. Montgomery 
7th Guards 
Brigade 
Brigadier J. A. C. Whitaker 
8th Brigade Brigadier C. G. Woolner 
9th Brigade Brigadier W. Robb 
4th Division  Major-General D. G. Johnson 
10th Brigade Brigadier E. H. Barker 
11th Brigade Brigadier K. A. N. Anderson 
12th Brigade Brigadier J. L. I. Hawkesworth 
5th Division  Major-General H. E. Franklyn 
13th Brigade Brigadier M. C. Dempsey 
17th Brigade Brigadier M. G. N. Stopford   
50th Division Major-General G. le Q. Martel 
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150th Brigade Brigadier C. W. Haydon 
151st Brigade Brigadier J. A. Churchill 
25th Brigade Brigadier W. H. C. Ramsden 
III CORPS Lieutenant-General Sir R. F. Adam, Bt. 
42nd Division Major-General W. G. Holmes 
125th Brigade Brigadier G. W. Sutton 
126th Brigade Brigadier E. G. Miles 
127th Brigade Brigadier J. G. Smyth 
44th Division Major-General E. A. Osborne 
131st Brigade Brigadier J. E. Utterson-Kelso 
132nd Brigade Brigadier J. S. Steele 
133rd Brigade Brigadier N. I. Whitty 
12th Division  Major-General R. L. Petre 
35th Brigade Lieutenant-Colonel A. F. F. Young (10th–12 May) 
  Brigadier V. L. de Cordova (from 13th May) 
36th Brigade Brigadier G. R. P. Roupell 
37th Brigade Brigadier R. J. P. Wyatt 
23rd Division Major-General A. E. Herbert 
69th Brigade Brigadier The Viscount Downe 
70th Brigade Brigadier P. Kirkup 
46th Division Major-General H. O. Curtis 
137th Brigade Brigadier J. B. Gawthorpe 
138th Brigade Brigadier E. J. Ginling 
139th Brigade Brigadier H. A. F. Crewdson (to 22nd May) 
  Brigadier R. C. Chichester-Constable (from 22 May) 
51st Division Major-General V. M. Fortune 
152nd Brigade Brigadier H. M. V. Stewart 
153rd Brigade Brigadier G. T. Burney 
154th Brigade Brigadier A. C. L. Stanley-Clarke   
1st Armoured 
Division 
Major-General R. Evans 
2nd Armoured 
Brigade 
Brigadier R. L. McCreery 
3rd Armoured 
Brigade 
Brigadier J. H. Crocker 
1st Support 
Group 
Brigadier F. E. Morgan 
  
52nd Division Major-General J. S. Drew 
155th Brigade Brigadier T. Grainger-Stewart 
156th Brigade Brigadier J. S. N. Fitzgerald 
157th Brigade Brigadier Sir J. E. Laurie, Bt. 
(Names highlighted in bold are those officers who advanced in the course of the war) 
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Of the original group of one hundred and fifty-six officers who were 
serving as brigadiers in 1940, fifty-eight of them were promoted to the 
rank of Major General or above, over a third of the group. Whilst a 
minority of the whole, this is still a considerable proportion when not 
all officers could expect to advance to such a rank. This also disproves 
any contention that service in France or Norway at this level of 
command (or responsibility in the case of staff appointments) was 
definitively detrimental to the promotion prospects of these officers. 
Twenty-one officers would be further promoted to Lieutenant General, 
over a third of the group of officers promoted, and whilst this 
represents less than one in seven of the whole France and Norway 
group, it further reinforces the idea that service in France or Norway 
was not automatically career limiting.  
The dominance of the public schools in producing army officers 
was sustained among this group, with fifty-four of the fifty-eight being 
products of the public schools. When the number of schools producing 
more than one officer who was advanced to Major General is taken 
further into account, a smaller group of certain public schools retains 
its dominance in the production of successful officers. with the seven 
“great” schools of the Clarendon Group generating 48% of the list, 
although some other schools with traditionally strong army 
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connections, such as Lancing, having 100% success (even if it only 
produced two Generals).  
Although direct contemporaneousness at school among the fifty- 
eight was limited at only six, the number of connections broaden 
significantly when close – arriving within a year - or near – arriving 
within two years - attendance at schools is considered, involving 
fourteen of the eighteen schools in the group which produced General 
officers from brigadiers in this 1940 group. Only four schools had no 
contemporary pupil networks. 
Although the infantry dominates in the group, with thirty-one of 
the fifty-eight officers being from county or line regiments at first 
commissioning, no particular single regiment predominates in the list 
of officers successful in gaining promotion. Although all three Guards 
officers from the 1940 group reaching Major General were from the 
Coldstream Guards on balance this is more likely to be coincidence 
than design. If there is a “regimental group”, it could be argued that 
this was from the Royal Tank Corps/Regiment, as four officers who 
progressed would transfer to it from their original regiments or corps 
in the inter-war period.  
Regarding previous war or active service, the majority of the 
fifty-eight were veterans of the Western Front, with only four officers 
spending all of the First World War away from this theatre. This 
indicates the significance of the Western Front, as the primary theatre, 
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as a route of experience towards promotion for officers in the post war 
period. Some secondary theatres produced groupings of officers with 
common experience, such as Gallipoli and Egypt, where five officers’ 
service overlapped in various periods from 1915-1917, creating a 
group with common experience and knowledge. However, the largest 
single group was of those officers who served in India on operations 
between 1919-1937, with twelve. This demonstrates the 
predominance of India as the main inter-war theatre in which to gain 
operational experience in the group. Other areas, such as Iraq or 
Persia, did not generate connected networks of officers.  
Attendance at Staff College, either at Camberley or Quetta, 
retained its significance as a route both to promotion and as a 
generator of networks between officers. Forty of the fifty-eight – over 
two thirds – were graduates of Staff College. Camberley, with thirty- 
six, was dominant. With no officers from the group graduating before 
1922 or after 1932, the core years for developing groups of 
contemporaries were from 1924-1928, when twenty-five of the group 
passed through Camberley and generated overlapping contemporary 
networks. Quetta was less significant in generating networks, firstly 
due to the low number of graduates from it, four, and the space 
between attendance. All nine of the officers in the whole 1940 group 
who attended the Imperial Defence College between 1933-1939 were 
promoted to Major General or above; six of them were contemporaries 
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at the college with two each in 1933-1935, producing further close 
networks.  
The possession of an award for gallantry or distinguished 
service, be it in the First World War, inter-war campaigns or indeed for 
service in 1940, does appear to have had some impact on whether an 
officer was advanced between the wars or after 1940. Over three-
quarters of the officers in the 1940 group had one or more decorations 
prior to 1939; seventy-three officers in the overall group received 
distinctions and/or decorations for service in France or Norway, 
receiving a total of eighty-two awards (when multiple awards to 
individuals are accounted for). Although the group of officers who did 
not progress gained more awards (forty-four to thirty-eight), the 
officers promoted generally received higher awards; seven out of eight 
officers who received the Companion of the Order of the Bath for 1940 
would be promoted; six of the ten first awards of the Distinguished 
Service Order, an award for gallantry or leadership were to officers 
who were promoted.  
Networks among the advancing group can therefore be found 
based on certain schools, successful, overlapping attendance at Staff 
College and the Imperial Defence College, and commonality of 
operational service away from the Western Front and in India. Receipt 
of decorations or distinctions, whilst not a “network” can also be 
argued to have been a promotion enhancing factor in comparison with 
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those who did not receive them or received recognition of lower grade 
(such as an MID alone).  
Existence of patronage networks among those promoted is 
present, but not completely obvious. The single most significant figure 
is Brooke, as on paper all the brigadiers in his Corps progressed to 
Major General, and above after 1940, even if few of the Divisional 
commanders in II Corps (with the signal exception of Montgomery) 
advanced themselves or were put aside into less significant 
commands. Being taught by Brooke or Montgomery, and more 
particularly the former, was an influence in a number of cases, but not 
to the extent that it was a critically decisive factor in an officer’s 
promotion. Also, Brooke’s favour was not permanent; results mattered 
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In the Battle of Normandy 
 
When pressure mounts and strain increases everyone begins to show 
the weaknesses in his makeup. It is up to the Commander to conceal 
his: above all to conceal doubt, fear, and distrust. 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander,  
in a letter to his wife. 30 December 1942 
Quoted in Ambrose “Letters to Mamie”1 
 
By the spring of 1944, with the invasion of the European continent 
imminent, the British Army had been at war for four and a half years. 
Having recently defeated the Axis powers in the Middle East, and 
despite ongoing operations in the Mediterranean, there was a larger 
pool of officers with recent combat experience from which to draw for 
senior command postings than existed in 1939-1940. This chapter 
applies the methodology employed with the brigadiers of 1940 to 
brigadiers who were serving on D-Day, 6 June 1944 and in the initial 
stages of the Battle of Normandy in June and July. The aim is to make 
comparisons between the careers of this latter group serving in British 
Second Army in 1944 and those in the primary group, the 1940 British 
Expeditionary Force and North West Expeditionary Force.  
From this point, the intention is to determine any changes in the 
patterns of recruitment, education, promotion and service between 
                                                          
1 Eisenhower, J. (ed.) (1978) “Letters to Mamie” (New York, Doubleday) quoted in S. 
Ambrose (1992 revised ed.) “Eisenhower: Soldier and President” (New York, Simon & 
Schuster), p. 88. 
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officers serving in the initial period of the Second World War and the 
beginning of the campaign in North West Europe. This will compare 
whether the army of 1944 showed patterns of networking comparable 
to or different from those of 1940 and to highlight any changes in 
between those dates, whether or not they may have come into effect 
due to the experience of war. 
This chapter seeks to examine and test a number of 
assumptions, assembled by this author which arose from the 
examination of the earlier group, for purposes of comparison. Firstly, 
that the average age of the Normandy group would be lower, and 
therefore younger, than its 1940 counterpart. Second, that previous 
battle experience between 1939 and 1944 would have contributed to 
accelerated promotion at an earlier age and whether possession of 
gallantry decorations and other honours also contributed to this 
process of appointment. Third, that a Staff College qualification was 
still a prerequisite, or advantageous, in advancement to brigade 
command. Fourth, that schools attended, regiments served in and 
previous active service created networks, as with and in comparison, 
to, the 1940 group and whether conditions existing in 1939-1940, 
such as no officer who were Territorials at the outbreak of war holding 
a field command at this level were still applicable.  
Due to the size of British Second Army in June 1944 the 
selection of officers to those holding fighting commands, namely 
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infantry, armoured, Commando and Airborne brigades and 
independent brigade groups, brigadiers in staff positions, such as BGS’ 
at Divisional level and above or specialists in role, such as brigadiers, 
Royal Artillery (BRA) and medical officers (among others) have been 
omitted in this case for reasons of space; a full examination of all the 
officers holding field commands and staff appointments at Brigadier 
level merits a separate thesis of its own. The selection is restricted, to 
the divisions of British Second Army and officers who replaced 
brigadiers in France by the end of June 1944 only. There are forty-five 
officers in the group.2  
In 1939-1940, to recapitulate, officers serving in a Brigadier’s 
appointment were predominantly pre-war, Regular Army officers with 
First World War service.3 Of the thirty-two brigadiers serving in non-
combat staff roles at GHQ BEF in 1940, nine were officers aged 55 or 
older recalled from retirement to fill skill gaps in specialist roles. (Two 
of them were aged over 60).4 In some fighting Brigades, Regular Army 
officers replaced Territorial Army officers commanding Territorial Army 
                                                          
2 The Brigadier commanding 4th (Special Service) Brigade, Brigadier Bernard “Jumbo” 
Leicester, had originally been commissioned into the Royal Marines and his Brigade 
was made up of Royal Marine Commando units; due to the Royal Marines being 
under the control of the Royal Navy, he is not considered further in this chapter.  
3 Of the 154 officers in the 1940 group, 122 of them (79.2%) had received at least 
one decoration for gallantry or distinguished service between 1914 and 1919; two 
brigadiers in 1940 were too young to have served in the First World War (q.v. Downe 
and Young) and one, though old enough in 1918, did not serve overseas (Nicholson) 
making lack of First World War service an exception.  
4 Brigadier Gervase Thorpe. Base Commandant Cherbourg, 63 in May 1940 and 
Brigadier The Honourable Hubert Clementi-Smith, the Signal Officer in Chief, who 
was 61.  
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brigade equivalents due, in a few proven specific cases, to a prejudice 
against the latter by the former when in command of Territorial Army 
divisions. (No Territorial Army divisions in France or Norway in 1940 
were commanded by officers whose careers had been in the Territorial 
Army; all divisional commanders were Regular Army officers).  
By 1944, twenty-five of the brigadiers, over half, had not seen 
active service in the First World War, almost entirely for having been 
too young to see active service in that war.5 Additionally, three officers 
in the Normandy group came from a pre-war Territorial Army 
background and had not served in the Regular Army.6 Two of these 
officers had commanded Territorial battalions and other formations, 
usually Brigades, in North Africa, Tunisia and Italy. This suggests that 
the prejudice towards Territorial officers holding operational command 
above battalion level had, in part. been overcome by mid-1944. By 
this point, with more opportunities for active service, and the 
expansion of the army providing a greater supply of new officers to fill 
junior posts, brigadiers in general had more experience both of battle 
and of command of troops either in training, on active service or both.  
Although as originally constituted 21st Army Group was made up 
of subordinate units which had seen little or no active service since 
                                                          
5 Eight of the group, born in 1899-1900, would have been old enough to serve 
overseas, but did not; Gwatkin, the first of the Normandy group to serve, was 
commissioned into the Coldstream Guards in December 1918. 
6 Colin Barber, OC 46 Bde in 15 Div, who later transferred to the Regular Army; 
James Oliver, OC 154 Bde in 51 Div and “Ronnie” Senior, OC 151 Bde in 50 Div.  
POINT OF FAILURE 





1940, Montgomery was fully aware that he needed to leaven the 
untried with the experienced and pressed the higher command both 
for the recall of battle-hardened divisions from the Mediterranean 
(50th, 51st Highland and 7th Armoured) and appointment of his 
preferred officers in key roles. For example, he wanted Oliver Leese 
and Miles Dempsey to command 2nd British and 1st Canadian Armies 
respectively, regardless of any previous selections and Allied 
sensitivities.7 (Both Leese and Dempsey had served as brigadiers in 
the BEF).8 He “lost little time”9 in replacing those individual officers he 
deemed either too inexperienced or experienced but in his view 
incompetent, even as far down as Brigade Majors, with veterans of the 
desert and Mediterranean. His choices were not universally accepted, 
especially by Brooke as CIGS and not all of them would prove 
successful in post (which, in fairness, Montgomery would later concede 
in part, especially over the appointments of Bucknall to XXX Corps and 
retaining Erskine at 7th Armoured).10  
Not all Brigade commanders landing in France had any combat 
experience prior to the Second World War. As noted above, over half 
                                                          
7 See French, D. (2003) “Invading Europe: The British Army and its preparations for 
the Normandy Campaign, 1942-44” in Goldstein, E. and McKercher, B. J. C. (2003) 
“Power and Stability: British Foreign Policy 1865-1965” (London, Cass), pp. 271-94. 
8 Leese had originally gone to France to take up the post of BGS III Corps under 
Adam but served at GHQ BEF when that Corps was diverted to establish and sustain 
the Dunkirk perimeter. Dempsey commanded 13 Bde in Franklyn’s 5th Division 
(Joslen (1960) Vol.1, p. 251. 
9 French (2003) in Goldstein and McKercher, p. 287. 
10 French (2003) in Goldstein and McKercher, p. 288. 
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had not served in the First World War and for most, their inter-war 
active service was predominantly on imperial policing duties, if at all. 
The latter included operations on the North-West Frontier of India or 
pacifying risings in the Near and Middle East. Although service 
overseas away from the regiment in the inter-war period provided 
opportunities to broaden experience, it does not appear to have been 
of a particular advantage for progression. Eight officers served on 
campaign in India at various points in the 1920s and 1930s; four 
served in staff positions there, three of whom did not see fighting.11 
Three officers served on attachment in Africa, but also saw no action. 
Three officers in the group served during the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 
1936-39.12 It cannot be asserted that active service overseas from 
1919-1939 was therefore a major contributor to advancement by 
1944. 
The initial tables below indicate, first, the initial assault divisions 
and their subordinate brigades and second, those formations which 
followed up to the end of June 1944. These tables show the arrival 
dates of the units, the ages of their commanders and whether 
                                                          
11 Cass, OC 8 Bde, 3 Div was Chief Instructor at the Small Arms School (India) from 
1935-39; Ekins, OC 131 (Inf) Bde, 7 Armd Div, served at GHQ India 1936-38 and as 
a Bde Maj in the Indian Army, 1938-39; Mole OC 129 Bde, 43 Div served briefly with 
the Royal West African Frontier Force before spending 1923-33 in staff appointments 
in India. Stanley Jones, OC 158 Bde in 53 Div, spent most of the 1920s in India, but 
saw active service twice before 1925.  
12 Elrington, OC 177 Bde of 59 Div; Johnson, OC 32 Gds Bde of Gds Armd and 
Mackintosh-Walker, OC 227 Bde of 15 Div. Elrington received a DSO for his service in 
Palestine, a rare distinction (London Gazette, 22 December 1939), p. 8529. 
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individuals were public school educated and/or graduates of the Staff 
College, and the percentage of officers in the latter two categories in 
the divisions on landing.   
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13 In both tables, Officers attaining the p.s.c. qualification from Camberley or Quetta 
prior to 1944 (Based on the April 1944 Army List) “Staff Qualified” only – indicated 
by s. next to an officer’s name in the Army List – is excluded.  
14 Attached to 50th (Northumbrian) Division for the landings; Joslen (1960) Vol.1, p. 
196. 
TABLE 5.1 NORMANDY: 
DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES 
DIVISION ARRIVED ON D-DAY 





3rd Division   75% 50% 
Maj Gen T.G. Rennie  44 Y Y 
8 Bde E.E. Cass 6 June 46 Y N 
9 Bde J.C. Cunningham 6 June 50 Y N 
185 Bde E.P. Smith 6 June 45 unk Y 
50th (Northumbrian) Division 6 June  100% 50% 
Maj Gen D.A.H Graham  51 Y Y 
69 Bde F.Y.C. Knox 6 June 45 Y Y 
151 Bde R.H. Senior 6 June 39 Y N 
231 Bde A.G.B. Stanier Bt. 6 June 45 Y N 
7th Armoured Division   66% 66% 
Maj Gen G. Erskine 6 June 44 Y Y 
22 Armd W.R.N. Hinde 7 June 43 Y N 
131 Bde M.S. Ekins 8 June 45 N Y 
51st (Highland) Division 6 June 
(Part) 
 25% 75% 
Maj Gen D.C. Bullen-Smith  45 unk Y 
152 Bde D.H. Haugh 8 June 46 unk Y 
153 Bde H. Murray 7 June 41 N Y 
154 Bde J.A. Oliver 10 June 38 Y N 
6th (Airborne) Division 6 June  100% 50% 
Maj Gen R.M. Gale  47 Y Y 
3 Para  J. Hill 6 June 33 Y N 
4 Para N. Poett 6 June 36 Y Y 
6 Airland Hon. H. Kindersley 6 June 45 Y N 
79th (Armoured) Division 6 June  100% 100% 
Maj Gen P.C.S. Hobart  59 Y Y 
30 Armd Bde N.W. Duncan 22 June 44 Y Y 
Independent Brigades   75% 50% 
1 Sp Svc Bde Lord Lovat 6 June 32 Y N 
8 Armd B. Cracroft 6 June 38 Y Y 
27 Armd  G.E. Prior-Palmer 6 June 41 Y N 
56 Bde14 E.C. Pepper 6 June 44 unk Y 
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TABLE 5.2 NORMANDY:  
DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES  
FOLLOW-ON DIVISIONS TO END JUNE 





49th (West Riding) Division 13 June  100% 25% 
Maj Gen E.H. Barker  49 Y Y 
146 Bde A. Dunlop 10 June 37 Y N 
147 Bde E.R. Mahony 12 June 45 Y N 
70 Bde E.C. Cooke-Collis 14 June 41 Y N 
11th Armoured Division 13 June  100% 0% 
Maj Gen G.P.B. Roberts  37 Y N 
29 Armd C.B.C.R. Harvey 15 June 43 Y N 
159 Bde J.G. Sandie 15 June 46 Y N 
15th (Scottish) Division 14 June  100% 50% 
Maj Gen G.H.A. 
Macmillan 
 46 Y Y 
44 Bde H.D.K Money 17 June 47 Y N 
46 Bde C.M. Barber 17 June 46 Y Y 
227 Bde J.R. Mackintosh-
Walker 
18 June 46 Y N 
43rd (Wessex) Division  24 June  75% 50% 
Maj Gen G.I. Thomas  50 Y Y 
129 Bde G.H.L. Mole 24 June 47 Y N 
130 Bde N.D. Leslie 24 June 34 Y N 
214 Bde H. Essame 24 June 47 N Y 
53rd (Welsh) Division 27 June  75% 50% 
Maj Gen R.H.K. Ross  51 Y N 
71 Bde V. Blomfield 25 June 45 Y Y 
158 Bde S.O. Jones 23 June 48 Unk Y 
160 Bde L.G. Whistler 28 June 45 Y N 
59th (Staffordshire) Division 27 June  75% 50% 
Maj Gen L.O. Lyne  45 Y Y 
176 Bde R.W.H Fryer 29 June 44 Y N 
177 Bde M.S. Ekins 27 June 45 N Y 
197 Bde J. Lingham 29 June 46 Y N 
Guards Armoured Division 28 June  100% 33% 
Maj Gen A.H.S. Adair  46 Y N 
5 Gds Armd N.W. Gwatkin 30 June 44 Y N 
32 Gds G.F. Johnson 25 June 41 Y Y 
 
The divisions earmarked to lead the invasion of Europe on the 
two British landing beaches, Sword and Gold, were a mixture of the 
veteran and the inexperienced, a trend which continued as the follow-
on divisions arrived throughout June. The records of their commanders 
also reflected this. The assault division on Sword, 3rd Division, 
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commanded by Major General Tom Rennie, was a Regular Army 
formation but had seen no active service since Dunkirk. Rennie had 
escaped from German captivity shortly after 51st (Highland) Division’s 
surrender at St Valery in June 1940; after a staff appointment and 
battalion command at El Alamein, he commanded 154 Bde of 51st 
(Highland) Division during the invasion of Sicily where he was 
wounded and impressed Montgomery with his abilities. Its counterpart 
on Gold Beach, 50th (Northumbrian) Division, still notionally a 
Territorial Army formation, had been constantly on operations in 
France, the Middle East and the Mediterranean since the outbreak of 
war.  
Rennie’s brigade commanders in 3rd Division also had a mixture 
of active service up to this point. Edward “Copper” Cass, in command 
of the initial assault brigade, 8th, was a very experienced officer. In 
1936, he was also the officer Champion Shot of the Army.15 A multiple 
gallantry recipient in the First World War16 he received a Bar to the 
DSO for command of his battalion, 1st Bn the King’s Own Yorkshire 
Light Infantry (1/KOYLI), in Norway in 1940.17 His service in Tunisia 
and Sicily, commanding 11 Brigade of 78th Division, added a CBE and 
                                                          
15 Dix, Noonan, Webb (Auctioneers) Orders, Medals and Decorations Sale 25th March 
2014; Lot 1106 “Orders, Medals and Decorations of Brigadier EEE Cass” Catalogue 
notes. 
16 DSO, MC and Mentioned in Dispatches. 
17 1/KOYLI was part of 15 Brigade in SICKLEFORCE, under Maj. Gen. Bernard Paget; 
Cass served alongside Arthur Kent-Lemon, then commanding 1/Y&L in Norway, 
before taking command of the Brigade when Herbert Smyth was wounded; Kent-
Lemon was the only senior officer to serve both there and in France in 1940. 
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an American Silver Star, the latter showing that he was an 
experienced field commander capable of operating successfully with 
allies. The follow-on brigade, 9th, was under the command of James 
“Jim” Cunningham, who, apart from eighteen months in command of 
the Shetland Defences earlier in the war and of his D-Day brigade from 
1942, had no notable combat experience in the war to this point. He 
had spent much of the inter-war period on the North West Frontier of 
India. The final Brigadier, 185 Brigade’s Kenneth Smith18 had had an 
exotic inter-war career in parts of Russia during the intervention there 
in 1919, in Africa and India. He had also been “effectively dismissed” 
by Montgomery from command of an infantry brigade on Malta during 
the siege there in 1941-42.19 Rennie and Smith were Staff College 
graduates, Rennie from Camberley in 1934, Smith from Quetta in 
1935. All four were public school alumni; Rennie from Loretto, Cass 
from St. Bees, Cunningham from Malvern and Smith from Eton. On D-
Day, Rennie was 44, Cass 46, Cunningham 50 and Smith was 45, a 
rare case of the Divisional commander being younger than his 
subordinate brigadiers.  
                                                          
18 He styled himself “Pearce-Smith” in documents and his later autobiography 
“Adventures of an Ancient Warrior in War, Peace and Revolution” (Milford on Sea, 
Stone’s Printers, 1984) but the Army List lists him simply as “KP Smith”. 
19 See Pearce-Smith (1984), p. 94 and Stewart, A. (2014) “Caen Controversy: The 
Battle for Sword Beach” (Solihull, Helion Ltd.), pp. 110-11. 
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The commander of 50th Division, Major General Douglas Graham, 
a Lowlander among Highlanders,20 had left France before the German 
invasion in May 1940. His battalion served in Miles Dempsey’s brigade, 
the latter ultimately commanding British Second Army in Normandy. 
Graham was posted home to command 153 Brigade, part of 9th 
(Scottish) Division. (9th Division was used as the basis from which to 
reconstitute 51st (Highland) Division after its surrender at St Valery 
and was subsequently redesignated as such). Graham led the Brigade 
at El Alamein. He then served under the command of the then Major 
General Neil Ritchie, who would command XII Corps in Normandy. 
Despite being a Lowlander, he was retained when Douglas “Tartan 
Tam” Wimberley, who strove aggressively to keep the division 
exclusively Highland in nature, a measure of his effectiveness. Graham 
was personally selected by Montgomery to assume command of 56th 
(London) Division in Tunisia, remaining with it for the Sicily and Italy 
campaigns. He was seriously injured in a jeep accident in Italy in 
October 1943 and evacuated to the UK. However, he was deemed 
sufficiently recovered by January 1944 to take over 50th Division for 
the invasion of France. Graham was considered “a Monty favourite”, 
widely respected and “a pure fighting soldier”.21  
                                                          
20 He had originally been commissioned into the Cameronians (The Scottish Rifles) 
HYAL 1938. 
21 Smart (2005), p. 120. 
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Graham was a student at Camberley in 1924-1925. His 
contemporaries included twenty-three other officers who would rise to 
General Officer rank during the Second World War, among them 
Archibald “Archie” Nye (Vice Chief of the General Staff) and Humfrey 
Gale (Chief Administrative Officer at Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Expeditionary Force - SHAEF) Several others would also command 
divisions, such as Ivor Thomas (43rd Wessex Division), a fellow 
commander in Normandy.22 His D-Day brigadiers were Fergus Knox 
(69 Brigade), Ronald Senior (151 Brigade) and Sir Alexander Stanier 
(231 Brigade).  
Although Knox, who was 45 on D-Day, had received a DSO for 
his effective command of 2nd Bn Royal Ulster Rifles (2/RUR) at Dunkirk 
(including personally leading a bayonet charge at the enemy) he had 
no other active service after 1940, remaining in the UK throughout.23 
Allan Converse, however, described Knox as “a Monty man” who upset 
his battalion commanders who thought him “too old and unused to 
modern methods”.24  
“Ronnie” Senior, a month short of his fortieth birthday on D-Day, 
was a pre-war Territorial officer who had been awarded a DSO for 
command of a company of the Territorial 1st /7th Battalion The Queen’s 
                                                          
22 The Army List (London, HMSO), January 1925, p. 920. 
23 Converse, A “(2011) “Armies of Empire: The 9th Australian and 50th British 
Divisions in Battle 1939–1945 (Australian Army History Series)” (Melbourne; 
Cambridge University Press Australia), p. 185. 
24 Ibid. 
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(Royal West Surrey) Regiment (1/7 Queen’s) in France in 1940. He 
commanded 5th Bn, The Royal West Kent Regiment (5/RWK; also, 
Territorial) and 1/7 Queen’s at El Alamein, returning from the former 
to the latter when its CO was wounded. A Bar to the DSO followed, as 
did appointment to take over 151 Brigade in Tunisia when his 
predecessor was sacked.25 Although Senior was thought to be a good 
Brigade commander by veterans, his relationship with his battalion 
commanders was sometimes as antagonistic as Knox’s either through 
regular emphasis of his connections to the Queen’s Regiment or an 
alleged disregard of the experience of his subordinates.26 Converse, 
however, described him as “a popular and effective Brigadier”.27  
Sir Alexander “Sammy” Stanier was a Baronet, a Welsh 
Guardsman and was personally selected by Montgomery for this 
command. He had distinguished himself during the defence of 
Boulogne in May 1940 and was thought “tough, courageous, 
unflappable and a good planner”.28 His war service since Dunkirk had 
been in home defence roles; whilst he was the same age as Knox, this 
did not attract the same criticism from within the brigade.  
                                                          
25 Brigadier Daniel Beak VC DSO MC*; Daniel Rolf suggests Beak’s sacking after 
Medenine in March 1943 was unfair and motivated by Montgomery’s intent to 
advance favourites, particularly Kirkman. D. Rolf (2001) “The Bloody Road to Tunis” 
(London, Greenhill). 
26 Watson, Lt. Col. William Innes cdg 6/DLI; IWM Oral History Recording 10420 
(1988). 
27 Converse (2011), p. 64. 
28 Converse (2011), p. 185. 
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Graham, who was 51 on D-Day, went to an independent school29 
and, as noted, was a Staff College graduate. Knox, 45, was a grammar 
school pupil; did not attend Staff College but was annotated as “s.” in 
the Army List (staff qualified) from the short wartime course. Senior, 
39, came from a public school, Cheltenham, and as a Territorial officer 
did not attend Staff College, even after a limited number of vacancies 
were made available to them in the late 1930s. Stanier, also 45, was 
educated at Eton and was not a Staff College graduate.  
Among the follow-on forces (listed in order of their initial arrival 
in France), 51st (Highland) Division, arrived between 6-10 June 
commanded by Major General Charles Bullen-Smith. The Division had 
been reconstituted from 9th (Scottish) Division in 1940-41 and saw 
action in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Although Bullen-Smith 
had fought in France in 1940, his time since then had been spent 
training troops in the UK, where he gained a strong reputation for 
doing so. He had also replaced Wimberley in command and faced 
resentment from within the division both for this and for being, despite 
a career spent in a Highland regiment, an Englishman.30  
7th Armoured Division, which landed on Juno, the Canadian 
assault beach, on 7 June31 were the “Desert Rats” of popular repute, 
having fought in the Western Desert and Italy; its commander after 
                                                          
29 The Glasgow Academy. 
30 Smart (2005), p. 51; French (2003) in Goldstein and McKercher, p. 288. 
31 Other divisional elements followed up to 12 June. 
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January 1943 was Major General George “Bobby” Erskine. 45 years 
old, educated at Charterhouse and commissioned into the King’s Royal 
Rifle Corps in 1918. Although he did see active service on the Western 
Front, he spent much of the inter-war years in India or in staff 
postings in the UK. He graduated from Camberley in 1930; two of his 
contemporaries were Herbert Lumsden and Neil Ritchie, both of whom 
would become General officers in the Second World War. He served in 
North Africa as an infantry battalion commander and then as the BGS 
to Brian Horrocks when the latter commanded XII Corps in the Middle 
East.  
Erskine’s brigadiers landing in Normandy were Robert “Looney” 
Hinde (22 Armd Brigade) and Maurice Ekins (131 Brigade). Hinde, 
educated at Wellington, was a cavalryman and too young to have 
served in the First World War. He had spent much of the inter-war 
years in India, reportedly obsessed with playing polo; he did not 
attend Staff College. He earnt his first DSO after taking command of 
his regiment, 15th/19th Hussars, in France in 1940 when the 
commanding officer was killed. Hinde commanded the same Brigade in 
the Western Desert from 1942, earning both a second DSO and his 
unfortunate soubriquet for his fearless command style, riding around 
the battlefield alone on a motorcycle to reach his units. Maurice Ekins, 
also 45 on D-Day, was from an unclear educational background; 
initially educated at Aldershot County Secondary School, in the 1911 
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Census he is shown as a “Student” lodging at an address in Whitley 
Bay with his parents.32 A Royal Fusilier, he was wounded in action in 
late 1918 and spent his whole inter-war career in staff postings in 
Turkey, the Rhine Army and India. He attended the Staff College from 
1933-34 alongside Tom Rennie; from 1935-1939 he served in staff 
posts in India. His war service up to 1942 is not apparent; from August 
1942-January 1944 he commanded 177 Brigade in 59th (Staffordshire) 
Division.  
11th Armoured Division, (11 Armd) which came ashore on 13 
June, was a new formation. Its commander, Major General George 
“Pip” Roberts, was the youngest general in the British Army at the 
time, being 37 on D-Day.33 He already had considerable combat 
experience both in command and in staff posts in the Western Desert 
and Tunisia, despite his comparative youth.34 Of his brigadiers, Charles 
“Roscoe” Harvey (commanding 29th Armd Brigade) was a professional 
inter-war cavalryman and international polo player who had help form 
one of the war-raised cavalry units in the United Kingdom, the 23rd 
Hussars. He then commanded it in 1941-42, before briefly taking over 
4th Armd Bde in the later stages of the Libyan campaign in 1942-43. 
John Sandie of the divisional Infantry brigade, 159 Brigade, was a 46-
                                                          
32 1911 Census of England and Wales, RG14PN30815. 
33 Smart (2005), p. 274; he had served on the staffs of 4th Armoured Brigade, 7th 
Armoured Division and XXX Corps before commanding, in 1942-43 alone, 22nd 
Armoured Brigade, 26th Armoured Brigade and 30th Armoured Brigade; he assumed 
command of 11th Armoured Division in December 1943. 
34 Ibid.  
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year-old infantryman with First World War experience and had earned 
a DSO in France in 1940 commanding his battalion (where he 
remained until 1942) but had spent the rest of the war so far in the 
UK. All the senior formation commanders in 11 Armd. were public 
school educated, but none had attended Staff College. Although this is 
mitigated by an armoured division lacking one brigade by comparison 
to an infantry division, 11 Armd was unique at this point among its 
contemporary formations in having no Staff College graduates in 
fighting command positions. (Second was Gds Armd, having only one 
p.s.c. among its commanders – George Johnson of 32 Gds Bde. 
Neither the divisional commander, Alan Adair, or the armoured brigade 
commander, Norman Gwatkin, had been educated at Staff College.)  
49th (West Riding) Division, had had some battle experience as 
two of its brigades had been sent to Norway in 1940, but thereafter 
spent two years garrisoning Iceland and training in the UK. Major 
General Evelyn “Bubbles” Barker, 49, had taken command in 
November 1943;35 a Brigade commander at Dunkirk he was credited 
with inspiring and toughening up the division prior to D-Day. Barker’s 
brigadiers included Andrew Dunlop (146 Brigade), a 37-year-old Argyll 
and Sutherland Highlander who had spent most of the 1930s attached 
to the King’s African Rifles or as an Adjutant in a Territorial battalion; 
no combat experience is recorded for him prior to 1944. Edmond 
                                                          
35 Joslen (1960), Vol.1, p. 79. 
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(known in some circles as “Tim”) Mahony, 45, was an Irish Guardsman 
who had been Assistant Military Attaché in Paris from 1937-39, only 
rising to command 1st Battalion Irish Guards in 1941, followed by a 
period on the staff of the Senior Officers’ School at Sheerness before 
taking over 147 Brigade in 1943. Edward Cooke-Collis of 70 Brigade, 
known as “Red Ted” both for his colouring and forthright politics36 was 
an experienced Green Howard who was “a veteran GH of high 
reputation in 50th Division”37 even though he was only 41 on D-Day. 
He had commanded a Territorial battalion and 69 Brigade in the Middle 
East; he already possessed two DSOs and two MIDs before landing in 
France. In 49th Division, all the formation commanders were public 
school alumni, but only Barker had graduated from Camberley. 
Another untested division was 15th (Scottish), under Major 
General Gordon MacMillan; it had spent the whole war so far in the 
United Kingdom, training. Macmillan had served as a BGS in the Middle 
East, culminating in command of a Brigade in Sicily before being 
appointed to his division in August 1943.38 His subordinates were 
Henry Money, 47, (44 Brigade) a First World War veteran of the 
Mesopotamia campaign who, after service in the Indian Army, 
commanded a battalion of the Royal Scots (RS), in France in 1940 and 
Colin Barber of 46 Brigade. Barber started his commissioned career in 
                                                          
36 Converse (2011), p. 6. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Smart (2005), p. 203. 
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the First World War as a Territorial but served as a Regular in India in 
the 1920s, followed by postings in Scotland and Southern Command in 
the 1930s. Also a battalion commander in the BEF, he was one of the 
few to avoid capture at St Valery; between 1941 and 1944 he 
commanded the same brigade in the UK that he took to Normandy.39 
John Mackintosh-Walker, 46 on D-Day, had been wounded three times 
and decorated three times (three Military Crosses) as an officer of the 
Seaforth Highlanders during the First World War; he was Mentioned in 
Dispatches for service in Palestine in 1937 and escaped from German 
hands with Tom Rennie in France in 1940; he had commanded 227 
Brigade since 1942. All four were public school alumni, but only 
Macmillan and Mackintosh-Walker were graduates of the Staff College.  
43rd (Wessex) Division, another formation based initially on 
Territorial Army units, had been intended to go to France in 1940, but 
the pace of the German invasion and the subsequent evacuation of the 
BEF precluded this. Major General Ivor Thomas’ longevity in command 
of his division before and ultimately after D-Day was unusual amongst 
the Normandy divisions; he had been appointed in March 1942.40 (His 
lengthy tenure was ascribed to his “energetic and ruthless methods, 
                                                          
39 Smart (2005), p. 20; Smart suggests that he commanded 54th (East Anglian) 
Division, a home defence formation, from 1941-43 (when it was disbanded and 
broken up), making his reversion to a brigade for Normandy puzzling, but this is 
possibly a misreading for Evelyn Barker. However, as Joslen identifies the divisional 
commander as “E.H. Barber” (Vol.1 p. 89) – most likely a misprint – the 
misunderstanding is comprehensible. 
40 Joslen (1960) Vol. 1, p. 69. 
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demanding the highest standards.”41 Thomas, originally a Gunner, had 
had no actual combat experience in the war thus far, having held 
senior staff positions at the War Office, including a period as Director 
of Organisation. His brigadiers were Gerald Mole (129 Brigade); 
Norman Leslie (130 Brigade) and Hubert Essame (214 Brigade). Mole, 
47, had served on the Western Front and in Russia in 1918-19 and 
earned a Military Cross; however, he spent four years overseas with 
the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) and did not attend Staff 
College. Leslie, young for the post at 34 on D-Day, had commanded a 
Territorial battalion of The Queen’s Regiment in Tunisia and came to 
Thomas’ division after a period as a GSO 1 in 51st (Highland) Division. 
Essame, 47, had spent a long period in India in the 1920s and 1930s 
in regimental and staff posts; he served in the War Office and then the 
BEF as a GSO 2, before command of an infantry battalion in the UK in 
1941-2. He assumed the post at 214 Brigade in September 1942.42 
Thomas, Mole and Leslie were public school alumni,43 but only Thomas 
and Essame were Staff College graduates; Thomas from Camberley in 
1925 and Essame from Quetta in 1930. 
53rd (Welsh) Division had both no previous combat experience 
during the war so far and a divisional commander who had not seen 
                                                          
41 Mead, (2007), pp. 384-35 and Smart (2005), p. 308. 
42 Joslen (1960) Vol.1. 
43 Mole was educated in India; Essame attended Nottingham High School now, but 
not then, a member of the HMC; Leslie was a Rugbiean.  
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action in it, Major General Robert “Bobby” Ross. Although Ross had 
served in Palestine during the Arab Uprising of 1936-39, he had seen 
no active service since the end of the First World War. He was 
promoted to command of the division in September 194244 via one of 
its subordinate brigades, 160th which he had led since 1940. (It is 
possible, but not confirmed, that both Ross and Douglas Graham may 
have encountered and impressed Montgomery in Palestine in 1938-39 
when the latter briefly took command of the re-activated 8th Division 
there).45 Ross’ brigadiers, Valentine Blomfield (47; 71 Brigade) Stanley 
Jones (48; 158 Brigade) and Lashmer “Bolo” Whistler (45, 160 
Brigade) had varying degrees of active service experience. Blomfield 
was a veteran of the First World War and of operations on the North 
West Frontier in the 1920s; he had been Mentioned in Dispatches in 
1940 as a Major. Jones was also a veteran of the First World War and 
post-war operations in India, but also had experience on the staff in 
the 1920s and 30s, including two years in the War Office. He 
temporarily commanded 6 Brigade but was then Commandant of the 
Senior Officers’ School across the middle of the war. Whistler, who had 
been held prisoner in the First World War, had extensive combat 
experience in the war so far, having been awarded a DSO for France, 
                                                          
44 Joslen (1960), Vol. 1, p. 87. 
45 McCarty, P. (2014) “Dangerously Overexposed?” – Divisional Operations on the 
flanks of MARKET GARDEN September to December 1944” in Buckley, J. & Preston-
Hough, P. (2016) “Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, 
Autumn 1944: Seventy Years On” (Solihull, Helion). 
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commanding a Territorial battalion; he was present at Alam Halfa and 
El Alamein in 1942 in command of the infantry brigade of 7th 
(Armoured) Division and served in Tunisia. He returned home with that 
division, transferring to 53rd (Welsh) Division in January 1944.46 
Although Ross and Whistler were both educated at public schools (Ross 
at Cheltenham College, Whistler at Harrow) neither attended either 
Camberley or Quetta; Blomfield was both a public school product 
(Rugby) and a Camberley graduate; Jones’ educational establishment 
has not been traced, but he did attend Staff College.  
59th (Staffordshire) Division, a war-raised unit, had originally 
been intended as a Motor Division carrying lorry mounted infantry to 
exploit “break-ins to breakthroughs” in support of Armoured divisions, 
but when this concept was abandoned after Dunkirk it reverted to 
being a conventional infantry division. Predominantly engaged in home 
defence duties for much of the war, despite impressing Brooke with its 
training progress in 1942-43,47 the arrival of Montgomery as 
commander of 21st Army Group led to its commander and two of its 
brigadiers being replaced by more experienced officers. The new GOC 
was Major General Lewis “Lou” Lyne, who had gone from a Lieutenant 
Colonel commanding an infantry battalion in 1940 to commanding a 
division in under three years, aged 43. This is even more surprising for 
                                                          
46 Smyth, Brig. Sir J. (1967) “Bolo Whistler: The Life of General Sir Lashmer Whistler 
GCB KBE DSO DL; A Study in Leadership” (London, Muller). 
47 Danchev, A. and Todman, D. (2001) Alanbrooke Diaries, p. 166. 
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the fact that his frontline experience only began in the spring of 1942. 
But he served under Graham in his previous posting as GOC 56th 
(London) Division in the Mediterranean where both had impressed 
Montgomery.  
His brigadiers were Reginald Fryer (44; 176 Brigade), Maurice 
Ekins (45, 131 Brigade) and John Lingham (46, 197 Brigade). Lyne 
was therefore equal to or younger than his brigadiers, which as noted 
in Chapter 1, was a touchstone for Blaxland concerning Harold 
Alexander’s early promotion to divisional command by dint of being a 
Guardsman. Fryer had received a Military Cross in the First World War 
and served in Iraq in the 1920s; Ekins spent most of his inter-war 
career in staff postings in Germany, and after Camberley in 1933-34, 
in India; for eighteen months in 1941-42 he had commanded 177 
Brigade in the UK before transferring to 131 Brigade.48 Lingham had 
served in France, Egypt and Mesopotamia in the First World War, been 
wounded and awarded a Military Cross in 1918. From 1940-1942 he 
commanded a Territorial battalion of the Northamptonshire Regiment 
before moving to the brigade he arrived in Normandy with. Lyne, Fryer 
and Lingham were public school educated;49 Lyne and Ekins were Staff 
College graduates.  
                                                          
48 Joslen (1960), Vol.1, p. 356. 
49 At Haileybury, Wellington and City of London respectively. 
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The last division fully to arrive, on 28 June 1944, was Guards 
Armoured, under Major General Sir Allan Adair. He had been a 
founding member of the division in September 1941 as commander of 
6th Guards Armoured Brigade. Adair, who had returned from France in 
early 1940 to become Chief Instructor at No.1 Infantry Officer Cadet 
Unit (1/OCTU) – the Royal Military College, Sandhurst (RMC) but was 
rapidly recalled after the German invasion to command his battalion of 
the Grenadier Guards, who had an “eventful” campaign.50 After 
command of a Guards infantry brigade, and his tenure at 6th Gds 
Armd, he took over the division in 1942 from another Grenadier, Oliver 
Leese – also a Dunkirk veteran. Despite lacking any frontline service 
after 1940, Adair inspired great loyalty and affection in his 
subordinates but unlike many other commanders lacking such 
experience was able to resist Montgomery’s attempts to remove him 
from post – ostensibly for lacking “drive” - due to the Guards looking 
after their own.51 
Adair’s brigadiers were Norman Gwatkin (44, 5 Gds Armd Bde) 
and George Johnson (41, 32 Gds Bde). As noted, Adair was a 
Grenadier; Gwatkin was a Coldstreamer and Johnson came from the 
Scots Guards. Gwatkin had missed service in the First World War but 
                                                          
50 R. Mead (2007), “Churchill’s Lions” (Stroud; Spellmount), pp. 35-37. 
51 Mead, R. (2007), p. 37; Smart (2005), p. 2. Adair also discussed this point in his 
own 1986 memoir “A Guards' General: the memoirs of Major General Sir Allan Adair, 
Bt, GCVO, CB, DSO, MC, JP, DL” (London, Hamish Hamilton) p.150 
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spent four years as the Adjutant of the RMC from 1931-35 and then as 
Assistant Comptroller of the Lord Chamberlain’s Office in the Royal 
Household.52 North West Europe was to be his first combat service in 
the war so far. Gwatkin was described as “a man of high colour, a 
choleric expression, a loud and infectious laugh and beloved by all...”53 
Johnson, unusual amongst Guardsmen in that he had been 
commissioned into the Brigade of Guards54 after having first been an 
officer in the Territorial Army, had served in Palestine in 1936-1937 as 
a staff officer and had also been a battalion commander in his 
regiment up to 1941. (His marriage to Lady Ida Ramsay, daughter of 
the 14th Earl of Dalhousie, in January 1938 would also have 
strengthened his social and regimental connections as his father in law 
had served with the Scots Guards in South Africa in 1901).55 In June 
1942 he was taken prisoner only three days after having taken over 
201 Guards Motor Brigade Group; he would later escape from a 
prisoner of war camp in Italy and return to the UK, where he took over 
his Brigade in December 1943. All three were public school educated, 
but only Johnson had passed Staff College.56  
                                                          
52 HYAL January 1940, p. 424; from the TA General List. 
53 Fraser, Sir D. (2003) “Wars and Shadows: The Memoirs of General Sir David 
Fraser” (London. Penguin), p.112 
54 From the General List (TA) to be 2/Lt S Gds, 12 Sep 25 HYAL January 1940. p. 
697. 
55 Mosley, Charles (2003) (ed) Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, 107th 
edition, 3 volumes. Wilmington, Delaware, U.S.A.: Burke's Peerage (Genealogical 
Books) Ltd, BP 2003, Vol 1, p. 1021. 
56 HYAL January 1940, p. 694. 
POINT OF FAILURE 





The two specialist divisions remaining were 6th (Airborne) 
Division, commanded by Major General Richard “Windy” Gale and 79th 
(Armoured) Division under Major General Percy “Patrick” Hobart. 6th 
Airborne had been formed in the United Kingdom in May 1943 to 
provide a second airborne division (along with 1st Airborne) ahead of 
the invasion of France. Gale, 47 on D-Day, transferred from the 
latter’s 1 Para Brigade to command the new formation, which was 
brought up to full establishment in September 1943.57 Gale’s inter-war 
career, despite graduating from Quetta in 1931, reflected the 
stagnation of an officer corps overstaffed and with a lack of promotion 
opportunity; by 1940 he was only a Lieutenant Colonel commanding a 
Territorial battalion58 but the standard of his training impressed Brooke 
when the latter was GOC Home Forces. This led to Gale occupying 
senior staff posts developing Britain’s airborne capability, including 
that of Deputy Director Staff Duties (Air) [(DDSD(A)]). Gale formed 
and trained a completely new specialist formation, requiring much 
retraining from scratch which was declared ready for active service in 
under nine months. This left, however, only four months to complete 
the specific to task training for D-Day.  
Gale’s brigadiers were comparatively youthful, as is discussed 
below. James Hill (3 Para Bde) was 33; Nigel Poett (4 Para Bde) was 
                                                          
57 Joslen (1960), Vol.1, p. 106. 
58 Smart (2005), p. 112; at the end of the First World War, aged 21, he had been an 
Acting Major. 
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36. The Hon. Hugh Kindersley (6 Airlanding Bde) was almost as old as 
Gale at 45 and had left the army in the 1920s after First World War 
service (where he was wounded and decorated) but remained on the 
reserve and re-joined the army on the outbreak of war. (This pattern 
was duplicated in 1st Airborne Division, with comparatively youthful 
Parachute Brigade commanders, namely Lathbury, 1 Para Brigade 
aged 38; Hackett, 4 Para Brigade, aged 34 and Hicks, 1 Airlanding 
Brigade, aged 49). 
Initially Kindersley was a member of Guards Armoured Division 
on its formation, but transferred to airborne forces in early 1943, 
completing parachute and glider pilot training at the age of 44. Hill was 
a regular officer before the war but resigned in 1936 to go into 
business. Re-joining the army in 1939, he served in France in staff 
posts at GHQ BEF in 1940, transferring to airborne forces and 
commanding 1st Parachute Battalion in Tunisia. He took over 3rd Para 
Bde on the formation of 6th Airborne Division.59 Poett had originally 
been commissioned into the Durham Light Infantry and served in India 
and the Sudan; at the outbreak of war he was serving in the War 
Office. He was briefly commanding officer of a DLI battalion on home 
service before being transferred to airborne forces. All four were 
educated at public school, but only Gale and Poett were p.s.c.  
                                                          
59 “Extended biography of Brigadier James Hill- compiled from his own service 
notes”. https://paradata.org.uk/articles/extended-biography-brig-james-hill 
Accessed 20 February 2018. 
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79th Armoured, intended to breach the complex array of beach 
defences facing the invasion force, was commanded by the pre-war 
armoured pioneer Major General Percy Hobart, an atypical 58 years old 
on D-Day. Hobart’s vision, ability and intellect were not used to best 
advantage in a cash-strapped army; “his successive superiors…[were] 
unable to understand Hobart’s theories of warfare or match his 
intellect….[Hobart was] undoubtedly a difficult subordinate with scant 
regard those who did not share his opinions.”60 Immediately pre-war 
he had antagonised superior officers by disobeying direct instructions 
in favour of his own theories; his tenure as Director of Military 
Training, where he could have propagated his thinking to more effect, 
was unsuccessful and lasted under a year in 1937-38. He also made 
enemies of powerful officers such as Henry Maitland “Jumbo” Wilson 
and Archibald “Archie” Wavell; John Dill considered him “impatient, 
hot-headed and intolerant”.61 Dismissed, ostensibly on grounds of age, 
in 1940, his restoration to command of 11th (Armoured) Division in the 
UK also lasted under a year, when he was considered too old to take a 
division overseas. Due to the specialist nature of the division’s role, it 
had only one “conventional” armoured brigade on strength in North 
West Europe, 30th.62 30 Brigade’s commander was a specialist tank 
officer, 44-year-old Nigel Duncan. 
                                                          
60 Mead (2007), p. 203. 
61 Smart (2005), p. 154.  
62 Joslen (1960) Vol.1 p.30 
POINT OF FAILURE 





Duncan and Hobart were both products of the public schools and 
Camberley, Hobart in 1920 and Duncan in 1936. Duncan was a 
pioneering officer in armour, serving in armoured car companies in 
Egypt, Northern Ireland and India, as Adjutant at the Tank Corps 
depot at Bovington, and on exercises in the UK with Hobart. When the 
war broke out, he was a staff officer with 1st Army Tank Brigade.63  
As noted, both the assault and follow-on divisions, even after 
Montgomery’s “stiffening” of the initial order of battle with combat 
experienced formations, would have a mixture of commanding officers 
with and without battlefield experience in the present war. Some 
officers in the Normandy group had served in France or Norway in 
1940 as regimental officers but again, not all of them had seen action 
since returning from the European continent. 
It is immediately apparent that unlike in 1940, commanders of 
fighting brigades in 1944 came from service branches appropriate to 
the brigade’s role, i.e. infantry brigades were commanded by infantry 
officers (including all Guards formations being commanded by Guards 
officers), and tank/armoured brigades by officers from cavalry 
regiments or the Royal Tank Regiment. Although this did not continue 
at divisional level – Thomas, a Gunner, commanding an infantry 
                                                          
63 IWM Sound Archive; Maj. Gen. N.W. Duncan 1976-09-24 Cat. No. 829. 
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division and Erskine, an infantryman commanding an armoured 
division – at the next level down it remained constant.  
  In 1940, two infantry brigades had been commanded by officers 
of the Royal Engineers; 143 Brigade of 48th (South Midland) Division, 
commanded by Brigadier James Muirhead64 and 8 Brigade of 3rd 
Division, commanded by Brigadier Christopher Woolner.65 (In the 
Guards Armoured Division, Guards Armoured and infantry Brigades 
were commanded by officers of the Foot Guards. The former arguably 
being infantry officers temporarily converted to the armoured role).66 
The Guards therefore sustained a “closed shop” of command of their 
own formations into the North West Europe campaign. This overall 
placing of “square pegs in square holes” - of an officers’ specialisation 
reflecting the role of the brigade reflects perhaps two factors as the 
war had progressed; a readier supply of officers to fill command 
appointments, and the weakening of the requirement or expectation to 
be a Staff College graduate to hold operational command.  
 
Age Profile 
                                                          
64 Joslen, Lt Col H. F. “Orders of Battle: Second World War 1939-1945” (London. Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office) 2 Vols., 1960. Vol.1, p. 328. Muirhead commanded the 
Brigade from September 1939-June 1940. 
65 Joslen (1960) Vol.1, p. 246. Woolner was in command from February-November 
1940. 
66 For example, Brigadier Gerald Verney DSO* MVO, Irish Guards who landed in 
Normandy in command of 6th Guards Armoured Brigade and assumed command of 
7th Armoured Division in August 1944 after its commander, Major General “Bobby” 
Erskine was dismissed. (Joslen (1960) Vol.1, pp. 19 & 187). 
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The average age of the officers is considerably lower, at 42.37 years, 
than the 1940 sample – 49.02 years for the BEF and North West 
Expeditionary Force combined. (The median is 43, compared with 46 in 
1940; the mode is 46, compared to 49). Of the Normandy group, 
twelve are aged under 40. Parachute and Commando formations 
contained comparatively youthful officers for their rank, such as Lord 
Lovat (1st Special Service Brigade) who was 32; James Hill (3rd Para 
Bde) who was 33 and Nigel Poett (4th Para Bde) who was 36. As 
parachute and commando formations had not existed at the outbreak 
of war, all three were infantry officers with pre-war service; Lovat with 
the Scots Guards, Hill the Royal Fusiliers and Poett the Durham Light 
Infantry.67 All three were originally Regular Army officers. However, 
despite being atypically young in post they were not completely 
exceptional – the youngest Brigadier in Normandy was Michael Carver, 
then 29; Norman Leslie of 130 Brigade in 43 Div was 34.  
However, there were variations between the several divisions 
landing in Normandy. Of the D-Day arrivals, the average in 3rd Division 
was 47, (the highest figure among both D-Day and the follow-on 
formations) – where all the brigadiers were older than the divisional 
commander. In Graham’s 50th Division it was 43; in 51st Division it 
was considerably below at 41.6. In 6th Airborne, despite having the 
fourth oldest divisional commander in Gale, the average age was one 
                                                          
67 The Army List, December 1938. 
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of the lowest due to the comparative youth of its brigadiers, at 38. 
With only two brigadiers, 7th Armoured’s average was 44, with its two 
brigadiers at 43 and 45 bracketing the 44-year-old divisional 
commander. The pattern was similar in the follow-on divisions was 
comparable; in 49th Division the average was 41; 11th Armoured and 
Guards Armoured (with two Brigades each) 44.5 and 42.5 
respectively. In the other infantry divisions, 15th (Scottish) was 46.3. 
43rd Wessex; 42.7, 53rd Welsh; 46.0 and 59th Staffordshire 45.0. 
Despite Montgomery’s “leavening” of inexperienced formations, in 
some divisions (such as 53rd Welsh) older officers who retained their 
posts after 1942 and 1943 contributed to a higher average age in their 
formations. 
Secondly, the replacement of battle casualties by junior 
subordinates commanding infantry battalions and armoured regiments 
could reduce the age profile of Brigade commanders. The six armoured 
brigades68 contained among them the youngest Brigadier in the 
Normandy group, the highly exceptional Michael Carver.69 He took 
over command of 4th Armd Bde on 27 June 1944 aged 29, following 
the death in action of Brigadier John Currie – who was more typically 
representative at 46 years old.70 The next youngest commander of an 
                                                          
68 4th, 8th, 22nd, 27th 5th Guards and 6th Guards. 
69 Carver was also a Regular officer, having been commissioned into the-then Royal 
Tank Corps in 1935. The London Gazette, 1 February 1935, p. 773. 
70 The Times (London, England), Friday, November 24, 1944; p. 7; Issue 49999; 
also, Joslen (1960) Vol.1, p. 153. 
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Armoured Brigade was Bernard Cracroft (8 Armd Bde), who was 38. 
The other three Armoured Brigade commanders were all aged over 
40.71  
In the infantry brigades, most commanders were over 40 years 
old, although there were exceptions. Of the five commanders of 
infantry brigades who were under 40, coincidentally, two of them were 
Scots originally commissioned into Scottish regiments, even though 
not all their Brigade commands were in Scottish divisions. Brigadier 
Ronald Senior, commanding 151 Brigade in 50th (Northumbrian) 
Division was doubly anomalous in being under 40 – he was 39 – and 
originally a Territorial. He had already commanded 152 Brigade of 51st 
(Highland) Division on its return to the UK from North Africa.72 The two 
Scottish regiment brigadiers serving outside the Scottish regimental 
group were Andrew Dunlop (aged 37), originally commissioned into 
the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, commanding 146 Brigade in 
49th (West Riding) Division, and Norman Leslie (aged 34), who began 
his service in the Cameron Highlanders and commanded 130 Brigade 
of the 43rd (Wessex) Division.73  
                                                          
71 Hinde, (22 Armd Bde) was 43; Prior-Palmer (27 Armd Bde) was 41; Gwatkin (5th 
Guards) 44, Verney (6th Guards), 43.  
72 Oliver, a solicitor before the Second World War, had commanded 7th Battalion, The 
Black Watch at El Alamein and been awarded the Distinguished Service Order for 
Tunisia. London Gazette 31 December 1942, p. 5055. 
73 Leslie had already moved away from the Scottish regimental tribe by serving with 
the West African Frontier Force from 1936-38; he also commanded a Territorial 
battalion of The Queen’s Regiment briefly in 1943. 
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However, command replacements due to casualties in June and 
July 1944 also left some infantry Brigades with commanders aged 
under 40, due to battalion commanders or members of the Brigade 
headquarters staff stepping in to fill the gap left by the loss of their 
senior officer. An example is Edward Colville. Aged 38, he assumed 
command of 227 Brigade (15th (Scottish) Division) on 17 July,74 
following the death in action of Brigadier John Mackintosh-Walker; 
Colville had been Commanding Officer (CO) of 2nd Battalion, Gordon 
Highlanders (2/Gordons) in the Brigade. Mackintosh-Walker was more 
of the more typical age of 46 years old when he became a casualty. 
The eldest Brigadier to fight in the initial stages of the Normandy 
battles was the fifty-year-old James Cunningham, who landed on D-
Day with his command, 9 Brigade of 3rd Division.75 Wounded around 
1300hrs on 6 June by a mortar strike on his Brigade Headquarters 
near Hermanville-sur-Mer, Arthur Orr76 (who was 43) replaced him.77  
Chart 5.3 illustrates the age distribution of the Normandy 
brigadiers.  Two cumulative spikes appear; twelve officers aged 40 or 
under, over a quarter (26%) of the whole group, whereas officers aged 
45-46 are the same proportion – although the spread of officers aged 
41-45, with eighteen, or 40%,  To compare with 1940 is inexact due to 
                                                          
74 Joslin (1960), p. 334. 
75 Cunningham had originally been commissioned into the Argyll and Sutherland 
Highlanders. 
76 Orr was originally commissioned into the Royal Scots Fusiliers in 1920 HYAL 
January 1940 p. 610-13. 
77 TNA WO171/616 9th Brigade War Diary. 
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the disparity in the number of officers, but with only three officers 
under 40 (no officers were exactly 40), under 2%, thirteen, or 8% of 
the group being 45-46 and thirty-three in the 41-46 bracket, or 21%, 
an element of rejuvenation is apparent between 1940 and 1944.  The 
largest clusters in 1940 were the 47-49 group (53, or 34%) and the 
51-53 (30, or 19%) being over half of all officers.  
 





Schooling and Education 
With schooling, while eight of the forty-five officers’ place of secondary 
education was untraceable, among the remaining thirty-seven, 
products of the public schools were dominant again in the 1944 list 
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significant, with four OEs, Wellington College overtook it, with eight in 
the list. Cheltenham produced three officers in this group, with 
Downside, Malvern, Marlborough and Rugby two officers apiece, a total 
of twenty-three. Twelve schools produced a single officer for the 1944 
group, as follows:  
TABLE 5.4 1940/1944 
COMPARISON OF SCHOOLS  
NORMANDY BRIGADIERS (SOLE ATTENDEE)  
SCHOOL 1940 1944 
Ampleforth 0 1 
Clifton College 4 1 
Coleraine College 0 1 
Nottingham High School 0 1 
Peter Symond’s Winchester 0 1 
Shrewsbury 2 1 
St Bees 1 1 
St Xavier’s Calcutta 0 1 
Stonyhurst 1 1 
Trinity College Glenalmond 1 1 
Uppingham 3 1 
Winchester 9 1 
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CHART 5.4A COMPARISON OF SCHOOLS ATTENDED,  
MULTIPLE NORMANDY BRIGADIERS 
 
 
Therefore, except for Peter Symonds’ College in Winchester (a 
boys’ grammar school founded in 1897) and the eight untraceable 
officers this Normandy group has thirty-four former pupils of schools in 
the Clarendon Group or the Headmasters’ Conference, eighty per cent 
of the total. Such dominance of a concentrated and specific group in a 
limited period therefore indicates that even after four and a half years 
of war, with an expanded army requiring more officers and a ready 
supply of replacements for casualties, the dominance of the public 
school as a source of officers remained and even increased compared 
with the larger 1940 group.  
Examining which officers of the Normandy group were school 
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largest single grouping, Wellingtonians, there is a ten-year spread 
between the eight indicating that they were not all at the school 
contemporaneously. Six of them were in education at the college in 
the same period, albeit at opposite ends of the school experience in 
terms of time of admission, i.e. two arriving as two left the college. 
However, two were direct school contemporaries. Cyril Coleman (160 
Brigade, 53rd Welsh Division) and George Prior-Palmer (27 Armd Bde, 
independent GHQ formation) entered in the same year, 1917. Of the 
OEs, all four were present at the school at the same time as there is 
only a four-year window, 1913-17, for their dates of entry. The 
youngest, George Johnson (32 Gds Bde, Guards Armoured Division) 
arrived in 1917, when Sir Alexander Stanier Bt.78 (231 Brigade, 50th 
Division) and the Honourable Hugh Kindersley (6th Airlanding Brigade, 
6th Airborne Division) were leaving Eton. Gerald Verney (6 Gds Armd 
Bde) was a year behind Kindersley and Stanier, arriving in 1914 and 
leaving in 1918.  
The three officers who attended Cheltenham College were 
present in a six-year bracket from 1912-1918. John Currie (4 Armd 
Bde, Independent GHQ formation) attended from 1912-1918; Edward 
Cooke-Collis (70 Brigade, 49th Division) from 1916-1920 and Ronald 
                                                          
78 Stanier became the 2nd Baronet in 1921 on the death of his father, Sir Beville 
Stanier, for whom the Baronetcy was created in 1917 in recognition of his efforts in 
organising sugar beet production during the war. See STANIER in Charles Mosley 
(ed) (1999) Burke's Peerage and Baronetage, 106th edition, 2 volumes. Crans, 
Switzerland: Burke's Peerage (Genealogical Books) Ltd, 1999. 
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Senior (151 Brigade, 50th (Northumbrian) Division) from 1918-1922). 
They therefore did not coincide as a group, although Cooke-Collis and 
Henry were in the College at the same time albeit separated by two 
years.  
Of the schools providing two officers to the group, the pair at 
Downside (Charles Harvey of 29 Armd Bde, 11th Armoured Division 
and Noel Poett of 5 Para Bde, 6th Airborne Division) were separated by 
seven years and were therefore not contemporary; James Cunningham 
(9 Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division) and Hugh Cracroft (8 Armd Bde, 
Independent GHQ formation) had an even greater separation at 
Malvern, of twelve years. James Hill (3 Para Bde, 6th Airborne Division) 
and Edward Colville (227 Brigade, 15th (Scottish) Division) were five 
years apart in their attendance at Marlborough, Hill being the junior, 
from 1925. At Rugby, Valentine Blomfield (71 Bde, 53rd (Welsh) 
Division) and Norman Leslie (130 Brigade, 43rd (Wessex) Division) 
were separated in attendance by eleven years.  
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To compare 1940 and 1944 in respect of schools:  
 
Although single products of one school predominate in both 
comparisons overall, there is a commonality between the 1940 and the 
1944 groups of brigadiers amongst schools providing multiple officers 
to the group. A distinct group of schools, Eton, Wellington, 
Cheltenham, Rugby and Marlborough dominate. Therefore, across the 
two groups combined not only do the public schools as a whole provide 
a majority of all officers reaching the rank of Brigadier – at least 109 
of 199, or 54.8%, but a group of five schools produced 71 of the 109, 
or 65.1% of it. Five schools, therefore, provided over one-third of the 
whole group – 71 out of 199, or 35.7% of it. It can therefore be 
                                                          
79 Excluding Downside for 1940 calculations, as it is included as a line item above to 
allow comparison with the 1944 group. 
TABLE 5.5 COMPARISON OF SCHOOLS ATTENDED:  














ETON 12 7.8 4 8.9 
WELLINGTON 10 6.5 8 17.7 
CHELTENHAM 9 5.8 3 6.7 
DOWNSIDE 1 0.6 2 4.4 
MALVERN 2 1.2 2 4.4 
MARLBOROUGH 6 3.9 2 4.4 
RUGBY 8 5.2 2 4.4 
ONE PUPIL 2679 16.8 12 26.7 
TOTALS 74 48.0 35 77.8 
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concluded that even after four and a half years of war, the public 
schools – and furthermore an even smaller group within them, 
increased their dominance considerably over the route of entry to the 
profession of any army officer who would rise to senior command.  
TABLE 5.6 SCHOOLS COMBINED, 








ETON 16 8.0 
WELLINGTON 18 9.0 
CHELTENHAM 12 6.0 
DOWNSIDE 3 1.5 
MALVERN 4 2.0 
MARLBOROUGH 8 4.2 
RUGBY 10 5.0 
ONE PUPIL 38 19.1 
TOTALS 109 54.8 
 
Associations of Schools and Regiments of First Commissioning,  
1944 Group 
 
The correlation of regiments to schools in the 1944 group is as follows 
below, including only those educational institutions which produced 
two or more officers who attained the rank of Brigadier before or 
during the initial stages of the Battle of Normandy.  
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1 ARTILLERY ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY 
2 INFANTRY GREEN HOWARDS 
QUEEN’S (TA) 
ETON 5 INFANTRY GUARDS (4) KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
DOWNSIDE 1 INFANTRY DURHAM LIGHT INFANTRY  
1 CAVALRY 10TH HUSSARS 
MALVERN 1 INFANTRY ARGYLL & SUTHERLAND HIGHLANDERS 
1 ARMOUR ROYAL TANK CORPS 
MARLBOROUGH 2 INFANTRY ROYAL FUSILIERS 
GORDON HIGHLANDERS 







2 CAVALRY 9TH LANCERS 
15TH/19TH KINGS HUSSARS  
5 INFANTRY ROYAL NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS  
DUKE OF CORNWALL’S LIGHT INFANTRY 
WELCH REGIMENT 




INDIAN ARMY UNATTACHED LIST 
 
Again, as highlighted in Chapter 2, the notion of “Eton and the 
Guards” is sustained with all four officers from Eton College being 
initially commissioned into regiments of the Foot Guards, even though 
Hugh Kindersley (originally an officer of the Scots Guards) was serving 
away from the Guards in command of 6 (Airlanding) Brigade on D-
Day. Also, in common with the 1940 brigadiers, there is little – 
arguably, in this case no - correlation between the location of the 
school attended and the infantry regiment of first commissioning; for 
example, officers commissioned into Scottish regiments were not old 
boys of Scottish schools.  
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Regimental and Pre-War Service 
Unlike the practice in the First World War and in 1940, by 1944 
fighting commands in all but one case were “to arm appropriate”, i.e. 
infantry officers commanded infantry brigades; Guards officers 
commanded Guards formations (both infantry and armoured) and 
cavalry/Royal Tank Regiment officers commanded armoured brigades. 
Officers originally of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers did not 
command fighting formations outside their own arm of service on D-
Day, with the sole exception of Brigadier John Currie. Currie was 
originally commissioned into the Royal Horse Artillery, commanded 2nd 
Field Regiment, Royal Artillery in France in 1940 and 9 Armd Bde in 
1942-43, after a successful campaign in the Western Desert.80 Currie 
was killed in action on 26th June 1944 by an enemy artillery barrage 
whilst returning to his command tank.81 As noted above, he was 
replaced in command by Michael Carver, originally commissioned into 
the 2nd Battalion, Royal Tank Corps on 1 February 1935.82  As Carver’s 
case illustrates, brigadiers who became casualties were quickly 
replaced from within, by junior, sometimes younger officers; Major 
Generals and above would be replaced often from without by other 
                                                          
80 Currie, whilst a Gunner. was awarded the Distinguished Service Order in February 
1942 for the Middle East, with a Bar awarded for the Battle of El Alamein in February 
1943 and a Second Bar for command of 4th Armoured Brigade in Italy 
http://www.hambo.org/hazelwood/view_man.php?id=114 Accessed 19 May 2017. 
81 http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-
dead/casualty/2956014/CURRIE,%20JOHN%20CECIL Commonwealth War Graves 
Commission. Accessed 19 May 2017. 
82 London Gazette 1 February 1935, p. 773. 
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officers of level status (e.g. Verney’s replacement of Erskine at 7th 
Armoured Division in August 1944 and Bucknall being replaced by 
Horrocks at XXX Corps  also in August, although both were Lieutenant 
Generals.  In 1940, the only replacement of brigadiers were those 
temporarily separated from their units in the retreat in France; only 
one was killed, in the final stages of the evacuation when the chain of 
command had been disrupted, so a direct comparison is not possible.  
Among the forty-five officers in this group, the regiment of first 
commissioning produced several smaller subgroupings as follows, 
which can be used to further define regimental connections:  
TABLE 5.8: NORMANDY GROUP,  
REGIMENT OF FIRST COMMISSIONING 
GUARDS 7 
CAVALRY 3 




Below, a further division is made into officers who served in the same 
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TABLE 5.9A: NORMANDY GROUP, 
REGIMENT OF FIRST COMMISSIONING 
SAME REGIMENT: GUARDS AND CAVALRY 
 OFFICER    DATE OF COMMISSIONING 
GUARDS   
SCOTS GUARDS (3) LOVAT83 AUGUST 1931 
 JOHNSON NOVEMBER 1923 
 KINDERSLEY AUGUST 1917 
ROYAL TANK 
CORPS/REGIMENT (2) 
CARVER JANUARY 1935 
 CRACROFT JANUARY 1925 
 
Guards and Cavalry 
Scots Guards 
Whilst Kindersley, Johnson and Lovat were all officers of the Scots 
Guards, their mutual connection pre-war beyond a common cap badge 
was slight. Despite being decorated with an MC in the First World War, 
Kindersley had resigned his commission in 1920 aged 21 and gone 
onto the Regular Army Reserve of Officers, from which he re-joined 
the regiment in November 1938. Lovat, after succeeding his father as 
the 15th Lord Lovat in 1932, also resigned his commission as a 
Lieutenant in 1937 to be placed on the Supplementary Reserve of 
Officers; when he returned to the army from the reserve in 1939, it 
was to a commission in the family regiment, The Lovat Scouts, which 
was a Territorial Army unit. (The regiment was a “family” one in the 
truest sense, having been formed by the 14th Lord to fight in the 
                                                          
83 Simon Fraser (as he then was) had originally been commissioned as a Second 
Lieutenant in a Territorial regiment, The Lovat Scouts, in January 1930; however, he 
transferred to the Regular Army in August 1931. London Gazette, 2 September 1932, 
p. 5621. 
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Second Boer War; although the 14th Lord, father of the 15th, was 
promoted during the First World War, the family connection remained 
strong and direct, as shown by the 15th Lord’s return to command it). 
Johnson, commissioned in-between them, was the only officer with 
uninterrupted inter-war service, being promoted Captain in March 
1932; from 1936-1939 he served in staff appointments at home and 
overseas84 before being appointed Lieutenant Colonel to command the 
war-raised 3rd Battalion of the regiment in 1940. Kindersley 
transferred to the Scots Guards battalion converting to armour in the 
newly-raised Guards Armoured Division before being appointed to 
command the 6 (Airlanding) Brigade in 1943. It is therefore unlikely 
that the three served together before the war and the likelihood 
lessened further between 1940 and 1944.  
Royal Tank Regiment  
Bernard Cracroft85 was first commissioned into the Royal Tank Corps 
(RTC) in January 1925, when Michael Carver was still at Winchester 
College. The latter was commissioned into the same Corps almost 
                                                          
84 He served as a General Staff Officer Grade 3 (GSO 3) in Palestine, September-
December 1936; as the Brigade Major, London District March 1937-October 1938 
and as a GSO 2 in the War Office, October 1938-December 1939 HYAL, January 
1942, p. 606. 
85 His given names were Hugh John Bernard, (named after his father Colonel Hugh, 
RASC), but went by Bernard. His younger brother, Lt. Col. Robert Cracroft MC RTR 
(Born 1910) was killed in action in Normandy , commanding 158th (9th Bn Loyal 
Lancashire Regiment) Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps, on 13th August 1944 
http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-
dead/casualty/2847858/CRACROFT,%20ROBERT%20GEORGE (Commonwealth War 
Graves Commission “Find War Dead” Accessed 1 June 2017. 
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exactly eleven years after Cracroft, in January 1936. By this stage 
Cracroft was an instructor at the Tank Gunnery School at Lulworth 
Cove in Dorset and had been since November 1933. From April 1930 
to March 1931, he had participated in operations on the North-West 
Frontier of India, suppressing the “Red Shirt” uprising of Afridi 
tribesmen.86 It has not been possible to confirm definitively whether 
Cracroft instructed Carver (the former left the school in November 
1936).87 Both had field commands in North Africa in 1943, but by the 
time Carver had been appointed CO of 1st Battalion, Royal Tank 
Regiment (1/RTR) in April 1943, Cracroft was in a different Brigade. 
On Cracroft’s appointment briefly to command 4 Armd Bde in 
December 1943,88 Carver was about to leave Italy with 1/RTR to 
prepare for Normandy with 22 Armd Bde and their paths did not 






                                                          
86 Service in this campaign was recognised by the award of the India General Service 
Medal 1908 with clasp “North West Frontier 1930-31”. 
87 Cracroft, Hugh John Bernard in HYAL January 1942, p. 691. 
88 He moved to command 8th Armoured Brigade in March 1944 Joslen (1960), p.160 
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Infantry – English/Irish Regiments 
TABLE 5.9B: NORMANDY GROUP,  
REGIMENT OF FIRST COMMISSIONING 
SAME REGIMENT 
INFANTRY REGIMENTS: ENGLISH/IRISH 
 OFFICER DATE OF 
COMMISSIONING 
BORDER REGIMENT (2) BLOMFIELD APRIL 1916 
 ELRINGTON SEPTEMBER 1917 
KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT 
INFANTRY (2) 
CASS OCTOBER 1916 
 WALKER DECEMBER 1920 
NORTHAMPTONSHIRE REGIMENT 
(2) 
ESSAME MARCH 1916 
 LINGHAM SEPTEMBER 1915 
ROYAL FUSILIERS (2) EKINS DECEMBER 1917 
 HILL 1931 
ROYAL ULSTER RIFLES (2) MOLE APRIL 1916 
 KNOX JUNE 1917 
 
As referred to above, infantry brigade commands in Normandy were 
“to arm appropriate”, in effect, commanded by officers who had 
originally been commissioned into the infantry as their original arm of 
service. This did not necessarily translate as being that officers 
commissioned into English country regiments automatically 
commanded infantry Brigades in English divisions, or that officers 
originally commissioned into Scottish regiments commanded Scottish 
Brigades in Scottish Divisions. By 1944, manning demands meant that 
attempts to sustain regional characteristics in infantry brigades and 
divisions, especially in those units from the Territorial Army which had 
recruited from specific areas (such as 50th (Northumbrian) Division 
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being made up of Brigades, battalions and soldiers from the English 
North East) had become unsustainable and largely artificial.  
For example, the 53rd (Welsh) Division was commanded by an 
Englishman and one of its subordinate formations was known as “The 
International Brigade”, as it contained at least notionally English, 
Scottish and Welsh infantry battalions.89 The only brigade commander 
in the division originally commissioned into a Welsh infantry regiment90 
was Stanley Jones, late of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, in 158 Brigade. 
Although two brigadiers in the group had come from the same 
Northern Irish infantry regiment, the Royal Ulster Rifles, on D-Day 
both were commanding infantry brigades in English, originally 
Territorial Army, divisions.91  
Valentine Blomfield (71 Brigade, 53rd (Welsh) Division) and 
Maxwell Elrington (177 Brigade, 59th (Staffordshire)) Division had both 
begun their careers in the Border Regiment, the former in April 1916, 
the latter in September 1917. Blomfield had served in the 1st 
Battalion92 during the First World War; Elrington served less than a 
                                                          
89 Barclay, C. N. (1956). “The History of the 53rd (Welsh) Division in the Second 
World War” (London: Wm. Clowes & Sons) 
90 The Royal Welch Fusiliers, The Welch Regiment, the South Wales Borderers and 
the Welsh Guards. 
91 Brigadier Fergus Knox, commanding 69th Infantry Brigade in 50th (Northumbrian) 
Division and Brigadier Gerald Mole, commanding 129th Infantry Brigade in 43rd 
(Wessex) Division. Both had been commissioned into the Royal Irish Rifles in 1917 
and 1916 respectively, although Mole spent most of the war until early 1919 
attached to the Machine Gun Corps. HYAL December 1938, pp. 456, 480. 
92 TNA WO/95/4311 War Diary, 1st Battalion Border Regiment January 1916. 
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year as a regimental officer before spending the rest of the war as an 
aide-de-camp (ADC) to a divisional commander in Italy from July 
1918-February 1919, and his and Bloomfield’s paths did not intersect. 
However, both officers served on operations in Waziristan from 1921-
24. Both were pre-war Staff College contemporaries, graduating in 
December 1935.93 
Edward “Copper” Cass of the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry 
(8 Brigade, 3rd Division) was commissioned into its Second Battalion 
(2/KOYLI) in October 1916, serving exclusively on the Western Front, 
where he was wounded, Mentioned in Dispatches and awarded both a 
DSO and an MC, all before he was 21.94 His sole active service 
between the wars was as an instructor at the Small Arms School, India 
from February 1935-February 1939. Eton-educated John Walker (146 
Brigade, 49th (West Riding) Division) was too young for First World 
War service, being commissioned in December 1920; he, however, 
served overseas putting down the Afridi “Red Shirt” rebellion in 1930-
31 (as had Bernard Cracroft, passim).  
Hubert Essame (214 Brigade, 43rd (Wessex) Division and John 
Lingham (197 Brigade, 59th (Staffordshire) Division both served in the 
Northamptonshire Regiment and were near contemporaries, Essame 
being commissioned in March 1916; serving almost three years on the 
                                                          
93 The Times (London, England), Thursday, February13, 1936; p. 9; Issue 47297. 
94 Edward Earnshaw Eden. Cass Private Papers, Imperial War Museum IWM 
Documents, 1471, 1987-2002. 
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Western Front, he was wounded, mentioned in dispatches and 
awarded an MC. Lingham, commissioned in September 1915, was also 
wounded and received an MC, but ended his war in the Middle East 
serving with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) for most of 1918. 
Both officers attended the Staff College in the inter-war period, 
although Essame went to Quetta95 and spent 1926-34 in various staff 
appointments in India before returning to take up a GSO 3 posting at 
the War Office. Lingham specialised in staff appointments connected to 
weaponry in the early 1930s, including a period as an instructor at the 
Small Arms School at Netheravon before moving into conventional 
staff roles in Northern Command from 1937-39. Lingham graduated 
from Staff College in December 1935.96  
In professional terms, Maurice Ekins and James Hill were a 
generation apart, the former being twelve years older than the latter. 
Ekins was commissioned into the 2nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers (2/RF) 
in December 1917, serving briefly on the Western Front, where he was 
wounded. Inter-war he served as a Staff Officer (Allied Military Liaison 
Officer) in Turkey in 1923, and as a Staff Captain in the Rhine Army, 
1928-29, in Northern Command 1929-32 and then in India, from 
October 1936 to November 1938. Hill served as a platoon commander 
in the 2nd Battalion up to 1936, when he left the army to work in his 
                                                          
95 He graduated in December 1930, a direct contemporary of Colin Barber; The 
Times (London, England), 7 March 1931; p. 17; Issue 45765. 
96 The Army List, January 1935 “Staff College: Senior Division” Column 920 (London, 
HMSO). 
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family’s business but re-joined the army on the outbreak of war in 
1939; his path is therefore unlikely to have crossed with Ekins, even 
though they served in the same battalion of the same regiment.97  
Gerald Mole and Herbert Knox were both Royal Ulster Rifles 
officers, close in age (46 and 45 on D-Day) and First World War 
veterans. Knox, known as “Gandhi”98 was a Staff College graduate, 
had been wounded twice on the Western Front and spent much of the 
inter-war period as a staff officer in the UK, serving with Territorials, in 
a staff Captain’s post in Southern Command and as a Brigade Major in 
Western Command. (He would command the 2nd Battalion, RUR in 
France in 1940). 
Infantry – Scottish 
TABLE 5.9C: NORMANDY GROUP,  
REGIMENT OF FIRST COMMISSIONING 
SAME REGIMENT 
INFANTRY REGIMENTS - SCOTTISH 
 OFFICER DATE OF 
COMMISSIONING 
ARGYLL & SUTHERLAND 
HIGHLANDERS (2) 
CUNNINGHAM AUGUST 1914 
 DUNLOP AUGUST 1926 
CAMERON HIGHLANDERS (3) BARBER OCTOBER 1916 
 MURRAY99 AUGUST 1923 
 LESLIE AUGUST 1930 




                                                          
97 https://paradata.org.uk/articles/extended-biography-brig-james-hill Accessed 07 
May 2017. 
98 Orr, David and Truesdale, David (2005) “The Rifles Are There: 1st and 2nd 
Battalions of the Royal Ulster Rifles (London, Pen & Sword) p.52 
99 Murray was originally commissioned into the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles). 
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James Cunningham, the eldest of the Normandy group, was a 
considerably experienced officer having been commissioned during the 
early days of the First World War in August 1914; after brief service on 
the Western Front, much of his war was spent in the Balkans. He 
ended the war as a 26-year old Temporary Lieutenant Colonel. 
commanding a Service Battalion, having been wounded and receiving 
a Military Cross. Reverting to Major, he spent the next three years as a 
Brigade Major in the Black Sea and Turkey occupation forces. He also 
saw active service in India in 1935-36 during operations on the North-
West Frontier. He did not attend the Staff College and did not regain 
the rank he had held in 1919 until 1941. Andrew Dunlop was only 
commissioned in 1926; he served overseas on attachment to the 
King’s African Rifles from December 1933 to October 1936 and on 
return served as the Adjutant of a Territorial Army unit from 1937. 
However, he graduated from Staff College after 1940. Due to their 
various absences abroad, it is unlikely that Cunningham and Dunlop 
knew each other through common service. 
The trio of Cameron Highlander officers are anomalous as 
although there was a fourteen year bracket between the first (Colin 
Barber, 46 Brigade, 15th (Scottish) Division) and last (Norman Leslie, 
130 Brigade, 43rd Wessex Division) commissioned in 1916 and 1930 
respectively; the officer in the middle of the three in terms of original 
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commission date, Horatius Murray (153 Brigade, 51st (Highland)) 
Division actually joined the Cameronians in 1923, transferring to the 
Cameron Highlanders in 1935. Barber, who had graduated from the 
Staff College in Quetta in December 1930100 was another veteran of 
Waziristan in the 1920s, being Mentioned in Dispatches in 1925 for his 
conduct there. After Quetta, he served in several staff posts in Scottish 
and Southern Commands in the UK from 1932-37. Norman Leslie, the 
youngest, spent his time on regimental service, reaching the rank of 
Captain in August 1938 on the eighth anniversary of his 
commissioning; he spent two years on attached service to the Royal 
West African Frontier Force from 1936-38. Horatius Murray spent 
1936-38 at the Staff College, Camberley and was then posted to a 
GSO 2 job at the War Office. The paths of Leslie and Murray may 
briefly have crossed paths regimentally around 1935. 
David Haugh (152 Brigade, 51st (Highland) Division) and John 
Mackintosh-Walker (227 Brigade, 15th (Scottish) Division) were 
roughly contemporary in the Seaforth Highlanders, receiving 
commissions in July 1917 and April 1916 respectively. Haugh spent 
much of the rest of the war through to 1920 attached to the Machine 
Gun Corps on the Western Front, where he was twice wounded, 
mentioned in dispatches and received a Military Cross. He graduated 
                                                          
100 Staff College. Quetta. The Times (London, England), 7 March 1931; p. 17; Issue 
45765. 
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from Quetta at the end of 1930,101 and spent the next six years on 
active service on the North-West Frontier and in Burma. John (also 
known as “Ronnie”) “Tosh” Mackintosh-Walker, who was posted to the 
2nd Battalion on commissioning; he ended his First World War Service 
with a Military Cross and two bars and a Mention in Dispatches. He 
served as a Company Commander at the RMC from 1929-33,102 and 
saw active service on the North-West Frontier and in Palestine, where 
he was again Mentioned.103 He did not attend Staff College.  
 
Staff College 
For the purposes of this thesis, only officers who attended the full 
courses at the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta and held the 
p.s.c. qualification have been considered.104 Short war courses during 
either World War have been disregarded as reliable and 
comprehensive lists of attendees are not available and the length of 
the course – weeks, rather than years – was less likely to be a source 
of nascent networks.105 Of the forty-five officers in the group, sixteen, 
                                                          
101 Thus making him an exact contemporary of Hubert Essame, passim.  
102 The Times (London, England), 30 August 1929; p. 7; Issue 45295. 
103 Obituary, The Times (London, England), 1 August 1944; p. 6; Issue 49923. 
104 No officers in the Normandy group attended the RAF or RN Staff colleges under 
the exchange arrangements. 
105 Graduates of the Junior Staff Courses held in France between November 1916 and 
April 1917 or at Cambridge University between September 1917 and January 1919 
were indicated in the Army List by the abbreviation (s.c.), or (S.C.) if graduates of 
the Senior Staff Courses held between the same dates. If the letters were 
unitalicized, it meant that the officer had attended an equivalent short war course 
after 1939.  
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37% of it, were Staff College graduates – thirteen from Camberley and 
three from Quetta.106  
Into the 1930s, the number of applications to Staff College 
greatly exceeded the number of places available. This was due, in 
part, to a common realisation that in a system where promotion 
prospects had stagnated due to bottlenecks and a lack of incentives for 
officers to retire early, professional distinctions may put one ahead of 
the pack. Even officers with a conditional offer awaiting a vacancy 
after passing the competitive examination could not be certain of a 
guaranteed place.  
Among the sixteen are some direct contemporaries in the 1944 
group. The Quetta officers, who all graduated in December 1930,107 
were Colin Muir, Hubert Essame and David Haugh, when the 
Commandant was Major General (later Lieutenant General Sir) Thomas 
Humphreys, a former Director of Military Operations and the Chief 
Instructor was Col. C.J.E. Auchinleck, (later Field Marshal Sir). The 
group of four who left Camberley together at the end of 1935 were 
Valentine Blomfield, Maxwell Elrington, George Johnson and John 
Lingham, when the Commandant was Major General (later General Sir) 
Clement Armitage. Maurice Ekins was in his second year at Camberley 
                                                          
106 If Bernard Leicester were included, the figure would be 17, as he was also a 
graduate of the Army Staff College.  
107 The Times (London, England), 7 March 1931; p. 17; Issue 45765. 
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as Armitage took over as Commandant and Blomfield, Elrington, 
Johnson and Lingham were joining the College.  
Of the remaining officers of the Normandy group, Stanley Jones 
left Camberley in December 1932, when John Dill, later Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, was Commandant. Ernest Pepper arrived when 
Armitage held that post but graduated in December 1936, during the 
relatively brief tenure as Commandant of the future Viscount Gort 
(March 1936-September 1937). The last of the Normandy group to 
graduate before the reorganisation of the of the Staff College course in 
1939108 were Horatius Murray in 1937 and Kenneth Smith in 1938.  
The aim of the College reorganisation was to lower the age at 
which officers became eligible to join the restructured Junior Division, 
with an intention to favour officers aged under 30. The reformed 
Senior Division – for which there was no entrance examination - would 
be held at Minley Manor near Aldershot, aimed at older officers, 
typically in their mid-thirties, and perhaps already (but not essentially) 
graduates of the Junior Division. The goal of this Division was to 
increase the supply of General Staff Officers Grade 1 (GSO 1), usually 
a Lt. Col’s posting. However, the approach of war curtailed this reform 
and the 1939 Camberley course intake was terminated after only 
seven months to provide officers to serve on operations; the Chief 
                                                          
108 OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT, "New Army Staff Course." The Times [London, 
England] 24 January 1939, p. 9. 
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Instructor on the outbreak of war, Colonel Brian Horrocks, went to 
France to command an infantry brigade. In January 1940, the course 
was restructured to run for seventeen weeks and focussed on the 
essentials of Divisional staff work.109 John Churcher, Bernard Cracroft, 
Nigel Poett and Gerald Verney were graduates of the curtailed course.  
In terms of “talent spotting” and being beneficiaries of 
patronage, those who arrived at Camberley in the second half of the 
1930s were perhaps less fortunate than their forebears of a decade 
before, when the likes of Alan Brooke, Bernard Montgomery and 
Bernard Paget were serving as instructors. Although Gort, Ronald 
Adam110 and Bernard Paget111 held the post of Commandant of the 
Staff College in quick succession from 1936-39, their relatively brief 
tenures due to promotion away to posts vital to the coming war effort 
lessened their impact as the instigators of their own networks. It 
should be noted, however, that those at Camberley in the mid-1930s 
were taught by such significant figures as Archibald “Archie” Nye (Vice 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff 1941-44), who instructed from 
1932-35; “Bill” Slim (Commander, XIVth Army, Burma) and Humfrey 
Gale (later Chief Administrative Officer, SHAEF) from 1934-37.  
 
                                                          
109 Smalley, E. Qualified, but unprepared: Training for War at the Staff College in the 
1930s, British Journal of Military History, Vol.2 Issue 1 (November 2015), pp. 55-71. 
110 Adjutant General of the Army, 1941-45. 
111 GOC Home Forces, 1941-44 etc. 
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The officers serving as brigadiers in 1944 had occupied a range of 
ranks in 1940, from Lieutenant to Lieutenant Colonel. The step from 
Lieutenant Colonel to Brigade command (bypassing a posting as a full 
Colonel in a staff posting) was not unusual or atypical. In 1940, six of 
the Normandy group were Lieutenant Colonels; a further four were 
Majors, Acting Lieutenant Colonels. Twenty-five were Majors (one of 
whom was temporarily in command of his battalion as a Major, not as 
a Temporary or Acting Lieutenant Colonel)112 There were two Acting 
Majors, eight Captains and a Lieutenant – the latter being the again 
most atypical Michael Carver. Active service can, therefore, in the 
cases of the Majors and below, be credited as a promotion enhancer; 
under peacetime conditions to rise from Major to Brigadier in four 
years would be most unlikely. Of the Majors and below, fifteen were 
Staff College graduates (the precocious Carver did not attend 
Camberley until 1950), indicating that the qualification was desirable, 
and an aid to faster advancement. Although again, the factor that the 
need to fill vacancies outstripped the supply of pre-war p.s.c.’s should 
not be discounted.  
 
 
                                                          
112 Colin Barber, commanding 4/Cameron Highlanders.  
POINT OF FAILURE 





Decorations for previous service 
Of the forty-six officers holding Brigade commands on or after D-Day, 
a considerable proportion had been decorated for services in 
connection with the war to this point; others received awards in 
addition to those granted for service in the First World War. The 
intention in this section is to correlate the possession of gallantry 
awards and appointment to Brigade command in this specific context.  
As noted above, sixteen of the forty-five officers were Staff 
College graduates, some 37%. However, the number of officers in the 
group who had earned decorations prior to D-Day came to thirty-seven 
– 82% of the total. Thirteen officers carried decorations earned in the 
First World War; one DSO;113 twelve MCs, two Bars (second award) to 
the MC and one second Bar (third award) to the MC.114 There were 
seven awards of Mentions in Dispatches (MID) for the First World War 
to the group. Rewards for inter-war service were comparatively 
scarce; two MIDs and one DSO for operations in Palestine in 1936-
37.115 Prior to 1939, sixteen officers had been decorated at least once 
                                                          
113 Awarded to Lieutenant Edward Cass, then 2nd Battalion King’s Own Yorkshire Light 
Infantry.  
114 The MC and Two Bars were to John Mackintosh-Walker: MC 1917, Bar to MC 
1918, 2nd Bar to MC 1919. He was further Mentioned in Dispatches in 1937 for 
operations on Palestine. He would receive a posthumous Distinguished Service Order 
in October 1944 for his command of 227th Infantry Brigade, backdated to date of 
death, 15 July 1944 London Gazette, 19 October 1944, p. 4785. 
115 The DSO and one of the MIDs were to the same officer; Maxwell Elrington of The 
Border Regiment.  
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during their career (including one for service to the Royal Family);116 
eight were recipients of multiple awards prior to 1939; six added 
Second World War decorations to their holdings.  
Of the sixteen Staff College graduates in the Normandy list, 
twelve had received decorations; five prior to the Second World War 
and seven during it. The combination of an award and a p.s.c. 
qualification being therefore 26% of the group. Additional factors 
cannot be overlooked for officers not achieving a Staff College 
qualification. These included not taking the competitive exams for Staff 
College, not receiving a recommendation from a commanding officer, 
failing the competitive exam, or even being successful in the 
examination but insufficiently high in the pass list to gain entry from 
the limited number of places available. As shown, there is a statistical 
argument that a decoration was as influential an element for an 
officer’s advancing to senior command than a staff qualification. 
However, two p.s.c. brigadiers in field commands in Normandy had no 
decorations or distinctions of any kind prior to 1944; being Maurice 
Ekins (131 Brigade) and Nigel Poett (5 Para Bde).117  
                                                          
116 Gerald Verney was appointed Member of the Royal Victorian Order, 5th Class in 
1937 for services to the Monarch whilst still serving with the Grenadier Guards. 
117 Poett would, however, end the war with two Distinguished Service Orders to his 
name: a late award for Normandy (London Gazette 29 March 1945, p. 1709) and a 
Bar for the Rhine Crossing, (London Gazette, 21 June 1945, p. 3231). Maurice Ekins 
died of wounds on 7 November 1944 in conditions still considered as contentious. 
(See A. Holborn (2010) “The 56th Infantry Brigade and D-Day: An Independent 
Infantry Brigade and the campaign in North West Europe 1944-45” (London, 
Continuum) pp. 182-83). 
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The working assumptions for this chapter again, were to make a 
comparison with the 1940 group of officers; firstly, that the average 
age of the Normandy group of brigadiers would be lower, and 
therefore younger, than its 1940 counterpart. By the spring of 1944, 
the average age of brigadiers in fighting formations intended to 
operate during the invasion of France had dropped appreciably 
compared with their 1940 counterparts. However, this is explained in 
part by the creation after 1940 of new, special forces units such as 
Parachute, Airborne and Commando formations which attracted 
officers who were younger and more ambitious than the norm. In 
conventional formations such as infantry and some armoured brigades, 
there had not been much change in the average since 1940 – with 
officers in command typically being in their mid-40s. Another factor in 
lowering the age average was the casualty rate for some brigadiers. In 
France in 1940 only one Brigadier had been killed in action and this 
was during the evacuation, so he was not replaced immediately.118 In 
Normandy, two brigadiers were killed in action in July and one 
wounded on D-Day itself; a fourth, Sandie, was sacked. In these 
cases, they were replaced by younger subordinates either from staff 
positions within or from component units of the Brigade.  
                                                          
118 No brigadiers were fatal casualties in Norway. The casualty was Brigadier Geoffrey 
Mansergh, the DA & QMG of II Corps who was killed in action at Dunkirk on 2 June 
1940. 
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The average age of the officers is considerably lower in 1944, at 
42.4 years overall, than the 1940 group – 49.02 years for the BEF and 
NWEF combined. (The median is 43, compared with 46 in 1940; the 
mode is 46, compared to 49). Sixteen officers in the Normandy group, 
nearly a third of them, were too young to have served in the First 
World War. In the Normandy group overall, eleven officers were under 
40 on 6 June 1944. Seven of these were serving in armoured119 and 
infantry brigades120 and the fall in the average cannot, therefore, be 
purely ascribed to the emergence of those war-raised special forces 
after 1940.  
The second factor considered, was whether previous battle 
experience between 1939 and 1944 contributed to accelerated 
promotion at an earlier age and whether possession of gallantry 
decorations and other honours contributed to this process of 
appointment. Thirty-seven of the forty-five were in possession of 
decorations, of whom thirteen had received them in the First World 
War; inter-war decorations were scarce, indicating that awards in the 
course of the present war were an advantage for advancement. The 
combination of a Staff College qualification and a gallantry award was 
equally marked; of the sixteen graduates of Camberley or Quetta, 
twelve had at least one, representing the single largest grouping 
                                                          
119 Carver (4th Armd Bde) and Cracroft (8th Armd). 
120 Leslie (130 Bde), Dunlop (146 Bde), Colville (227 Bde), Churcher (159 Bde) and 
Senior (151 Bde). 
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among the officers. By peacetime standards, the progression of over 
half the group from Major to Brigadier in just under four years 
indicates that active service was a factor in accelerated advancement 
among this group.  
In January 1940, twenty-three of the Normandy brigadiers were 
serving as Majors; of these, ten were Staff College graduates. There 
were five substantive Lieutenant Colonels, of whom none were Staff 
College graduates and of whom four had combat experience in the war 
thus far – two in France only: two in France and the Middle East 
and/or Mediterranean. Of the five Acting Lieutenant Colonels (A/Lt. 
Col), four had commanded battalions in 1940; three in France and one 
in Norway; three were decorated in 1940, with one receiving a Bar to a 
First World War DSO. Seven officers had started the war as Captains, 
of whom only two were Staff College alumni; three of the seven were 
decorated for service in France in 1940 and five of them served in the 
Middle East and Mediterranean. The most marked advancement among 
the Normandy group was again the exceptional Michael Carver – a 
“mere” Lieutenant in 1940, but with extensive staff and combat 
experience in the North African and Mediterranean campaigns before 
1944.  
Also, unlike 1940, officers who had come up through the 
Territorial Army had risen to command both Territorial Army battalions 
and Brigades in action. Territorials who had distinguished themselves 
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in North Africa in 1941-42, Tunisia and Italy in 1943 were not 
debarred from leading Brigades in North West Europe, although 
officers who had the accidental misfortune to command formations in 
Ken Anderson’s 1st Army were less likely, regardless of their abilities, 
to serve in British Second Army due to Montgomery’s preference to 
recall veterans of his – not Auchinleck’s – Eighth Army. Ronald Senior 
and James Oliver, both part-time officers before the war, distinguished 
themselves in command of their battalions and later brigades and 
retained command in North West Europe, indicating that the 
reluctance to promote pre-war Territorials to operational commands 
had been overcome by 1944. 
  The third factor was whether a pre-war Staff College qualification 
was still a prerequisite, or advantageous, in advancement to brigade 
command. With thirty-seven percent of the group being in possession 
of a p.s.c. qualification the statistic is not decisive in and of itself 
alone.  
The educational background of the 1944 group showed no 
deviation from 1940; former pupils of the public schools still 
dominated, and, in fact, increased as a proportion of the whole. A 
distinct group of schools, Eton, Wellington, Cheltenham, Rugby and 
Marlborough retained their dominance, although in 1944 Wellington 
had replaced Eton as the single largest provider of officers (and all the 
Guards brigadiers). Over half, or 54.8% of all the 109 officers reaching 
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the rank of Brigadier across the two groups were public school 
educated, but that group of five schools produced 71 of the 109, or 
65.1% of it. Thirty-four of the forty five in the Normandy group, an 
even higher proportion at 77% were public school educated; It can 
therefore be concluded that even after four and a half years of war, 
the public schools – and furthermore an even smaller group within 
them, remained the dominant means of entry to the profession of any 
army officer who would rise to senior operational command. From 
these figures, it also emerges that even though Territorial officers did 
rise to this level, a public school education was of advantage to them.  
No regiments dominate among the group with only the Scots 
Guards and the Cameron Highlanders producing more than two officers 
each, both contributing three; however, one of the Scots Guards 
officers, Lord Lovat, is a moot point in this regard, as he had resigned 
his regular commission and transferred to the Territorial Army before 
1940. Of the seven regiments providing two officers to the group,121 
only four produced officers who could be considered close 
contemporaries at point of entry into the army, and only by 
disregarding further distinctions such as the specific battalion of a 
regiment.  
                                                          
121 The Border Regiment, The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, The 
Northamptonshire Regiment, the Royal Fusiliers, the Royal Ulster Rifles, the Argyll 
and Sutherland Highlanders and the Seaforth Highlanders. 
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A Staff College qualification was not an automatic route to 
Brigade command, with just over a third of the Normandy group being 
pre- or early war graduates of Camberley or Quetta, before the 
emphasis in the College’s training shifted to producing as many 
officers qualified to operate as divisional staffs as possible in as short a 
time as possible to meet demand. Experience in France in 1940, 
highlighted in the Bartholomew Report, had noted deficiencies in staff 
training and capability. Combat experience - and other indicators of 
front line ability such as decorations – could therefore act as a route to 
command as much as, if not more than, the formal qualifications 
sought and preferred in peacetime.  
When divisional commanders are included in the comparison, 
only one division among either the initial assault or follow-on 
formations had a commander and his Brigade commanding 
subordinates where both were all public school educated and staff 
college graduates, namely 79th Armoured Division, but this was an 
atypical case as there was only one Brigadier subordinate to the 
commander. Three out of six assault divisions were fully public school 
educated down to Brigade level; in the follow-on divisions it was four 
out of seven. (In the other three, it was uniformly 75%, or three out of 
four). The fighting command groups of four of the seven follow-on 
divisions were 100% public school educated, with the other three 
being 75% so staffed; although one division had no Staff College 
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graduates in its fighting command group, four of the others were 50% 
p.s.c.  
There is no single paradigm for an officer who would be in place 
commanding a Brigade in Normandy in June 1944. From these findings 
he would be aged between 43-46, educated at public school and 
preferably from a select group of schools, preferably but not 
necessarily with First World War experience, and again preferably a 
Staff College qualification and to be in possession of one (or more) 
gallantry awards before landing in France 1944. There was no 
preference or dominance of a particular regiment, except, perhaps for 
the Royal Tank Regiment in armoured commands. He would also be 
from a background appropriate to his command, i.e. infantry for 
infantry, airborne and Commando and armour or cavalry for armoured 
formations. The era of Sappers and Gunners commanding infantry 
formations had, by 1944, passed on.  
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As the summer of 1940 began, attention shifted from the catastrophic 
defeats in France and Norway towards the possibility of invasion from 
now occupied France. Although lessons clearly needed to be identified 
and change made to how the army fought and, perhaps, was 
structured, in the face of impending danger radical change could not 
be imposed too swiftly as the army rebuilt.  The Bartholomew 
Committee’s final report on the defeat in France avoided direct 
criticism of individuals; its further recommendations were watered 
down as it passed around the army’s senior commanders. Of most 
immediate application to this thesis was one that the Brigade should 
be the fundamental operational fighting unit in preference to the 
division; this recommendation was not adopted. 
   
 The army which began the Second World War, especially at this 
level of command, continued to reflect the social and educational 
makeup of the army of the 1920s and 1930s, reaching back further to 
the First World War.  However, changes in the societal makeup of the 
officer corps between 1914-1918 did not much endure.  Although the 
army underwent processes of evolution and change from 1940-1944 in 
officer selection, these did not impact greatly at this level of operation 
and command. Attempts at reform to clear promotion logjams prior to 
the outbreak of war came too little and too late to affect brigadiers in 
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1940, and changes to personnel and officer selection during the war 
itself.  
 In the course of compiling this thesis, which it should be 
emphasized is not presented as or claiming to offer a paradigm for all 
senior officer advancement in the course of the Second World War, 
simply an examination of two specific groups based on rank, 
comparing a point of defeat, and another proceeding to victory.  A 
number of factors proved to be of no preferential impact on an officers’ 
advancement after 1940. Although public schools predominate in the 
educational backgrounds of all the officers, and counter-intuitively 
increased as a proportion in the 1944 group no particular school 
dominates over others.  No particular regiment figures greatly to the 
disadvantage of others; although the Royal Artillery is the most 
numerous single regiment, its officers in 1940 were in specialist 
Gunner or senior staff posts, and in 1944 all officers were commanding 
Brigades reflecting their background – infantry for infantry, 
cavalry/RTR for armour.  There is no lobby based on particular school 
or regiment.  Equally, there are no evident “rings” among the officers, 
based either on places served, or officers served with or under.  There 
is some evidence of patronage, notably from Alanbrooke and 
Montgomery, but this was occasionally overlapping and sometimes 
removed. 
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Notwithstanding the scale of the defeats in Europe in 1940, the 
charge that service in a Brigadier’s posting in either Battle of France or 
the Norwegian campaign in 1940 led to the automatic end of an 
officer’s career is readily refuted. A Brigadier’s posting could be a 
temporary expedient to fulfil an operational need, and some officers in 
the 1940 group did revert to their substantive ranks, such as Colonel, 
and did not progress further in the course of the war. However, a 
sufficient number of the group did advance in rank at least one step 
beyond Brigadier – to Major General or beyond (even if only 
temporarily) before 1945 and the end of the Second World War to 
disprove the simplistic assertion that mere participation in either 
campaign was enough to stall, or end, a military career.  
An officer holding a Brigadier’s position in France and Norway in 
1940 was, with a few exceptions occasioned by operational 
circumstances (such as the commander becoming a casualty) a pre-
war, professional Regular Army officer who had served throughout. By 
1944, more officers who had progressed up the promotion chain came 
from a Territorial background, but regular soldiers retained their 
predominance in command positions. The majority of the officers in 
the group received their commissions before or in 1914; the 
immediate outbreak of the First World War produced a spike in the 
number of commissions reflecting the immediate need to expand the 
army in the summer of 1914, but few of the officers in the group were 
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commissioned after 1915. Indeed, the highest single number of 
commissions among the group overall came in 1914.  
At this time, officers who fitted pre-war social profiles of 
suitability through the advantages of birth and education had an edge; 
although the school and university Officer Training Corps system had 
been established in 1908, a significant number of the 1940 brigadiers, 
nearly 20% of them, had been commissioned before then. A public 
school education, whilst not a mandated requirement for access to a 
commission, was sufficiently prevalent to be a distinct preference 
before 1916, when pure demand loosened this system. The 1940 
brigadiers were, however, almost completely products of the public 
school system. They attended thirty-five different public schools at 
varying times. No single school absolutely dominates the group, 
although Eton with twelve former pupils and Cheltenham, Wellington 
and Winchester – all traditional sources of supply - with nine each 
figure prominently. The assertion by Bowman and Connelly that the 
Edwardian officer corps was dominated by the products of six great 
schools is not borne out among this group of officers, although over 
half did come from schools of the Clarendon Group and the 
Headmasters’ Conference.  
 
Although products of the grammar schools became acceptable 
officer candidates as the First World War progressed, after 1919 and 
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the rapid demobilisation of a mass army, officers who stayed in the 
army and progressed were predominantly public school alumni. 
University graduates are a minority in the group, albeit a significant 
one, represented at a significantly higher rate than in the wider 
population. The most represented universities were Oxford and 
Cambridge; although the Oxford graduates formed three loose 
groupings by virtue of their overlapping attendance, all attended 
different colleges of the university. As part of an elite within a set, 
firstly of public schoolboys and secondly, in an even smaller group, 
university graduates, those officers who both survived the First World 
War and progressed did so against not insignificant statistical odds 
against doing so, a factor which also applies to all the other officers of 
the group.  
With the exceptions of Eton – with five of twelve officers heading 
to Guards regiments and arguably Fettes, as a Scottish school sending 
both its alumni to Scottish regiments – there is no correlation between 
schools and specific county or line infantry regiments. This shows 
there is no direct network connection of school to regiment, such as a 
particular school directing its pupils to specific regiments. Nor is there 
any strong correlation between the school’s geographical location and 
the local county regiment.  
Almost none of the officers could be described as having 
emerged from working, or lower class, backgrounds with one notable 
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exception who was commissioned from the ranks. However, neither do 
they comfortably fit a stereotype of the officer corps as being 
dominated by the aristocratic or land-owning classes. In this sense, 
they defy the Barnett and Williamson archetype that the aristocratic 
and upper classes still dominated and were still the main source of 
supply to the British officer corps up to, into and beyond the First 
World War. Otley’s assertion of weakening social dominance by those 
social strata is supported by Frost’s analysis of certain 1944 
commanders, and both of these analyses are borne out by the 1940 
brigadiers in this thesis. This shows that the trend was maintained into 
the Second World War, although by D-Day, at least at the Brigadier 
level there had been some reassertion of the social background of the 
“officer type”, with an increase in percentage terms of public school 
alumni, including the Territorial officers.  
This thesis has shown that Sheffield’s assertion that even 
“temporary gentlemen” could be inculcated with the system of values 
to fit in when the post-war social norms began to reassert themselves 
stands in respect of the officers studied, whether they progressed or 
not. Among the 1940 officers, an additional advantage was lent by the 
earning of decorations for gallantry or distinguished service. Having 
“proved” themselves in action thus lent them an additional means to 
stand out against other candidates. Contrary to expectation, where 
Adam’s reforms of personnel selection sought to better reflect the 
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“people’s army” being formed and the ability to choose officer 
candidates based on testing and field experience, the proportion of 
public-school educated officers, even with the higher number of 
Territorials occupying Brigade level commands, actually increased. 
Although Adam’s reforms came into effect after the outbreak of war 
and cannot be expected to have influenced the selection of officers for 
this level of command – as all the 1940 and 1944 groups were already 
serving, either as Regulars or Territorials in 1939, the presence of a 
bigger and socially wider pool for which to select officers for promotion 
may have been thought to broaden the paradigm, but this was not the 
case. Although the resistance to appointing officers who had come up 
through the Territorial Army was to some extent overcome in front line 
commands by 1944, those who did were generally sent to formations 
which had originated in the Territorial system, even if by 1944 the 
distinction had become increasingly blurred and nominally “Territorial” 
formations became mixed.  
Another subgroup – of officers who had served as GSOs during 
the First World War - is significant as nearly a third of the whole group 
did so. Those who already were, or subsequently were graduates from 
the Staff College – is also statistically significant, as it represented a 
quarter of the whole. The fact that the majority of those who did (19 
from 22) advanced in rank during the Second World War suggests its 
status as something proffering distinction and advantage over other 
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potential candidates, representing nearly a third of all the officers who 
progressed in rank.  
Otley’s assertion about the decline of scions of the “upper 
classes” making up the British officer corps in the inter-war period has 
some applicability to the 1940 group, but its influence endured as the 
senior officers of the time reflected the social make up of their group a 
generation or two before, when they actually joined the army. 
Following from this, the largest single professional group of relatives of 
the officers is indeed that of an army officer, with just over a fifth of 
the whole group being the sons of professional officers. Other 
professional groups, with the possible exception of clergy, did not 
feature sufficiently to be an influential factor, however indirectly, in an 
officer’s advancement. However, all of the officers who were set to 
inherit Baronetcies from their fathers did progress beyond Brigadier.  
With the return of peace and demobilisation, attitudes towards 
the profession of soldiering quickly reverted to pre-war norms and 
prejudices. This attitude was particularly visible in the area of 
professional education, where prejudices and custom would reassert 
themselves as the army returned to “normal”. The continued existence 
of the Senior Officers’ School was a focus for this among some officers, 
despite its commendable intent to prepare officers both for battalion 
command and to inculcate a wider world view in its students. Some 
Commanding Officers, to whom the role of training and preparing their 
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fellow officers for such command (whether or not they were successful 
in gaining entry to the Staff College) Graduating or having been 
Directing Staff thereof did not proffer any particular advantage to 
officers in terms of advancement or the generation of networks. As 
most of its Commandants were late in their careers who retired 
thereafter their ability to influence the careers of former subordinates 
was limited.  
Officers who served as GSOs during the First World War, and 
especially those who subsequently graduated from Staff College had an 
edge over those who had not, but not decisively so as several officers 
who had not done so but did graduate from Camberley and Quetta did 
progress after 1940. Attendance at the Imperial Defence College, after 
1927 when it was founded was influential, as all who attended it from 
the group were promoted to higher command during the war, and it 
also generated small, but close groupings of officers as minor 
networks, in once case reinforced by the officers being contemporaries 
both at Camberley and Buckingham Gate.  
The single most influential path for advancement, whatever the 
actual value of the education offered there, remained the successful 
completion of Staff College at Camberley or Quetta. The assessment 
that Brooke and Montgomery used their times there as Directing Staff 
in later years to “talent spot” is well-founded, but other officers such as 
John Dill also identified pupils they would later act as patrons for. 
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Camberley also produced clusters of officers who would reach General’s 
rank during the war.  An officer who was public school educated, a 
Staff College graduate and who had served overseas between 1919-
1939, was therefore possessed of advantages ahead of his 
contemporaries.  
Of the original group of one hundred and fifty-six officers who 
were serving as brigadiers in 1940, 58 of them were promoted to the 
rank of Major General or above, over a third of the group. Whilst a 
minority of the whole, this is still a considerable proportion when not 
all officers could expect to advance to such a rank. This also disproves 
any contention that service in France or Norway at this level of 
command (or responsibility in the case of staff appointments) was 
definitively detrimental to the promotion prospects of these officers. 
Twenty-one officers would be further promoted to Lieutenant General, 
over a third of the group of officers promoted, and whilst this 
represents less than one in seven of the whole France and Norway 
group, it further reinforces the idea that service in France or Norway 
was not automatically career limiting.  
The dominance of the public schools in producing army officers 
was sustained among this group, with 54 of the 58 being products of 
the public schools. When the number of schools producing more than 
one officer who was advanced to Major General is taken further into 
account, a smaller group of certain public schools retains its 
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dominance in the production of successful officers. with the seven 
“great” schools of the Clarendon Group generating 48% of the list, 
although some other schools with traditionally strong army 
connections, such as Lancing, having 100% success (even if it only 
produced two Generals). Although direct contemporaneousness at 
school among the fifty-eight was limited at only six officers, the 
number of connections broaden significantly when close – arriving 
within a year - or near – arriving within two years - attendance at 
schools is considered, involving fourteen of the eighteen schools in the 
group which produced General officers from brigadiers in this 1940 
group. Only four schools had no contemporary pupil networks. 
Across both groups of brigadiers, 1940 and 1944, a distinct 
group of schools, Eton, Wellington, Cheltenham, Rugby and 
Marlborough retained their dominance, although in 1944 Wellington 
had replaced Eton as the single largest provider of officers (and all the 
Guards brigadiers). Over half, or 54.8% of all the 109 officers reaching 
the rank of Brigadier across the two groups were public school 
educated, but that group of five schools produced 71 of the 109, or 
65.1% of it. Again, the six schools identified by Bowman and Connelly 
are not the predominant ones in the 1944 group, suggesting that their 
influence as a source had weakened by the Second World War, whilst 
it had not completely declined.  
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Although the infantry dominates in the 1940 group, with thirty- 
one of the fifty-eight officers being from county or line regiments at 
first commissioning, no particular single regiment predominates in the 
list of officers successful in gaining promotion. Whilst all three Guards 
officers from the 1940 group reaching Major General were from the 
Coldstream Guards on balance this is more likely to be coincidence 
than design. If there is a “regimental group”, it could be argued that 
this was from the Royal Tank Corps/Regiment, as four officers would 
transfer to it in the inter-war period.  
Regarding previous war or active service, the majority of the 
fifty-eight were veterans of the Western Front, with only four officers 
spending all of the First World War away from this theatre. This 
indicates the significance of the Western Front, as the primary theatre, 
as a root of experience towards promotion for officers in the post war 
period. Some secondary theatres produced groupings of officers with 
common experience, such as Gallipoli and Egypt, where five officers’ 
service overlapped in various periods from 1915-1917, creating a 
group with common experience and knowledge. However, the largest 
single group was of those officers who served in India on operations 
between 1919-1937, with twelve. This demonstrates the 
predominance of India as the main inter-war theatre in which to gain 
operational experience in the group. Other areas, such as Iraq or 
Persia, did not generate connected networks of officers.  
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Attendance at Staff College, either at Camberley or Quetta, 
retained its significance as a route both to promotion and as a 
generator of networks between officers. Forty of the fifty-eight – over 
two thirds – were graduates of Staff College. Camberley, with thirty- 
six, was dominant. With no officers from the group graduating before 
1922 or after 1932, the core years for developing groups of 
contemporaries were from 1924-1928, when twenty-five of the group 
passed through Camberley and generated overlapping contemporary 
networks. Quetta was less significant in generating networks, firstly 
due to the low number of graduates from it, four, and the space 
between attendance. All nine of the officers in the whole 1940 group 
who attended the Imperial Defence College between 1933-39 were 
promoted to Major General or above; six of them were contemporaries 
at the college with two each in 1933-35, producing further close 
networks.  
The possession of an award for gallantry or distinguished 
service, be it in the First World War, inter-war campaigns or indeed for 
service in 1940, did have impact on whether an officer was advanced 
after 1940. Over three-quarters of the officers in the 1940 group had 
one or more decorations prior to 1939; seventy-three officers in the 
overall group received distinctions and/or decorations for service in 
France or Norway, receiving a total of eighty-two awards (when 
multiple awards to individuals are accounted for). Although the group 
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of officers who did not progress gained more awards (forty-four to 
thirty-eight), when the seniority of the award is taken into 
consideration, the officers promoted are more significant; seven out of 
eight officers who received the Companion of the Order of the Bath for 
1940 would be promoted, indicating its significance as marker of 
approval. Six of the ten first awards of the Distinguished Service 
Order, an award for gallantry or leadership were to officers who were 
promoted.  
Networks among the advancing group can therefore be found 
based on certain schools, successful, overlapping attendance at Staff 
College and the Imperial Defence College and commonality of 
operational service away from the Western Front and in India. Receipt 
of decorations or distinctions, whilst not a “network” can also be 
argued to have been a promotion enhancing factor.  
Existence of patronage networks among those promoted is 
present, but not completely obvious. The single most significant figure 
is Brooke, as on paper all the brigadiers in his Corps progressed to 
Major General and above after 1940, even if few of the Divisional 
commanders in II Corps (with the signal exception of Montgomery) 
advanced themselves or were put aside into less significant 
commands. Being taught by Brooke or Montgomery, and more 
particularly the former, was an influence in a number of cases, but not 
to the extent that it was a critically decisive factor in promotion. Also, 
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Brooke’s favour was not permanent; results mattered and his support, 
however indirect, could soon disappear.  
This thesis shows that the social networks existing within the 
British Army between 1919-1939 fell between those on a formal basis 
(such as fellow Staff College graduates) and informal ones, based on 
initial education, such as where the future officers attended the same 
schools, albeit at different periods, a loose connection as alumni and 
“old boys”. Also, given the wide range of regiments represented 
among the group, there is no real influencing network based on any 
particular regiment, although there was an expectation that officers of 
line and county regiments felt that they could call upon the career 
advice of former officers – whether they knew them personally or not 
– who had risen to high rank.  
Yet there is no strong evidence that officers who did exercise 
patronage to a greater or lesser extent were influenced by their 
previous cap badge – the Royal Artillery for Brooke, the Royal 
Warwickshire Regiment for Montgomery; Dill’s regiment of first 
commissioning, the Leinster Regiment, had been disbanded in 1922 on 
the formation of the Irish Free State but there is no indication that he 
preferred officers of Irish regiments. For Brooke, the breadth of the 
Royal Regiment of Artillery and its branches made it difficult to specify 
individual types of Gunners. For Montgomery, the virtual absence of 
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officers from the Royal Warwicks in commands either in 1940 or 1944 
points towards the other direction – to an avoidance of selecting them.  
Equally, external influencing networks are weak; the professions 
of an officer’s parents and grandparents do not provide firm linkages; 
of the thirteen officers whose parent or grandparent was a senior 
officer, only six had forbears who rose above the rank of Colonel. The 
sole candidate who was the son and a grandson of a General, Clifford 
“Joe” Beckett, spent much of the war on Malta, eventually becoming a 
Major General but was neither a GSO nor a Staff College graduate. 
Although not a real “network” except a perceived one, all four officers 
who were the heirs to Baronetcies advanced to Major General with two 
proceeding to Lieutenant General.  
With regard to patronage from senior officers, this thesis upholds 
French’s findings on the status of Brooke and Montgomery as patrons 
and “talent spotters”, primarily when both were instructors at 
Camberley. None of the 1940 officers were students at Quetta under 
Montgomery. Twenty-nine officers passed through Camberley during 
their overlapping tenures as instructors; twenty-two of these became 
Major Generals of whom twelve would further progress to Lieutenant 
General There is, therefore, cause to identify attendees at Camberley 
between 1923-27 as a network of successful officers. Commandants of 
the Staff College are less successful as “talent spotters” with respect to 
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the 1940 group, not least due to their early retirements, with the 
exception of Sir John Dill, who promoted the career of Arthur Percival.  
This thesis has also shown that there was no strong case to 
indicate that the majority of brigadiers in 1940 owed their 
advancement to the “coat tails” of the Major and Lieutenant Generals 
they served under in France or Norway. Five Divisions in France 
produced no Major General s or above, whereas in four others all the 
brigadiers advanced (including all of those who had served under 
Montgomery in 3rd Division, two of whom had been students of his at 
Staff College) – and all eight who served under Brooke’s Corps 
command did so. A General’s failure in France was also not necessarily 
a block on advancement as all three brigadiers subordinate to Major 
General Roger Evans did so, even though their commander had 
performed badly and attracted the opprobrium both of Brooke and 
Montgomery. 
As nearly all the officers in the group saw active service in the 
First World War, it is of lesser value in determining the enhancement 
of the career prospects of those who were promoted against those who 
were not. Whilst the majority served on the Western Front, experience 
on other fronts was not of itself a bar to advancement, and small 
networks were created of officers who served in Gallipoli and Egypt, 
who progressed, although most of these served on the Western Front 
also. Although, as has been shown, the award of one (or more) awards 
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for gallantry during that war did have an impact on promotion 
prospects up to and after 1940, accelerated promotion during the war 
did not, as in the case of Archibald Beauman, who took fifteen years to 
return to the Temporary rank he had held in 1919. Only four of the 
officers promoted beyond Brigadier after 1940 saw no service on the 
Western Front from 1914-1919.  
Attendance at the Staff College – predominantly at Camberley, 
less so at Quetta – was influential in advancement; as noted above, 
there are grounds to support French’s contention on Brooke and 
Montgomery “talent spotting”; twenty-one from thirty-six officers who 
were promoted later in the war had been pupils under them between 
1923-1927. The largest envelope of connected officers was between 
1924-1926, with a total of twenty four officers overlapping between 
their times in junior and senior years, although similar, smaller groups 
were created and similarly formed from 1927-1929; the numbers 
declined after 1929, but Ritchie and Dempsey were contemporaries 
albeit in separate divisions in 1931 whilst Dempsey and Horrocks were 
also in 1932. Attendance at the Imperial Defence College, in respect to 
the 1940 group, would prove in retrospect to be a guarantee of 
promotion beyond Brigadier as all nine in the 1940 group carried on to 
Maj.Gen or beyond. It produced three pairs of direct contemporaries 
also. Brooke would feature again, training four of the nine when an 
instructor from 1932-1934. 
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Overseas service between the world wars attached to other 
Commonwealth armies or to staff postings provided opportunities for 
officers to distinguish themselves when compared with their 
contemporaries. This was especially so when promotion prospects at 
home were logjammed by the combination of a lack of promotion 
prospects engendered by the seniority system, and a general lack of 
opportunities for active service. In the inter-war period, over half the 
officers in the 1940 group as a whole served overseas at some point, 
with several serving in multiple areas. The single largest group served 
in India, both in staff postings and on active service on the North West 
Frontier. However, the very size of India and the variety of posts and 
locations these officers served in during the period does not make it a 
decisive generator of an advantage for post-1940 promotion. Yet it did 
produce a number of groups of contemporaries who service overlapped 
in respect of time spent in India, if not in precisely similar locations. In 
purely percentage terms, the most “successful” area in which to serve 
was Palestine after 1936, with five out of the seven officers present 
there advancing in rank. All of these officers served in staff postings. 
Palestine was a rare example of active service due to the pre-war Arab 
Revolt of 1936-1939; it was also an opportunity to come to the 
attention of Montgomery and Dill, who held senior field commands in 
the region. However, in other areas, such as Iraq, China and Malaya, 
there were few informal networks and fewer opportunities to be seen 
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by senior officers who could exert positive influence on their post-1940 
careers.  
Although some officers with overseas postings who were 
subsequently promoted after 1940 did not attend Staff College, the 
majority of them were graduates of Camberley or Quetta, making this 
a significant combination. Serving in multiple overseas postings from 
1919-1939 was not decisive as a network or to enhance promotion 
prospects with the disparity of regions served in and less than half of 
the officers who did so advancing.  
Of the fifty-eight officers of the 1940 group who progressed in 
the course of the Second World War, twenty-one, or 38% of the whole 
group, reached the rank of Lieutenant General before 1945. The 
average age among this group in 1940, was 46.8 years, below the 
overall average of both the whole group which stood at 49.2 years, 
and of the overall advancing group, at 47.8. Of these twenty-one 
officers, only two had not attended Staff College (none of whom 
attended Quetta). Four had been contemporaries graduating in 1924; 
three in 1925 and two in 1928. Eight had been taught at Staff College 
by Brooke or Montgomery. Three were contemporary graduates of the 
IDC in 1935. All were products of the public schools. Only one of the 
twenty-one had not been decorated for gallantry in the First World 
War. Fifteen of the twenty-one would be decorated again for their 
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services in 1940. Twelve saw overseas service in the period between 
1919-1939.  
With the thirty-seven Major Generals, their average age in 1940 
at 48.3 was higher than Lieutenant Generals: just below the whole 
group but higher than the average for the whole group of progressing 
officers. Fifteen of them did not graduate from Staff College; of the 
twenty-two who did, four attended Quetta. Three of the Camberley 
graduates did so in 1922; three in 1924; two in 1925 and two in 1927, 
making seven taught by Montgomery or Brooke. Two were 
contemporaries at Quetta in 1927. Two graduated from the IDC in 
1934, with three passing out there in 1935. Only two of the group of 
thirty-seven had not been educated at public school. Thirty-five of the 
thirty-seven had been decorated before 1939. Sixteen would receive 
further awards for their service in 1940, more in total, but fewer in 
proportion to the size of the sub-group. Thirty of the thirty-seven had 
seen overseas service between 1919-1939.  
By 1944, veterans of the First World War were much less 
represented among the brigadiers in fighting commands in the initial 
stages of the Battle of Normandy than among their 1940 counterparts. 
Over half of the forty-five officers involved had not seen service 
between 1914-1918, mostly on the grounds of age, although some 
had been commissioned before the end of the First World War but did 
not see action. This meant that the average age of brigadiers in 1944 
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fell to 42.4 years; a contribution to this drop was made by the 
existence of war-raised specialist formations, such as Airborne and 
Commando brigades, which had attracted younger, dynamic 
candidates. However, the rejuvenation was not completely due to this; 
the replacement of battlefield casualties – a phenomenon less marked 
in 1940 - by younger, junior subordinates also contributed to this. The 
process was not universal; two Brigade commanders, one infantry, one 
armoured, were under 40 years old on D-Day itself. Conversely, the 
eldest Brigadier to land on D-Day was 50 years old – six years older 
than his divisional commander. In the distribution of ages of Normandy 
brigadiers, however, the number aged 46 on 6th June 1944 – born in 
1898, and notionally old enough to have served in the First World War, 
equals that of officers aged 35-40. This indicates that rejuvenation of 
officers at this level was not a uniform phenomenon and taken as a 
whole Brigade commanders in 1944 were in their mid-forties – not 
greatly distant from their 1940 counterparts.  
Not all the Brigade commanders landing in France had any 
combat experience prior to the Second World War. This was either 
through being too young to serve in the First World War or through not 
having had the opportunity to serve either as attached service or on 
imperial policing duties, such as on the North-West Frontier of India or 
pacifying risings in the Near and Middle East. Eight officers served on 
campaign in India at various points in the 1920s and 30s; four served 
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in staff positions there, three of whom did not see fighting. Three 
officers served on attachment in Africa, but also saw no action. Three 
officers in the group served during the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-
1939. It cannot be asserted that active service overseas from 1919-
1939 was therefore a major contributor to advancement by 1944. 
An examination of the number of Normandy brigadiers also 
indicates that even though shorter War Courses were instituted after 
1939 to train officers in staff duties, the number of fully qualified p.s.c. 
officers among the Brigade commanders was markedly reduced, with 
less than a third of the group being so. Some divisions landing on D-
Day had only half of their fighting commanders so qualified whereas 
one landing as follow-on forces, 11th Armoured had no p.s.c. officers at 
all in its fighting commanders. Another, 49th (West Riding) Division - 
had only its commander with those post-nominals, Evelyn Barker – 
who had served in France in 1940. The officers who did attend 
Camberley or Quetta were less fortunate in their connection to officers 
who may have been patrons later in their careers than those who 
served when Montgomery and Brooke were instructing. 
The aversion evident towards Territorial officers in Brigade 
command was overcome to a degree by 1944; three officers in the 
Normandy group came from a Territorial Army background, two of 
whom had commanded battalions and other formations, usually 
Brigades which had an at least notionally Territorial lineage and 
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composition in North Africa, Tunisia and Italy. (The influx of conscripts 
of all ranks during the course of the war meant that formations coming 
from the Territorial tradition were often Territorial in name only). This 
suggests that the prejudice towards Territorial officers holding 
operational command above battalion level had, in part, been 
overcome by mid-1944. None, however, commanded Regular Army 
formations.  
As to education and schooling, whilst a smaller group than both 
the whole 1940 grouping and the smaller group of officers advancing, 
the proportion of alumni of public schools actually increased. Although 
the educational background of eight of the forty-five could not be 
definitively identified, of the remaining thirty-seven, thirty-five came 
from public schools. There was some change among the schools 
represented, with five schools which produced no 1940 brigadiers 
(such as Ampleforth) generating at least one Normandy officer. Also, 
Eton was not the single highest producer officers this time; it was 
overtaken by Wellington College, with eight of the forty-five. However, 
there is some commonality among the schools which produced the 
most officers in both the 1940 and 1944 groups, with Eton, Wellington, 
Cheltenham, Rugby and Marlborough dominant. This also further 
indicates the weakening, across the Second World War, of the 
Bowman/Connelly dominance of a group of public schools before the 
First World War. There is also a weakening in the degree of 
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contemporaneousness between those attending the same schools, with 
fewer officers being direct contemporaries.  
Also in 1944 there is no predominance of schools supplying to 
particular regiments, even though four of Eton’s five officers were 
initially commissioned into Guards regiments, thereby sustaining the 
label of “Eton and the Guards” even if some officers transferred to 
other, war-raised units in the course of the war. Also in Normandy, 
officers were “to arm appropriate” - infantry commanding infantry, 
armour commanding armour – unlike 1940 when some officers 
originally commissioned as Gunners or Sappers held commands 
outside their speciality.  
The 1944 group also demonstrates that accelerated promotion 
by virtue of active service was a genuine phenomenon; whilst most of 
the group were Majors (either acting or substantive) in 1940, and 
therefore advanced four ranks in four years – one noteworthy officer 
went from Lieutenant to Brigadier. The possession of a decoration for 
gallantry or distinguished service was again an influencing factor in 
advancement; thirty-seven of the forty-five possessed them. Sixteen 
of these thirty-seven were also Staff College graduates.  
In summation, the variation in the notional paradigm of a 
Brigade commander in the British Army both at the beginning of the 
Second World War who would advance in rank before its end, and 
those in 1944 commanding fighting formations in the advance to 
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victory in North West Europe is not as great as may be popularly 
assumed. He would be an alumnus of a public school in the Clarendon 
Group or Headmasters’ Conference; in his mid-40s, preferably a 
graduate of the Staff College, in possession of one or more decorations 
for gallantry and/or distinguished service and with some overseas 
experience – whether active or on the staff – between 1919-1939. 
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neither did it offer guarantees of it. Although the nature of an 
operational commander did alter during the Second World War, certain 
consistent threads from before it endured. Transformation of the 
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the road to victory in the spring of 1944 did occur, but not as radically 
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